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*THE WHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, THEORETICAL GAP
AND A DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY*

APSTRAKT: In the first part of this paper I will outline the debate in philosophy of mind between those who, to borrow from Chalmers (Chalmers 1996) recognize the existence of the hard problem of consciousness and between those who do not. I will call the two groups non-reductivists and reductivists, respectively. The second part will put forward a specific type of criticism against reductivists – in short that its proponents incorrectly assume the resolution of another dispute, the one between the so-called pessimistic and optimistic inductivists. It will be claimed that such an assumption should not be made, and that until the latter debate is settled, or at least until a specific solution is offered within the context of the philosophy of mind, we have every right to be skeptical towards reductivist attempts. In the third part of the paper I will propose a possible solution which might offer some hope of finding the middle ground between the two sides.

KLJUČNE REČI: Consciousness, Mind, Reductivism, Non-Reductivism, Theoretical Gap, Double-Aspect Theory.

1. The Why of Consciousness

One of the most fundamental disputes in philosophy of mind is whether consciousness can be reduced to something physical. On the one side there are those who argue it can (and must), while on the other side there are those who believe it is not possible (or at least that we are unable to grasp how it would be). We can describe this dichotomy in several ways. We could say, like Valerie Hardcastle does, that on the one side there are naturalists, committed to natural science and its methods in trying to discover everything there is to be discovered about consciousness. The second group ensembles those who, in her words, are not so convinced (Hardcastle 1996). Another way to describe the two sides is to adopt Block's (Block 2003) suggestion and say that the first are deflationists, while the others are phenomenal realists.¹ The third way, one we can find in Chalmers

1 In Block's views, his nomenclature cross-cuts the one Hardcastle adopts. In other words, there can exist naturalists who are non-reductivists. There is a debate going on about whether, for

(Chalmers 1995) is to delineate the differences between the opposing sides by focusing on types of problems each recognizes. According to Chalmers, there are easy problems of consciousness and there is the hard problem of consciousness. Easy problems are principally soluble by contemporary or future science, while the hard problem is the one science could never have any hope of solving. The hard problem of consciousness could itself be formulated in several ways. It is often called as the “Why” question of consciousness. Chalmers describes it the following way: “Why should physical processes give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does” (Chalmers 1995). Or, as Block would put it, “We do not know how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis” (Block 2003).

In short, there are those who believe consciousness is something over and above its scientific basis and that thus science, dealing only with the latter, does not have anything to say about (every aspect of) the former. On the other hand there are those who think that what science has to say about the physical basis of consciousness is all there is to be said about it. In the most general terms, the latter position could be called reductivist, while the former one could be called non-reductivist.

After sketching the way to classify the two sides in dispute, we can point out what exactly their mutual differences are. We have already mentioned one. Namely, reductivists argue that being conscious means nothing more than exercising what is already present in the physical basis of consciousness. As Heil (Heil 2006) notes, we can describe two sets of conscious phenomena. The first one is generally described as representational (see Tye 2006 and Chalmers 1995). It is the part of consciousness through which we interact with the world and are cognitively engaged in it. The second one pertains to sensory states and is usually dubbed qualitative. The first encapsulates our intentional states and its contents can be straightforwardly denoted as memories, belief-states, complex emotions, perhaps even dispositions, or language. On the other hand, there is the qualitative aspect of our consciousness. As Nagel (Nagel 1974) famously says, there is the way it is like to be in a particular mental state. Reducing representational states to their physical basis or to the functional mechanism that brings them about is for Chalmers one of the easy problems (Chalmers 1995). Now, easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions (Chalmers 1995). It is perhaps true that science cannot currently give complete account of these aspects of consciousness. However, assuming that once we are able to identify all functional mechanisms laying in the basis of representational conscious

example, materialism can be plausibly non-reductive. Anthony thinks it can (Anthony 2007), while Churchland believes it need not to, since eliminativism gains more and more ground (Churchland 2007). I will not go into this debate here. In any case, none of my points rests on its resolution.

states we will be able to give satisfactory explanation of that set of phenomena is enough to call these problems principally soluble. Of course, the ground for that claim is Chalmers' commitment to the idea that to explain a cognitive function one needs only to specify a mechanism that can perform it. I will not discuss here whether Chalmers is correct in assuming that.²

What is important here is his idea that reductivists do have all the means to solve (now or in the future) every easy problem. This idea can was met with characteristic reactions from members of both camps. Reductivists would protest for being barred from solving the hard problem. They would even deny the existence of a hard problem (see, for example, Dennett 1995). On the other hand, non-reductivists would claim that giving the so-called easy problems up to the other side means giving up too much. Additionally they could, like Lowe (Lowe 1995) argue that there really are no easy problems when it comes to consciousness. Even though Chalmers' division of labor does not satisfy either side, it is obviously very useful for explicating what their general differences are. A disagreement that categorical results in two sides having, as Hardcastle notes, nothing to say to each other.³

Such a situation results in the existence of a gap. The famous (or infamous) explanatory gap represents the failure to connect two very distinct modes of explaining what should be a unified set of phenomena – the mental and the physical. Without being able to conclusively reduce one to the other, or to somehow show the way the two can mutually interact we are left with a gap in explaining how both could function in an obvious accordance (see Levine 1983). Now, when we look to the theories dealing with these phenomena we can also recognize a gap. Not surprisingly, it stems from, in Hardcastle's opinion, antecedent intuitions about the status of consciousness in relation to the physical. We can call the resulting gap the "theoretical gap". Even though it might seem less important than the explanatory gap, it certainly needs some sort of addressing if we want to understand what is

2 I will only briefly note that it is not as clear as perhaps Chalmers assumes (nor does it amount to the most plausible alternative), that once we have identified all the functional mechanisms giving rise to, say, capacity for planning future actions, we will explain all there is to be explained about that capacity. It could be, perhaps, that the specific features of person A's career plans rest on something closer to his personal qualities, other relevant plans, etc. It could be, in other words, that some sort of mental holism obtains and that it has explanatory priority over functional mechanisms at its basis. However, nothing crucial rests upon assessing the validity of this Chalmers' assumption.

3 Additionally, we can note that such a situation clearly shows the disagreement between two camps indeed is real, and not only verbal (for specificities regarding this distinction, see Manley 2008).

it that makes two sides having little to say to each other. Such a sharp division, however, is not characteristic only for philosophy of mind.

We encounter similar situation in physics. It is now quite common to recognize that there are two comprehensive theories that deal with much of what comprises visible Universe. Einstein's theory of relativity deals with macro phenomena, while the quantum theory deals with micro phenomena. While each is successful in its domain, they are mutually incompatible. Physicists are trying to understand how the Universe can be so accurately described in its proper aspects by two theories that are so mutually distinct and to find a way to unify them. In a similar fashion, philosophy of mind needs more than to simply recognize the problem by one side or the other, leaving it at that. Of course, one big difference between physics and philosophy of mind is that the general relativity and quantum mechanics are both currently recognized as the genuinely successful theories in their respective domains. On the contrary, in the philosophy of mind we still do not have any conclusive arguments that would make one side recognize strength of the claims by the other and its respective solutions as accurate and satisfactory. Moreover, the very way this debate is formulated precludes any sort of compromise as long as both reductivists and non-reductivists do not give up on at least something. Setting aside the mere analogy, it seems to me that there is more to be learned from theoretical physics than this.

However, before we delve into that at the end of the paper, we need to understand what sort of demands both reductivists and non-reductivists make when they try to claim both easy problems and the hard problem belong to them. In the root of these demands is an assumption that a theory has to be able to describe every type of phenomenon it recognizes as relevant in order to be a coherent and complete theory of the mind. Thus, for a non-reductivist, if he gives up on the problems of cognitive capacities of the mind – its representational aspect, his attempts to explain the qualitative aspect non-reductively become a much easier prey to reductivists. Namely, a reductivist might find it very dubious that consciousness, having such a significant part reducible to some sort of physical basis has also that mysterious qualitative aspect no science could ever attempt to reduce or eliminate. And this is precisely what reductivists do say, calling non-reductivists the new mysterians and Why-question, a non-issue (see Hardcastle 2006). On the other hand, reductivists understandably protest against giving up *any* aspect of consciousness to non-reductivists. Their attempts characteristically focus on reducing each and every part of consciousness to something physical that gives rise to it (or at least to some functional mechanism in virtue of which it can perform). Thus, we might argue, if one could conclusively show that even a single feature of consciousness is not reducible to that which enables it physically, reductivism would have a significant hurdle to overcome.

Now, assessing the two positions, we can say that reductivists are in a more difficult position. Namely, non-reductivists may be reluctant to give up on a significant set of problems regarding consciousness, but they have at least some advantage. Namely, even if they do that (and Chalmers is not the only non-reductivist to do it) they can still argue that the qualitative aspect of consciousness is not reducible to anything physical. In other words, their flexibility consists of precisely that additional maneuvering space that reductivists cannot claim to have. Furthermore, it seems that the rigidity of reductivism – reflected in its proponents' reluctance to recognize the hard problem – reveals its vulnerability and presents a possible reason to doubt its chances of success. Of course, it still of course does not prove that it must fail, far from it. Instead of attacking reductivism directly, we can keep this potential problem in mind and turn to another possible way of criticism that goes from a different direction. Instead of claiming that there is a specific type of problem, or a phenomenon science will never be able to solve or explore, we can focus our attention to the very faith in science and question just what that faith (wrongly) implies about scientific endeavor. We now turn to that consideration.

2. The Role of Science in the Debate

In contemporary philosophy of mind, ever since Place and Smart (Place, 1956; Smart, 1959), there have been philosophers who claimed that the reduction (or identification) of mental to (or with) the physical will become truly possible as the science progresses. As we have seen in the past, the argument usually goes, many of the phenomena people thought had some sort of mysterious irreducible quality were shown to represent either a confusion on our part, or turned out to be completely soluble. The examples are many. Flogiston is certainly one. The other, mentioned by reductivists and non-reductivists alike is the phenomenon of life. Non-reductivists are, as we mentioned, sometimes called the new mysterians. The old mysterians were vitalists who thought that life itself is a phenomenon that will never be comprehensible to biologists. Both Dennett and Chalmers (Dennett 1995; Chalmers 1995) use this example. Both say how confusion on vitalists' part was in thinking that even though science will be able to deal with particular manifestations of life such as metabolism or reproduction, the life itself will always remain something over and above any particular process living organisms typically exhibit. Dennett, a reductivist, proceeds, of course to claim that consciousness is just like life, while Chalmers claims that consciousness is decidedly not like that because it is an explanandum in its own right. *Elan vital*, according to Chalmers, was always posited in order to serve as an explanation of relevant functions of living systems. However, consciousness has something that separates it from particular functional

mechanisms science can explain, and we have seen earlier he intends for its qualitative aspect to occupy that specific role.

The analogies with phlogiston and *elan vital* serve to reductivists as a reminder that science was challenged before and that it always prevailed against the skeptical attempts at overriding (some of) its conclusions. One way they deal with present uncertainties is to say that at this point we are like the people of past centuries who would not be able to make sense of our concepts of mass and energy. Just as they couldn't grasp how the two pick out the same thing, we are currently unable to understand how is consciousness reducible (or identifiable) with the physical. And, just as we are now able to understand the former due to the scientific progress, so will those of the future be very comfortable with saying that consciousness really is nothing more than that which gives rise to it. According to O'Hara and Scutt (O'Hara and Scutt 1995), the latter sort of scientific result simply makes no sense to us now just like Democritus' writings about atoms had nothing to do with the real nature of such particles, regardless of how some of his descriptions might (accidentally) be similar to what we now know. And, just as we are now comfortable with the concept of atom and what it represents, so too we will be comfortable with the reduction of consciousness in the future.

Even though it may seem plausible to draw such an analogy as the basis of the optimistic claim about the future science, and thus enforce the reductivist perspective, it actually rests on an assumption that is rarely emphasized by the reductivists in this context. It is the assumption of the validity of a position I will call here the optimistic inductivism and it concerns the nature of scientific endeavor itself. What does science do? What its results mean? Are they the true discoveries of our world, or are they simply the most adequate explanations we currently have, with prospect of being completely replaced anytime in the future by we-know-not-what? The answer to the last question distinguishes those we can call optimistic inductivists from those we can call pessimistic inductivists (terminology from Stanford 2006). Optimistic inductivists typically claim that scientific theories are true discoveries about the world. Pessimists typically deny it.⁴ When we isolate the crucial part of the analogies reductivists make, or even the questions we have seen non-reductivists try to pry away from their opponents, we can recognize that the majority of philosophers from both camps at least agree upon one thing – they both accept optimistic inductivism. Namely, both groups recognize the same view of science, disagreeing on what belongs to that kind of science. However, too much rests on the debate between optimists and pessimists to assume its resolution.

4 There is a further disagreement, having much to do with the present problem about the very predictive strength of scientific theories and the implications of that strength. See Leplin 2004 for a view close to optimistic inductivism. See Kukla and Walmsley, 2004 for the opposite view.

In fact, whether optimists or pessimists are correct makes a lot of difference for the debate in philosophy of mind. One thing both optimists and pessimists share is looking at the history of science in order to reach their respective conclusions. While optimistic inductivists look at the situations in which mankind was not aware of something, but later came to know it in great detail (viz. phlogiston or life), pessimistic inductivists turn to situations where scientific development shifted in the most surprising and unexpected directions. Pessimistic inductivists, inspired by Kuhn (Kuhn 1962), first recognize that many times in the past we thought that some scientific theory or some paradigm represented some truth about our world. They then proceed to argue that at some later point we were surprised by a completely unexpected scientific development. For example, for a long time scientists operated under the assumption that the Sun revolves around the Earth. What no one could have expected in, say 1150, was that couple of centuries later a theory would successfully offer proof of a completely different structure of the Solar system. Also, at one point, it was virtually indisputable to say that Newton's theory was completely accurate. However, mere centuries later, Einstein's theory, incommensurable with Newton's, replaced it as an accurate description of the world.⁵ Moreover, Einstein operated with completely different concepts of time and space. Pessimists conclude that in the future we might also be surprised by some new scientific developments. Thus, not only we cannot predict the development of scientific theories, we cannot even consider them to be the true objective descriptions of our world. We can only look to them for an adequate explanation of the phenomena each particular theory deals with.

If pessimists are correct, then reductivists cannot so lightly make their claim of future scientific success. If science surprised us so many times in the past, then who is to say its current seeming progress in explaining some of our cognitive capacities will not turn out to be something quite different from what we now think is the case. Even worse for reductivists, it is not even necessary to claim that pessimism is true. It is enough to say that it might be. Precisely because of the aforementioned rigidity, the conclusion that we simply don't know the future prospects of scientific developments makes reductivist position very problematic. We can now fully recognize the importance of the debate in philosophy of science. Even without turning to this debate, non-reductivists are in position claim a specific type of conscious phenomena is not susceptible to any kind of reduction. Relying on the very possibility of pessimistic inductivism being valid, they can claim reductivists first need to show how their faith in science can deal with the pessimists' arguments before regaining right to argue for that faith and draw conclusions from it. And, if

5 Saying a theory is incommensurable with another is to say, according to Kuhn, there are significant conceptual differences. Simply put, since Einstein understands space, time and matter quite differently from Newton, we cannot hope to somehow compare one to the other.

antecedent intuitions are, to again cite Hardcastle, the main factor that distinguishes reductivists from non-reductivists, then such a task obviously becomes increasingly difficult. Here again, the flexibility of non-reductivist position shows its strength.

Non-reductivists simply claim that consciousness is not wholly reducible to its physical basis. Whatever the mutual differences within that camp are, they can say that one of the signs of such a claim being plausible is that it explains much of what we encounter in our experience. The non-reductivist position in this sense has explanatory strength which is not undermined by optimistic inductivism. Furthermore, pessimistic position may even reinforce it because it demands of any theory to satisfy the standard of explanatory strength if it is to be plausible. However, optimism requires a standard quite different – that of extensional adequacy. It needs the scientific theories to accurately capture every instance of any particular phenomena. For reductivists, it means precisely what we have seen at the end of the first section – that they require *every* aspect of consciousness to be reducible. If that wasn't the case, the standard of extensional adequacy would not be fully met. It is, of course, possible for reductivists to claim their attempts have more explanatory power than the competing attempts. For example, Hardcastle, talking about plausibility of materialism claims something this. Tye (Tye 2006) also takes similar standpoint.

However, we can immediately recognize that by arguing for faith in future science reductivists are aware their theories are not perhaps explanatorily strong now as they need to be, but that it will certainly be the case in the future. Nevertheless, if pessimism is (or can be) true, then they can claim no such thing and have to admit the force of explanatory strength is, at least in part, on the other side. Furthermore, the very same faith they rely on shows that the standard of extensional adequacy has still not been met. That said, non-reductivist position gains more plausibility in light of the possibility of adopting explanatory strength as the standard a theory should satisfy. One option for reductivists is, of course, to show how pessimism cannot be true, and how the optimistic inductivism is the only way to think about scientific theories. Since their position is quite close to that sort of inductivism, and since perhaps even cumulativist reasoning stands behind many reductivist attempts to give science priority over any conceptual explanation of consciousness, they would certainly try to dispute pessimistic inductivism.

Unfortunately, as we mentioned at the beginning of the section, that is not something they usually do (if at all). It is of course far from certain that they cannot do it, but before they do, non-reductivism, as long as it adopts the goal of meeting the standard of explanatory strength, seemingly gains an upper hand over reductivism. And, combining rigidity of the reductivist view with that standard significantly reduces chances to any sort of compromise. While such a prospect would not seem dim in some cases, in the case of consciousness whose manifestations and

characteristics offer ways to dispute at least some of the reductivist conclusions (we can recall here various problems concerning qualia), it seriously puts in doubt the strength and plausibility of reducing (or identifying) mental to (with) the physical.

3. Attempting to Bridge the Theoretical Gap

In the final section of the paper, having adopted the standard of explanatory strength as the one to be met, and disputing, at least in some respect, reductivist theories, I would like to offer a way to bridge the theoretical gap I mentioned at the beginning. Even though the second section seems to conclude that we should abandon reductivism (at least until some other conditions are met) in favor of non-reductivism, I think that the standard of explanatory strength presents us with another possibility.

McGinn (McGinn 1989) famously stated that we are cognitively closed with respect to the phenomenon of consciousness. He seemed, in a way, skeptical toward any attempt at reaching a solution. Chalmers, on the other hand, thought such attitude is premature. We can ask, however, when is the right time for it? We might claim that there still are plausible options left, and that thus we should not be so quick to judge our cognitive capacities as limited. Non-reductivists, as we have seen, are generally concerned with the “Why” question of consciousness. Now, there are two senses in which “Why” question can be posed. One way, arguably the trivial one is the direct way. We could simply wonder why is the world the way it is, and not different. Why our minds work the way that they do? These are perhaps interesting questions in some contexts, but they can easily be deemed philosophically superficial. The world is the way it is, and there is no way for us to even conceive how things might drastically be different. The answer to that question lies, to cite McDowell (McDowell 1985) outside of boundaries of what is intelligible. That way of posing the question is also the one where McGinn’s pessimism is wholly appropriate.

Another way to ask the “Why” question is to demand a very concrete answer to the question: “What is significant about consciousness that separates it from the physical basis it arguably rests upon”, For many philosophers, the answer lies in its qualitative aspect. It might be said that the very fact we can posit this possibility and arguing in favor of it is what makes McGinn’s pessimism inappropriate. In other words, this particular alternative is obviously located inside the boundaries of what is intelligible. However, we are still left with an impasse between reductivists and non-reductivists. Recognizing that, Heil (Heil 2006) proposes that something completely different should perhaps be forthcoming. Nevertheless he immediately admits that it is not clear what that something could be. I agree with Heil with

respect to the first point. With respect to the second, I believe that a satisfactory solution should meet one obvious condition for bridging the theoretical (and with it, perhaps the explanatory) gap – it should somehow incorporate some claims of both sides, instead of trying to put the entire burden on only one of them.

One candidate to satisfy that particular criterion is a double-aspect theory. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Chalmers, who gave up easy problems to reductivists and left the hard problem to non-reductivists, attempted to develop a theory of that sort (Chalmers 1995). However, his double-aspect theory was almost immediately rejected by both camps for resting on an ontologically dubious conception of information. Neither side shared such a commitment, so each discarded the whole theory. The result was unfortunate, because it could be argued that it was not the double-aspect approach itself that was faulty. Any double-aspect theory is bound to recognize the dual character of our world. However, this does not mean it should rest on any particular ontological assumption. The reasoning that it must was what led to abandoning most of such attempts. Spinoza notoriously (according to currently accepted interpretations) founded his theory on an idea that the ontological basis of our world is one substance, God or Nature, whose objective properties are the mind and body. Since then, almost every attempt, and there were not many, failed in convincing philosophers precisely because of what was in its foundation.

This previous history of failures should not be enough to preclude developing any sort of double-aspect theory. In fact, it could help us distinguish two possible types of double-aspect theories. The type usually put forward could be called the heavyweight double-aspect theory. The role of the heavy weight here is of course played by any kind of ontological commitment such a theory demands. On the contrary, if we attempt to satisfy the standard of explanatory strength, guided by pessimism in science which claims that we can never really say we have discovered truth about our world, we could advance a sort of lightweight double-aspect theory, the one that is not committed to any particular belief about the underlying structure of our world. Such a theory would emphasize explaining what, in the case of consciousness, requires an explanation.

It would first recognize that there are two aspects of the world we live in. The one aspect or domain is the physical. Using various scientific methods, we can explore and explain this aspect by a language appropriate to it. The other aspect or domain is the mental, quite different from the first aspect. It can be explained by means different from those the physical aspect of our world requires. Lightweight double-aspect theory recognizes some of the claims of reductivists by leaving room for various scientific endeavors in the realm of the physical, where many scientific disciplines have already shown the usefulness of their respective methodologies, means of research and exploration. Physics, chemistry, biology, and many other sciences helped us understand, at least for the time being, significant parts of the

world we live in. On the other hand, we have often been able to explain our inner states by means of psychology and this is perhaps true of both qualitative and representational aspects of our consciousness. We should also not forget various forceful explanations of the mental in sociology, history, and even art. All of these disciplines attempt to say, and often succeed in saying something informative about the realm of the mental with language and means quite different from those which natural sciences employ for describing the physical realm.

An ontologically neutral (or agnostic) double-aspect theory recognizes both types of attempts and then proceeds to establish a way in which we might understand, with all the plausibility that the standard of explanatory strength requires, how our world is the one which contains both aspects. If such recognition could indeed satisfy both reductivists (at least in part) and non-reductivists, we could say that at least a theoretical gap is bridged. And if, going down that road, we managed to develop a coherent theory of how it is all possible, there would be a good chance of solving the explanatory gap itself.

Here we can return to the case of theoretical physics and what we can learn from it. Just like physicists accept both general relativity and quantum theory (even though some great minds such as Einstein could not), we might be able to accept the existence of both realms in our worlds. Of course, the easy part with accepting the former pair is, as we mentioned, that their explanations have been confirmed as adequate at this point. In philosophy of mind, that was the difficult part because of attempts to satisfy, just like in physics, standard of extensional adequacy. However, adopting the standard of explanatory strength, we can also accept theories concerning both realms, precisely because each has plausible explanations in its own respect (or is heading in the right direction). Thus, such a standard can help us solve the hard part of the riddle and to, accepting the existence of both mental and physical as irreducible, attempt to solve their apparent cotenability. Of course, I did not try here to develop such a theory fully, but only to suggest reasons why it might be the a promising route to finding a solution satisfactory to both reductivists and non-reductivists.⁶

6 One way to try and accomplish this would be to adopt Strawson's theory (Strawson 1959) of persons and to claim that human beings are such that specific mental and specific physical predicates have its appropriate application. The other way would be to adopt a sort of overall parallelism, reminiscent of what Spinoza attempted to describe in *Ethics* (IIp7) and say that there is an analogy in how physical world functions within itself and how mental world functions within itself. This analogy would then have to be specified and explained so as to enable theoretical explanation of cotenability of mental and physical. The third route, perhaps, could be to develop an anti-realistic account of the world, reinforcing explanatory tendencies, and simply claim that here lies our cognitive limitation – in deciphering the way both mental and physical could coexist not being reducible to one another, while also detailing how each can obviously function in its own right. Finally, we could focus on relation between the mental

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and the physical events, and follow Lewis (Lewis 1986) in his suggestion that parallel to the physical developments we perceive as the current events (say a conference, to mention his example), there is a quite different event (in his case, a battle of goblins) occurring at the very same spatio-temporal location. We might try developing that account and applying it to the case of the mental and the physical. The end result would be saying the mental events and physical events are precisely like that, and instead of having to show how it is possible, we would primarily needed to show that two events (or in our case, two types of events) could indeed occupy the same spatio-temporal region (or at least temporal, if we want to avoid to claim that mental events have spatial character) and still be mutually distinct.

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„Zašto“ svēsti, teorijski jaz i teorija dvostrukog aspekta

(Apstrakt)

U prvom delu rada, govoriću o debati koja se vodi u filozofiji duha između, da se poslužimo Čalmersovim izrazom, zastupnika teškog problema svesti i onih koji to poriču. Taj jaz se često (vidi recimo Hardcastle 1996) smatra nepremostivim. Ove dve grupe filozofa nazvaću, tim redosledom, nereduktivistima i reduktivistima. U drugom delu rada izneću jednu specifičnu vrstu kritike uperene protiv reduktivista – ukratko to da oni neispravno pretpostavljaju razrešenje spora između pesimističkih i optimističkih induktivista. Tvrdiću da takva pretpostavka ne bi trebalo da se napravi i da sve dok se ovaj spor zaista ne razreši, ili barem ne ponudi neko rešenje u okviru filozofije duha, imamo osnova

da budemo skeptični u pogledu reduktivizma. U trećem delu rada predložiću jedan mogući put ka rešenju prve debate koje bi sugerisalo da jaz između dve strane ipak nije nepremostiv.

KLJUČNE REČI: *Svest, duh, reduktivizam, nereduktivizam, teorijski jaz, teorija dvostrukog aspekta*