


Dragomir J. Pantić
Zoran M. Pavlović

POLITICAL CULTURE OF VOTERS IN SERBIA



Institute of Social Sciences
50
years



Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research
45
years

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research

Dragomir Pantić
Zoran Pavlović
POLITICAL CULTURE OF VOTERS IN SERBIA

Izdavač:
Institut društvenih nauka
Kraljice Natalije 45, 11 000 Belgrade

Za izdavača:
dr Mirjana Rašević

Recenzenti:
dr Miloš Nemanjić
dr Snežana Joksimović

Prevod:
mr Tijana Vesić

Korice:
ing. Nenad Jovanović

ISBN: 978-86-7093-126-8

Beograd, 2009.

Dragomir Pantić
Zoran Pavlović
POLITICAL CULTURE OF VOTERS IN SERBIA

Publisher:
Institute of Social Sciences
Kraljice Natalije 45, 11 000 Belgrade

For the publisher:
Mirjana Rašević, PhD

Reviewers:
Miloš Nemanjić, PhD
Snežana Joksimović, PhD

Translator:
Tijana Vesić, M.A.

Cover design:
Nenad Jovanović

Print run:
300 copies

Printed by:

ISBN: 978-86-7093-126-8

Belgrade, 2009

Publishing of this monography was funded by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, which also financed the work of the two co-authors on the following projects: “*Development of Serbian Society in Contemporary Global Integrative Processes: Perspectives, Alternatives and Implications*” (project 149020, project coordinator: Slobodan Vuković, senior research fellow) and “*Democratic Models of Developing Social Cohesion, Tolerance, Human Rights and Economic Growth in Political and Institutional Processes of EU Integration in Serbia*” (project 149017, project coordinator: Professor Zorica Mršević).

On the occasion of the jubilee of the Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research (45 years of work) and Institute of Social Sciences (half a century of scientific activity),

With our deepest respect, we dedicate this book to:

Professor Firdus Džinić, PhD (1931-2008), father founder of the Centre, its first director (1963-1973), deserving of successful establishment of the system of public opinion research in Yugoslavia and Serbia and for international cooperation of the Institute of Social Sciences



and

Professor Nikola Rot, PhD (1910-2007), who founded social psychology in Serbia, the former dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, director of the Institute of Psychology, chief of Psychology Department, in several mandates, also the president of the Scientific Council of the Institute of Social Sciences, exceptionally deserving of encouragement of empirical orientation not only in psychology, but social sciences in Serbia in general.



CONTENTS

PREFACE	7
I INTRODUCTION	12
1. History of Interest in Political Culture	12
2. The Main Reasons of Interest in Political Culture	14
3. Reactions of Critics	15
4. Definitions of the Category of Political Culture	17
5. Classifications of Types of Political Culture	26
II RESEARCH OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN SERBIA IN PRE-PLURALIST PERIOD	28
III VALUE COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE	38
1. Four Components of Political Culture	38
2. Short Overview of Selected World Research of Value Component of Political Culture of Voters	42
3. The Main Findings and Conclusions of Empirical Surveys of the Value Component of Political Culture of Voters in Serbia in the First Period of Pluralism (1990-2000)	43
4. The Value Component of Political Culture of Voters in Serbia after 2000	70
IV MOTIVATIONAL COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE	90
V ACTION COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE	99
VI COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE	110
VII CONCLUDING REMARKS	119
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125
APPENDICES	136
1. General information on important political parties and coalitions in Serbia	139
2. Parliamentary elections in Serbia	146
3. Social base of political parties in Serbia	149
4. List of abbreviations used	152
AUTHORS INDEX	153

PREFACE

»The political culture provides structure and meaning to the political sphere in the same manner as culture in general gives coherence and integration to social life«.
L.W. Pye, 1965.

»Something like a notion of political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and written about politics«.
G. A. Almond, 1980.

»Political culture plays a crucial role in sustaining democratic political institutions: economic development is linked with democracy, in large part, because it leads to changes in social structure and political culture that are conducive to democracy«.
R. Inglehart, 1997.

This book presents the endeavour of authors to present to the international and domestic expert public the main findings and conclusions on the nature of political culture of voters in Serbia, primarily on the basis of secondary analysis of empirical surveys of Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), that is, its Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research (CPSPOR).

During the fifty years of existence of ISS (started working in 1958) and forty five years of activities of the above-mentioned CPSPOR, established in 1963 as the first institution of this kind in Eastern Europe, at the time under the name of Centre for Public Opinion Research, a considerable amount of data about the public opinion of the then Yugoslavia and later Serbia was accumulated, which in themselves deserve some kind of meta-analysis and systematisation of findings. From the first years of its activity, CPSPOR, besides the programme of public opinion research, developed the programmes of media research and studying elections and electoral behaviour of citizens, of course, the latter in the measure in which it was feasible in the monist and self-management system of the time.

As early as in the 1960s, ISS and CPSPOR participated in several significant international comparative projects managed by the professors from the universities from USA. Visiting scholars and leading researchers were such famous names of American social sciences such as Daniel Katz, one of the most famous social psychologists, with his associate John Delamater, now the professor at Wisconsin

university, who prepared and conducted the Michigan's project concerning ethnic commitment in USA, Greece and Yugoslavia during 1967/8 in ISS-CPSPOR.

During 1967/8 in Yugoslavia, in cooperation with ISS-CPSPOR, George M. Zaninovich, professor at the University of Oregon, conducted the research on values and political culture whose results were published in several of his papers, such as: Zaninovich, M. (1970): Party and Non-Party Attitudes on Societal Change (294-334), in B. R. Farrell, ed.: *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*. Chicago: Aldine; Zaninovich, M. (1973): Elites and Citizenry in Yugoslav Society: A Study of Value Differentiation (226-297), in Beck et al.: *Comparative Communist Political Leadership*. New York: David McKay; Zaninovich, M. (1971): The Case of Yugoslavia: Delineating Political Culture in a Multi-ethnic Society, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 4, 2, 58-70; Bertch, G. K. and G. M. Zaninovich (1974): A Factor Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures: The Multinational Yugoslav Case, *Comparative Political Studies*, January, pp. 219-244.

Philip Jacob from Pennsylvania University, Philadelphia, managed a large international project, well-known in Belgrade even today under a popular name "Jacob's Study", within which nearly 4000 local leaders from the USA, India, Poland, and Yugoslavia were interviewed, with active participation of ISS and other institutes from former Yugoslavia (see: Jacob, P. et al. (1971): *Values and Active Community*. New York: Free Press).

Alen Barton, Charles Kadushin and Bogdan Denitch from the Bureau for Applied Social Research - Columbia University, New York, realised in the period 1968-1972, together with CPSPOR associates, the project of opinion makers in Yugoslavia which included interviewing of almost 600 leading individuals from six sectors – three political: party leaders from LCY Central Committee, state officials and federal legislators, as well as the most prominent mass communicators, intellectuals and top business managers of the time, by applying first the sample based on formal positions and then snowball sample (see their book: *Opinion-making Elites in Yugoslavia*. New York: Praeger, 1973).

Dan Voich and Lee Stepina from Florida State University, Tallahassee, at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, managed the international empirical comparative project on values relevant for management in cooperation with the researchers from nine countries, including Yugoslavia, represented by the CPSPOR team (see Voich, D. and L. Stepina (1994): *Cross-Cultural Analysis of Values and Political Economy Issues*. London: Praeger).

During the 1990s, CPSPOR conducted many surveys of public opinion, media, political culture, values and elections in cooperation with international foundations, including the Fund for an Open Society, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and a number of other, primarily American institutions.

In the period from introduction of pluralism until 2005, the most important political parties and some presidential candidates in Serbia and Montenegro ordered from CPSPOR special pre-election public opinion surveys, with the aim of establishing their rating, creation and modelling of election campaign strategies and election outcome predictions, which has enabled collecting an abundance of valuable data relevant for further studies of political culture at the time. It goes without saying that in those studies the experiences of CPSPOR researchers, acquired in cooperation with international institutions and contemporary world literature in the field, were used. In strategic surveys for participants on the Serbian political scene, a significant contribution was given by Professor Zoran Slavujević, the leading expert for political

marketing in Serbia, who introduced this subject in the curriculum at the University of Belgrade and wrote textbooks on that matter.

In the second half of the 1990s, ISS and CPSPOR, in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences, conducted four projects devoted to transition problems, and parallel in Moscow in Russian language and in Belgrade in Serbian, the following books with that topic were published, with participation of several dozens of authors from Serbia and Russia: “Goals and roads of transitional countries” (1995); “Social conflicts in transitional countries” (1996); “Integrative and disintegrative processes in transitional countries” (1998); “Processes of democratisation in transitional countries” (2000). Large contribution to accomplishment of these projects on the Russian side was given by academics, political scientist Gennady V. Osipov and sociologist Zinaida Golenkova. We would also like to remind that this Centre, as early as in 1996, published in English the book “Challenges of Parliamentarism: the Case of Serbia in Early Nineties” (ed. V. Goati). In the series of Berlin University “Founding Elections in Eastern Europe”, whose initiators and editors were H.D. Klingemann and Charles Lewis Taylor, the book of papers of ten authors was published in 1998, out of that eight from CPSPOR: “Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990-1996: analyses, documents and data” (ed. V. Goati). Certain parts of this journal are without doubt relevant for the present study as well.

CPSPOR has recently conducted surveys within the third (1996) and the fourth wave (2001) in Serbia and Montenegro as an institution-participant in the World Values Survey (WVS), a large comparative project initiated and conducted in past decades by the American sociologist, Professor Ronald Inglehart from Survey Research Centre, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in cooperation with the colleagues from the European Values Systems Study Group (EVSSG), formed at the end of 1970s, which later gathered many prominent social scientists. For including Serbia in this grandiose project, besides R. Inglehart, special credit has to be given to Professor Hans-Dieter Klingemann from Berlin University. As a result of WVS projects, valuable findings about values and other aspects of political culture were collected in eighty countries, which enabled for Serbia, often perceived, presented and easily classified in world media as a “deviant case” and “trouble maker in the Balkans”, to be perceived more realistically, and to be compared on the basis of empirical criteria with respect to dominant values with countries in the region, with countries of Eastern Europe in transition, but also with the most developed world countries, as well as with the countries that former Yugoslavia (in the period of Tito’s regime) belonged to as part of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The above-mentioned and other visiting professors and researchers also gave their significant contribution advancement of theoretical, methodological and comparative capacities of domestic researchers led by the director at the time and founder of CPSPOR, professor Firdus Džinić (1931-2008), and chief of the group for public opinion and founder of the CPSPOR Permanent network of field associates, Ljubomir Stojić (1934-1998), the first president of the Association of Psychologists of Serbia, the man who brought to Belgrade even the biggest names such as Erich Fromm, famous throughout the world, and the author of sociometry Edgar Moreno. Among a multitude of the youngest researchers in ISS and CPSPOR at the time were also Professor Vesna Pešić, later the founder and president of Civic Alliance of Serbia, member of Serbian parliament and Serbian ambassador in Mexico, Ljiljana Bačević, director of CPSPOR with longest years of service (1989-2005) and most deserving for its international cooperation, especially with Intermedia from

Washington (twelve comparative media surveys in the period from 1992 to 2004), at present Serbian ambassador in Athens, then the co-author of the present study, Dragomir Pantić, later director of ISS – in the period from 1989 to 2002 – and director of CPSPOR from 2005 since. Vojislav Koštunica, who later became the president of Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian Prime Minister, also worked in CPSPOR for several years. Vladimir Goati, professor at several international and domestic universities, was the director of CPSPOR from 1978 to 1983 and the director of ISS from 1983 to 1988. Among CPSPOR associates were also political scientist Ognjen Pribičević, present Serbian ambassador in Germany, then Milan Matić (1930-2006; in the period 1965 – 1970; he founded and led the Group for Election Studies), Mijat Damjanović, Zoran Slavujević and Mirjana Vasović, all of them later the professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences of University of Belgrade (the former was also the Faculty Dean), then the political scientist Zoran Lutovac, now Ambassador of Serbia in Montenegro, social psychologist Snežana Joksimović, now a senior research fellow at the Institute for Educational Research, Belgrade.

The new generation of researchers now successfully continues with the multidisciplinary research of public opinion, political culture, media, elections and other problems: Aleksandar Bošković, professor of social anthropology at several international universities; senior research fellow, Jovanka Matić, one of the best-known communication scientists in Serbia; political scientist Irena Ristić, doctoral candidate at the University of Passau; sociologists Suzana Ignjatović, doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade (specialised for problems of sociology of education and social capital) and doctoral candidate at the University of Novi Sad, Srećko Mihailović (specialised for sociology of elections and electoral behaviour of citizens); and the second co-author of the present study, social psychologist Zoran Pavlović, doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, oriented towards studying values and political culture.

One of the reasons we decided to publish in English this book on political culture in Serbia based on relevant studies is our desire to try and contribute to certain synthesis of conclusions, and by that at least partially shed light on the complex relation between the phenomenon of public opinion, values and political culture, which we wrote about earlier. We were also motivated by considerable interest of domestic audience, as well as of international authors for this topic, which is, for example, confirmed by a large number of visits to the internet presentation of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, where some of our papers in Serbian, made in cooperation with this foundation, are presented in electronic version, and which also fragmentarily discuss certain aspects of political culture in Serbia. We really had an abundance of intellectual incentives for working on book of this kind, bearing in mind the contributions of our predecessors in Serbia, stimulative experiences obtained in contacts with international authors and current tendencies of research in this field in world in general.

Since this book is primarily intended for readers outside Serbia, we included some elementary contents in the text, such as the reminder about important political events in the past decades in Serbia, which may be less familiar to one portion of international, especially younger readers, as well as several, hopefully, useful appendices – short overviews of basic information regarding political parties, elementary information about elections in the period from 1990 since, about social base of party followers, abbreviations of the names of political parties and some other concepts.

The planned volume of this book did not allow us to deal with some indubitably important contents, for example, characteristics of political culture of chronic abstainers and undecided citizens with regard to elections, which would be interesting in themselves and as a peculiar “control” group to those electorally decided. We also had enough ideas and empirical material for analysing formal types of political culture, but it was necessary to leave this topic for some other occasion for the same reasons. Unfortunately, we also had to be utterly economical when it comes to looking back on theoretically relevant and even provocative contributions of other authors about the phenomenon of political culture, including the need of restrictiveness in quoting the authors that are numerous even in a very selective literature. One additional reason was decisive in minimising the discussion about the nature of political culture, and that is the fact that both authors are social psychologists and therefore not competent enough to embark upon discussions assuming a deeper insight into specialised knowledge of other scientific branches. The consequence of that is a characteristic socio-psychological approach to analysis of political culture, whereby the older co-author is responsible for the introductory parts of the text and an extensive chapter on value component of political culture, while the younger co-author analysed the remaining three components of political culture.

Recently, the database consisting of 120 empirical studies conducted in the past two decades has been formed at CPSPOR. Owing to the data placed in this database, authors had access to all data necessary for analysis. In addition to this, the installation of a special database entitled “NEDA” (National Empirical Data Archive) is ongoing, which, besides international compatibility (DDI standards), will also make it possible to search through the data from six other Serbian state institutes, the members of consortium coordinated by CPSPOR. UNESCO and GESIS helped the establishment of this database, and we use this occasion to once again express our sincere gratitude for that.

The authors of the present study, due to the abundance of studies, decide to primarily perform secondary analysis of data from CPSPOR database, that is, from their own production, and only exceptionally those originating from other institutions. Another reason for the selection of such a corpus is a diachronic approach, since some trends could have stretched as far back as one quarter of century ago.

On this occasion, we would like to thank, besides all the above-mentioned, Professor Stanislav Fajgelj, long-standing programmer of statistical processing of data obtained in the studies conducted by the Centre and the author of the above-mentioned databases.

Also, we are grateful to a numerous team of field associates – psychologists, sociologists, social workers, pedagogues and political scientists, who, by working meticulously, enabled the collection of quality data, sometimes in very difficult conditions (during weather storms, wars in neighbouring countries and record hyperinflation), as well as coders and other people who helped in our research.

We would also like to thank the translator of this text into English, Tijana Vesić, and reviewers, senior research fellows and colleagues, Miloš Nemanjić, culturologist and Snežana Joksimović, social psychologist.

We are also grateful to all financiers of field research, and there were many of them over the past 45 years.

D. P. and Z. P.

I INTRODUCTION

1. History of Interest in Political Culture

Under different names, the elements of political culture had been discussed as early as by ancient age thinkers, even considerably before the new era, in several regions of the world then, which can at the same time be considered separate civilisations as well. The father of the modern understanding of the concept of political culture, G. Almond (1980) wrote an exceptional study on that topic entitled “*The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept*” as the first chapter in the cited book, which at the very beginning explicitly stated the following: “*Something like a notion of political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and written about politics... The concept and categories we use in the analysis of political culture – subculture, elite political culture, political socialisation, and culture change – are also implied in ancient writings*”.

It is possible to identify the elements of political culture from preserved documents such as speeches, discussions and other writings of priests, writers, historians, philosophers, orators and rulers of the Old World. The predecessors of the concept of political culture, the contents close to understandings of the authors nowadays, appear especially in ancient Greek philosophers. In his Republic, Plato, for example, studied the characteristics of aristocratic, democratic and oligarchic politics, their connection with characters of people, attributes of what is today called political socialisation etc. In his work “*Politics*”, among other things, Aristotle talked about the forms of government depending on the social structure of the society. It is known that the works of Augustine and Aquinas are of enormous relevance for political culture, and later also the works of Machiavelli and Montesquieu. Rousseau emphasised the importance of morality, customs and especially opinions that are, in his interpretation, often more important for understanding behaviour of people than formal laws. It is well known that de Tocqueville made a contribution to the analysis of American democracy, political opinion of French peasantry, bourgeois, aristocracy, as well as that he introduced the concept “habits of the heart”. Both Madison and Jefferson also dealt with the issues of political culture.

Almond was right to wonder: “*If the notion of political culture has in some sense always been with us, how do we explain its sudden popularity in the 1960s and the proliferation of research dealing with it in recent decades?*” (1980, p. 6). General development of the society in the past three centuries, both economic and cultural, undoubtedly contributed to that as well as the development of social sciences, to which the most important philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, historians and pedagogues gave their contribution. That list includes many of the biggest names of philosophy and science, such as: Locke, Hobbes, Spinoza, Bentham, J. S. Mill, Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Parsons, Mosca, Pareto, Saint-Simon, Freud, Malinowski, R. Benedict, M. Mead, Linton, Levinson, Kardiner, Kluckhohn, Geertz, McDougall, Thorndike, Dewey, Lazarsfeld, Adorno, Lasswell, Inkeles, Fromm and many others.

According to Barnard (1969), the very term “political culture” in recent time was first coined by J. G. Harder at the end of the 18th century in his work “*Reflection on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*” (original from 1791). However, in the 20th century it was most probably used for the first time in 1936 (Webb, Sidney and Beatrice: “*Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?*”. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons). During the last half of the century, as a reaction to the works of Almond (1956; 1960), that is, Almond and Verba (1963), three tendencies crystallised regarding the importance and contribution of the concept of political culture itself in social sciences. Some authors, such as Inglehart (1988), enthusiastically assumed that we are dealing with the real “Renaissance” of political culture in order to point out to the evident increase in interests for the problematic of political culture in the recent period. However, at the same time, other authors – such as Jackman and Miller (1996), Dalton (2000), Seligson (2002) placed a question mark behind the term “renaissance” in titles of their papers or questioned the usage of the term “renaissance” in their texts.

In our opinion, it seems that the occasional popularity of discussions about the nature of political culture should rather be named “Phoenix” in social sciences, bearing in mind, indeed, the longer period of time with cyclic occurrence of interest in political culture. Alternate going into fashion and weakening of interest of social scientists in the topic of political culture could be marked as an expression of a realistic view on the importance of the phenomenon of political culture. Namely, after affirmative texts about political culture would almost as a rule follow the series of critical re-examinations and questioning, including the suggestions to entirely abandon the concept or replace it with some other (for example, ideology).

Even the third tendency (with numerous variants) is not completely without foundation, the common denominator of which could be the comparison with the Myth about Sisyphus. If it is taken into account how complex, diffuse, vague, internally contradictory the concept of political culture is, according to some authors even a “sea without shores”, it is no wonder that many strenuous endeavours to determine at least the definition of this concept ended in failure. Such a verdict was pronounced by certain earlier, and more rarely, also by contemporary sceptics and critics of the category of political culture, openly emphasising that over and over again they reach the conclusions about the futility of endeavours to penetrate into the nature of political culture, about constant evasiveness of its essence, about the circularity of findings, the necessary imprecisions, amorphous meanings etc.

It is certain that what was decisive for today’s great interest of authors in political culture was precisely the flourishing of empirical studies of this phenomenon after Almond’s papers over half a century ago. These papers were obviously an impetus to that trend as well, and at the same time occurred in the right time that was mature for empirical testing of ideas, hypotheses and statements about the nature of political culture, accumulated during the centuries. Almond himself often emphasised that political culture is not a theory; it refers to a set of variables which may be used in the construction of theories. Also, he often emphasised that many doubts regarding political culture can be removed only by empirical research. Elaborations of the essence of political culture, including also the pointing out to its significance for development of democracy, as well as relying on the results of the relevant research up to then, basically, their secondary analysis, reinterpretation and synthesis that he himself, his associates and followers undertook, largely contributed to moving towards formulation of theoretically grounded hypotheses, on the one side, and on the other starting with extensive (especially comparative) and intensive (deepened) empirical research, that is, testing of explicated hypotheses.

2. The Main Reasons of Interest in Political Culture

At the beginning of the 21st century, the already mentioned affirmative, enthusiastic flow, contrary to sceptics, appears irreversible, which is confirmed by the permanent recent increase of researchers' interest in the phenomenon of political culture. Let us only mention that only two decades ago, in the then current search databases, the number of "hits" with the key word political culture was approximately several hundreds to several thousands, while today in Google search only we get 29 million of mentions, out of which, to be honest, not all are scientifically relevant. However, it is indicative that political culture is at the top of important concepts in political sciences, right behind the concepts like freedom, elections, democracy, and even ahead of so general and so used concepts such as political process and political action.

Why is political culture such an attractive concept that obviously still acquires an increasingly large popularity among social scientists? The reasons for that are really numerous and it is not possible to enumerate them all here, since a whole study could be written on the importance of political culture, so we listed only one dozen of reasons.

First of all, political culture is a heuristic concept that definitely encourages and directs empirical research. Political culture owes that status not only to the contents of lower order that it comprises, but also to their mutual interaction. For example, there is a certain synergy effect between the cognitive and value component, between the value and motivational component of political culture etc.

Second, political culture is an intermediate between the micro- and macro-approaches in research and theory, that is, it serves as "...a bridge between behaviour of individuals and behaviour of systems" (Almond and Verba, 1963). This concept connects economic and political phenomena, as was shown in many papers by Lipset, Inglehart and other authors.

Third, from the very beginning, that is, the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963), it was shown that political culture is suitable for comparative research that had become a "golden standard" in social sciences. "*The logic of political culture is always comparative*" (Formisano, 2001, p. 424). The author of this exceptional overview of historians' views on the nature of political culture argues that when his colleagues perform comparisons, they do that with regard to time rather than space. That means that historians use primarily the diachronic (longitudinal) method, and rarely synchronic or the so-called "cross-section" method in their endeavours to study the problems of political culture.

Fourth, several authors have so far emphasised that political culture as a subject of studying is simply made for multidisciplinary cooperation and research. That means that "*political culture is not reducible to psychological, sociological or economic variables*" (Wilson, 1997, p. 500). There is no doubt that political culture is also suitable for interdisciplinary research, for which there is generally a large need in social sciences.

Fifth, political culture has a considerable explanatory power (when it is used as an independent variable), but it can also be a dependent variable, which Almond especially wanted to emphasise (Almond, 1980, p. 29). We would add here that it is possible to plan political culture as a specifying, intervening and intermediate variable in research as well.

Sixth, political culture is an integrative category that unites various contents: cognition, motivation, evaluation (values) and behaviour. Integral political culture is definitely more than an aggregate of its components. Besides, it contains, apart from its subjective side within which we differentiate between the mentioned components, the objective side as well – institutions, political processes et al. Political culture is integrative also in the sense that one of its functions in the society is to regulate conflicts and overcome differences.

Seventh, political culture makes it possible to take into consideration the effects of historical development. With regard to that it points out to continuity and stability. This does not mean that political culture is fixed and inert to the degree that changes are not possible, but only that as a phenomenon of long standing it affects the speed of social processes. It sometimes slows down those processes, for example, as in the case when deeply rooted parochial or traditional culture hinders modernisation of some society. However, that is not always the rule, since some other kind of political culture can speed up this same process, for instance, participation political culture developed above a certain critical point.

Eighth, political culture is a context, an environment; it is a social background, the basis which other phenomena are constructed on and expressed by. This aspect of political culture enables that, when one knows the wider matrix, such less general occurrences can be known better.

Ninth, political culture, especially owing to its value component, provides a meaning to political life. Therefore, it possesses a “specific colour” and recognizability in space and time. About the complex relation between political culture and values we wrote in more detail in a separate paper (Pantić, 1998a).

Tenth, political culture is usually a prevalent cluster, even when it coexists with its other forms. Of course, in practice, there are cases when there is a mixture of cultures, then the parallel existence of equally developed political (sub)cultures in one and the same society, as well as other combinations with regard to the criterion of domination of some form of political culture.

Eleventh, political culture is, despite its relative compactness, internally structured with respect to the existence of political subcultures that it covers. Subcultures can be theoretically and analytically very significant, and Elazar (1966) was among the first to prove this by dealing with political cultures (more precisely subcultures) of the American states, in order for that to become a special subfield of research later.

Twelfth, the knowledge about political culture of one society or a group within the society enables better prediction of various phenomena, for example, election results, readiness of citizens to accept economic measures adopted by governments, reactions of the public to the changes in foreign and internal politics etc.

3. Reactions of Critics

The reasons of popularity of the concept of political culture, which are at the same time its advantages as well, provoked a lot of critics who have explicated a number of shortcomings and even disqualifications regarding this concept up to now. It is interesting that even some good sides of political culture served to its opponents to deny them using opposite argumentation, that is, to present them as shortcomings

of the concept. That is why, for example, it can be heard that political culture is a *“too wide and abstract concept”* – unlike the advantage in the sense of comprehensiveness. Or, it is claimed that *“general explanatory value of political culture is, at best, limited”* (Jackman and Miller, 1996, p. 654). These authors, and not only them, also argue that the concept of political culture is rather descriptive than explanatory, and Edwards thinks that the concept *“obscures more than it explains”* (cited according to Formisano, 2001, p. 418), which is all, naturally, completely contrary to those who affirmed the considerable explanatory power of political culture.

While there were those who praised the heuristic value of political culture, the critics considered it to be just a normative category. Chilton (1988) claims that *“political culture remains a suggestive rather than a scientific concept”*. As opposed to integrativeness of the category of political culture, objections are made that we are really dealing with a “catch-all” nature of the concept (Dittmer, 1977), something that makes up for everything that is absent from political discussions, an “umbrella concept” that necessarily leads to “vague meaning”.

There were also objections claiming that political culture is a seductive concept, that subjectiveness in its usage cannot be avoided, that it is imprecise, controversial, that it allows for different meanings, that it is used too freely, too casually. Even recently deceased Pye, one of the authors that were among the first to join Almond and Verba in studying political culture, expressed the fear that political culture might become a “residual category”.

Keeping up in the framework of wider theories of modernisation, it was expected from political culture to be a more dynamic concept that can explain social changes as well. Instead, as critics emphasise, political culture is a static and by definition a “conservative concept”, which favours status quo of the society and “fixes stability” (Dittmer, 1977).

The critics also claimed that there is a vague relation between political culture and the higher, superordinate concept (general culture), as well as the logical differentia specifica (politics), then that between the two members of the concept there is a paradoxical relation – tension and contraindication because culture is something that implies community of people, and politics deals with the conflicts of opposed opinions (Rose, 1989, p. 127) et al.

Still, *“the most dramatic distinguishing quality of the rejuvenated political culture concept is definitional”* (Somers, 1995). Formisano (2001, p. 414) remarks ironically that *“probably no two historians defined political culture (explicitly or implicitly) in the same way”*, but similar can apply for all other scientific branches as well. This author remarks that there is not a small number of historians who, when discussing political culture, do not define this concept at all nor accept the definition suggested by someone else, which is also not a characteristic of this discipline only, that is, the climate in it when it comes to political culture. Pye observed that *“everyone somehow intuitively understands very quickly the content of this concept”* and it seems as though they do not feel the need for its further more precise defining.

Some thought that political culture is an “unconscious category”, but not in the sense of Freud’s concept of the repressed, but “taken for granted” content (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 137). *“The concept itself is embedded in a historically constituted political culture”* (Somers, 1995). It was even objected that this concept is neither political nor cultural, but rather a “private, anti-political” thing, as well as that it refers more to the “naturalised” than cultural side of a man (the same author). It seems that

Laitin (1995; cited according to Formisano, 2001, p. 404) went the farthest, by claiming that this is an “*unproductive, unclear, and tautological programme*”.

On one occasion, Almond (1990) classified into four groups the most serious criticism regarding the category of political culture up to then: determinism of political socialisation and attitudes with regard to political behaviour (1); determinism of economic and socially-structured changes on attitudes (2); psychological reduction of the content of the concept of political culture (3) and neglecting the role of interests, that is, the rational decisions of political participants (4). Replying to those objections, he relativised the mentioned determinism, allowing for reverse influences (causal arrows in both directions), and advocated the relative autonomy of attitudes, insisted on the need of analytical separation of attitudes and behaviour and remained with the cultural approach to political phenomena, not denying the existence of people’s acting out of interest as well.

The common denominator of all criticism with regard to political culture could be summarised in a phrase that it is more of a “denomination of political ideas” than something that carries an essential meaning. However, empirical research undertaken in the past four and a half decades speaks without a doubt in favour of the authors from the first, enthusiastic movement, which means that the category of political culture is welcome to social sciences, that it has filled in the void that had until then disabled understanding of an entire important field in social sciences. Political culture justified the attribute that it carried a heuristic power and a number of other qualities in it. Today, we have at our disposal an impressive number of empirical findings that make it possible to talk about the nature of political culture more based on facts, and less based on conjectures and speculations, impressions and malicious arbitrariness of the critics who seemed to have overseen that there was also a possibility of research verification of their assumptions and claims. All this does not imply that the problem of defining and considering of the essence of political culture is solved and closed once and for all. On the contrary, the very findings of empirical research were the ones that opened up new issues on that level as well, as it generally happens in science, that is, that after the initial discovery new questions and problems are imposed that call for the next round of theoretical discussions and research in the eternal spiral of knowledge.

4. Definitions of the Category of Political Culture

Gibbins (1989, p. 3) was right to reach the following conclusion: “*At the heart of the problem for political culture lie three problems, (a) definition, (b) paradigm conflict, and (c) operationalisation*”. The other two problems actually refer to the definition as well. Formal definitions of political culture were not that often explicated as it might seem at the first glance, especially if we take a look at the multitude of those presented in this paper. Namely, as it was stated so far and which was perceived by many authors of research and critics of the concept of political culture, the absence of definition is more of a rule than an exception, even within empirical research where one would expect at least operational definitions. That means that authors frequently use implicit definitions that can sometimes be recognised or at least partially reconstructed (for example, based on the scientific origin of the term), or, still, that take as their starting point the belief that the concept of political culture is “clear to

everyone”. On the other hand, what is also present are the endeavours of certain authors to try to define the concept of political culture at all costs, mostly without success and inadequately, avoiding to accept the definitions already offered by other authors, which could be adequate to the former.

Generally, numerous definitions of political culture suffer from formal shortcomings, for example, leave out the *genus proximum* or *differentia specifica* – if we hold on to the classic rules of concept definition. Content-wise, the definitions of political culture are very heterogeneous, which largely stems from the affiliation of authors to scientific disciplines, but also from their preferences of narrower theories as well (micro- and meso- theory) within the disciplines. However, these theories usually do not directly refer to political culture itself, but to some other phenomena. In fact, there is still no completely developed theory about political culture, definitely not the one that has a satisfactory level of abstractness, formalisation, logical consistency and whose predictions would be valid for different historical periods and types of society. Theorising about the nature of political culture so far, unfortunately, has a lower scientific status. In the best case, we are mostly dealing with unevenly developed clusters of hypotheses waiting for their empirical verification. It is also evident that there is a lack of correspondence of certain theoretical generalisations with the facts, over-extensive speculativeness, impossibility to test certain theoretical claims, and those are all the signs of a still insufficiently developed field of theorising and research (with honourable exceptions). That is not unexpected if one bears in mind that this field was constituted basically less than one half of century ago. Maybe it is unrealistic to expect that in the foreseeable time such a comprehensive theory of political culture would be formulated. Still, it is clear that the problems of defining the category of political culture stem in not such a small degree from the absence of satisfactory individual theories about political culture. One of theoretic weaknesses, with direct repercussions on defining political culture is an indistinctive and unspecific usage of the concept we are dealing with, since the latter is sometimes taken in a very wide meaning that covers some other, even distant contents, or political culture is used for trivial contents that are subsumed under this concept.

There are objections aimed at the authors in this field regarding the definition of political culture, saying that the possibilities offered by the findings of quality empirical research are not utilised (not to mention the possibilities of meta-analyses) for possible inductive attempts of repairing the old or formulating the new definitions of political culture. In the case of other key concepts in social sciences empirically oriented authors justified themselves by saying that the direction “from research to theory” is scientifically legitimate, that for the beginning it is sufficient only to present operational definitions, and then gradually construct the elements necessary for theoretical definitions of the theory itself, based on the very facts determined by research. Extreme inductive approach still rarely comes to fruition if it does not rely on at the same time deductive development of hypotheses and theoretical attitudes that could be complementary to the findings obtained by research.

Without aspirations towards making this sample of definitions of political culture a comprehensive and representative one, we will present some of them, in the first place for the purpose of illustrating the variety of attempts and difficulties in the process of formal determination of the content of the concept in question. Even a quick and superficial insight into that list reveals, on the one hand, the achievements so far on the level of specification of what is assumed under political culture, and on the other, the dilemmas, straying and reservations on the part of authors with regard to that. Based on almost three dozens of definitions presented, it is possible to see which

provisions of definitions achieved the higher level of agreement (for example, whether political culture is formed by orientations towards political objects), and where authors are divided (for example, statements about whether the concept involves political behaviour or not, whether political culture is a part of general culture of the society or not, whether the concept comprises only subjective aspects or objective as well, whether political culture is a normative or rather existential and expressive category etc.).

The list of definitions of political culture is listed chronologically:

“... every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it is useful to refer to this as the political culture” (Almond, 1956, p. 396).

“Commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules” (Macridis, 1961, p. 40).

“... political orientations - attitudes toward the political system... a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system... Political culture consists of attitudes toward political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system... It is a set of orientations toward a special the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1963, 13, and so on).

“The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics” (Verba, S. in: Pye and Verba, 1965, p. 513).

“Psychological dimension of the political system”; also: *“Political culture is a pattern of individual attitudes and preferences towards politics among the members of a certain political system”* (Almond and Powell, 1966, p. 12-13, 23).

“The particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded” (Elazar, in: Elazar and Zikmund, 1966).

“Attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour” (Pye, 1968).

“The pattern or patterns of knowledge, evaluation, and communications relating to political authority” (Nettl, 1967, p. 57).

“Patterned ways of life and action as well as the states of mind that sustain and condition these patterns” (Fagen, 1969, p. 5).

“Political culture is, simply, the political aspect of the culture of a society” (Devine, 1972, p.15).

“...political culture orients a people toward a polity and its processes, providing it with a system of beliefs (a cognitive map), a way of evaluating its

operations, and a set of expressive symbols” (Beer, in: Beer and Ulam, 1974, Ch. 1); “Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try to do. This sector of culture we call political culture. ... the principal components of the political culture are values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes. In turn, within each of these we can distinguish between elements that emphasise means and those that emphasise ends-between conception of authority and conceptions of purpose” (Beer, p. 12).

“Political culture can be defined in two ways, depending upon the level at which we want to study political life. If we concentrate on the individual, political culture has a basically psychological focus. It entails all the important ways in which a person is subjectively oriented toward the essential elements in his political system...The second definition of political culture refers to the collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system” (Rosenbaum, 1975, p.4).

“Political culture consists, apart from dominantly attitudinal elements... of the degree in which citizens participate in political affairs” (Presthus; cited in: Pammett and Whittington, 1976, p. 31).

“Political culture is a system of political symbols, and this system nests within a more inclusive system that we might term ‘political communication’” (Dittmer, 1977, p. 566).

“Political culture consists of assumptions about the political world. If a person acts on the assumptions which are widely shared in his collectivity, he will ‘pass’ as a legitimate political actor. An ‘outsider’ who holds quite different views on the nature of the political game, on proper modes of conduct, and on goals and strategies will be identifiable as deviant; he will not ‘pass’. Assumptions about the political world focus attention on certain features of events, institutions, and behaviour, define the realm of the possible, identify the problems deemed pertinent, and set the range of alternatives among which members of the population make decisions. Political culture, then, is a shorthand expression for a ‘mind set’ which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviours, problems, and solutions which are logically possible. Since it represents a ‘disposition’ in favour of a range of alternatives, by corollary another range of alternatives receives little or no attention within a particular culture. Most people in any culture, therefore, will take for granted a particular course of action or consider only a few alternatives...” (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 127-8).

“Totality of attitudes, values and patterns of behaviour existing in a given society (and) relating to the mutual relationships between the (state) power and the citizens. This category ...includes knowledge of politics, evaluation of political phenomena, emotional aspect of political attitudes, and patterns of political behaviour” (Wiatr, in: Almond and Verba, 1980, p. 107).

“Political culture is a system of knowledge, value orientations, beliefs and activities that has a cognitive, normative, value and action function, and depends on the level of inclusion into social life” (Chuprov, 1982).

“Political culture... may be regarded as an enduring set of publicly shaped and socially communicated beliefs, values, and traditions about politics which constitutes a general framework of plans, recipes, rules, and instructions for the conduct of political life, especially who gets what, when, and how” (Kincaid, 1982, p. 123).

“Political culture is a mosaic of symbolised patterns of political orientations” (Engell, 1983).

“A political culture is a particular distribution of political attitudes, feelings, information and skills... As people’s attitudes affect what they will do, a nation’s political culture affects the conduct of its citizens and leaders throughout the political system” (Almond and Powell, 1984, p. 37).

“... we may regard the political culture as a shorthand expression to denote the set of values within which a political system operates. It is something between the state of public opinion and an individual’s personality characteristics” (Kavanagh, 1972, p. 49) ; “Every political system is embedded in political culture... Now we are more likely to refer to the political culture – the values, beliefs, and emotions that give meaning to political behaviour. These are the values which create dispositions for people to behave in a particular way or which provide justifications for behaviour” (Kavanagh, 1985, p. 46).

“Political culture is the totality of ideas and attitudes toward authority, discipline, governmental responsibilities and entitlements” (Robertson, 1985, p. 263).

“A political culture is a more or less harmonious mixture of the values, beliefs and emotions dominant in a society...that influence support for authority and compliance with its basic political laws” (Rose, 1985, p.127).

“All publicly common ways of relating within the collective” (Chilton, 1988, p.431).

“Political culture ... does draw attention to the values prized by societies and the political behaviour to which these give rise... Political culture in this sense attempts to identify those factors in a political system which have a formative political influence on the individual, the group and the society; it further seeks to evaluate the importance of certain values and norms over long and short term” (Girvin; in Gibbins, 1989, p. 33).

“The political culture of a society is composed of the political attitudes, values, feelings, information, skills, which form the Weltanschauung of political actors, and give meaning and justifications to their actions” (Topf, in Gibbins, 1989, p 53).

“Almost anything may become politicised in such a way that it becomes at least momentarily a part of political culture. But, of course, every giving of meaning is not political culture. Only those meaning – giving which are reflected in the political arena, in the arena of political forces and power relationships, may be understood as political culture” (Pekonen, in: Gibbins, 1989, p.129).

“Set of discourses or symbolic practices by which individuals and groups in any society articulate, negotiate, implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon each other” (Baker, 1990, p. 4-5; citation based on Somers, 1995, p. 133).

“... actual contents of social consciousness and behavioural patterns that are materialised as consciousness and behaviour of an actual individual, with regard to his/her peculiar situation in life, with regard to the position of the group, that is, groups in the structure of the society and with regard to the dominant contents of consciousness and behavioural patterns on the level of global society” (Šiber, 1992, 94).

“According to the most general definition, political culture would be that part of general culture of a society that comprises values, beliefs, attitudes, inclinations and patterns of behaviour with regard to politics and political issues, such as those issues that refer to the general conditions of living together in a society and to the choice of directions and goals of the total social development.” (Matić, 1993).

“Political culture is ... the normative component of institutions” (Wilson, 1997, p 485).

“... a characteristic form of social consciousness and political practice including the knowledge about political reality, feelings related to politics, political values and a political behaviour more or less adequate to them.” (Mihailović, 1998, p. 118).

“... in its basic meaning, political culture presents an integral whole of knowledge, assumptions, attitudes, values and emotions that provides sense to political processes and defines the rules that determine political behaviour” (Stevanović, 2007, p. 97).

“What is assumed under political culture is a part of social culture comprising values, beliefs, attitudes, symbols and patterns of behaviour directed towards the political system, management of social development and the activity of an individual in it” (Butigan, 2000, p. 27; cited according to Stevanović, 2007, p. 61).

“Political culture is a part of general culture that has its objective side (institutional infrastructure of political life) and subjective side – orientations of individuals and social groups towards political objects, and which (orientations) contain a cognitive, value, motivational, and action (behavioural) component, and are structured in such a way as to influence political and other processes in the society.” (Pantić, 2008)

The last definition of political culture was formulated for present research. We are aware that it is a compilation of the previous definitions. It is evident that we accepted the ideas of Almond and Verba about the nature of political culture. This definition is essentially of structural type, and, formally speaking, eclectic – in such a way as to combine the elements that are the least dubitable, and hopefully not syncretic.

The number and heterogeneity of definitions of the concept of political culture have long ago encouraged the systematists to try and group them in several content

wholes, which would indicate the potential theoretical orientations standing behind these classifications. For example, Kavanagh (1972) suggests differentiating between the concepts of political culture (basically definitions) as political orientations (1), cognitions, feelings and evaluations towards political objects (2), patterns of beliefs, values, feelings, knowledge about politics (3) and empirically determinable levels of agreement between divided beliefs, attitudes, values (4). According to Glenda Patrick (1984), formal definitions of the concept of political culture can be classified into four groups: "objective" that best represents Easton's understanding (1963), "subjective" or psychological (Almond & Verba, 1963 etc.), "heuristic" (represented by definition of Pye, 1972) and "comprehensive" (Fagen, 1969; Tucker, 1971; etc).

Interpreting Easton's understanding, Patrick emphasises that political culture is not necessarily a part of general culture and that in every society there are "political-cultural totems and taboos", the goals that are not being reconsidered, patterns of beliefs, ideas, norms and values that express the forms of thinking, feeling and acting important for the efficiency of the system perceived by the members of the society as authoritative. Through the process of socialisation, society members internalise these contents by which the system secures itself from massive violation of norms and maintains stability. Every political regime enables one joint framework for integration through three components: values (in the sense of Parsons' "shared values"), norms (these specify the kinds of procedures that are expected and acceptable) and "authority structure" (formal and non-formal patterns of power in the process of decision-making). Every political system, as well as the historical era, endeavours to cultivate a peculiar political culture. However, within that, political subcultures of different social groups are possible, but there is always one that is dominant and the differences are only partially tolerated. If the system did not control large cultural variations, there would be chaos and its dissolution.

Subjective determination of political culture, the most distributed today, was introduced by Almond, stating that "every political system is imprinted in a certain pattern of orientations towards political action", which is basically political culture. He later pinpointed that "the term political culture refers to specific political orientations – attitudes towards political system and its different parts and attitudes towards one's own role in that system (Almond, 1968; similar also in the mentioned paper with Verba, 1963). According to Powell (1966) "political culture... is a subjective reality that emphasises and provides meaning to political actions". Almond and Verba (1966) point out that we are dealing with "the political system internalised in cognitions, emotions and evaluations of the population". In one paper, Verba (1965) pointed out that political culture provides "a subjective orientation toward politics". The concept of orientation itself is usually decomposed into its three components (similar to attitudes): cognitive, affective and evaluative.

According to Patrick, "heuristic" definition of political culture is best illustrated by an understanding that this concept penetrates into deeper strata of attitudes, emotions, sentiments and values regarding politics (Pye) and that we are dealing with a hypothetic construct of the pattern of psychological orientations that have to be predominant in the population in order to accomplish certain relations. "*Such an extrapolated conceptual model is then applied on reality, in the first place to test whether critical subjective elements really exist in relevant population*" (Pye, 1972:293), and then "systemic hypotheses are tested as well using the potential of psychological theories".

According to Fagen (1969:5), political culture is "*an aggregate or shaping of individual spiritual states with regard to the reversed patterns of manifest behaviour*".

According to Tucker as well, this concept is comprehensive, that is, contains both experiencing and expressed behaviour. Therefore, comprehensive definitions of political culture would mostly suit anthropologists' taste, because this concept in this version includes both the subjective contents and behaviour.

There are also different divisions of definitions, that is, basic understandings of political culture. Drawing on an earlier paper by Patrick, Podunavac (1982) mentions a number of as much as thirty conceptions of political culture. Gibbins (1989:3) argues that one can add new kinds of the concept of political culture as well. For instance, drawing on the presented division suggested by Kavanagh, expansions may go in the direction of introducing the group of definitions involving what political culture means for a certain group or even further in the direction of the departure towards the concepts such as national culture, political identity or even dominant ideology. Inspired by Habermass' discussion of the category of the "public sphere" some philosophically oriented authors suggested that the research and the very definition of political culture be directed towards the idea of "public culture" that would replace the concept of political culture (more about this see Formisano, 2001). It is possible also to expand the content of the concept of political culture in such a way as Topf did (see Gibbins, 1989) – even so far that it is "a form of moral order of a society". It seems that such suggestions contribute to losing the peculiarity of the content of the concept of political culture. There is also a possibility of division of definitions starting from the formal criteria, for example, into structural and functional (Pammet & Whittington, 1976), into definitions that emphasise the institutional aspect of political culture and those that place subjective aspects in the centre, into definitions stressing the role of an individual and event participants in general and those that favour the supra-individual features etc.

From the formal point of view, definitions of political culture, as well as the definitions of other general concepts in social sciences, can be classified into substantial, normative, genetic, teleological, restrictive, pluralist, descriptive, operational etc. There are also different kinds of inadequate definitions, such as, tautological, omnibus, listed, logically incomplete (for example, lacking the higher, superordinate concept or *differentia specifica*) and other formally dissatisfactory definitions. However, in this paper we will not deal with that aspect of defining political culture since that would demand a separate study dedicated exclusively to logical and formal problems of defining political culture.

Adding our definition of political culture onto the original determination of the concept of political culture by Almond and Verba (1963) as the network of orientations towards political objects, we emphasise that it is an utterly general definition demanding the pinpointing of all of its determinants. In our opinion, political culture has to be attached to the wider concepts of culture and politics, that is, it is one aspect of general culture. Since it occurs as an attribute, politics in the definition actually is, logically speaking, a specific difference (*differentia specifica*). However obvious these notes may seem, it should be mentioned that many authors neglect them, seeking right away for the meanings that are almost independent both from culture and politics in the construction "political structure". Of course, there is an additional new problem opening up here: it is also necessary to define the concept of culture in general (or, to say more precisely, to opt for one of about several hundreds of those suggested so far) and the concept of politics. What is assumed under culture here is the collection of all general, permanent and symbolically important spiritual creations of a certain society that are also partially materialised (that is the field of civilisation), but are also themselves conditioned by the manner of

economic existence. Politics is understood as a complex activity that involves power relations, ruling over groups and individuals by means ideology (rationalised interests of the class in power), state coercion, as well as the agreement of citizens themselves (legitimacy). “Network” in the definition refers to the totality of orientations, while the concept of orientation can be equalled with the concept of general attitudes containing the three above-mentioned components (cognitive, affective and motivational), with the addition that some authors prefer to call the latter evaluative component, which to be fair, does not match the motivational component entirely. Namely, evaluation is also based on motivation, in the same way as motivation implies choice (higher forms and evaluation), but still there are differences between these concepts that we will not go into on this occasion.

One of the ways to cope with the complexity of political culture is to take into account both the objective and subjective sides of this concept in the definition. The first side can be most simply represented by the political infrastructure of a society, that is, by its institutions, normative sphere, mechanisms of exercising government, political relations and processes.

Subjective side of political culture, which was completely neglected until the appearance of Almond in the 1960s, consists of political knowledge and level of information of society members, their values, especially those politically relevant (ideological), the motives of political behaviour and political behaviour itself, especially the engagement (activism) regarding the goals important for the system. Researchers of political culture avoid such all-embracing definitions because it is almost impossible in research to include at the same time everything that they (theoretically) cover, since by definition empirical research is a restricted enterprise. The subjective side of political culture should not be confused with the arbitrary, and not even with strictly individual, internal, perceptive aspect of political occurrences (an even bigger mistake would be to do the opposite – to exclude the psychological aspect).

In this case, subjective primarily implies that the participants in decision-making (actual and potential) gain a certain importance as subjects of occurrences. Therefore, subjective implies acceptance of the principle of self-activity and autonomy of participants in decision-making, although for the majority of citizens of one society that rather remains more of a possibility than something being accomplished in practice.

By pointing out in our definition that there is an influence of interaction of components of political culture on political life, it is confirmed that political culture can be an independent variable in studies. However, almost all authors agree that political culture could be a dependent variable as well. At the same time, by emphasising that political culture also influences other (non-political) processes, it is pointed out that political culture does not exclusively determine political occurrences, which was only hinted at earlier, and now has been verified through many empirical studies. Therefore, political culture is a relational category, two-sided (objective-subjective) in a way in which the same characteristic is treated in literature when it comes to values, which (politically relevant) political culture comprises as its own component anyway.

5. Classifications of Types of Political Culture

It is possible to discuss the different kinds of political culture starting from the different criteria of division. Which division will be adopted depends on the goal and theoretical orientation of the author in the actual discussion or research. As well as grouping of definitions of political culture, the classification into its kinds can indicate something about the very nature of political culture.

Classic and the most widely used classification of political cultures is the one suggested by G. Almond (1963; 1980). According to this author, there are three main kinds of political culture. The parochial (some authors prefer the term “traditional”) is characterised by unspecific orientations towards the system, deep-rootedness into religious patterns, affective loyalty, relative absence of cognitive contents, non-differentiation of political attitudes. For subject culture it is typical for the subjects of the society to obey the state, the leader and the party and non-critically provide the support to the system, whereby the latter is perceived primarily as government. Participation political culture is characterised by the existence of relatively autonomous subjects – citizens and their organisations aspiring to actively influence the state and its subsystems which are perceived in a differentiated manner. Almond thought that the most functional for democracy is the fourth kind of political culture – civil - that is basically determined as mixed, with occasional participation and stable support of the citizens to the system.

Authors differentiate between the kinds of political culture starting from a significant number of criteria. For example, Gibbins (1989) differentiates between traditional, modern and postmodern political culture and Girvin (1989) between micro-, meso- and macro-political culture. For Parkin (1971) the important division is into radical, subordinating and dominant political culture, and for Marsh (1977) the division into conventional or orthodox and protest political culture, for others the division into elite, sub-elite and counter-elite political culture (Daugnad & Mehl, 1983), for some the division into civic and revolutionary political cultures (many authors in the former USSR).

In a number of his papers, Inglehart (for example, Inglehart 1997, 1990 etc.) differentiated between two wide classes of political cultures – materialist and postmaterialist, while in recent time he proposed modernist and postmodernist culture and within them the corresponding political cultures (Inglehart 1995; 1997). The division into political cultures of elites and masses is frequent in literature (for example, Zaninovich, 1971), but these are rather the basic subcultures.

According to Beer (S. Beer, cited according to Matić & Podunavac, 1993:833), there are teleological and instrumentally oriented political cultures. The division into cooperative-pragmatic, apathetic and estranged political culture was suggested by Dahl (1961, 1966 etc.).

An important division of political cultures is also into centripetal or consensual and centrifugal or fragmented (Lijphart, 1968 and other papers). There is also a frequent division into democratic as opposed to autocratic or authoritarian political cultures. By intersecting the ways of attachment and forms of support, it is possible to distinguish between at least four kinds of political culture: hierarchical, individualist, fatalist and egalitarian (Diamond, 1993; only proposed as an idea on p. 32). Brown (1979) suggested the classification of political cultures into integrative, dominant, which coexist with different subcultures, dichotomous (divided, conflicted) and

fragmentary. The same author distinguishes between official and real political culture. In one research it was possible by means of an index to single out six kinds of political culture (alienated, traditional, subject, participation, self-management and humanist) in the young, noting that the first three, as well as the last three, were united in two factor-analytic clusters at the higher level of analysis (Pantić, 1988b; 1990b).

II RESEARCH OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN SERBIA IN PRE-PLURALIST PERIOD

Bearing in mind a considerable inertness of political culture and the tendency of persistence of certain elements of traditional culture in general in this area, it is important to point out to the original research of political culture, as well as to the findings obtained by the authors studying similar phenomena and predecessors of the concept of political culture. For example, at the end of the 19th century, Cvijić (1918) conducted extensive anthropogeographic field research, using the techniques of observation and comparative method, in the Balkan Peninsula. His findings that refer to the Dinaric and central type and their varieties are relevant for the population of the territory of Serbia today, but only when one takes into critical consideration some of his conclusions containing a certain dose of stereotype and tendency of idealisation of the Dinaric type, even prejudice when it comes to the Central and Eastern type, evaluating from the point of view of science today also the findings about the so-called national character. Namely, he did not understand then, as well as his other contemporaries that acted in the spirit of national romanticism, that the differences in psychological characteristics within one nation are often bigger than the differences between two or more nations. However, if we set aside the mentioned mistakes Cvijić made in drawing his conclusions, some of his findings can still be relevant for studying the roots of traditional and subject culture in Serbs. Some of his findings were more or less confirmed through the behaviour of people during the previous century. For example, the historians have shown how strong was the resistance towards introducing novelties in a patriarchal country such as Serbia (group of authors, 1994). Cvijić also anticipated some personality syndromes revealed by contemporary empirical research, such as authoritarianism, conformism, impulsiveness, suggestibility, low tolerance to frustration etc. – of course, under other names (he used a neutral term – “characteristics” of people in certain regions).

In the second half of the 19th century, Serbia had a parliamentary system within monarchy, and even significant achievements in parliamentary democracy, for example, on the eve of the First World War. Still, the period of early democracy in Serbia was marked by immense party and dynasty conflicts (between the dynasties of Karađorđević and Obrenović). We should mention here the observation of Dvorniković (1939) about the easy change of mood of people between the passionate choosing of certain ideas and apathy, as well as the susceptibility of the inhabitants at that time to “collective fever”, which is his term for what we today call psychological induction and suggestibility. Immediately after the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was formed, later named Yugoslavia, in which very soon huge disagreements happened, conflicts, even murders in the Parliament, and therefore King Aleksandar was forced to set up a dictatorship. Based on different historical sources, it can be concluded that in the area of former Yugoslavia the traditional political culture was dominant both among people and in the elites, with certain tinges of subject political culture.

After the Second World War, the winning anti-fascist partisan movement set up a communist dictatorship under the influence of the USSR, but the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito turned his back on Stalin as early as in 1948 and later on

gradually introduced the softer variant of communism. It is interesting to mention that in the first post-war election, which definitely was not fair and honest, voter turnout was the smallest in Serbia (somewhat less than three quarters, while in other parts of the country it reached and went over 90%).

In the period before the reintroduction of multi-party system, that is, from 1945 to 1990, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (transformed into League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1957) endeavoured to compensate for the lack of free elections by frequent and cosmetic changes of the electoral system and thus create an impression of its legitimacy. Critics were right to qualify those elections as a “one horse race” or consider them as a peculiar “theatre” (for example, Lipset, 1981), since they prevalently had a manifestation and mobilisation function. Within-party elections on the basic level were a purpose to themselves, while on the higher levels they reduced to “appointing”. Ideological glorification of the system of delegate elections actually concealed inefficiency, irresponsibility, powerlessness and incompetence of the “decision-making participants” behind the facade of massiveness and immediate democracy (the latter was enforced only in working process and not in political life), and actually bureaucratic mediation and manipulation.

The first empirical studies of elections in Yugoslavia were conducted in the 1960s by the researchers of the Institute of Social Sciences from Belgrade (Matić et al., 1968; 1970), but the indicators of political culture were barely comprised, for example, only somewhat at the level of political information, electoral interest of voters and readiness for engagement. From the first empirical public opinion studies, also conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences (in 1962, within the debate on the draft of the new Constitution), that is, its Centre for Public Opinion Research (founded in 1963 – the first of that kind in Eastern Europe), it can be concluded that the elements of the cognitive and action component of political culture of citizens were undeveloped, that motivational component was partially developed (certain general interest of citizens in politics, but low readiness for personal engagement), while the value component of political culture of citizens reflected their formative-declarative acceptance of the ruling ideology, especially the idea of self-management on the internal level and non-alignment as a foreign policy commitment.

In the empirical research of elections on all three levels – local, republican (Croatia) and federal (Šiber, 1971), among other things, it was shown that one third of voters approached the election in a conformist manner, that one half was passive and disinterested in politics and that there was no linkage between the socio-psychological characteristics of voters and their perception of elections. It can be said with certainty that in other parts of Yugoslavia the same tendencies were at work as well, and even in Serbia. If one bears in mind that voter turnout in the so-called delegate elections imposed in the 1970s was very high, public opinion studies on the samples of citizens of age nearly reveal the picture that would be obtained if only those who had voted were studied. Namely, the usual turnout in those elections, organised both territorially and functionally (in work organisations), ranged between 90% and 95%, which is indicative of the manifestation type of voting, pressure to vote, as well as of “tampering” with the results, since there was no independent control of voting process.

In cooperation with the Institute of Social Sciences from Belgrade, in 1967 one of the first relevant studies of values and political culture was conducted in SFRY (Zaninovich, 1970; 1971; 1973). By means of factor analysis, three types of political culture were identified: parochial-traditional, socialist-patriot and state-rationalist, as well as two value clusters: anxious-pessimist and egalitarian-allocative. Zaninovich

concluded that political cultures were differently distributed territorially, so the one in Slovenia could have been marked as “Northwest” (low results on all of three the above-mentioned factors, that is, types of political culture), the one in Macedonia “Southeast” (high results on all three types), and “Heartland” in the central part of the country, including Serbia (high results on socialist-patriot type, low on traditional and “moderate” on state-rationalist type). However, the basic dimension that distinguished the political elite at that time from peasants and workers, which this author classified into “mass”, was traditionalism versus modernism. According to this author, elite was composed of directors and experts, who appeared relatively homogenous due to modernism, preference of decentralisation, atheism and low anxiety and pessimism. The stratum of peasants and workers was more heterogeneous, but basically traditionally oriented, extremely anxious and pessimist, egalitarian and state-rationalist committed. The LCY members were the closest to the central (“Serbo-Croatian”) political culture, that is, above-average oriented towards decentralisation and the society, collectivism, atheism, modernisation and predominantly optimistic and activist oriented. In the opinion of this author, the LCY organisation performed at that time two general functions in the society, also relevant for political culture, those being social-cohesive and modernising role.

Also in cooperation with the Institute of Social Sciences from Belgrade, the comparative research of values and political culture of local leaders was published in the 1960s – besides SFRY, also in the USA, Poland and India (Jacob et al., 1971). Authors found that values can have a similar meaning for the behaviour of local officials regardless of cultural, economic and political differences between the countries comprised by the research. It seems that this comparative project established even bigger intra-national differences than the differences between the respondents from four countries. Therefore, the authors were right to assume the existence of trans-national political culture in local leaders. It was also concluded that personal characteristics, demographic variables and especially the elements of social role were more important factors of political culture than the factors of local environment. The kind of social change that is frequently described as modernisation was most probable if the municipality was economically well-developed and under the condition that its leaders did not appreciate egalitarianism, and at the same time rejected consensus and social harmony at all costs.

Also in cooperation with the Institute of Social Sciences, during the year 1968, a cooperative research of public opinion makers was conducted, actually, of the national, political, economic and intellectual representatives of the SFRY elite, and partially also in the USA and Poland (Barton, Denitch, Kadushin, 1973). It was shown that opinion makers in comparison with general population were significantly less egalitarian and more modernist and liberal oriented. Still, within opinion makers certain sector differences were discovered. For example, the executives of the big companies emphasised the goals regarding economic development, politicians assigned priority to maintaining order and avoiding conflicts in the society, while the leading intellectuals and journalists preferred freedom of speech and the need for unfettered criticism.

On the convenient sample of secondary school students in Belgrade and Kragujevac, Rot and Havelka (1973) found a widely distributed authoritarianism, in some categories (for example, in female students of vocational schools in Kragujevac) even one of the highest results in the world on Adorno’s F-scale for measuring this syndrome. The authors ascribed this finding to traditional patriarchalism as an accepted cultural value, and not to the outcome of psychodynamic process interpreted

in keeping with Freud. Paradoxically, the then young, along with considerable authoritarianism, at the same time also expressed clear preferences towards democracy. The young from the manual families were more conservative and aspired more towards pleasures, benefits and power, while those coming from non-manual families were more knowledge and altruistic oriented.

In the first research of the young from all republics and provinces of the SFRY, it was found that there were significant national, regional and educational differences in the distribution of egalitarianism, which was most deeply rooted in South-East of the country, where there was the highest concentration of poor population at the time, which remained until today (Pantić, 1974). The young were then even more homogenous with regard to self-management and non-religious orientation, also the dominant one in the oldest population of the whole Yugoslavia at that time.

In the young in Serbia, Tomanović (1977) found, in spite of the domination of self-management and egalitarian orientation, a significant mixture of these values with some dogmatic and liberal ones, some different transitional types, as well as the high distribution of materialist orientation, which, indeed, is not a unique phenomenon since it can imply financial necessity, aspiration towards private possession, consumer mentality etc.

Study on social strata in Serbia conducted in 1974 indicated that there were immense value and other differences, also important for the political culture of the period, depending on occupation and education and respondent's belonging to a class (Pantić, 1977). The most homogenous with regard to values was the stratum of political officials. Distribution and the intensity of pro-system orientation (the self-management ideology at the time that combined the orientations: modernist, collectivist, openness towards the world, preference of public property and self-management) increased proportionally with the position of strata in social hierarchy. This regularity was explained in multiple ways (we explicated ten possible factors, indeed, of unequal strength), with the addition that the main interpretation was utilitarian. Namely, those who gained the most benefits from the system, held the most positive attitudes towards that system as well. By means of factor analysis the main ideological factor was isolated: "self-management versus traditionalism" that was orthogonal compared to, fairly eroded in comparison with ideally-typical, factor "statism versus liberalism". The third factor-analytical dimension was formed of psychological variables identified as "tolerance-intolerance", at the first pole of which higher social strata achieved the above-average results.

Based on the results of empirical research from the 1960s and the 1970s in Serbia, the main conclusion about the nature of political culture is that there was a parallel traditional (in lower social strata), subject (in the new, more educated stratum of workers) and participation political culture (non-manual strata, the young in school, especially students, who were prominently internationalist oriented), as well as alienating political culture (urban small private entrepreneurs). These are just tendencies, since the elements of these kinds of political culture were in all strata more or less present and mixed, except in political officials that were homogenous on a verbal-declarative level and almost ideally-typical representatives of the ruling self-management-participation-humanist culture, while in political behaviour they manifested egoist-materialist interests and strived towards preserving political power and dominating over all other strata, therefore, practically actually expressing the authoritarian political culture.

In the late 1980s, great value changes were recorded as well, which, on the one hand, were caused by the global Yugoslav crisis, especially by economic stagnation and political conflicts, but, on the other, the values themselves were (in moral sphere) a part of that crisis and deepened it additionally. Crisis of values manifested itself as their severe conflict (anomie), regression (for example, retraditionalisation, nationalism at the end of 1980s) and revival of the earlier suppressed values (religiosity, orientation towards private ownership) or those prohibited on the part of communists for this area (entrepreneurship, political democracy).

Several research studies from the 1980s indicated the decrease in self-management and collectivist orientations and erosion of preference of public property (Pantić, 1981b; 1987a; 1987b; 1990a; 1990c; Kuzmanović, 1987, etc.). Especially intensive was the weakening of self-management orientation which, for instance, was found in 62% of cases in the young in 1979, for it to decrease some ten years later to only 35% in the then generation of the young in Serbia (Pantić, 1981b; 1990a). Bearing in mind that self-management orientation was an axis of integration of all pro-system value elements in Serbia, its decline was also reflected on other components of the former core of values relevant for ruling ideology and political culture. However, the eroded self-management orientation did not successfully lend its place to pluralist values, but non-self-management orientation, the predominant content of which assumed the preference of traditional, bureaucratic, statism and even chauvinist goals. Therefore, certain potentials of self-management political culture were not utilised, since it was dominant in Serbia in the 1970s and 1980s in the majority of social strata, for example, for evolution towards some version of shareholders socialism and for transformation towards the democratic political culture. Value regression occurred instead, first within the crisis of the society, and later as a part of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the accompanying process of retraditionalisation of the entire ruling social consciousness. It should be emphasised that the main bearers of self-management political culture as long as until the end of 1980s were the LCY members (Pantić, 1987b), managers, experts and clerks, the most educated workers and students. The index of self-management political culture highly correlated with indexes of participation and humanistic political culture, less firmly with indexes of social status and criticism, and negatively correlated with indexes of traditional and alienating political culture. Regression analysis on the sample of the young indicated that their results on the index of integral political culture (combined components) were best predicted by the variable of membership in LCY and activity in youth organisations, then their social power and education, and then by whether they were employed and what their financial status and social background were (Pantić, 1988a).

The 1980s in Serbia were also marked by gradual spreading and strengthening of authoritarianism, also under the influence of escalation of social crisis after Tito's death. However, authoritarianism was even earlier more spread in Serbia and Montenegro than in other countries, and in Kosovo it was very spread even among the young and educated population. Other national groups of the then Yugoslavia that lived in an environment of the nationalities that were larger in number also manifested an above-average authoritarianism, for examples, the Muslims outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats outside Croatia, etc. which inevitably leads to the conclusion that situationally and culturally formed authoritarianism has a protective function for the nations feeling endangered. Political cultures of the Southern Balkans (including Greece) are in general characterised by a considerable authoritarianism: lowly authoritarian Northwest (Slovenia), the strip of moderate authoritarianism on the

stretch of Southwest – Northeast (Croatia, Vojvodina, one part of Bosnia) and highly authoritarian Southeast (Herzegovina, Central Serbia, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and especially Kosovo). It seems that authoritarianism colours political cultures very peculiarly in this area, but also that it reflects the stage modernisation process of, as well as the level of economic and cultural development of the region, urbanisation and religious differences, and the historical experiences and collective memories. However, research in Serbia did not reveal a high correlation between authoritarianism and non-democratic behaviour (as elsewhere in the world and which implies the understanding of Adorno and his associates about an authoritarian personality), which, together with some other findings, suggested the existence of the three layers of authoritarianism: psychodynamic (as in the original concept), cultural-conformist and situational. It seems that the most relevant for the characteristics of political culture in Serbia is the culturally rooted authoritarianism, if one bears in mind that situational authoritarianism is unstable and that it had increased suddenly in a short period of time under the influence of extreme circumstances, including the armed conflicts, and then it soon returned to the previous proportions as the situation calmed down.

The years of crisis, the 1980s, were also marked by incomplete modernisation that Serbian historians label differently as pseudo-modernisation, failed, half-way, deformed, slow and partial modernisation (group of authors, 1994). They discovered a considerable number of factors of incomplete modernisation that had been active in Serbia for more than two centuries. For understanding the nature of the political culture here maybe the most important are the following factors: persistence of patriarchalism, xenophobia, epic immersion into the past, national romanticism. We also added to this the dictate of limited goods (as understood by Foster), “*raya*¹ mentality” that Cvijić talked about and the “*syndrome of spoiled child*”, especially in relation of the population towards work and responsibilities, which can all together be qualified as “*reverse Protestant ethics*” (Pantić, 1995b). The idea of such ethics, also relevant for the nature of political culture, still demands further studies, elaboration and specification and additional arguments. In this context, it can also be relevant that modernist orientation of citizens, measured by the scales of Likert type, had been previously usually spread in approximately 50% to 60% of population (in the period of financial welfare supported with the help of the West), while in the end of 1980s it was lower by twenty or more percentage points.

As early as at the end of 1980s, it was possible to distinguish between “*three Serbias*” in Serbia, if specific national cultures of minorities were abstracted – Albanians’ (under 2% without Kosovo), Hungarians’ (4%) and Bosnians’/Muslims’ (somewhat more than 2% of population of Serbia). The first, pre-modern Serbia comprised around one third of population, predominantly located in the rural stratum, in South-East, in mountains and hills, and in the demographic sense that was mostly older, poor and poorly educated population. The second Serbia could be identified, based on a number of indicators, as an incompletely modern, comprising almost one half of population, in the first place in the central part, mostly of lower and secondary education (workers, part of peasants and clerks). This population highly depended on the state, but secured their existence additionally by cousin relations with villages of their origin, since it was basically comprised of the migrants of the first generation. The third Serbia might be recognised as postmodern (approximately, 15% to 20% of population), and it consisted mainly from the members of younger generation, better

¹ The poor people in the Balkan area oppressed by Turkish reign.

educated, inhabitants from the North and larger urban centres. Three Serbias inclined towards different political parties as well, for example, the first towards SPS and SRP, and the third towards civic-democratic parties. All this applied in the sense of tendencies and modal types, and not for each individual with the above-mentioned characteristics (Pantić, 1995b).

Political culture in the 1980s, especially in the East of the former Yugoslavia, that is, in Serbia, was also characterised by a considerable secular religiosity – “functional equivalent of classic religiosity”, as it was qualified by B. Russel and many other authors. Namely, classic religiosity in Serbia until the end of that decade was relatively poorly spread. Under the influence of ideological indoctrination, after the Second World War atheism was one of the foundations of the ruling ideology. Out of the numerous kinds of secular religiosity, the most important one for political culture is definitely the one expressed in the domain of politics. In Serbia, that kind of secular religiosity was registered in 1984 by means of meticulously constructed scales of Likert type in practically one half of the population at that time (average 47%). The above-average inclination towards idolatry and literal adoration of the personalities, events, ideas and symbols from the domain of politics was perceived in manual workers, the old, poor and the respondents of certain psychological features and syndromes, for example, in intolerant, alienated, hypersensitive etc. Only experts, students and secondary school pupils were in absolute majority critically distanced from the tendency of secular religiosity in the field of politics. Therefore, we concluded that social non-emancipation, psychological dependence, syndromes of defensiveness and withdrawal were the main factors of formation and maintenance of that kind of secular religiosity, which is similar (but not identical) to authoritarianism (correlation coefficient between them was 0.60, which is somewhat more than one third of shared variance). A more favourable social and cognitive status, life experience and encouragement of family climate contributed to the appearance of criticism, although not to a complete immunisation from the political secular religiosity (Pantić, 1988a; 1988b). This kind of secular religiosity was probably responsible for a diffuse support to the system, even when its leading institutions were not characterised by legitimacy, and it thus served as a base for the strengthening of subject politic culture.

Instead of the previously fairly spread Promethean activism (connected to a naive belief that self-management radically changes the very human nature in the political sense) and generally prominent, sharpened value profile (“value fullness”), indeed, in a significant degree encouraged by ideological indoctrination and the semblance of the fast social improvement, in the 1980s enormous anomie became effective, especially in the young generation. In that sense, the young from the former Yugoslavia were highly homogenised and similar applied for other generations as well. Anomie was manifested on all three levels – on cognitive, emotional and motivational, that is, as disorientation, non-hedonism and apathy. Anomie is usually the result of a severe conflict between values and to some degree was expected and understandable since it is a normal occurrence in transitional societies in general. However, its proportions (75% to 80% in the young), intensity and longevity indicated the disintegration processes in the former Yugoslavia and different pathological deviations that, as a rule, accompany a long-lasting and massive anomie of population everywhere else in the world. Record anomie contributed for the one kind of political culture (alienating) to appear in even one third of members of the then generation of the young (Pantić, 1988b; 1990a; 1990b; 1990c), although it had been relatively rare previously.

Classic religiosity is an important component of parochial political culture, but in some countries it can be interwoven with other kinds of political culture as well. Until the mid-1980s, Serbia was dominantly unreligious and even atheist environment. With that respect it was significantly different from traditional Catholic and Islamic parts of the former Yugoslavia. However, in the middle of the decade in question the process of revival of religiosity started under the influence of social crisis, but also because of the higher tolerance of authorities towards religion. Massive insecurity of citizens contributed to the rejuvenation of religiosity, as well as the fact that religion instead of ideology started to perform certain significant social functions: national-protective, cultural, moral, and even ideological. The latter was reflected in the differences in the attachment to religion of the supporters of certain political parties (Pantić, 1993) that were established at the beginning of the pluralist period, that is, in the early 1990s.

The political culture in general and values in particular of LCY members can be interesting even for the early pluralist period because many LCY activists became opposition leaders. Voters also retained the habits and political culture of the previous period (self-management) because those were mostly the same people, except for representatives of the new generations. Even the early empirical studies of values determined significant differences in values between the LCY members and the majority of citizens who were not the members of that organisation. These differences were the biggest when value commitments were defined and measured as obviously ideological, deducted from the LCY Programme. In one study at the end of 1970s (Goati, 1981) it was found that LCY members in Serbia widely accepted the strategic goals of their party: equality of nations (91%), the idea of self-management (85%), the tenets of delegate system (75%), the economic concept of self-management socialism (71%) and communist internationalism (68%). Zaninovich (1970) determined that LCY members in the 1960s were relatively homogenous with regard to values – predominantly optimistically oriented, active, preferred modernism and decentralisation and were oriented towards the society.

In the above-mentioned research of social strata in Serbia in the 1970s (Pantić, 1977), on the value cluster “self-management – traditionalism” the LCY members were clearly inclined towards the first pole, they were more homogenous with regard to values, especially in the upper strata, they achieved significantly higher results on the personality factor “tolerance” and were inclined towards liberalism in the upper strata, and statism in the lower. Applying a vast index of ideological component of political culture it was determined that workers in Vojvodina accepted in a considerably smaller degree the goals of ruling ideology (36%) than engineers (63%) and lower managers (65%), which confirmed the previous research findings about the influence of respondents’ belonging to a social stratum on their value differentiation (Pantić, 1987a; 1987b). In addition to this, many contradictions of values were found in workers in that research, for example, the conflict between traditionalism and modernism, solidarity and egoism, authoritarianism and tolerance etc., which implies that anomie was prominent among them. However, their acceptance of the goals of ruling ideology depended in a fair degree on the fact whether they were LCY members (48%) or not (29% accepted that ideology). According to the index containing over a hundred indicators, it was concluded that one half of LCY members had a satisfactory integral political culture and only one fifth of the workers that were not the LCY members.

The differences between LCY members and non-members were especially intensive regarding the values from the activist syndrome. For example, in one

research on engagement of Belgrade communists (Pantić, 1983) it was found that the syndrome of Promethean activism, which is at the same time a culturally important value, and not only politically relevant, existed in 63% of LCY members and in 40% of those who were not. This difference consistently persisted when an otherwise important source of differences was controlled – educational factor. The second similar research (Pantić, 1985) discovered some other characteristic differences in values and politically relevant personality syndromes. For example, the former LCY members were more conformist and authoritarian oriented than the current LCY members, but also non-members. Even at the time immediately before the break-up of LCY organisation, the pro-system component of political culture characterised the majority of LCY members below the age of 27 (56%) compared to 41% of their peer non-members. The above-average position on the index of integral political culture was then expressed by the nine tenths of the active young members of the LCY, one half of passive, one third of aspirants, 29% of former members and only one fifth of non-members (Pantić, 1987b; 1988b). Of course, operationalisation of the concept of political culture contained important elements – in keeping with the ruling social system at that time.

On the eve of culmination of the social crisis in the SFRY that resulted in the break-up of the country, several studies were conducted whose findings can be indicative for drawing conclusions about the values of the potential voters and LCY members, the organisation that was basically already bursting at the seams. The research on the selected value orientations of the members of young generation of the whole Yugoslavia (Pantić, 1990a) pointed out to anomie that was spread in record proportions (three quarters of respondents) which, paradoxically, at the time was the factor of homogenisation of the young in Yugoslavia! High anomie was definitely an expression of a serious social crisis, especially the moral one, and was itself even the part of the latter, as well as an expression of the blurred perspective of the young. Anomie manifested itself as dissolution of the values held up to then, the lack of the new ones and a severe conflict of disparate values. For example, the key system value – self-management orientation eroded in the young from almost two-thirds in 1979 to only one-third in the generation of the young at the end of 1980s, while the non-self-management orientation increased from the former 8% to even 41% in the same period as part of, as it would be shown later, the wider process of retraditionalisation. Wilting of self-management orientation was not duly compensated by democratic orientation, partly because deeper dispositions persisted in the consciousness of population – authoritarianism and secular religiosity, differently spread in SFRY in the three cultural strips that had already been mentioned, and which hindered the faster transition to democracy.

It is indicative that in 1990, that is, immediately before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it was also found that materialist values (56%) were predominant in population over postmaterialist (16%) and that the former were spread above the average, apart from Montenegro, in Serbia itself with as much as 70% (Vasović, 1990). Inglehart (1990) documented around the world how much postmaterialist values, based on the sense of security of citizens and on the accomplishment of their existential needs, are important for stability, progress and democracy of modern societies.

On the whole, it can be concluded that in Serbian citizens in general and the members of the only party – LCY in the former Yugoslavia in the monist period, value orientations were considerably a product of indoctrination. The values were definitely also conditioned socially and structurally, that is, originated from class,

strata and educational differences, and even political ones, although the latter sometimes only reflected themselves through (non)membership to the LCY organisation, if one bears in mind the different background of LCY membership in society fragments. The LCY had the largest proportion of members in the upper layers of society. For example, more than 90% of senior state and local officials and company directors, about 60% of intellectuals, about 40% of white collar workers, about 25% of manual workers, but less than 5% of farmers and small private owners were members of the party (Goati, 1984). It is definite that some of the mentioned political values were not deeply rooted, since their holders gave them up relatively easy as soon as severe social crisis happened (the examples of atheism, orientation towards public property, activist syndrome). This value conversion was not only spontaneous, but was largely dictated by political elites by means of the already tested manipulative mechanisms that we had already mentioned (social demagoguery, the creed "Divide et impera!", scapegoating, "Panem et circenses!").

A more detailed analysis of the value panorama of the population and political activists in Yugoslavia and in Serbia within it in the monist period would probably still reveal certain potentials for the democratic conversion of the society in the social base. Considering the multitude of the empirical studies at that time, that would still remain the task for the retrospective studies of this phenomenon. However, the true indication of the possibility of a violent break-up of Yugoslavia, civil war and self-isolation of Serbia were not present in research until 1990, except for maybe record anomie. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that those later regressive events were more induced from the top – in the function of sustaining in power the disguised communist top people, than they were the reflection of the desires, intentions and approval of the majority of population. Despite the above-mentioned retrograde tendencies, the fall of communism and the wave of democratisation in the whole Eastern Europe brought to these areas the first multi-party elections, indeed, somewhat late in Serbia, the implications of which will be the topic of our further text.

III VALUE COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

1. Four Components of Political Culture

The starting point of this study is structuralist understanding of political culture that assumes differentiating between four of its components: value, cognitive, motivational and action. Such a viewpoint is theoretically justified and heuristic, and advocated by many authors, as elaborated in the first chapter, it is suitable for operationalisation and measuring in empirical research, it is justified and supported by the very findings and conclusions of empirical research, including the ones conducted in Serbia, and it was successfully applied in several studies here as well (for example: Pantić, 1988b; 1990b; Šram, 2006; Pantić & Pavlović, 2006; etc). The approach to studying political culture via its components provides not only a relative completeness and comprehensiveness of this otherwise very complex category (if research includes all four components), but also a better insight into the interrelations between components, producing typologies and searching for integral political culture, at least in the sense of a construct and statistical model. Of course, there are studies whose authors deal with exclusively one component of political culture, which is by all means legitimate and sometimes can even contribute to the more profound insights and realisations about the nature of an individual, selected component.

In Serbia and apparently everywhere else in the world, the least studied is the cognitive component of political culture, which is wrongly reduced exclusively to the level of political information and knowledge about current contents that are constantly imposed by the media. Namely, this component also implies understanding of politically relevant ideas, possessing of permanent knowledge about politics and the society, connecting it in a system, memorising important regularities in this field, and even critically discussing the facts and conclusions that are often taken “for granted” in public. Therefore, the cognitive component of political culture, which is seemingly simple in operational sense (authors usually reduce it to the score the respondent achieved on the test of relevant knowledge), is itself complex and multi-level, that is, has an internal structure within which some elements are more important, more central, while the majority of them is only of peripheral significance, although all of them, in the sense of variable, can be parts of the same (factor-analytical) structure. The main factors of variations of this component are as a rule the level of education of the respondent and the level of his/her political activity (formal role), and sometimes inclusion in social actions and forms of unconventional engagement. Cognitive component correlates with all other components of political culture. For example, in the study of young people in Serbia two decades ago (Pantić, 1988b; 1990b) the index of this component correlated most highly with the index of motivational component of political culture ($r = 0.47$), then with action component (0.42) and least with value component (0.29), but correlation coefficient was the highest with the index of integral political culture ($r = 0.71$), higher than in the case of other three components. All coefficients of linear correlation presented here are statistically significant.

Motivational component of political culture also deserves comprehensive research with regard to its theoretical and practical importance for interpretation and prediction of political behaviour. By the nature of things it is close to action component (in the above-mentioned research of the young in 1988 correlation coefficient was 0.42). Therefore, it owes its power to cognitive capacities as well ($r = 0.47$, therefore, correlation coefficient was even higher than in the case of correlation with action component). This confirms numerous political studies indicating that cognitive capacities tend to transpose into motives and acting itself. Motivational component draws its power from value component as well, certain elements of which overlap with the elements of motives and motivational features relevant for political life ($r = 0.37$ in the mentioned research). Motivational component of political culture is by all means important for successful functioning of a political system and accomplishment of democracy in practice. This component of political culture is also extremely complex, because it involves numerous elements that are structured hierarchically, which is revealed by applying factor-analytical techniques. Motivational component of political culture is also important because it connects the individual and social levels, interwoven in the nature of political culture (for example, personal motives with enthusiasm of social movements), but also subjective and objective (institutional) sides of political culture. Besides value component, motivational component is the most responsible for relative stability of political culture. In the above-mentioned research of the young, correlation coefficient between the indexes of motivational and integral political culture was 0.66. Weakening of this component is often the first indication of changing of the whole political culture.

Within studying of the subjective side of this wide category, action component of political culture objectifies the whole political culture, which is especially suitable for behaviourist oriented researchers, who draw conclusions about political culture in general based on specific behaviour of people. Depending on theoretical affinities, there is a sharp distinction between authors with regard to (un)acceptance of action or behavioural component of political culture.

For some of them, political culture is exclusively consciousness, background and normative sphere that, to be fair, influences all kinds of people's behaviour, even those politically relevant, but it cannot be "introduced" into the very concept of political culture. It is obvious that these standpoints are influenced by explicit or even only implicit understanding of culture on part of the authors (the narrower or wider meaning). Other authors think that without action component political culture is an "untold tale" and that it is precisely through this component that political culture becomes materialised and verified in certain sense. In research, action component is often unjustifiably reduced to electoral behaviour of citizens, although voting is indubitably an important formal and conventional element of this component. For better understanding of the nature of this component of political culture a "theory of general activity" is important (Smith, Maccaulay et al., 1980). In a nutshell, these authors think that political activity is a part of the wider activity of individuals and that it can be represented by concentric circles in the centre of which dominant individuals are grouped with regard to intensity and other dimensions of social behaviour. During the 1980s the team consisting of B. Kuzmanović, D. Pantić, M. Vasović and S. Mihailović performed a series of research studies on samples of the young and citizens of age in Serbia, testing the hypotheses deduced from this theory, as well as their own hypothesis about the nature of "Promethean activism" of that time, and especially the relation between general and social activism. The results of these research studies are only partially published. In an already mentioned study of

the young in Serbia in 1988, the index of action component correlated moderately with indexes of cognitive and motivational component (each 0.42), and surprisingly low with value component, probably because the process of dissolution of the governing self-management ideology had already begun. However, the index of action component correlated fairly high with the index of integral political culture (0.66), which confirms the justifiability of involving action component in the structure of integral political culture, that is, this finding does not speak in favour of those authors who think that political culture (as consciousness) and political behaviour should be considered separately.

In Serbia, as well as anywhere else in the world, the most studied was the value component of political culture, on the samples of the young, workers, citizens – potential voters, followers and members of political parties. It should be mentioned right away that there are authors who almost identify political culture with its value component, because it usually expresses and represents integral political culture in the largest degree. However, since our starting point in this study is the already mentioned structuralist understanding of political culture, its value component will be treated as one of the four equal parts – until proven differently. Indeed, at the very end of the monistic period we found (Pantić, 1988b; 1990b) that for integral political culture, primarily in the sense of distribution, the value component itself was the most important, at the core of which was still self-management orientation, despite its considerable erosion (the fall from around two thirds of those oriented towards self-management first to 43% and then to 35% during the period of one decade) and dissolution, which implied weakening of this central ideological axis in the consciousness of people in the sense of its less intensive linkage with other contents of ruling ideology, such as openness towards the world, modernism, preference of public property, collectivism etc. In the young in Serbia in 1988, the value component was, starting from a criterion-defined threshold, still the most widespread (despite the mentioned fall), the cognitive component followed (exactly one third of respondents above the criterion of elementary information level on knowledge test), then the motivational component (exactly one quarter of respondents ready to be involved), while action component, according to expectations based on the findings in other countries as well, was the least spread among the young in Serbia (14% of those really involved based on the applied index). This can imply that political socialisation of that period was the most efficient in forming a positive attitude towards the political system, and therefore, in shaping the value component of political culture. It was evident that the regime invested the majority of resources in and exerted the highest pressure at the very level of adopting the key ideological values in youth.

In the study of young people in 1988, the index of value component correlated significantly (0.56) with the index of integral political culture, although slightly lower than the indexes of other three components. By applying factor analysis in that research we identified the “participation orientation” in the young, which, among other variables, also consisted of action and motivational component of political culture. The second factor was identified as “critical-humanist” orientation which, along with other relevant variables, encompassed the value, cognitive and motivational components of political culture. In the third identified factor – “alienation” – value component was one of “marker” variables, but with a negative sign ($r = -0.74$). We paid a great deal of attention to the data obtained in this research of the then young generation because the representatives of that generation are in the prime of their life now (35 to 47 years old) and definitely have a very big influence on democratic processes in Serbia, with the possibility that they preserved some patterns

of consciousness and behaviour regarding political socialisation from their early formative years, which may be partly dysfunctional for the needs of the present time.

Value component of political culture (some authors call it evaluative and equal it with the evaluative) has multi-faceted significance for integral political culture of a society. In the first place, this component has an orientational function; it indicates how value promoters treat important objects (ideas, symbols, persons etc.). Value component offers to the whole political culture an emotional and perceptual content and it is sometimes interpreted primarily as affective, with the prediction that this component also contains certain cognitive and motivational elements, since values comprise such elements as well. Value component provides a “specific colour” to political culture and makes it recognisable also among the members within the group and with regard to the external groups, that is, in perception of other groups that take part in political life. More than other components, the value component of political culture enables the members of the society, as well as the followers of certain parties, to identify with the core of values in the respective society or some narrower group. It is also possible that individuals and parts of groups retain a critical distance and actively reject the values comprising the dominant political culture, which is manifested through counter-cultures, subcultures, “anti-system” of values (the latter, for example, in the members of one portion of opposition). Although none of the components of political culture is completely “pure” compared to other components, it is precisely the value component of political culture that is largely suffused with others and usually “loads” considerably the integral political culture (in the sense of factor analysis), which means that it is the least ideal-typical, and mostly content mixed. Value component of political culture usually has a considerable predictive potential, which recommends it, for example, for usage in prognosis of election results, especially in tandem with other variables within indexes and regression equations.

It is well-known that one of the main characteristics of values is their relative stability. Therefore, value component is also more resistant to changes compared to other three components of political culture, although that does not mean that it is completely stable. The example of erosion and dissolution of self-management orientation, the pivot of value component of political culture in Serbia near the end of the 1980s, indicates that changes are possible on short-term basis, which is also confirmed by the second example – the return and revival of religiosity, that is, suppression of once dominant atheism in Serbia in the same period of several years. Still, other components of political culture generally oscillate more during time, they are more unstable, which means that they are more susceptible to the influence of social events.

Value component enables heterogeneity of integral political culture and is mostly responsible for diversity in this field, that is, for appearance of different kinds of political culture (for more information about the division of political cultures see the first chapter of this study). Value component of political culture assumes the possibility of evaluating different objects, ideas etc. and that is why certain authors call it evaluative, although it is only one aspect of its value nature. In brief, value component of political culture mostly influences the quality of integral political culture and its continuity.

2. Short Overview of Selected World Research of Value Component of Political Culture of Voters

World social science literature provides numerous studies of the values of electorates and the memberships of political parties, including the value component of their political culture. Early research in Great Britain was summed up by Eysenck (1954), who proposed, on the basis of his own findings, a typology of followers of political parties, for example, those who combine in a coordinate system with radicalism versus conservatism on one axis (R–C) and authoritarian versus democratic attitudes on the other, or the still better known and provocative typology comparing the R – C axis with a measurement of temperament on a tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness dimension.

One of the first research studies on voters (Lipset et al., 1954) pointed out to the significance of psychological disposition as a determinant of electoral behaviour. For example, it identified a number of explanatory factors for variations in leftist voting within low-income groups. However, empirical research on values as a determinant and correlate of the act of voting and party preferences became more common only at the end of the 1960s as the concept of values had first to be theoretically and empirically more fully researched. In the most cited book on the nature of values in the last two decades, Rokeach (1973) states that “*Americans who identify themselves as Democrats, Republicans and Independents have highly similar value patterns, which may reflect either the fact that there is really very little difference between them or, more likely, that there are just too many different kinds of Democrats, Republicans and Independents in the United States*” (p. 83). One of the first research studies and analyses done in the USA (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964) arrived at the conclusion that political values, or ideology, played only a small role in partisan choice, but it was found in the 1970s that the influence of ideology on voting had risen (Nie et al., 1976). Dalton (1988) quotes data from the 1974/5 Political Action Survey which indicated that in the seven most developed countries “active use of ideology” was less widespread among citizens than an understanding of the left – right dimension, with the vast majority of citizens being able to place themselves on the left or the right without much difficulty. The same author indicated that in three of these developed countries a minority of citizens perceived political parties in ideological terms, but the evaluation of parties on the basis of intrinsic values and ideology was very widespread. Studying the level of ideological sophistication in five nations, Klingemann (1979) concluded that citizens with high ideological competence represented a minority, but he also pointed out to complex levels of ideological conceptualisation among voters and important related cultural differences.

The attempt of Inglehart (1990) to link materialist and postmaterialist values with party identification is also impressive. He concludes that: “*Western politics are coming to polarise according to social class less and less, and according to values more and more*” (p. 280), and that: “*There has been a growing tendency for Western electorates to polarise according to Materialist versus Postmaterialist values*” (p. 286). Reviewing a vast number of studies, Dogan (1995) concluded that ideological space was greatly reduced in the period 1950-1990 and that “*the growing individualisation of voting behaviour is the result of the parallel decline of the class vote and the religious vote, and also of a decline in partisanship*”. Therborn (1995)

criticised Inglehart's idea of materialist vs. postmaterialist dichotomy as an alternative to class in predicting political commitment "because it is itself to a large extent a traditional left-right opposition". He found that "class voting is still a distinctive characteristic of Europe in the 1980s."

At the very end of their book from 2005, after extensive comparative research and profound analyses, Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 300), among other things, conclude: "*Favourable existential conditions contribute to emerging self-expression values that give individual liberty priority over collective discipline, human diversity over group conformity, and civic autonomy over state authority. The emergence of these values transforms modernisation into a process of human development in which the underlying theme is the growth of autonomous human choice, giving rise to a new type of humanistic society that has never existed before. Rising self-expression values provide a social force that operates in favour of democracy... Democracy is the institutional reflection of the emancipative forces inherent in human development, and self-expression values are the best available indicator of these forces. (...) Effective democracy is very likely to emerge when more than 45 percent of a society's public ranks high on self-expression values*". These conclusions are very relevant and heuristic for future research of value components of political culture (of voters).

3. The Main Findings and Conclusions of Empirical Surveys of the Value Component of Political Culture of Voters in Serbia in the First Period of Pluralism (1990-2000)

Formally speaking, the last decade of the 20th century in Serbia can be considered as the first period of pluralism, despite the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević. Namely, at the end of 1990, multi-party system was introduced and the first elections were held. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), led by Slobodan Milošević, acknowledged that Serbia was entering the process of transition as well, but the whole decade was actually marked only by the destruction of the old institutions. Indeed, breaking down of communist institutions did take place elsewhere in Eastern Europe as well, but in Serbia that process took unusually long and was accompanied by the transference of destruction principle on the whole society, and the neighbouring countries in the region as well, which did not allow for the positive sides of transition to be visible in the first place in Serbia itself. With the introduction of multi-party system and the culmination of state crisis that resulted in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, some previously suppressed ideological values came to the forefront very suddenly, but also some relatively new values for this area. The changes in values, for which it is worth mentioning that they are the most consistent human dispositions in normal times, were also additionally influenced by the following factors in Serbia: UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992 that contributed to the decrease in production to only one third of the one in 1989, record hyperinflation in 1993, drastic impoverishment and unemployment of population, wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, inflow of Serbian refugees from the environment, participation of the Yugoslav National Army in quelling the rebellion of the Albanians in Kosovo in 1998 and NATO intervention against the FRY in 1999.

Under the influence of the afore-mentioned negative events, massive xenophobia occurred (in three quarters of the population), although a decade earlier xenophobia was restricted to 10% to 15% of Serbian citizens, as well as in Croatia in the middle of the 1980s. The once dominant value components of political culture of the population – openness towards the world, internationalist feelings, multiple loyalty (multiple identification, for example, simultaneous identification of people both with local community and Serbia and Yugoslavia, and even wider – with Europe and the world) were in a short time replaced by closeness, nationalism and intolerance. A similar tendency was at work in other countries of Eastern Europe as well, but on a smaller scale, which means that nationalism is a regular occurrence in the first years of transition that, as a rule, carry with them sacrifices and frustrations for population. However, Yugoslavia, “the shining star of Eastern Europe” (Gagnon, 1994) was still not expected to break up through a series of ethnic wars, since other countries of the region, such as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, had more repressive communist regimes until the crucial year of 1989, when the democratic changes started.

Political elites from the area of the whole former Yugoslavia, mostly realigned top communist people, as well as the leaderships of new parties – both democratic and extremist (anti-communist, nationalist, radical) more or less used nationalism in their endeavours to win over the voters. Prior to that, the departing communist regime, but also some of the new parties, used media propaganda to induce the feeling of national endangerment and abused the massive anxiety of the population caused by the change of system, state borders, decrease of economy, unemployment, wars. It has been mentioned earlier that, as well as in the 1980s, classic manipulative mechanisms of gaining and sustaining power were applied, such as scapegoating, social demagoguery (“The Serbs – the oldest nation”, “The Serbs – the heavenly people”, et al.), antic tenets “Divide et impera!”, “Panem et circenses!” etc. Survival strategy and “ghetto-consciousness” were natural reactions of the population, which, along with all the above-mentioned, had an extremely negative effect on political culture in general and its value component in particular. For example, in the first half of the 1990s, authoritarianism increased dramatically, affecting more than two thirds of the population, obviously as a consequence of all negative processes and events (Kuzmanović, 1994; Golubović, Kuzmanović and Vasović, 1995). Therefore, the main characteristic of integral political culture in the 1990s in Serbia was probably the increased authoritarianism, which, indeed, had been increased in comparison to other countries before that as well. In keeping with that, we can speak about the political culture of Serbia of the time primarily as extremely authoritarian.

At the beginning of the second half of the 1990s (1996-1997), certain positive changes did occur in Serbia, such as the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stopping of hyperinflation, lifting of the UN sanctions against the FRY, abandoning of open nationalist propaganda, beginning of economy revival, smaller increase in standard of living due to selling some attractive state-owned companies. This calming of the situation contributed in the first place to the reduction of xenophobia and hyper-patriotism in people, which will be elaborated in further detail later on. However, the rebellion of the Albanians in Kosovo in 1998 and NATO intervention against the FRY in 1999 slowed down the recovery of Serbia, and by that also the positive changes in the value component of political culture of voters and population in Serbia in general (in the sense of strengthening the values of democratic political culture).

Before we present the selected findings and conclusions of empirical research on the value component of political culture in Serbia from the last decade of the 20th century, we would like to draw the attention to certain characteristics of parliamentary scene relevant for understanding of voters' declarations and their value profile at the time. After several years of multi-party system and several first elections, political life in Serbia remained very unsettled, as demonstrated by a number of indicators. These are the large number of parties, their instability and frequent divisions, changes in party leaders, change of party by prominent leaders and sections of the membership and followers, conflicts between party representatives including parliamentary deputies, the creation of ad hoc coalitions, change in party programmes including mutual exchanges of election platforms, the fluctuation and erosion of party memberships, etc. (for more see: Goati, Slavujević and Pribičević, 1992; Vasović, V. and Goati, 1994; Goati, 1994).

The conclusions concerning values of voters and the value profile of the memberships of the most influential parties are therefore valid only for a limited time span. Another important limitation of the results of empirical research in the first stage of pluralism is the fact that values were not exclusively a reflection of party membership or preference. They often preceded citizens' party preferences, or had been formed even before the parties existed. Differences in the values of voters are therefore more likely to be a cause than a consequence of their party identification, although it is indisputable that parties formulate certain values. Big differences in the value systems of voters, particularly those that were confirmed in many surveys conducted in the still short multi-party period, can most probably be interpreted as the result of value selection and the attraction of citizens to parties that were active in this process and themselves reinforced ready-formed values of their supporters during election campaigns and the periods between elections. Political parties, primarily their leaders and to a lesser extent party programmes and activities, were presented to citizens as important social factors, although the image citizens formed of parties was not always the one they expected or sought to portray. This subjective image was determined by a series of social and psychological factors, the historical background and the current situation. For some voters, political parties were social communities, like churches or (for party fanatics) sects, through which they projected their expectations, wishes and fears. The voters of that time were mostly the same citizens who until 1990 uncritically supported the only party that existed (LCY), which means that many of them were only just beginning to form electoral preferences, motivations and perceptions of the differences between the parties. Previous loyalty to the self-management system and the LCY could manifest itself in various ways in the changed circumstances, that is, as: nostalgia for the past; disappointment with the party's current offer; unreal expectations from the new parties; confusion; radical conversion to anti-communism. The continuing influence of the earlier system could have been manifested in already-formed personal traits, for example, the authoritarian syndrome.

The conclusions about the commitment of voters to certain political parties were drawn mostly on the basis of their electoral orientation, and sometimes also on the basis of other indicators, for example, a hypothetical choice from the list of relevant parties only, the feeling regarding the party closest to voters, the probability to ever vote for a certain party et al. We will compare the results obtained among followers of the main parties in order to determine to what extent their followers shared certain values. We should mention that what we assume under party identification is the customary emotional or other psychological attachment of voters to a given party. The act of voting itself is considered by many authors as a form of rational, conventional

political participation and an element of general activism (Lipset et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Smith et al., 1980; Niemi and Weisberg, 1984; etc.). This approach stresses the role of parties as groupings of people with similar values, enables comparisons between them and assumes that parties also contribute to the formation of voters' values to some extent. It will be shown later that political parties in Serbia, at least in that first period of pluralism, were still only tertiary agents of political socialisation in general, and within it of value component of political culture in particular. It is quite possible that some more profound conditions simultaneously determined electoral orientations of voters, their voting behaviour and values on one side and the parties and their programmes on the other, like the class structure of society or some crucial political events.


Public opinion survey in Serbia performed immediately before the first parliamentary election at the end of 1990 (Mihailović et al., 1991) showed that there were significant differences in distribution of authoritarianism depending on party preference of the respondents. Using the index (but not Adorno's F-scale) it was established that the absolute majority of SPS supporters, the party that was soon going to win the first elections by a wide margin, were characterised by authoritarian orientation in that moment (60% versus only 20% of non-authoritarian), while the Democratic Party (DP) supporters were oriented completely the opposite (20% of authoritarian versus 62% of non-authoritarian). Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) supporters were divided (42% of authoritarian versus 37% of non-authoritarian). In the same survey, tough national orientation was expressed by as much as 92% of the then supporters of the SRM, 70% of respondents affiliated to DP, 66% to SPS and 39% to other parties (Mihailović, 1994). Under the influence of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "firm" national orientation was much more spread in the voters of some parties in November 1993: in almost all supporters of SPS and Serbian Radical Party (SRP), in four fifths of supporters of DP and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) and two thirds of those inclined towards Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEMOS).

The research of the youth from Belgrade performed later (Mihailović, Džuverović and Vuković) confirmed that SPS (67%) and SRP (65%) attracted the authoritarian oriented youth and maybe partially encouraged the development of that personality syndrome in their young supporters, while the young inclined towards DPS (10%) and DP (11%) were rarely authoritarian. Applying the scale, the authors discovered that only 9% of young people from Belgrade were closed in their national group as opposed to as much as 54% of those open, which is the usual percentage obtained in the research of youth in the period of monism. The relatively rare young people who declared themselves as SPS and SRP supporters in Belgrade in 1993 were above-average nationally closed (respectively 29% and 22%), in which they still significantly lagged behind the older supporters of these parties. The young who were inclined towards the parties of the then democratic opposition were nationally open in over two thirds of cases as opposed to only one fifth of their peers who preferred SPS and one quarter of those inclined towards SRP. It seems that the correlation between nationalism and electoral orientations was established at an early young age, but that could only apply to the minority of those young people who were party oriented until that moment (in total, only 30% of the generation). As far as the above-average distribution of authoritarianism is concerned, and even the "firm" national orientation of the older followers of SPS and SRP, these tendencies can primarily be interpreted by the social structure of the members and followers of these parties (the domination of the less educated). The lower social status definitely determined authoritarianism

and the “firm” national orientation of the voters at the time. However, there is no doubt that potential voters with an authoritarian personality structure and those nationalist oriented were attracted by the parties that espoused paternalism, fanatic patriotism, the strong state, militancy, obedience.

At the beginning of the period of pluralism, the nostalgia syndrome was not prominently spread among the citizens in Serbia. Nostalgia for the old political system was identified as a minority phenomenon throughout the Eastern Europe during the first period of transition. However, a “latent nostalgia for socialism” was very widespread even among the Germans in the Eastern part of the country since its unification. In 1992, for example, 75% of them considered socialism “a good idea that was poorly realised” (Klingemann & Hofferbert, 1994). On the basis of a shortened index of only four elements (Pantić, 1995a) we confirmed that nostalgia of this kind existed in Serbia in almost half of population, but in nine out of ten cases was weak in intensity and concentrated among the followers of ruling party, the successor to the former LCY, while the absence of nostalgia was evident among the supporters of all other parties, including SRP, which effectively took part in the 1992 elections in an unspoken coalition with the SPS.

Graph 1: The nostalgia syndrome and electoral orientations of citizens (%)



Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research (CPSPOR), Institute of Social Science, Belgrade, October 1992 (N = 1,932 respondents).

However, a subsequent research using the index of nine dimensions of living discovered that three quarters of citizens evaluated the past positively (Mihailović et al., 1996). This finding was interpreted as the sign of people’s memory about the better life in the near past, and not as a lament for the previous political system.


In a non-published public opinion survey in Serbia (March 1992, Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research), it was found that the religiosity of SRM supporters (63%) was considerably more spread than the religiosity of the supporters of DP and SPS (36% each). However, it was to be shown soon that the supporters of the then ruling SPS, the successor to the former atheist LCY, would become above-averagely religious, partly as an expression of their social structure (lower society strata), and partly because of the real turning of this party to the once proscribed religion – now a substitute for ideology for the members

of this party. Milić (1992) and Branković (1992) obtained similar findings with regard to the religiosity of the supporters of the political parties of the time.

Summing up the results of the first studies in the period of pluralism on the values of supporters of political parties in Serbia, we come to the conclusion that SPS supporters were at the time characterised by nostalgia, authoritarianism, unreligiosity and “firm” national orientation. SRM supporters were the most religious, nationalist oriented, moderately authoritarian and without nostalgia for the old system. DP supporters also rarely manifested nostalgia, but in most cases expressed neither religiosity nor authoritarianism. Still, in the beginning they were the followers of the “firm” national orientation and drifted away from it gradually, as we will see later, only after the cessation of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while their youth predominantly manifested aversion towards nationalism at the beginning of pluralism already.

We have written more fully elsewhere on the changes in the religiosity of citizens in Serbia in comparison with other countries (Pantić, 1993). Of course, conclusions on the extent of religiosity depend on the definition of the phenomenon and the indicator chosen, and empirical data on the religiosity of party members and followers differ therefore. If membership to a particular confession is taken as an indicator of religiosity, according to the 1991 census nine out of ten citizens of Serbia were religious, but this is a weak indicator because it reflects the national origin and the cultural and family background more than an actual religious feeling. However, if other particularly restrictive indicators are taken, for example, belief in life after death, no more than 6% Serbian citizens were religious, in contrast to the USA, where almost half of the population was religious in this sense. On the basis of self-identification of the respondents themselves, which is the usual indicator in comparative research, we confirmed that there had been an increase in religiosity in Serbia at the end of 1993. The results vary depending on the electoral/party orientation of citizens. Graph 2 shows the extent of religiosity among the potential followers of the main parties.

Graph 2: Religiosity of potential supporters of political parties (%)




Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, November 1993 (N = 1,510 cases; Serbia without Kosovo).

Religious views were the rarest among the potential followers of the League of Communists/Movement for Yugoslavia (LC/MY) and another small party – Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS). Some other surveys confirmed that DP was the worldliest party among the biggest ones, that is, the relevant parties in the parliament, probably due to the structure of its membership and supporters (educated and relatively emancipated from religion). Again, it is interesting to note that many actual and potential supporters of the SPS had religious feelings, although that party was in many ways the heir of the former atheistic LCY. The differences in the religiosity of followers of individual parties could have had important implications, particularly because religiosity had continued to grow in the following years. These implications primarily concerned parties' electoral platforms. However, at the theoretical level religiosity could be used in the positioning of the parties and their voters and for the sake of prediction and interpreting the results of elections.

The traditionalism versus modernism value dimension was exceptionally important for political differentiation of Serbian population in the period of political monism (Zaninovich, 1970; Pantić, 1977; etc.). Judging from comparative studies of several decades, it has been important in the political life of both developed and developing countries. More has been said on this subject elsewhere (Pantić, 1990b).

We would recall here only that, researching the role of ideology in the political orientation of the Americans, Robinson (1968) concluded that the classical liberal versus conservative dimension “does not work” and proposed using the “more promising dimension of traditionalism-modernism” in the future. The enormous political relevance of this dimension is probably due to the fact that it covers and integrates a number of other important dimensions: the temporal one, the attitude towards change, dependence versus emancipation etc. It is exactly in the period of transition towards democracy and market economy that this dimension acquires a particular importance.

Graph 3: Voters' orientations towards traditionalism and modernism (%)



Source: The same as in Graph 1.

Support for modernism significantly decreased compared to two decades ago, when it was usually around 50% as an average. This was a consequence of the revival of old traditions, which political elites throughout the former Yugoslavia had

encouraged in order to retain power. The decline of modernism was also linked with the uncertainty that reforms had brought for the majority of the population. Differences between party supporters were striking concerning this dimension, which was very relevant for the value component of political culture in Serbia of that time. On the one side were the followers of SPS and SRP, among whom traditionalism was dominant, and on the other side were the supporters of the democratic opposition, among whom an absolute majority favoured modernism. The linkage between the support for one or the other of these values and the party identification of Serbian citizens leads to the conclusion that SPS enjoyed the support of conservative and right-wing voters (status quo), in spite of the fact that this party frequently declared itself to be modern and left-wing. With respect to this important value dimension, SPS supporters were close to SRP supporters in 1992 and 1993. On the other side, a clear majority of followers of SRM/DEMOS, DP and DPS favoured modernism. This was probably due to their advocacy of political discontinuity and the openness of their party leaderships towards the world, and undoubtedly also owing to the age structure (mainly young) and greater level of education of this part of the electorate.

Xenophobia is usually defined as a dislike of groups or members of groups that are seen as foreign. This broad category thus covers many related phenomena (chauvinist nationalism, prejudice, racism, etc.), unless it is defined in its most literal and narrow sense as fear of foreigners. Xenophobia exists in greater or smaller degree in all societies and manifests itself in two forms: moderate and benign, or active and malign. The latter implies experiencing every foreigner as an enemy and acting in accordance with that view, although often only at the verbal level. Xenophobia has been the subject of considerable amount of empirical research in Europe during the 1990s, particularly since it has grown stronger in both Western and Eastern Europe for different reasons, whose common source is increased insecurity due to the collapse of states, wars, waves of refugees, recession, declining standards of living, unemployment and frustration caused by unrealistic expectations of the transition to democracy and market economy. For example, Klingemann and Hofferbert (1994) discuss the extent, some determinants and the implications of xenophobia. They show that xenophobia is a product of social situation and not an expression of a „German character“. The chief advocates of xenophobia were young, unemployed and poorly educated males and the followers of extremist parties.

Table 1: The presence of xenophobia in relation to voters' electoral preferences in three surveys

Party followers	Date of survey		
	Oct. 1992	May 1993	Nov. 1993
SPS	85	88	87
SRM	59	71	-
DEMOS	52	55	49
DP	59	71	64
DPS	54	45	57
SRP	92	88	84
DCVH	-	-	0
Undecided	33	45	63
Abstainers	20	60	61
Average	68	76	67

Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, October 1992 (sample=1,932); May 1993 (sample=1,904); November 1993 (sample=1,510).

Xenophobia was operationalised as the relationship towards members of different nations and measured by an index of 20 items. It is clear that xenophobia was very widespread, particularly if one bears in mind that other values, such as openness to the world and multiple loyalty, were dominant in this country until 1990s. However, the level of extreme xenophobia was very low (6% in 1992 and only 2% in November 1993). This leads to the conclusion that xenophobia was not deeply rooted and was the result of media manipulation for political purposes. It was probably of a situational nature, which means that it was a temporary phenomenon for many individuals. This conclusion is supported by oscillations in the presence of xenophobia and its culmination at the moment of greatest tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the Vance-Owen peace plan was advanced. The SRP and SPS followers were almost homogeneous with respect to xenophobia, while the followers of smaller parties and Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DCVH) did not exhibit such attitudes at all. Xenophobia was also relatively widespread among the followers of the democratic opposition and later spread to undecided voters and abstainers.

Certain phenomena linked to diffuse xenophobia were similarly widespread in Serbia and varied depending on party affiliation and the time when research was conducted. For example, one survey (Golubović, Kuzmanović and Vasović, 1993) revealed big differences in the presence of nationalist attitudes between the supporters of SPS (53%) and SRP (52%) on the one side and the followers of SRM (20%) and DP and DPS (10%) on the other.

Table 2: The distribution of hyper-patriotism (%) and voters' electoral orientations in two surveys

Party followers	Date of survey	
	May 1993	Nov. 1993
SPS	94	62
SRP	96	85
DEMOS	25	14
DP	45	15
DPS	26	14
DCVH	-	0
Undecided	64	34
Abstainers	60	28
Average	67	37

Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade (as in Table 1).

It is clear that hyper-patriotism, which was also measured by an index, was to a greater extent programmed from above and was, even in 1993, greatly exacerbated on the eve of the elections, but it had remained the majority phenomenon among SPS and SRP followers. Like xenophobia, hyper-patriotism found a fertile ground in mass frustrations and uncertainties of the time of sudden changes, wars and economic catastrophe.

Table 3: Importance of group membership in relation to the electoral orientation of respondents (%)

Party followers	Kind of commitment		
	Republic of Serbia	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	Europe
SPS	86	89	38
SRM	70	40	61
DEMOS	60	24	65
DP	42	41	63
DPS	56	40	75
SRP	88	48	24
Undecided	67	67	44
Abstainers	59	59	49
Average	68	68	47

Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Science, Belgrade (as in Table 1).

Note: Percents refer to those who answered either „very important” or „quite important“ to separate questions on the importance of belonging to each category.

Table 3 shows that Serbian citizens attached greater importance to membership to the narrow group, particularly to the Republic of Serbia, than to commitment to Europe. However, in spite of the widespread xenophobia and massive acceptance of hard-line nationalism, almost half of the respondents also saw loyalty to Europe as important. In the last survey of public opinion in the former Yugoslavia in 1990, 52% of Serbian respondents stressed the importance of belonging to Europe, 71% to Yugoslavia and 51% to the Republic of Serbia (Pantić, 1991). The view that belonging to Serbia was important had therefore grown, which is a part of the wider process mentioned above. The importance of commitment to Europe was emphasised by a significantly higher proportion of opposition supporters than the supporters of SPS and SRP. However, the reverse was true with respect to the importance attached to membership to the FRY. DP and DPS supporters mainly identified themselves as Europeans, while SRM/DEMOS supporters equally emphasised the importance of belonging to Serbia and Europe. At that time, these parties strongly disputed the establishment of FRY. Similarities are again evident between SPS and SRP supporters. Both groups rated highly the importance of belonging to Serbia and the FRY, but attached relatively little importance to membership to Europe. Abstainers were closer to opposition than to SPS or SRP supporters in their views on the importance of belonging to Serbia and the FRY. To sum up, it is clear that the ruling patriotic block and the unofficial coalition of SPS and SRP imposed a narrower concept of group loyalty, stressing the importance of citizens' identification within the republican and federal frameworks.


The authoritarian personality syndrome is especially important for studying political behaviour, particularly as a personal and value basis for differentiating undemocratic from democratic orientations, as has been proved time and time again since Adorno and his associates (1950) published their capital work „*The Authoritarian Personality*“. Half a century of research on authoritarianism proved consistently that the culturally and psycho-dynamically determined authoritarian personality has a predisposition for undemocratic reactions. Several specific features of authoritarianism have been found in Serbia: a widespread, sometimes record, defensive function, not only at the personal level, but also in the sense of group

identity (it is very strong, for example, among the Serbs in Kosovo); current reproduction, which thus cannot be interpreted as the result of inertia; a tendency to concentrate on the both poles of the dimension of activity versus passivity; and homogenisation due to the lack of variation in educational levels in the South (it is worth noting that education everywhere in the world leads to social differentiation of the level of authoritarianism). Many studies of authoritarianism in Serbia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia by Rot and Havelka (1973), Pantić (1977; 1981b; 1990a; 1990b; 1990c), Kuzmanović (1994) and other authors point to these distinctive features. The results of an extensive study conducted on the eve of the first election in 1990 (Mihailović et al., 1991), which found significant differences in the frequency of authoritarianism among the supporters of different parties, has already been commented on.

It was evident that a clear majority of SPS followers had an authoritarian mentality, while DP followers were predominantly unauthoritarian and SRM followers were even more divided. One later survey (Golubović, Kuzmanović and Vasović, 1993) found even more people with authoritarian mentalities among SPS supporters (64%) than SRP supporters (47%). Relatively few followers of SRM (20%), DP (12%) and DPS (10%) belonged to that category, as was the case with members and followers of all other parties (18%).

There is still no generally accepted antipode to authoritarianism in world literature. Some authors simply speak of non-authoritarianism, implying an absence of authoritarianism, while others seek a qualitatively distinct concept (for example, “anti-authoritarianism” Kreml, 1977) and others equate non-authoritarianism with tolerance. Opting for the last definition, particularly because of its relevance for the problem of transition towards democracy in Eastern Europe, we constructed the index with eight indicators, referring mainly to current conflicts and problems in the FRY and its vicinity, and compared this index with the electoral preferences of citizens.

Graph 4: Frequency of tolerance (%) and voters’ electoral preferences



Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences (as in Table 2).

Note: The differences until 100% are made up of “mixed type”.

The proportion of tolerant and intolerant persons in each party led to the conclusion that SPS and SRP supporters were grouped on the intolerant side and the DPS followers on the other. SRM and DP supporters were divided (with a slight inclination towards intolerance) and DEMOS supporters were predominantly tolerant.

Radicalism is usually defined as a system of beliefs and behaviour expressing a desire to change the existing state of affairs completely. It is sometimes stressed that radicalism refers more to the use of intensive and even ruthless methods in order to accomplish certain political goals. The opposite of radicalism is most often defined as conservatism (Eysenck, 1954), or, alternatively, reformism or liberalism. We shall assume here that the opposite of radicalism is expressed in the preference of peaceful means of changing or upholding the existing state of affairs. In the survey of FRY public opinion conducted in May 1993, we measured radicalism by fifteen indicators that had originally been designed for research on other issues. This index is therefore heavily weighed with questions about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which made it possible to distinguish the inclination of respondents towards forceful methods of resolving conflicts.

Table 4: Frequency of radicalism (%) and electoral preferences

Party followers	Orientation		
	Radicalism	Mixed	Anti-radicalism
SPS	64	29	7
SRP	97	3	0
DEMOS	16	28	56
SRM	24	29	47
DPS	19	16	65
DP	25	18	57
Undecided	26	38	36
Abstainers	32	33	35
Average	38	31	31


Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, May 1993 (N=1,904).

At the time the survey was conducted (when Vance-Owen plan for peace in Bosnia was put forward, which proved an important issue for the expression of radical attitudes) radicalism was present among over a third of Yugoslav citizens, but there were exceptionally great differences between the followers of each party. Our index is practically validated by SRP followers, who were almost unanimous (97%) in this respect, while exactly one half manifested the most extreme form of radicalism measured by the index. Although two thirds of SPS followers were radical, only 6,5% manifested the strongest form of radicalism, the same percentage as for the whole sample. Weak or latent radicalism (21%) was more common in the sample as a whole than manifest or moderate radicalism (11%) or extreme radicalism (6,5%). Anti-radical feelings were more common among the majority of DPS, DP and DEMOS followers (more because of the smaller parties than the leading SRM). It is interesting to note that the best indicator of radicalism was the opinion that the Serbs should keep all the territory they controlled in Bosnia and Herzegovina ($r=.64$). Radicalism was particularly widespread among the rural population, the older and less educated, manual workers and the economically frustrated. However, it was still more widespread among the admirers of SRP leader Vojislav Šešelj (86%) and Bosnian Serbs leader Radovan Karadžić (67%), the people who would terminate the UN

mission in Bosnia (78%), the advocates of ostracism (61%), the people who were convinced that the FRY could survive for a long time under UN sanctions (62%) and the people who confessed to being interested in politics (51%).

Like the previous index, liberalism was measured later on the basis of the results of an existing public opinion research in Serbia (October 1992) and the significance of the results is therefore restricted. Thus, this index of ten items has only a tentative or explorative function, although some of its elements, such as the importance of private property, the individual versus the state, questioning of the exaggerated importance of borders and opposition to isolationism, would probably form any index of similar kind.

Graph 5: Frequency of liberal attitudes (%) and voters' electoral preferences



Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences (as in Graph 1)

On the eve of the 1992 election Serbian citizens were divided with respect to this value dimension, which many authors consider the most important of all in terms of ideological relevance. Conservatism (support for the status quo) had a mild advantage, which would be slightly larger if the overall result did not include the supporters of other parties. These are not listed here because each of them had only a few followers, but their supporters were generally liberal-minded.

As in several other comparisons, SPS followers were on one side, almost unanimous in their conservatism, with two thirds of SRP supporters thinking the same way. On the other side, the followers of the opposition parties were liberally oriented, with DEMOS supporters, especially those outside the SRM, standing out. If similar or even less striking differences were confirmed by later research using a broader spectrum of relevant issues (more closely related to the theoretical concept of liberalism and less burdened by current developments), that would mean that the main directions of value differentiation between parties were identified at the beginning of the period of pluralism in Serbia, in restricted and conflict-ridden social circumstances. These value differences primarily reflected the social structure of their membership and show on what basis the opposition and the ruling party sought to win the support of voters.

Attempts have been made in the past to contrast liberalism with statism in both theoretical works and empirical research. The results obtained by Golubović, Kuzmanović and Vasović (1993), using a different scale, confirm the findings described above, although at a lower level, which could be explained by the fact that statism is a narrower concept than conservatism. These authors found that statism characterised 61% of SPS, 42% of SRP, 17% of SRM, 10% of DPS and 7% of DP followers.

It would be wrong to conclude from the above that the followers of the main parties belonged to parallel and irreconcilable worlds. Although voters gave their votes to only one party, they could have had several favourites, even when they traditionally voted for only one party. For example, in the 1984 Euro-Barometer Survey 21, cited by Inglehart (1990), voters in West European countries named on the average three parties for which they would consider voting. Liberals achieved the highest rating (60%), although for the overwhelming majority of voters they were only the second or reserve party for which few people actually voted in elections. They were followed by socialists (55% of potential voters), Christian democrats (49%), ecologists (47%), conservatives (37%), nationalists (18%), communists (16%) and fascists (only 2%). However, a further 15% of Europeans stated that they could theoretically vote for “some extreme left” and 14% for “some extreme right” party (Inglehart, 1990).

In Serbia, DP was at first a potential reserve party for up to 40% of voters, and it was later joined by DPS with up to one third of voters. However, both parties gained far fewer Parliament seats, precisely because they were mainly reserve parties. Opposition voters actually saw little distinction between these parties. The coefficient of their similarity when seen from the perspective of voters was very high ($r=.75$). Within the opposition block, DEMOS/SRM and DPS had also often been mutually exchangeable parties. Until the middle of 1993, the SRP was the reserve party of the ruling SPS and vice versa.

In the November 1993 survey of public opinion in Serbia respondents were asked a series of hypothetical questions about whether they would vote for the most important parties: SPS, SRP, SRM, DP, DPS, DCVH, CAS, LC/MY, PSU (Party of Serbian Unity) and SNR. They were asked for each party individually whether they could ever vote for that party. Positive answers included “probably yes” and “certainly yes”, which, taken together, gave the highest limit of each party’s vote. Each respondent selected 2.3 parties on the average, but a total of 70%, which was close to the proportion of those who actually voted in December 1993 election, singled out one party and said they would certainly vote for SPS, 10% for DP, 8% for DPS, 6% for SRP, 3% each for CAS, LC/MY (League of Communists/Movement for Yugoslavia) and DCVH, 2% for PSU and so on. However, when the number of respondents who answered “certainly yes” and “probably yes” was combined, SPS would have a potential vote of 39%, DP would have the same, DPS 35%, SRM 21%, FPS 24%, SRP 17%, CAS 14% PSU 13%, LC/MY 12% and DCVH 7%.

It is clear that Serbian parties had a considerable electoral potential, and we therefore constructed a special index of party expansiveness to test how many supporters of the leading parties had alternative parties as hypothetical or reserve choices.

The proportion of unattached voters in the first four columns demonstrates the inconsistency of voters who had previously said that they would vote for a particular party in the next election. However, this phenomenon is common only among undecided voters and particularly abstainers (40%), which confirms the fact that the

latter really did not have a favourite party and had therefore decided not to vote. Averagely, only a quarter of voters was attached to only one party, this answer being most common among SPS (46%) and SRP (38%) supporters. Most respondents (59%) were polyvalent. Despite being attached to one party, they said they could vote for some other party in certain circumstances. The proportion of respondents with reserve parties was incomparably higher among the supporters of democratic opposition, reaching almost nine out of ten among followers of DP and DPS. Closer correlation analysis shows that as second and third parties they most often chose DEMOS, DP, DPS or some other party. However, SPS and SRP followers also had potential favourites, most often choosing each other (despite the already apparent conflict between the two parties) and sometimes other parties.

Table 5: Index of party expansiveness (%) and voters' electoral orientations

Party followers	Modalities		
	Unattached	Single party	Polyvalent
SPS	3	46	51
SRP	4	38	58
DEMOS	10	12	78
SRM	6	16	78
DP	0	12	88
DPS	0	11	89
Undecided	20	25	55
Abstainers	40	18	42
Average	15	26	59

Source: Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences (as in Graph 2).

Table 6 sums up the above-mentioned and certain not mentioned findings and draws possible conclusions about typical values profile of followers of most important Serbian parties. The distribution of value orientations can be compared and ranked in this way, enabling us to draw a picture of the followers of each party on the basis of their dominant characteristics.

The typical values of SPS followers were an emphasis on the importance of the FRY (89%), a positive attitude towards the regime (88%), xenophobia (87%), radicalism (74%), confidence in the political institutions of the system (71%), authoritarianism (64%), hyper-patriotism (62%), statism (61%) and nationalism (53%).

SRP followers were predominantly radical (97%), hyper-patriotic and xenophobic (84% each), emphasised the importance of belonging to the FRY (78%), had no nostalgia for the old system (71%) and were interested in politics (60%).

SRM followers were characterised by a lack of nostalgia for the old system (91%), openness to other parties (78%), liberalism (70%), the view that everything must be done to get the UN sanctions against the FRY lifted (68%), a sense of belonging to Europe (61%), interest in politics (58%) and modernism (53%).

DP followers were open towards other parties (88%), not nostalgic for the old system (79%), were liberal (71%), modernist (67%), xenophobic (64%), stressed the importance of belonging to Europe (63%), thought everything should be done to get the sanctions removed (60%) and were interested in politics (53%).

Table 6: Distribution of selected value orientations and related dispositions (%) and citizens' electoral orientations

Value	Time of survey	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS	Average
Without nostalgia	Oct. 1992	28	71	91	79	85	45
Religiosity	Nov. 1993	43	36	50	31	34	42
Modernism	Oct. 1992	13	9	53	67	73	37
Hyper-patriotism	Nov. 1993	62	84	14	15	14	37
Belonging to the FRY important	Oct. 1992	89	78	40	41	40	62
Belonging to Europe important	Oct. 1992	38	24	61	63	75	47
Authoritarianism	Oct. 1993	64	47	22	12	10	-
Tolerance	May 1993	3	7	35	30	58	22
Liberalism	Oct. 1992	17	32	70	71	78	47
Radicalism	May 1993	74	93	24	25	19	38
Xenophobia	Nov. 1993	87	84	49	64	57	71
Confidence in institutions	Oct. 1992	71	43	21	23	18	43
Interest in politics	Nov. 1993	45	60	58	53	56	37
Party polyvalence	Nov. 1993	52	58	78	89	89	59
Nationalism	Oct. 1993	53	52	20	10	10	-
Statism	Oct. 1993	61	42	17	7	10	-
Positive towards regime	May 1993	88	45	5	4	6	42
Do all to end UN sanctions against the FRY	May 1993	30	18	68	60	71	44

Note: All data come from the three already cited surveys by the Institute of Social Sciences, except for the data on authoritarianism, nationalism and statism, which are taken from the preliminary results of the survey by Golubović, Kuzmanović and Vasović (1993), in which the marginals for these three dispositions are not presented.

DPS followers were distinguished by openness towards other parties (89%), a lack of nostalgia (85%), liberalism (78%), emphasis on the importance of belonging to Europe (75%), modernism (73%), a belief that everything should be done to get sanctions against the FRY lifted (71%), tolerance (58%), xenophobia (57%) and interest in politics (56%).

Coefficients of rank of correlation between the order of values of followers of the five leading Serbian parties show how close or far they were from each other. SRM, DP and DPS followers were exceptionally close in terms of their values, which means that strategic and tactical differences between these parties were primarily dictated by their leadership. Value profiles of followers of these parties were significantly inversely correlated to value profiles of SPS supporters, although this was less striking in the case of DP followers. They were also inversely correlated to value profiles of SRP followers, but the negative value is in this case low and not significant. SPS and SRP followers had similar value profiles and were much closer than their leaderships had ever been.

Table 7: Rank correlation coefficients (rho) between the order of values of political parties

Party	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS
SPS	-	.67**	-.71**	-.46*	-.64**
SRP		-	-.18	-.07	-.22
SRM			-	.94**	.93**
DP				-	.96**


Note: Coefficients with a significance of 99% are marked with two asterisks, and coefficients with a significance of 95% are marked with one asterisk. The coefficients are calculated using 18 pairs on the basis of the data in Table 7.

The data on the distribution of value orientations among followers of different parties make it possible to determine the positions of five main Serbian parties and a number of other parties on the basis of various criteria or value dimensions. The similarities and differences between the members and followers of the parties are perhaps best expressed by their location in the coordinate system based on two axes: traditionalism versus modernism, which subsumes several other relevant values and goals, and radicalism versus non-radicalism. The latter is perhaps the projection of the personality in the domain of values and political behaviour, which (similar to Eysenck's distinction between tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness) ultimately concerns a preference for tough or gentle methods of resolving conflicts, including the acceptance or rejection of war.

It can be seen in Graph 6 that SRP, PSU and SPS occupied the traditional/radical quarter. In typological terms, this quarter reflects Töennis' old idea of "Gemeinschaft", which in modern times is most often operationalised as ethnocentric communities with a homogeneous population, prone to sacralisation of organic solidarity, traditionalism and subsistence economy. On the opposite side, in the quarter distinguished by modernism and non-radicalism, were the supporters of DCVH, the only ethnic minority parliamentary party, CAS, SRM, DP, DPS and DEMOS. This quarter could be typologically defined as "Gesellschaft" because it is where people acquire openness to the world, an orientation towards change as a goal and a preference for peaceful and evolutionary methods. The followers of LC/MY and FPS were in the third quarter, which combines traditionalism with the rejection of radical methods. The fourth quarter, combining modernism with radicalism, remains empty as far as party followers are concerned.

The results of the above research on the values of voters, or followers of political parties and the undecided and abstainers in the period 1990-1993, lead to the basic conclusion that values and related dispositions (for example, personality syndromes such as authoritarianism, interest in politics, confidence in institutions) which are fairly general among the population of Serbia (except Kosovo), heavily depended on party preferences of citizens.

Graph 6: The attempt to locate the followers of political parties in terms of their values



The results of empirical research consistently depicted followers of the ruling SPS as supporters of a state party and a party of continuity with the preceding one-party period. The followers of this party were inclined to isolationism and glorification of the nation, and accepted the use of radical means to further their goals. Two thirds of them manifested authoritarian tendencies, which could be the deepest, personal basis for all the above-mentioned values orientations. This generalisation is valid for typical but not all followers of the SPS. A similar qualification applies to the supporters of other parties.

SRP followers were overwhelmingly hyper-patriotic, xenophobic and radically-minded, radicalism appearing to be less of a means and more of an end in itself. In most cases they too were authoritarian. In contrast to SPS followers, they had certain reservations towards the regime, although they were until recently ambivalent in this respect. Although they were in favour of a discontinuity of rule, they were closer to SPS followers than to followers of other parties and were not distinguished by opposition tendencies until their break with the SPS in the middle of 1993. Interest in politics was more developed among them than among followers of other parties, developed in all likelihood to the point of fanaticism.

SRM followers were characterised by antagonism towards the regime and party expansiveness (i.e. willingness to cooperate with the similar-minded parties or

vote for them as a reserve party). SRM members and sympathisers were mostly liberal, internationalist and modernist, and suffered less than members of other parties from xenophobia. They were more religious than the followers of other main parliamentary parties in Serbia. Their relative lack of authoritarianism, lack of inclination to glorify the nation and rejection of radical means of resolving conflicts is also striking.

The followers of the two democratic parties, DP and DPS, were so similar in terms of values that they can be described together. Both were characterised by great party expansiveness (especially towards each other and the SRM). They advocated discontinuity of power and were critical towards the present regime, but had no nostalgia for communism. DP and DPS supporters were also characterised by liberalism, internationalism, modernism and above-average tolerance and interest in politics. They were the least authoritarian, religious and radical, but surprisingly prone to xenophobia, although far less than SPS and SRP supporters.

The research on differences in the distribution and intensity of value orientations and related dispositions among followers of the main Serbian parties, their value profiles, and especially their location on the value axes of modernism versus traditionalism and radicalism versus non-radicalism, enables a better understanding of political life in the Balkans in the first years of transition towards democracy and market economy. Research findings open up new questions, the essence of which concerns the real causes of value differences between followers of the main parties. The nature of differences suggests that they are caused more by social structural factors than by the existence of parties themselves. It is known that the level of education and age structure of the followers of the ruling SPS were least favourable and that the SRP was closest to it. Against this, the level of education and social position of followers of the SRM, DP and DPS corresponded on the average to middle and upper groups which, given the pyramidal shape of the social structure, accounted for a minority of population. Long ago, research discovered that there was a significant linkage between certain values and the position of citizens in the social hierarchy. The more educated were, for example, less authoritarian, religious, radical and xenophobic, and more liberal, tolerant and modernist.

This does not mean that political parties are not important generators of value differences, only that the primary sources of these differences are to be found in the social structure and also the constellation of modal personality types linked to the traditional culture of this region. Parties probably represented rallying points for the previously formed differences because their programmes, activities and the symbolic role of their leaders attracted followers with certain values. The parties then deepened, reinforced and spread these values further. The main value differences of Serbian political parties were (following Töennis' theory) along the axis "*Gemeinschaft*" versus "*Gesellschaft*", the SRP, PSU and SPS being located in the first quarter and the SRM, DPS, DP, CAS, DEMOS and DCVH in the last quarter of the highly complex typology, while some smaller parties (LC/MY and the FPS) were situated between them. This division reflects the class and educational structure of the society, but also value differences which cannot be explained by structural determinism alone.

The differences in the values of followers of the main parties are particularly sharp because they comprised only half of the electorate, even when Kosovo was excluded. From 1990 to 1999, in periods between elections and even at the beginning of the election campaigns, about 20% of the electorate had declared that they would abstain (and most of them did not vote in the elections), while about 30% were undecided (including those who were not certain that they would vote and those who

certainly would, but for various reasons could not make up their mind who to vote for until the election day). Value differences existed therefore among the already decided voters, who made up half of the electorate. The five main parliamentary parties accounted for about four fifths of the voters in this half, but compensated for the missing fifth in the elections and managed to win over a large part of undecided voters (average turnout was about 65% of the electorate).

This analysis is based on the values of followers of political parties, which might not correspond fully with the values advocated by party leaderships. The values of ordinary voters, followers, activists and party leaders have different weights everywhere in the world. Here especially, the latter characterise party activities.

The value profile of party followers is also relevant because certain values (e.g., hyper-patriotism, xenophobia and confidence in institutions) change unusually rapidly as a result of situational factors. More research studies, especially longitudinal, are necessary, and the spectrum of values studied must be widened.

Given the big changes in the election programmes and the activities of almost all the parliamentary parties between elections, it is possible that voters changed parties so often that the research discussed above confirmed differences between followers of political parties whose membership and following had changed. This means, for example, that the people who supported the SRM in 1991 and 1993 were not necessarily the same people, but only the people who were attracted by concrete party platforms and policies at the given time.

From the comparative point of view, the main conclusion of this review of the values of party followers in Serbia during the early 1990s is that rational determinants of voters' values (recognisable interests) appear to be less important than in the West. Irrational determinants of voters' values (emotional identification, feelings of insecurity and frustration, defiance and openness to manipulation) were probably more important in Serbia than in developed countries and some previously socialist countries of Central Europe. However, this conclusion relates mainly to value orientations like xenophobia and hyper-patriotism, which were primarily conditioned by situational factors like the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN sanctions against the FRY and economic difficulties. Under the influence of these same factors, there existed a trend towards inertia and regression, in particular retraditionalisation, which had important implications precisely with respect to party preferences and voting behaviour of citizens. The value potential for social change was considerable in the younger and middle generations, among educated people, in bigger towns and developed areas in Northern Serbia. However, the pre-existing value system and previous changes in values, whether they were appropriate for transition or delayed that process, influenced both political parties and voters' behaviour.

We have already discussed a certain turning point towards the normalisation of circumstances in the society in the second half of the 1990s in Serbia, especially under the influence of Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Situationally more sensitive value orientations of citizens in Serbia returned to the state from the 1980s in 1996 already or they were in the process of returning to the previous state. The new discontinuity occurred in 1998 during the campaign of quelling the rebellion of the Albanians in Kosovo and in 1999 as a consequence of NATO air raids, that is, bombarding of military and strategic targets in Serbia. Still, these events, however traumatic, did not produce such dramatic consequences on the level of value component of political culture as the afore-mentioned negative events in the period 1991-1993. From the beginning of 2000, Milošević conducted an extremely aggressive election campaign, endeavouring to remain in power at all costs. However,

when opposition finally began to unite (preparing to create the Democratic Opposition of Serbia – DOS), Serbian citizens on their own began to involve in opposing the authoritarian regime more and more actively and efficiently.

It seems that it was the very resistance of citizens to Milošević’s regime that contributed most to shaping and stabilising certain values important for the subsequent democratic turn-around that commenced after the presidential election on September 24th 2000. Mass protests on October 5th, unseen until then, had the characteristics of a revolution and a spontaneous plebiscite of people with significant repercussions on subsequent features of the value component of political culture. Before discussing the effects of the October 5th turn-around, we will linger on some other findings of the studies from the 1990s (after 1995) as indications of change in values soon to follow. One of the indicators of the approaching changes was also the width of citizens’ identification with social and territorial entities. Unlike the early 1990s, in the second half of the last decade of the 20th century, wider primary identifications appeared in population more than previously, especially in supporters of opposition parties of democratic provenance. Indeed, one should bear in mind that even today in the inhabitants of developed Western countries with a long and mature democracy what predominates is a local identification, but often in the form of multiple loyalty, that is, the local citizens at the same time feel both as members of their narrow local or regional communities, and as members of wider social/territorial wholes.


Table 8: Width of identification of respondents in Serbia (only the first rank)

Party followers	Local affiliation	Belonging to Serbia	Belonging to FRY	Belonging to Europe/the world
PDA	95	0	5	0
DCVH	79	0	21	0
SRP	62	14	21	3
SRM	59	17	9	15
SPS	56	11	30	3
DPS	51	12	26	11
DP	46	11	30	13
YUL	43	8	41	8
CAS	24	6	29	41
Average	52	13	27	8

Source: World Values Survey – Third Wave, October 1996; Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Belgrade

The supporters of the two largest parties of ethnic minorities in Serbia were almost exclusively rooted in local environment in 1996. The supporters of SRP, SRM, SPS and DPS also identified in an absolute majority with the local environment, while in the so-called simple or relative majority primarily loyal to their own environment were the supporters of DP and YUL (Yugoslav United Left) at that time. Only the CAS followers were in a relative majority oriented towards Europe or the world, while among the supporters of other political parties in Serbia in 1996 European and/or identification with the world as primary was rare.

Graph 7: Change of xenophobia among the Serbs during the years of crisis (%)



Source: Surveys of the Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Belgrade.

The presented development of xenophobia among the Serbs during the critical period indicates that we are dealing with a situational and reactive phenomenon whose function was defensive in the psychological and social sense. The variation of xenophobia parallel with the social crisis leads to the conclusion that this reaction was temporary and that it was not an expression of the “Serbian national character”. It is interesting that at the beginning of the 1990s Klingemann and Hofferbert (1994) empirically established that xenophobia in Germany at that time was primarily a product of social situation, and not of some deeper personality dispositions of the population. According to these authors, the above-average scores on xenophobia were registered among young, unemployed and poorly educated males and among followers of extremist parties. We argued previously that xenophobia in Serbia was very unequally distributed among the supporters of political parties, that is, during the crisis it occurred fastest and widest among the SPS and SRP supporters, and withdrew slowest in them as well.

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia, accompanied by wars in some of its regions, the introduction of the UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, grave economic problems, the inflow of refugees and isolation produced massive frustrations of the Serbian population and a climate suitable for manipulations. The battle of the old political elite to maintain power and the new ones to obtain it, whereby both excessively used nationalism, additionally influenced radical changes in the national heterostereotypes of the Serbs and caused the explosion of xenophobia which had not been a characteristic of this region earlier. Nationalism was therefore induced from above and was instrumental from the standpoint of the elite, while in the lower class it mainly had a defensive and socially integrative function. Once created, nationalism of the majority nation created additional problems in relations with national minorities and surroundings, which culminated in 1993 when the picture of the Serbs about other nations was the most negative. However, the heterostereotypes about the nations that propaganda proclaimed as friendly (some of them being geographically and civilisation-wise very distant, like China and Japan), according to the contrast effect, were estimated even more positively than before. The traditional

picture about the Roma, according to the same principle, changed radically for the better. No matter how generalised, xenophobia was all the same mainly transitional, having a reactive and situational nature and was not deeply rooted in the majority of the population. The heterostereotypes towards the nations the Serbs were in conflict with and those marked as the “culprits” for the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and the “enemies” or “the friends of our enemies”, were connected most with negative attributes and changed slowest after the peace turning point, even after xenophobia considerably decreased.

The World Values Survey, carried out in Serbia as a part of the third wave during October 1996, also contributed to the possibility of mutually comparing the followers of various political parties on many values. Only a brief selection of the findings relevant for determining voters’ value profile is presented here (see Table 9).

Table 9: Distributions of six values selected from the WVS depending on Serbian citizens’ electoral orientations in 1996 (%)

Party followers	Trust in people	Post-materialism	Egalitarianism	Private property	Conservatism	Liberty
SPS	29	12	53	30	59	23
SRP	33	17	48	46	41	43
DP	31	26	35	60	50	57
SRM	41	26	48	55	37	42
DPS	29	28	29	65	29	59
CAS	35	41	17	61	29	67
YUL	31	30	43	24	53	25
DCVH	64	5	86	36	71	0
PDA	41	18	32	68	76	56
Average	32	23	43	42	52	36

Note: Total includes, besides the above-mentioned followers of parties, other small party supporters, abstainers, and undecided respondents, that is, average percentages for each value in the complete sample.

Postmaterialist values, measured by the original Inglehart’s index of questions, were espoused by almost one quarter of citizens on the average, but still with significant differences among various political parties, that is, their supporters. The first two places were occupied by the followers of two small parties – CAS and YUL, and the last by the supporters of an ethnic minority party – DCVH. It is worth mentioning that Inglehart’s concept of postmaterialist values assumes, in brief and simplified, that under the influence of a continuous increase in the standard of living of the population, in the first place in the developed Western countries after the Second World War, there is a shift in value priority from aspiration towards financial welfare and security towards the quality of life and humanisation of relations in the society, which further leads to transformation of political culture in those countries precisely in the direction of a democratic, open and postmodern society (Inglehart, 1990; 1997; Inglehart and 2005; etc.). Postmaterialist syndrome comprises the occurrence of higher needs connected with self-actualisation of individuals in the domain of work motivation, emergence of ecological values as priorities, higher emphasis on aestheticism and quality of life, change of attitudes towards marriage, the family and the role of women in social life, the changes in moral and religious values and the change of political values in the direction of higher importance of tolerance, human rights and democratic tenets.

Trust in people, a characteristic highly important for the implementation and functioning of democracy, as well as for the broader process of modernisation of the society (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; 1997, etc), was found only in one third of the people on the average, which is not much different from other Eastern European countries of that time. However, differences depending on political party affiliation were again significant, putting DCVH at the first place. Basic trust in people is obviously a cultural value with significant implications precisely for political culture of a society. It seems that in Serbia basic distrust in people is experienced as a value of caution, similar as in Southern Italy, where ethnologists established an existence of “amoral familism”, that is, a traditional norm that is expressed as a lack of trust and moral obligation towards anyone outside one’s own family. Unlike Almond and Verba (1980), who argued that interpersonal trust is a precondition for forming secondary associations that are important for effective participation of citizens in the democratic process, Inglehart (1990) assumed that the development of economy and democratic institutions might also encourage the creation of basic trust in people. The latter, and certainly not by coincidence, is most widely spread in Scandinavian countries, for example, in the fourth wave of WVS 2000/2001, it characterised two thirds of citizens of Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and 58% of them in Finland. It was least spread in Brazil, where only 3% of citizens thought that the majority of people can be trusted (Inglehart et al., 2004).

Supporters of political parties also differed widely in terms of egalitarianism, i.e. espousal of the idea that the range of individual incomes should be narrow, again with DCVH at the first place (even 86%). Percentages refer to the respondents who, on the scale from 1 to 10, chose any of the modalities 1–4 which represented accepting the view of smaller differences between incomes. It seems that advocating the smaller differences in income, as egalitarianism was operationalised, was understood differently in certain social strata and among the followers of political parties. For some, egalitarianism was identical to social justice, for others it was a prerequisite of survival, some thought it was a demagogical demand used by parties in their electoral programmes and campaigns for the purposes of manipulation, while some others considered it connected with some higher concept of equality, for example, in the sense of equal paltriness before God.

Citizens’ attitude towards state-owned and private property was measured in the same manner. As far as favouring private property was concerned, on the rank of supporters of various parties, CAS held the first place, while the followers of YUL were at the last place. Ownership orientation is extremely important for the value dimension of liberalism versus statism, and thereby also for the nature of political culture of followers of political parties.

The number of respondents who thought that the best ideas are those which had withstood the test of time (52%) was much higher than the number of those holding that new ideas are as a rule better than the old ones (28%). If this is taken as a measure of an inclination towards conservatism, the PDA (Party of Democratic Action) followers kept the first rank, DCVH supporters came second, and CAS sympathisers were at the last place.

When choosing between the two basic functions of government, keeping order in the society and ensuring liberty to each individual, a considerable majority of respondents favoured the former (64%), but variations were still wide among the followers of different political parties. The orientation towards liberty was mostly preferred, even in the so-called qualified majority, among the supporters of CAS, while no follower of DCVH expressed this preference. Although preference of liberty

or order can be for many respondents a difficult and artificial dilemma, this kind of attitude, by reflecting more general values, enables acquiring a better insight into the quality of political culture of the society in question.

Based only on the above-mentioned six values from the WVS, it is possible to form differential value profiles of the supporters of the five parties relevant at the time, that is, those that crossed the election threshold (5%) for entering the Parliament, as well as of the four smaller parties that were either their coalition partners or enjoyed a special status as ethnic minority parties. These value profiles of the followers of the political parties at the time in certain measure reflect the nature of the value component of political culture in Serbia in the middle of the 1990s.

The followers of the ruling SPS party were characterised by an above-average spread egalitarianism and conservatism, and below-average presence of the other four values taken for comparison: postmaterialism, trust in people, freedom (that means that they assigned the advantage to the function of the state to ensure order with respect to individual citizens' rights) and a preference of private property.

SRP supporters more than averagely emphasised freedom, private property and egalitarianism, and less than average postmaterialism and conservatism, while with respect to trust in people they were at the very average for the total sample.

DP supporters above-average preferred postmaterialist values, private property and freedom, below-average egalitarianism, and at the level of average trust in people and conservatism.

DPS followers at the time, as well as DP supporters, evaluated above-average freedom, private property and postmaterialist values, and less than average egalitarianism, as well as conservatism and trust in people. The latter two, therefore, compared to DP followers, were evaluated relatively lower.

SRM supporters above-average accepted as many as five values: postmaterialism, freedom, egalitarianism, trust in people and private property, while with regard to conservatism they were below the average.

Followers of CAS above-average preferred freedom, private property, expressed trust in people and postmaterialist values, while less than it is the case for the whole sample they manifested egalitarianism and conservatism.

DCVH supporters manifested egalitarianism, conservatism and trust in people more than averagely, and less than averagely postmaterialist values, preference of freedom and private property.

YUL followers were above-average conservative, but also postmaterialist oriented, while less than average they expressed trust in people, as well as preference of private property and freedom. Although YUL declared itself as a left-wing party, its supporters manifested egalitarianism at the level of average for the whole sample.


PDA supporters above-average accepted private property, freedom, expressed trust in people and conservatism, and less than average were egalitarian and postmaterialist oriented.

As early as in the mid-1990s in Serbia, two basic blocks of followers of political parties could be discerned based only on a small number of selected values from the WVS. There were, indeed, significant mixtures of profiles, atypical combinations of values and transitional categories, which is understandable if one bears in mind only half a decade of pluralism, voters' confusion and turbulent social scene. Still, the joint characteristic of value profiles of the supporters of the parties at the time (analysis of abstainers and the undecided would only intensify that conclusion) is the inertia of value elements from the traditional political culture, the presence of characteristics of subject political culture, and the existence of a relatively

small number of elements of participation and liberal-democratic political culture, even among the followers of opposition democratic parties.

On the eve of the watershed presidential election held on September 24th 2000, in which V. Koštunica defeated S. Milošević, and the parliamentary election held in the December the same year, followed by the formation of the democratic government with the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić, value profiles of the political party supporters had already been differentiated and relatively synchronised with the electoral platforms of political parties. Two antagonised blocks of voters were formed, reflecting the division into the authorities at the time (SPS and SRP) and opposition (eighteen parties united in DOS). This division reflected a typical contrast of value systems which had already been mentioned previously, that is, Töennis’ dichotomy into “Gemeinschaft” or (organic) community as opposed to “Gesellschaft” or the society, that is, the equivalent of civic political culture. In a coordinate system – typology of general value dimensions traditionalism-modernism and radicalism-non-radicalism the supporters of DOS coalition were located without exception in the quadrant determined by modernism and non-radicalism, while the supporters of SPS, SRP and PSU were in the quadrant combining traditionalism and radicalism.

Graph 8: The position of party followers based on Rokeach’s typology



At the similar, but more nuanced and somewhat debatable, findings, we also arrived by applying one of Rokeach’s value typologies (Rokeach, 1973), which, also in the form of a coordinate system, combines equality (egalitarianism) versus non-equality (non-egalitarianism) on x-axis with aspiration towards freedom versus aspiration towards order on y-axis. Based on the available data from our surveys, DCVH supporters indubitably belonged to the Rokeach’s quadrant “socialism”, since at the same time they preferred egalitarianism and freedom. Followers of the majority of parties from

the future DOS could have been classified into the quadrant “capitalism” because of their preference of freedom and non-egalitarianism. SPS supporters were located in the quadrant “communism” (combination of values of egalitarianism and preference of order). Rokeach named the fourth quadrant “fascism” (the adequacy of this term could be elaborately discussed) and in it were the supporters of YUL led by M. Marković, party of Milošević’s wife, but also SRP supporters and – surprisingly – SRM supporters. However, the followers of these two latter parties were practically closer to coordinate beginning, which means that they were in the conflict between the values representing two dimensions, with a very poorly expressed predominance towards preferring non-egalitarianism and order in the society.

Therefore, on the eve of the turn-around of October 5th 2000, for the supporters of the still ruling SPS the following values were characteristic, taking into consideration the findings of all studies: prominent identification with the FRY, positive relationship towards the regime, trust in institutions of the system at the time, radicalism, authoritarianism, hyper-patriotism, statism, conservatism, nationalism, xenophobia, egalitarianism, basic distrust in people, intolerance, traditionalism, preference of state property and materialism – in the way that the concept is defined and measured by Inglehart (priority to maintain order, suppressing inflation by state imposed measures, insisting on economy growth, even at the expense of polluting the environment etc.). This is a synthesised picture of the value system of the supporters of regime party at its very end and on the basis of the findings of the presented, but of some other non-mentioned surveys as well, both of the Institute of Social Sciences and other institutions. Opposite values characterised the supporters of opposition parties, especially the bigger parties from the later DOS, but even for some small parties from this coalition (CAS, ethnic minority parties).

On the eve of the 2000 watershed election, SPS supporters, according to the selected value indicators, turned out to be the most dogmatically oriented, which is confirmed by the increased values of authoritarianism, conformism, preference of centralism, full sovereignty etc. As well as in previous research, the most similar to them were SRP supporters, who still emphasised the idea of “Great Serbia”, although far from homogenisation in that respect, as well as the idea that the true sense of life was acquiring material wealth. The idea of the limited or, to be more precise, divided sovereignty, which is more or less an expression of reality in today’s world, was almost maximally accepted among the DP followers and then among SRM supporters. Those attached to these two parties were most modernist oriented. DP and DPS supporters were the least authoritarian, conformist and centralist oriented and together with SRM supporters were least inclined towards the radical idea of “Big Serbia”. Starting only from the above-mentioned eight indicators presented in the Table, bearing in mind all risks involved in drawing conclusions about values only on the basis of respondents’ reaction to one, indeed, very discriminative item (as indicated by pilot testing), DP, DPS and SRM supporters were mutually highly consistent with regard to value priorities. As opposed to that, among the SPS supporters, on the one hand, and those of DP and DPS, on the other, the order of value priorities was without any correlation (correlation rank around 0).

The items used as the indicators of values were chosen from the clusters of claims that were the most discriminative for the mentioned values and were formulated respectively: “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important things that child should learn” (agreement indicates latent authoritarianism); “Man should be minimally different from others” (conformism); “After each change, things usually get worse than they were” (traditionalism); “Whether we want to admit it or

not, the true sense of life is in acquiring material wealth” (material values); “There is no economic progress without a strong central government” (centralism); “As a rule, new ideas are better than the old ones” (modernism); “It is better to be poor and one’s own than to live well with international help and influence” (full sovereignty); “Great Serbia will be accomplished sooner or later” (the idea expressed in SRP programme implying that Serbia would extend everywhere where the Serbs live in the countries of the former Yugoslavia).

Table 10: Values of the supporters of the largest parties on the eve of 2000 election

Values	Party followers				
	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS
Authoritarianism	78	73	39	28	32
Conformism	60	40	32	19	24
Traditionalism	38	34	9	11	18
Material values	46	57	43	39	42
Centralism	62	64	33	15	26
Modernism	41	49	60	65	48
Restricted sovereignty	9	9	77	92	48
Great Serbia	31	42	20	6	18

Source: Surveys of the Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research.

Note: Figures in the Table refer to the percentage of those accepting the content of the respective claims.

In the end, we will just mention several more findings of surveys important for the value component of political culture of the followers of the political parties in Serbia at the time, that is, potential voters. At the time, as much as three quarters of the supporters of the three largest democratic parties (DP, DPS and SRM) strived towards changes. The widest, European belonging was expressed by almost one third of the supporters of the then coalition Alliance for Changes, which was basically the predecessor of DOS coalition which in the end consisted of eighteen parties. The followers of the parties at that time in general primarily identified with the nation or generation (30% each), then occupation (14%) and religious community (12%), while political parties were mentioned as a primary object of identification in only 2% of cases (this is another one in the range of proofs that political parties are only the tertiary agent of political socialisation). Considerably more than the mentioned average, the followers of DPS (48%), SRP (44%) and SRM and SPS (42% each) primarily identified with the nation.

4. The Value Component of Political Culture of Voters in Serbia after 2000

Surveys of the Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research during the year 2000 indicated that there were several candidates who could defeat Milošević in presidential election scheduled for September 24th that year. Starting from February, one of those candidates was also Koštunica, whose rating suddenly started to grow from the middle of 2000. Having ensured the support of eighteen members of DOS coalition, he also managed to achieve synergy effect because the potential of votes was larger than the one for the

members of DOS coalition taken together. It is obvious that this candidate was also supported by many disappointed followers of SPS, SRP and SRM and that portion of abstainers who had been waiting for the moment when opposition would unite against Milošević. Therefore, the September election for the FRY President actually had the character of a referendum and at the same time were the elections with a record turnout. At the attempt of the official Election Committee to present the results as though a run-off ballot were necessary (according to the first report, Koštunica won 49,8% of votes), mass protests broke out on October 5th, after which the Election Committee went out into the public with the corrected results, which implied the victory of the DOS candidate (50,2% of votes for Koštunica in the first round already). Such an outcome of the election, apart from delegitimising Milošević's regime, also produced at least two additional effects: acquiring self-confidence of the up to then opposition voters for the upcoming parliamentary election and inclination of those "on the wrong side" towards the winner, that is, large inter-party transfers of voters, especially of those who had until then been inclined towards SPS and SRP to DOS and, within this coalition, to Koštunica's DPS. In the December election for the National Assembly of Serbia, despite a surprisingly low turnout (on the one side, due to the "dormancy" of the supporters of the winning DOS, and on the other, because of the disappointment of the followers of defeated parties of the up to then regime), still solidified DOS victory, which enabled the formation of a stable majority in the Parliament. During 2001, the voters and their sudden and unrealistically increased expectations about an immense and swift change for the better were especially influenced by an express return of the FRY into the international institutions, economic help from abroad, initial results in reforming the institutions and certain improvement of citizens' standard of living, despite the unpopular correction of price disparities.

Inter-party transfers of voters after the October 5th turn-around also radically changed the picture usual of value profiles of the supporters of certain parties for several years. The previously almost elitist liberal-democratic-national DPS in a short time increased tenfold the percentage of its supporters, who came from the ranks of SPS, SRP, SRM and some marginal parties outside DOS. Therefore, this party significantly changed the structure of its members and followers, including a considerable mixture of values of the supporters of different provenance.

That is why DPS soon faced the problem of its ideological and value identity, since different interests of groups within this conglomerate party started to manifest. Interest heterogeneity and mixing of values inevitably watered down the value profile of DPS supporters, making it indistinctive and most equivalent to the electorate as a whole. SPS, SRP, SRM and PSU mainly preserved the cores of their orthodox and most loyal supporters, although there were smaller party transfers of voters among them as well. DP supporters and several smaller allies from DOS started to concentrate and profile towards the liberal-democratic part of the political spectre, also refining their identity and stepping away from, as far as values are concerned, the less and less recognisable DPS.

We made conclusions about the voters' values immediately after the October 2000 events on the basis of the findings of two representative surveys. The first research was conducted in July 2001 on the sample of 1800 respondents. It comprised only a smaller circle of value indicators, but even these indications of values were reliable, diagnostically important and discriminative for value profiles of political party followers, since they were based on previous research. The other research is WVS, the fourth wave of which was conducted in Serbia in November 2001 on the

sample of 1200 citizens of age. This survey comprised about 300 value indicators, and it was conducted in eighty countries. It was already the first mentioned research that indicated that the supporters of relevant political parties significantly and predictably profiled in terms of values. Namely, value orientations had become an important factor of electoral decisions of voters. Based on them, it was possible to judge even more reliably about the characteristics of integral political culture in Serbia, and especially about the nature of the main kinds of cleavages – historic, ethnic, cultural, political.

In the middle of 2001, SPS supporters remained homogenised with respect to emphasising full sovereignty (in 90% of the cases) and massively authoritarian oriented as in 2000 as well. They preferred even more centralism in the function of economic development (increase from 62% to 76%) and traditionalism (increase from 38% to 67%), and expressed very highly distrust in other nations as well. While a year and a half ago they believed that “new ideas are as a rule better than the old ones” in 41% of the cases, in 2001 the distribution of that belief was reduced by half. The order of value priorities based on the data from the corresponding Table was practically identical in the SPS and SRP supporters, although in both radicals and socialists certain changes in distribution of values were established, mostly in the direction of their increased crystallisation. For example, while in February 2000 there were 73% of those authoritarian among the radicals, in the middle of 2001 there were 82% of them. Among the radical followers, the circle of traditionally oriented (from 38% to 67%) and centralist oriented (from 62% to 76%) was expanded as well, while the idea of full sovereignty preserved a high place in their rank of value priorities.

Table 11: Indicators of values of party followers in Serbia in 2001 (%)

Values	Party followers				
	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS
Religiosity	39	41	56	41	49
Authoritarianism	78	82	59	33	52
Traditionalism	67	58	38	9	26
Modernism	19	26	59	52	40
Reuniting of all Serbs	47	59	32	17	26
Centralism	76	77	44	30	53
Distrust in other nations	72	77	79	34	57
Restricted sovereignty	3	13	56	79	41

Source: The above-mentioned survey CPSPOR.

Notes: Formulations of value indicators are provided in the previous Table, except for distrust in other people (the appropriate statement was: “One should always be cautious and restrained towards other nations, even when they are our friends”) and reuniting of the Serbs (“Reuniting of all Serbs from the territory of the former SFRY is bound to happen sooner or later”).

In this period, the least changed were the values of DP supporters, although they did not remain completely stable in them even, for example, modernism decreased from 65% to 52%, and preference of the restricted, that is, divided sovereignty from 92% to 79%. Among the DPS followers authoritarianism was especially increased (from 32% to 52%) as well as the inclination towards centralisation (from 26% to 53%), and there was a considerable distribution of distrust in other nations (57%), which are all the consequences of the inflow of new

supporters of this party that had until recently supported other parties, SPS and SRP in the first place. In the ranks of the reduced number of SRM followers there was a considerably increased percentage of authoritarian (from 39% to 59%), traditionally oriented (from 9% to 38%), those who preferred centralism (from 33% to 44%), while the number of advocates of restricted sovereignty was reduced (from 77% to 56%).

On the whole, value profile of DPS followers was the least prominent – in the sense of average distribution of dominant orientations in each pair of dimensions. For example, religiosity was then found in 49% of supporters of this party as opposed to only 15% of those unreligious (the remainder up to 100% consisted of the undecided). That means that value differences between the DPS followers themselves were bigger at the time than in the case of followers of other parties. The average of dominant orientations was the biggest in SPS and SRP followers (67% each). Therefore, they had the most refined value profiles or, in other words, were the most homogenous in terms of values. Out of the then relevant parties, SRM followed (with the average of dominant orientations of 59%), and DP (57%) and PSU (56%).

After the value similarity in the past decade, and even practical correspondence of the value priority ranks, for example, in 1993, by the middle of 2001 correlation of value ranks between DPS and DP almost disappeared ($\rho = 0.07$), which means that the supporters of the two democratic parties drifted apart in terms of values and became mutually independent with that regard. Due to the mentioned inflow of supporters into DPS, their value profile, however, was partly similar to radicals, socialists and PSU followers, and considerably with value priorities of SRM followers ($\rho = 0.67$). The order of values of DPS supporters basically represented the sample as a whole at the time ($\rho = 0.96$). On the other side, the rank of value priorities for DP supporters was identical with other members of DOS coalition ($\rho = 0.99$), and highly significantly negative with the ranks that characterised the supporters of SPS ($\rho = -0.88$), SRP and PSU ($\rho = -0.79$ in both cases).

In the middle of 2001, there were no big differences in religiosity of the supporters of the relevant political parties in Serbia at the time. The majority of the religious were among SRM followers, while DPS supporters came second. The below-average percentage of the religious was among SPS, DP and SRP followers. Compared to the situation a decade ago, on the average, the circle of religious supporters of SRM and DPS increased, the percentage of religious radicals decreased, while SPS and DP followers were in approximately the same percentage religious as before. However, in both periods DP supporters were by five percentage points below the average of the religious for Serbia. One additional statement, which partly speaks about religiosity indirectly, and which was formulated as: “Introduction of religious instruction in schools will contribute to the spiritual revival”, was accepted in an absolute majority by SRM (68%) and SRP (54%) followers, and least by SPS supporters (27% versus 51% of opponents).

By the mid-2001, authoritarianism had almost reverted to its earlier proportions. It is interesting that the most authoritarian were the members of all minority nations in Serbia, and in percentages considerably higher than in their home countries. This regularity was explained by one of the functions of authoritarianism in Balkan area – national-protective, which was discovered two decades ago in both the Serbs and Albanians in the places where they lived in minority enclaves. Observed according to electoral orientation in summer 2001, the most authoritarian were the radicals, then followed the socialists and PSU supporters, while the least authoritarian

were DP supporters and those who were inclined towards smaller parties within DOS coalition.

Judging on the reactions of respondents to the statement: “Whether we want to admit it or not, the meaning of life is acquiring financial wealth”, the citizens of Serbia in the mid-2001 were somewhat more non-materialist oriented (49% of opponents) than they favoured material values (40%). The differences depending on electoral orientation were relatively small, since the followers of the majority of parties were grouped around the mentioned average. The majority of materialist oriented were among SRM supporters (53%), and those of opposite orientation among DP followers (59%).

It is well-known that the conclusions about the deep-rootedness of nationalism in the population depend on the way of defining and operationalising this concept. If the inclination towards nationalism is measured by respondent’s agreement with severely formulated statements such as “Serbia is for Serbs only”, then a small percentage of bigoted nationalists is obtained (on the average 12% versus 85% of those who do not agree). The Serbs themselves rarely accepted this statement implying an ethnically clean state (14%, similar as in the research up to then). Slightly more followers of this idea could be found only among the radicals (26%), although a considerable majority of SPS supporters expressed disagreement with the above-mentioned statement (71%). One quarter of respondents believed that the “reuniting of all Serbs from the territory of the former SFRY is bound to happen sooner or later”, but still a relative majority rejected this claim (44%). The majority of those with a radical attitude with regard to this topic belonged to the supporters of SRP (59%), SPS (47%) and PSU (40%). The largest number of the opponents of this idea could be found among the supporters of DP (60%) and the followers of small parties in DOS coalition (58%). A more moderate form of nationalism, measured by the statement “One should always be cautious and restrained towards other nations, even when they are our friends”, is largely indicative of wider proportions of nationalism (50% as opposed to 39% of those who disagreed with the content of this statement). In the 1970s and 1980s, this statement was usually accepted by less than one third of respondents, and among the young even less than one quarter. In the middle of 2001 the supporters of DP and small parties that comprised DOS expressed their disagreement with this statement in an absolute majority, while the followers of four other relevant parties agreed highly with what this statement espouses (see the previous Table). It is also possible to place in this context the finding that at the time a great majority of the socialists and radicals preferred sovereignty at all costs, while DP supporters reacted quite the opposite – four fifths of them favoured restricted sovereignty as an achievement of the modern age in which all countries, and even the largest and the most powerful ones, were mutually dependent. Finally, the absolute majority (60%) of respondents in the middle of 2001, as, for that matter, somewhat earlier as well, identified a good citizen with a patriot as opposed to 27% of opponents of such an understanding. The statement that “the first and most important task of a good citizen is to be a patriot” was accepted by almost all socialists (91%) and radicals (87%), but also by a great majority of followers of PSU (79%), SRM (71%) and DPS (64%). Only a relative majority of DP supporters expressed disagreement with such a definition of a “good citizen” (49% versus 41% of those who agreed).

Almost in an identical percentage as in the survey from the beginning of 2000, Serbian citizens primarily identified with narrower territorial and social groups. They were mostly primarily attached to the local/regional community (38%). Only a somewhat smaller number identified with Serbia in the first place (35%). There were

12% of citizens who primarily identified with the then current Yugoslavia (FRY, which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro), the same percentage as with Europe. The widest identification was manifested by DP supporters (for 32% of them, Europe was the most important belonging), although among them as well three fifths preferred either local/regional, or primary attachment to Serbia. The above-average distribution of primary attachment to Serbia was manifested by the followers of SRP (55%), PSU (51%) and SPS (48%). As far as large social groups are concerned, in the middle of 2001 Serbian citizens identified most with nation (38%), then with generation (27%) and only then with profession (12%) and religious community (11%). Political affiliation was the most significant for only 2% of respondents. According to expectations, national identification was most widely spread among the followers of SPS (60%), PSU (56%) and SRP (52%). In DP supporters, the national (27%) and generation identification (28%) were equally spread, and then followed profession with 17%. Religious affiliation was mentioned as the first by SRM supporters (24%), but after the nation (35%), and least by socialists (5%). Religion was also more important to the followers of the then PSU (17%) than profession (6%). DPS supporters primarily identified with nation (40%), then with generation (29%), and then with profession (13%) and religion (10%). Political affiliation was emphasised somewhat above a generally very low average by the followers of SRM (6%) and DP (5%).

The conclusions about the value component of political culture of the supporters of political parties in Serbia one year after the changes of October 5th were also made on the basis of the already mentioned fourth wave of WVS, which was conducted in Serbia in November 2001.

Bearing in mind a large number of value indicators that were at our disposal, we had to limit ourselves to a selection of findings that were most directly relevant for the aims of this paper, and which also entailed the criteria of content and temporal comparison of data.

Table 12: Selected values of the followers of political parties (WVS, November 2001)

Values	Party followers					
	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS	CAS
Egalitarianism	47	52	22	19	31	30
Private property	25	46	57	72	48	66
Internal locus of control	41	37	35	51	43	52
Trust in people	18	13	9	19	20	13
God is important	51	50	43	39	48	22
Men are better leaders	53	54	58	37	43	27
Ecology is more important than development	34	39	44	46	44	70
Belonging to Europe is primary	14	20	61	51	33	99
Conservatism	68	72	61	49	56	22
Liberalism	8	13	17	22	16	61

Note: Data for the supporters of PSU, AVH, PDA, NS and LSDV are not presented in the Table because of the small number of cases.

Egalitarianism, defined as advocating as small differences between incomes as possible (narrower “spans”) was at the end of 2001 less spread on the average (33%) than five years ago in the third wave of WVS, measured in the same way (the sum of percents for modalities 1-4 on the scale 1-10). The most egalitarian were SRP, SPS and PDA followers. The least egalitarian, that is, most inclined towards differentiation of incomes were DP, SRM, AVH (Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians) and PSU supporters.

The preference of private property in November 2001 was only slightly higher (45%) than in October 1996 in the third value of WVS (43%), therefore, in the range of possible sampling error. However, the differences in preference of private property depending on the electoral orientation of respondents were more prominent in the fourth wave of WVS than five years before. More than others, the followers of DP, LSDV (League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina), CAS, SRM, PDA and NS (New Serbia) accepted private property, and SPS and PSU followers did so the least.

The internal locus of control of events, which is usually defined in socio-psychological literature as perceiving the cause of events in oneself (43%) versus the external locus of control (23%; the latter has different appearances: in the form of a belief that everything is determined by a supernatural being, nature, powerful people, the state or fortunate circumstances), remained fairly stable in comparison with the situation a decade before, or before a longer period of time. Although it is, as well as (dis)trust in people, essentially culturally conditioned, the distribution of the internal locus of control, generally very important for political activity of people, was different partly due to the party preferences of respondents. The only ones who believed in themselves as subjects of events in absolute majority were CAS and DP supporters, while NS, SRM, PDA and SRP followers were most inclined towards the external locus of control of events.

Despite the fact that it was not particularly spread even in 1996 (on the average in 32% of respondents), trust in people decreased considerably five years later (to only 18%), probably under the influence of unfavourable social events in the period 1998-2000. Only among PDA followers the basic trust in people was spread in absolute majority (in even three quarters of them). Followers of other parties rarely manifested basic trust in people, most rarely PSU followers (only 6% of them) and then SRM supporters. We should mention here that at the beginning of this millennium the world average of basic trust in people was 28%. Scandinavian countries led the way with that respect, where trust in people reached up to two thirds of population, while Brazil was at the very end with only 3%. Out of the former Yugoslav republics, the widest trust in people was registered in Montenegro (33%; 26th place in the world), and the smallest in FYR Macedonia (14% and 70th place in the world list).

The research in question indicated that considerably more citizens considered themselves a “religious person” (average 68%) than claimed that God was important in everyday life (49%). That discrepancy was perceived in supporters of all parties, except in the case of PSU and PDA. It seems that in Serbia the first formulation belongs the so-called softer religiosity indicators, which implies that respondents more easily declare themselves as religious (it is possible that it is less of a commitment) than they admit that God is important in everyday life, therefore, the latter belongs to the sharper religiosity indicators.

It was also noticed that there is a seasonal variation in the growth of the number of “religious persons” in the period of frequent St. Patron’s names (Ser. *slava*) in Serbia towards the end of the year, while that percentage declines in summer

months. PDA, SRM and AVH supporters in November 2001 claimed more than others that God was important in everyday life. Below-average religiosity operationalised in this way was least manifested by CAS and DP supporters. For comparison sake, we will present some data regarding the religiosity of countries (in the sense of importance of God) obtained in the fourth wave of WVS. World average was 66% for eighty included countries that represented 85% of world population. Citizens of the Islamic countries mostly emphasised that God was important in everyday life, for example, all respondents in Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco, 99% in Indonesia etc. As far as European countries are concerned, the Romanians came first (with 86%; still, they held only the 26th place in world rank), then the Poles (82% and 31st place in the world) and Portuguese (74% and 32nd place). FYR Macedonia was the first regarding the former SFRY countries with 70% (36th place in the world), then followed Bosnia and Herzegovina (68%), Croatia (66%), Montenegro (55%), Serbia 49% (56th place among 80 countries) and in the end Slovenia (35% and 71st place). The Czechs most rarely stated that God is important in their life (only 20% of them) and the Danes (21%). We should mention that at the first place in the third wave of WVS in 1996 was Poland with 87%, the second was Ireland, then followed Italy and Canada (72% each), but at the time Islamic countries did not participate in the research.

On the average, 42% of respondents thought that men as political leaders, on the whole, are better than women. In absolute majority, this traditional attitude was espoused by SRM, PDA, SRP, SPS and NS followers. The majority of followers of AVH, CAS and DP rejected this statement about inferiority of women as political leaders. Supporters of other parties did not differ from the average for the whole sample.

Faced with the dilemma whether to give priority to preservation of the environment or to economic development, even at the cost of some pollution to the environment, the Serbian respondents were almost divided (41% for the first alternative as opposed to 36% for the other). Preservation of the environment was highly preferred by CAS supporters, while PDA, AVH and NS followers gave primacy to economic development more than others. The world average for the preference of saving the environment was 52%. As far as European countries are concerned, Sweden held the first place in the world rank list (73%). The countries of the former SFRY did not show large mutual differences, and the leader with respect to ecological awareness was Slovenia.

Belonging to Europe and/or the world was measured by asking the respondents to choose out of five possible belongings – from local to the world – the two they cared about most, bearing in mind that local identification was predominant everywhere. So, as the first or the second answer, the world and Europe as a continent were mentioned by on the average 46% of respondents in Serbia. The widest social/territorial identification, measured in this way, was expressed by all CAS followers. The smallest degree of such an orientation was found among the PSU supporters (only 11%), and then in the ranks of socialists, radicals and NS supporters.

Based on twenty indicators taken from WVS, we constructed an index of conservatism - liberalism (C-L) which is validated not only logically but also using factor analysis. As an integral measure, this index is definitely more reliable than individual indicators of the C-L dimension. Elements of conservatism in this index included: religiosity, attitudes about the traditional role of parents in upbringing of children, obedience as the goal of upbringing, distrust in relations with people, attitude towards marriage as the foundation of the institution of the society,

disapproval of giving birth outside marriage, favouring men as political leaders, respect for authorities, self-identification of rightist orientation, idealised relation towards the army, preference of economic development at the expense of destroying the environment, negative attitude about female movements, belief in the existence of a priori weaknesses of democracy, giving priority to moral absolutism over moral relativism, opposing euthanasia, divorce and the right of a woman to free abortion. Opposing different contents was treated as an indicator of liberalism. One third of these questions was already analysed individually as part of pointing out to the differences depending on electoral orientations of respondents. However, joined together in a battery, these twenty indicators definitely provide a more representative picture about the real proportions of liberalism and conservatism than any other, even the most discriminative, question taken individually.

By applying C-L index, we found that those conservatively oriented were predominant in Serbia – there were almost four times more of them than those liberally oriented (see Table). Indeed, the majority of the conservatively oriented consisted of those with a moderate form of conservatism compared to those intensively conservative.

Table 13: Distribution of liberalism and conservatism depending on the electoral orientation of respondents in Serbia in November 2001 (%)

Party followers	Liberalism	Mixed type	Moderate conservatism	Intensive conservatism	Conservative in total
SPS	8	24	32	36	68
SRP	13	15	41	31	72
PSU	0	29	34	37	71
SRM	17	22	35	26	61
DP	22	39	37	12	49
DPS	16	28	33	23	56
CAS	61	17	22	0	22
NS	10	19	42	29	71
LSDV	31	34	23	12	35
AVH	6	19	69	6	75
PDA	9	27	37	27	64
Average	15	29	33	23	56


Note: Total of percents in rows is not 100 because the last column is derived, that is, presents the sum of the two forms of conservatism.

It is obvious that in the population of Serbian voters at the end of 2001 liberalism, defined and measured rather as a general and cultural than a purely political phenomenon, did not achieve significant proportions. Still, CAS followers were in absolute majority liberally oriented. Above the generally low average were the LSDV and DP supporters, although even among them there were more of those conservatively than liberally oriented. The mixed type was fairly represented, most in the followers of the latter two parties. Most widely spread conservatism was registered in AVH, SRP, PSU and NS supporters (in the range from 75% to 71%), then followed the socialists and PDA followers with around two thirds of such oriented. The absolute majority of SRM and DPS supporters were also conservative, while we did not register strongly conservative CAS followers at all. Intensively conservative were also relatively rare among the DP, LSDV and AVH supporters. As

opposed to that, intensively conservative formed around one third of those in the ranks of PSU, SPS and SRP voters.

Bearing in mind the numerousness of political party followers, the presented data indirectly suggest that in Serbia even one year after the democratic turn-around and establishment of DOS government, the majority value orientation was still indicative for the domination of traditional and subject political culture. Namely, conservatism in Serbia was even at the beginning of the millennium based on traditional patriarchy, and not on, for example, the English type of conservatism. Authoritarian aspiration towards maintaining status quo especially characterised the then followers of SPS, SRP and PSU, and in smaller degree SRM supporters as well, as can be seen in the graphic illustration combining the scores on the dimension of authoritarianism – non-authoritarianism on x-axis with the results on the dimension inclination towards changes versus the aspiration towards status quo on y-axis. In the liberal quadrant, combining non-authoritarianism and orientation towards changes, out of the then relevant parties, only the supporters of DP and especially CAS were located. DPS supporters were located near the coordinate beginning in this typology. In the measure in which they departed from the very beginning (minimally), DPS followers were inclined towards the quadrant identified as “enlightened absolutism”, which combines authoritarianism with orientation towards changes.

Graph 9: The position of the followers of relevant political parties regarding the two value dimensions important for the nature of conservatism in Serbia in 2001



Therefore, synthesised findings about the nature of the electorate one year after the October 2000 shift of power point out to the conclusion that value component of political culture, and definitely integral political culture as well, was only slightly changed (observed as a whole, and not through the prism of individual parties) compared to the situation in the period of the authoritarian regime of S. Milošević. Namely, party supporters partially “mixed” with each other, which changed the value profile of parties more than the actual values of voters really changed. In the 1990s political parties in Serbia actually mutually “exchanged their platforms” (more electoral than programme) and that was more of a rule than an exception in their campaigns for winning over the potential voters. After 2000 more massively than previously voters transferred from one party into another, either within the same block (for example, SPS followers became the supporters of SRP) or even from one block into another (for example, transfer of one portion of SPS and SRP supporters into DOS, later to DPS). One portion of those who had been voters until then temporarily became abstainers, while others ceased with electoral abstinence and usually joined the winning parties. Although these inter-party transfers played their part in certain changes in value profiles of party followers, globally speaking, distribution and intensity of critical values, especially the relevant ones, that is, discriminative and diagnostically important, were only somewhat changed, which confirms the conclusions of many authors about a relative stability of values (starting from Rokeach, 1973 and a number of others later).

It is definite that the transformation of traditional and subject political culture, at least when it comes to its value component, assumes the processes of longer duration regardless of the stage of the transition of the society in economic sphere. Introduction of democracy itself and repositioning of economy in keeping with market criteria obviously demand some time to pass in order to contribute to qualitative changes in the consciousness and the behaviour of population. Therefore, in order for the civic political culture to take root in Serbia, and not only remain a mere hypothetic achievement and a long-term ideal, certain critical time period is necessary for the political maturation of citizens. However, with regard to the considerable inertia of the existing forms of political culture, it cannot be ruled out that only the biological departure of the generations that are the main champions of parochial political culture and larger integration of Serbia into the European Union would create the space for the real breakthrough of civil political culture. It seems that, in the beginning of the first decade, the then available capacities of Serbian society for more significant branching of the forms of political culture (participation, civil, humanist), which are desirable from the viewpoint of the functional development of Serbia and compatible to its more effective international communication, were still insufficient and that on short-term basis did not promise to reach the necessary critical mass for that kind of changes. The indication that this is not an overly critical and pessimist conclusion is, among other things, a slow process of transformation of the educational system in Serbia, especially the continuously small percentage of highly-educated citizens who, by definition, have to be the main bearers of changes in the domain of political culture.

In 2003 among the SPS and SRP supporters who formed the hard core of the “patriotic” or “socially-national” block, as defined by Šram (2005) and Mihailović (2006), starting from the findings of factor analysis, on the one side, and the supporters of the parties of the “democratic block” (DP, DPS, G17, SRM, NS et al.), on the other, there was a certain increase in value differences that are definitely interesting with regard to the implications for the nature of value component of

political culture. Diachronic comparability is not always possible because different indicators and instruments for measuring dispositions of the same name were used, but the differences among party followers are definitely indicative in the same time cross-section and up to a certain degree still point out to the possible trend (of increase) in value dynamics.

Table 14: Selected values of party supporters during 2003

Values	Party followers					
	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS	G17
Centralism	76	77	44	30	53	-
Absolute sovereignty	90	80	35	11	41	-
Religiosity	46	64	63	52	58	-
Modernism*	0	4	11	66	34	50
Traditionalism*	93	78	46	7	37	14
Pro-national orientation*	88	79	43	4	40	10
Civic orientation*	3	6	14	81	20	60
Belonging to Serbia the most important	45	56	40	23	38	32
Belonging to Europe the most important	1	4	15	28	8	18

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Data regarding modernism, traditionalism, pro-national and pro-civil orientations were obtained by indices used in the research of Komšić, Pantić and Slavujević (2003).

Party followers from a social-national block highly preferred centralisation, full sovereignty, traditionalism, nationalism and primarily identified with Serbia (rarely with Europe), while the supporters of the political parties from the democratic block expressed pro-civic orientation, modernism, preference for divided sovereignty and not rarely primarily identified with Europe (for example, DP supporters in 28% of the cases). Therefore, the values of the supporters of the two blocks were diametrically opposite, which implies that those from the first block were still the captives of parochial and subject culture, while the followers of certain parties from the second block, especially DP and G17 followers, had already massively accepted certain values that are the prerequisite or even an integral part of participation and civic political culture.

At the end of 2004 the supporters of all parties except SRM were characterised by an insecurity that was manifested in the preference of a secure, even a poorly paid job, compared to a well-paid, but less secure job. This preference in population increased in the last decade and a half, obviously as a reaction to massive unemployment in the process of transition. The largest insecurity was expressed by SPS and SRP followers in whose structure the dominant were the members of the lower class, who were objectively most vulnerable regarding the chances to find the job.

According to the applied indicator, xenophobia was reduced in comparison with the situation one decade before (its decrease was the biggest in the second half of 1993 and until 1996), except among the followers of NS, DPS and SPS. Judging by the reactions of the respondents to the most discriminative statement, authoritarianism was still considerably spread, especially among the radicals and Serbian Strength Movement (SSM) followers. The least authoritarian were the democrats and G17 supporters, although authoritarianism occurred in absolute majority among them as

well. The need for a strong leader was even increased in the period of only one year (averagely from 59% to 66%), especially in the ranks of SPS, SRP, SRM, SSM and NS. Only among LDP (Liberal-Democratic Party) followers the “leadership principle” was in the minority and was stagnating in democrats. It should be mentioned that at the very end of 2005 the ranks of total value priorities of DP and DPS supporters had become very similar, again, after a ten-year period (Pantić, 2006), which was probably conditioned by different factors, among others by the process of cohabitation of the Serbian President B. Tadić from DP and the Prime Minister of Serbian Government V. Koštunica from DPS.

Table 15: Value indicators of party supporters at the very end of 2004 and 2005

Values	Party followers								
	SPS	SRP	SRM	DP	DPS	G17	SSM	LDP	NS
Strong leader*	66	67	51	56	65	55	60	-	56
Xenophobia*	50	44	32	19	51	29	30	-	63
Secure job*	82	81	37	58	72	54	73	-	69
Authoritarianism*	66	72	68	53	62	53	74	-	63
Strong leader	84	86	61	54	66	60	74	38	64
Foreign conspiracies	69	68	39	23	38	17	48	19	32
Trust in EU	22	22	46	66	49	73	36	81	28
Albanian as a friend	41	36	39	54	47	55	50	81	20
Hungarian as a friend	35	30	34	51	33	46	46	72	44

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: The first four values, marked by an asterisk, are taken from the December 2004 research, and the other five from December 2005 research. Conclusions about xenophobia are drawn based on the acceptance of the statement: “Foreign influences are a danger to our culture”, and about a “secure job” on the basis of the agreement with the statement: “It is better to have a secure job and a smaller salary than a less secure job and bigger salary”.

The paranoid tendency was very spread in socialists and radicals. The supporters of G17, LDP and DP were the ones who least believed in foreign conspiracies, followed by those inclined towards NS, DPS and SRM. Trust in the EU (average 31%) is very discriminative for the value profile of today’s party supporters: highly in the ranks of LDP, G17 and DP on the one side, and lowly among the socialists, radicals and NS supporters. Finally, the data about the acceptance of the members of the two biggest ethnic minorities regarding the social relationship of friendship, being the most discriminative for the total ethnic distance of Serbian citizens, also confirm that there were differential value profiles depending on the citizens’ affinity towards political parties. As part of a considerable distance in the total sample of respondents, it was shown that the least ready to accept an Albanian as a friend were NS supporters, followed by the radicals, socialists and SRM supporters, while the absolute majority of LDP, DP and G17 followers were ready to do so. The similar tendency is also at work in acceptance of a Hungarian as a possible friend, except for the fact that NS supporters were now less intolerant and everyone else more intolerant than when it comes to a hypothetical friendship with an Albanian. It is certain that ethnic tolerance was low in the Serbian population, except in the ranks of DP and the two relatively small parties – LDP and G17. Namely, the studies on ethnic distance reveal that this phenomenon was generalised – in the sense that

(non)acceptance of only one group with respect to one social relationship can be indicative for the total score, that is, there is a high correlation between the individual reaction and the score of ethnic distance as a whole. The reduced ethnic distance reflects the insufficiently regulated relations of the majority nation towards minorities, but even more the influence of situational factors (current conflicts) and especially the fact that it is very easy to direct the feeling of deprivation and economic scarcity of mass social strata (consisting of lower educated, poorer, older citizens) towards the members of ethnic minorities, disregarding the fact whether the latter are responsible for possible conflicts or not.

The conclusions we presented with regard to the chances for transformation of political culture from dominantly parochial-subject into participation-civil can, without reservations, be applied with respect to the data for years 2004 and 2005, which even additionally confirms the previous statements and predictions.

Having identified, on the basis of factor analysis of closeness and distance of respondents towards the ten relevant parties in Serbia at the time (2005), two factors – the liberal-democratic and social-national block of parties, Mihailović (2006) established that respondents from the social-national block expressed a high identification with the nation, authoritarianism, traditionalism, patriarchy and anti-Western orientation in the larger degree than the supporters classified into the first block, who preferred the opposite values, except for the fact that traditionalism was more spread than non-traditionalism in them as well (the latter was found in only 22% of the cases for them).

Table 16: Selected value orientations of the followers of two blocks of parties in Serbia

Values	Liberal-democratic block	Potential abstainers	Social-national block	Average for the whole sample
Strong identification with nation	22	16	39	23
Authoritarianism	30	38	60	39
Traditionalism	47	58	70	57
Patriarchism	22	29	46	30
Pro-Western orientation	57	35	17	38

Source: Adapted from the tables from Mihailović's paper (2006, pp. 162 -164). On the basis of factor analysis of respondent's closeness to ten parties, this author identified the liberal-democratic block consisting of G17 (factor loading 0.79), DP (0.78), LDP (0.72), SRM (0.71), SDP (0.62). The social-national block comprised the following parties: SPS (0.75), SRP (0.74), SSM (0.61). NS was more loaded by the factor SN block (0.58) than the factor LD block (0.46), while DPS was more associated with LD block (0.49) than with SN block (0.32). Data were collected as part of CESID (Centre for Free Elections and Democracy) research from April 2005 (the first two rows) and November 2005 (the remaining three rows). Total of percents in the Table is not 100 because they are combined data for the categories from different tables.

Besides the mentioned values, those attached to these blocks were different with regard to other characteristics as well, including both cultural styles and preferences, in such a degree that, in our opinion, it can be assumed that they belonged to "parallel worlds", which was the formulation used by the Ivo Andrić, Serbian Nobel prize winner for the year 1962, in his work "Signs near the Travel-

road”, to qualify the large and qualitative differences in lifestyles among certain social groups existing at the same time in the same society.

The supporters of the two antagonist parties and the leaders of the above-mentioned two blocks, DP and SRP, were very different with respect to the frequency of cultural activities. For example, the former went to the theatre in 46% of the cases, the latter in only 8% of the cases; the former had bought at least one book during the past year in 70% of the cases, the latter in 24% of the cases; the former used e-mail in 52%, and the latter in barely 9% of the cases; the former listened to all kinds of music, mostly popular and jazz (52%), while the latter in 69% of the cases exclusively listened to folk music etc. (Mihailović, 2006, pp. 166-167).

In the data from the last survey we rely on, authoritarianism was also registered in a standard high degree, especially in the followers of the parties that were previously identified as considerably homogenous with this respect – in radicals, socialists, and even NS followers. On the other side, LDP and G17 supporters were the least authoritarian. Similar differences were perceived with regard to conformism as well, but with a slightly smaller level of distribution.

Table 17: Distribution of selected values and some attitudes of Serbian citizens in 2007 depending on their value orientations (in %)

Values	Party followers								Average
	SRP	DP	DPS	SPS	SRM	G17	NS	LDP	
Authoritarianism	80	52	54	76	62	35	75	29	58
Conformism	41	21	31	34	26	18	20	5	28
Internal locus of control	52	59	47	40	67	62	58	66	49
Trust in people	28	24	29	29	25	27	27	37	24
Intolerance	57	26	40	49	50	20	65	16	39
Materialism	52	39	42	59	31	49	65	19	47
Changes under certain conditions	70	49	62	74	60	47	65	22	52
Isolationism	30	11	22	15	33	20	29	3	16
For joining the NATO	16	54	38	12	38	37	20	65	27
For joining the EU	42	92	79	46	67	83	64	91	63

Source: Poll of the Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research conducted in June 2007 on the sample of 2000 respondents above the age of 15.

Note: The column Total also includes the results for abstainers, undecided and small parties. Intolerance was operationalised by non-acceptance of a homosexual as a possible neighbour. Materialism refers to the concept as defined and measured by an index by Inglehart. “Changes under certain conditions” refer to the agreement with the statement: “Social changes and novelties should be introduced only if they do not disturb our customs and way of life” (actually, that assumes resistance to changes). As an indicator of isolationism, that is, closeness towards the world as opposed to openness, one of multiply verified statements was taken from the appropriate scale: “Ethnically mixed marriages are doomed to fail in advance”. Orientation of citizens with regard to foreign politics was represented by attitudes about the necessity of Serbia to join the EU and NATO.

When all ten values from the Table are taken into account and only those dominant in each pair of dimensions, LDP followers had the most refined profile, followed by DP supporters, and the least prominent profile of dominant orientations was registered in DPS followers. Therefore, the latter were still heterogeneous among themselves, but not as much as in the period of the massive inflow of supporters in 2001. It is interesting that with respect to value priorities between DP and DPS

supporters rank correlation was still significant ($\rho = 0.79$), which implies that due to the cohabitation of the Serbian President and DP leader, B. Tadić with the Prime Minister and DPS leader, V. Koštunica, that had been noticed in 2006 as well, the ranks of certain values had become more similar in the supporters of two parties, at least partially, since it seems that the similarity of value priorities in DP and DPS supporters in 2007 was more influenced by inter-party transfers of the potential voters of these two parties. However, in 2008, because of the recognition of the self-declared independence of Kosovo by the majority of EU countries, and against the desire of the majority of DPS followers for Serbia to join the EU and strong campaign for European Serbia led by Tadić's DP with coalition partners gathered in For European Serbia (FES), Koštunica started an anti-European campaign (with the slogan "Only integral Serbia in the EU, not without Kosovo"), which suffered defeat in May parliamentary election. This would, without doubt, soon be reflected on the new drifting apart of DP and DPS followers in terms of values.

Internal locus of control – perception of cause of events in oneself as a subject is, as a cultural value with clear political implications, fairly developed in Serbia. Internal locus is not even susceptible to large variations depending on electoral orientation of respondents, except for the contrast between SPS followers (below-average), on the one side, and SRM and LDP supporters on the other.

Basic trust in people is also relatively equally distributed among party followers, although it had not yet returned to the level from 1996. It is evident, still, that, more than others, LDP supporters had somewhat more trust in people.

In several of his papers, Inglehart pointed out that around the world, in recent period, (in)tolerance, in the sense of being statistically discriminative, is best manifested through the attitude towards sexual minorities, that is, tolerance of homosexuals as neighbours and in other hypothetical social relations and situations. The last survey of the Institute of Social Sciences revealed that intolerance, conceptualised and measured in this way, had decreased from 49% in the fourth wave of WVS in 2001 to 39% in 2007. Only NS and SRP followers were intolerant in absolute majority, SRM and SPS supporters were at that limit (actually, the intolerant among them had a so-called relative majority), while the smallest number of the intolerant was among LDP, G17 and DP supporters. This indicator is important because it speaks in a fairly indirect way about a more general value orientation, including also the consequences for political behaviour. Namely, this individual indicator reflects a generalised tendency of tolerating differences. It is interesting that in 2001 world average for tolerance of homosexuals as neighbours was 43%. An even more interesting finding is that at the top of the list with regard to (almost maximal) intolerance were Muslim countries (Jordan 98%, Morocco 93%, Azerbaijan 91%, Turkey 90%), but with regard to maximal tolerance as well – other Muslim countries like Egypt (without the intolerant), Iran (only 1%), Bangladesh (5% of the intolerant). In the world, this kind of intolerance is above-average in men, older, the least educated, in lower classes and especially in materialist oriented, as defined by Inglehart (52% as opposed to only 29% of intolerant postmaterialists).

Reservations towards changes, manifested by their acceptance only under the condition that they did not disturb the established domestic patterns of consciousness and behaviour of people, was expressed in an absolute majority of respondents in Serbia in 2007. However, this kind of conditioning for accepting changes (basically, resistance to changes) was much more present than the average among the supporters of SPS and SRS (above the so-called qualified majority), but it was present in absolute majority among NS, DPS and SRM followers as well, which indicates the

survival of conservatism. Only among the supporters of LDP there was a prominent minority of those who accepted the changes under the condition that nothing significant changed in their lives.

One item from the scale, openness towards the world – closeness (inclination towards isolationism), which generally functions well in research here as far as from the studies in the 1970s, indicated that there was a considerable reduction of the tendency for closing oneself in local and national framework, which was partially imposed to Serbia during Milošević's regime (UN sanctions against the FRY imposed in 1992, NATO intervention in 1999, etc.), and thus was not only an expression of traditionalism and conservatism. The statement that ethnically mixed marriages are doomed to fail in advance (we would like to remind that until fifteen years ago there were many such marriages in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Province of Vojvodina – even up to 30%) indirectly reveals the latent attitude of isolationism in respondents, which has been verified by factor-analytical research as well. This tends to become general attitude towards other fields of life as well, and even for the domains relevant for the value component of political culture. Closed towards the world, more than other, were those preferring SRM, SRP and NS, although among them the dominant were the ones who rejected the claim about an inevitable disaster of multinational marriages. The majority of those open towards the world, as determined by this indicator, were registered among LDP and DP supporters.

Two indicators of foreign politics orientation belong to the circle of more general political attitudes, but definitely assume certain value elements as well, since they are integral parts of anti- and pro-Western orientation that has been a political value important for divisions in public opinion of Serbia in the past two decades. The obtained results practically do not deviate from trends of many years regarding the possibility of Serbia to join the European and Atlantic integrations (more about these trends, see Pantić, 2007, pp. 322). The attitude that Serbia should join the EU has been dominant for the past ten years and only slightly oscillated around the two-third majority. The percentage of opponents to Serbia's integration into the EU is approximately five times smaller than the percentage of euro-enthusiasts. Thereby, it is paradoxical that euro-scepticism exists in the form of fairly spread reservations, and even distrust in the EU as an institution. Until recently, along with the above-mentioned majority commitment of Serbian population that their country should join the EU, the majority distrust in the European Union also existed simultaneously, which indubitably indicated the conflict of rational and emotional elements of the attitude towards the EU. Namely, the citizens wanted Serbia to join the EU out of utilitarian reasons (in ordinary people, the phrase about Europe as a "road towards a better life" became very common), with the simultaneous shrinking from introduction of European standards and from all the changes of laws assuming large changes of behaviour on all levels, including the completion of the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Only in the middle of 2007, the distrust in EU decreased to only 17%, but there were still many ambivalent and undeclared (totally 39%). Still, from that period the trust in EU was expressed in public opinion of Serbia by at least a relative majority (44%). Within the newly established trust in the EU, however, there were three times more of those who claimed that they "somewhat trusted the EU" than there were those who expressed that trust more intensively (33% as opposed to 11%). The most interested for entering the EU were the followers of LDP, DP, G17, but also more than average DPS supporters, while the smallest number of those who advocated that idea was found among SRP and SPS supporters, although in recent time there

were more euro-enthusiasts than euro-sceptics among them as well (there was 36% and 23% of the latter respectively). Distrust in the EU was mainly concentrated precisely among the followers of these two parties (38% and 33% as opposed to 27% each of those who demonstrated trust in the EU).

In the last decade and a half, averagely 28% of citizens said that they supported Serbia's integration into NATO, but that percentage fluctuated within the usual sampling errors (by 3% up to 4% in both directions). From 2001 the percentage of opponents of the idea of Serbia joining the NATO declined from 55% to 38% in the middle of 2007. This issue has sharply divided the political party supporters in Serbia. Advocates of Euro-Atlantic integrations of Serbia could be found in absolute majority among LDP and DP followers, those preferring G17 plus, while SRM and DPS supporters were divided. The radicals and socialists were in an absolute majority against Serbia entering NATO (62% and 68%), while NS supporters were against this integration in a so-called simple or relative majority.

Based on the data from the four WVS waves, Inglehart isolated two bipolar factors by factor analysis, first based on 22 variables, and later using only 10 variables. He named the first "traditional versus secular-rational values". This factor was responsible for 46% of variance explained when aggregate level of analysis was applied, that is, when countries were used as units, that is, 26% of variance explained when all individual participants in the research were used in the analysis – over 160,000 over the world. This author and his associates identified the second factor as "survival values versus self-expression values", whereby the percentage of variance explained on the aggregate level was 25%, and on the individual level of analysis 13% (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart 2005; Inglehart et al., 2004; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 and in other papers). Based on these data Inglehart built his theory of modernisation and postmodernism, postmaterialist values (within these, very important are scarcity and socialisation hypotheses), political culture and cultural changes that he mapped combining the findings for the observed countries, that is, by combining the two mentioned factors.

Inglehart paid special attention to self-expression values that he observed as an essential element of democratic political culture. High distribution of self-expression values, which, in keeping with Inglehart's theory, are developed as a consequence of socioeconomic development, is, for this author, the key precondition of democracy. Namely, it has been shown that there is a strong empirical connection between the degree of distribution of self-expression values and the development of democratic institutions, which, according to Inglehart, reflects the fact that self-expression is conducive for democratic institutions – precisely the type of institutions that enables civil and political liberties emphasised by self-expression values. The degree of distribution of self-expression values highly correlates with the index of effective democracy and, together with economic indicators, explains around 80% of variance of differences in the degree of development of democracy of different countries. Four waves of World Values Survey and extensive analysis of linkage between the distribution of self-expression values and effective democracy in the countries around the world, led Inglehart to the conclusion that it is highly "*effective democracy is very likely to emerge when more than 45 percent of a society's public ranks high on self-expression values*" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 300)

Using the data from the third and the fourth wave of WVS conducted in Serbia in 1996 and 2001, as well as the data from the above-mentioned public opinion research from 2007, Pavlović (2008) studied the nature of Inglehart's second factor on individual level of analysis. While Inglehart found that this was the factor that

integrates five elements – materialist values (loading 0.59), description of oneself as not a very happy person (0.59), intolerance towards sexual minorities (0.58), lack of experience in signing petition/negative attitude towards that form of unconventional engagement (0.54) and interpersonal distrust (0.44), also by applying factor analysis, Pavlović found two independent factors (correlation coefficient between them was only 0.08). The author identified the first factor as a *democratic value orientation*, since it comprised postmaterialist values (loading 0.60), public self-expression (0.70) and tolerance of differences (0.63) and explained 30% of variance. The second factor (21% of explained variance), however, seems “incomplete” since it integrated only two variables – subjective welfare (factor loading 0.58) and interpersonal trust (0.85). This factor was identified as *acceptance of oneself and others* and in further analysis of self-expression values turned out to be less significant than the first factor.

Using factor scores on these two factors, Pavlović constructed a 2 x 2 typology in which the type of survival values was presented by a quadrant in which the respondents with negative scores on both factors were located. Positive factor scores on both factors were grouped in the type of self-expression, since that combination of dispositions describes what Inglehart assumed by it. It was shown that dominant in Serbia was the mixed type (52%), which is actually the sum of the two mixed subtypes – the type of a distrustful democrat (26%) and the type of a trustful non-democrat (26%), and that somewhat more spread was the type of survival values (29%) than the type of self-expression values (20%).

The factor of democratic value orientation was above-averagely spread in the inhabitants of urban settlements (26%), and within them there was a regularity – the bigger the place, the more spread this orientation (31% in towns above 100,000 inhabitants versus only 13% in the places up to 2000 inhabitants). It was also above-averagely spread in the youngest generation – among the respondents aged from 15 to 24 (29% as opposed to only 11% in those older than 60), highly educated (26% as opposed to 15% of those with primary school), in the employed (23%), pupils and students (39% as opposed to only 8% of farmers and 13% of the retired), those who lived together, but were not married (30%) and those living alone (28%) and in those who were satisfied with their standard of living (33% as opposed to only 12% among the dissatisfied).

Democratic value orientation correlated significantly with other value orientations, such as modernism ($r = 0.26$), openness towards the world (0.20), non-authoritarianism (0.33), non-conformism (0.32), except with the internal locus of control and religiosity. Still, the results on this factor were mostly differentiated depending on party affiliation (Cramer's $V = 0.216$; Table 18). The type of self-expression values was the highest among LDP supporters (51%), then in DP followers (32%) and G17 plus (29%), while it was least present in socialists (8% as opposed to as much as 50% of the type of survival values) and radicals (17%).

Table 18: Distribution of four types of values with regard to party participation and orientation

Party followers	Value type				Total
	Survival values	Distrustful democrats	Trustful non-democrats	Self-expression values	
Abstainers	40	22	22	17	100
Undecided	39	17	28	17	100
SRP	32	23	28	17	100
DP	15	32	21	32	100
DPS	22	32	24	22	100
SPS	50	13	29	8	100
SRM	25	47	13	13	100
G17 +	16	29	26	29	100
LDP	4	26	9	51	100
Other party	20	26	39	16	100
Average	29	26	26	20	100

The presented data are in keeping with the numerous studies in our country that identified deep divisions in the Serbian electorate with regard to the relevant characteristics of voters of certain political parties (Komšić et al, 2003; Mihailović, 2006; Pantić, 2002; 2006; Pantić and Pavlović, 2006; Pavlović, 2006b). Not rarely, it is spoken about “two Serbias” or the “U” distribution with regard to the characteristics of voters, the socioeconomic, historical-ethnic, cultural-value or ideological-political cleavages in the political life of Serbia etc., which point out to the existence of the two confronted (and often irreconcilable) groups of voters in the Serbian electorate – the one (characterised as pro-European, democratic, modern, liberal, civil etc.) formed mostly of DP voters of and voters of G17 plus, LDP, and, in a smaller degree, DPS, who are similar to them in many relevant respects, and the other (characterised as anti-European, non-democratic, traditional, conservative, nationalist et al.), mostly consisting of SPS and SRP voters. The usage of a completely new concept and an instrument which, in theory, should point out to the democratic potential of an individual, led to analogous, although not so sharp, divisions in the Serbian electorate, since, both with respect to acceptance of democratic value orientation, and to the distribution of the type of self-expression values within the voters of the analysed political parties, it can be spoken about two groups of voters – one which would be formed of, in the first place, DP, G17 plus and LDP voters, and the other, comprising SPS and SRP voters, opposed to them. This finding is an additional confirmation of the differences established between the supporters of political parties over and over again.

IV MOTIVATIONAL COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Motivational component of political culture assumes a disposition or a potential lying at the basis of politically relevant behaviour perceivable at a manifest level. We are dealing with a dynamic readiness of an individual for a certain political behaviour (that causes, directs and manages it), but not the behaviour itself (which will be described by the action component of political culture). Motivational component includes a number of dispositions such as citizens' interest in politics, assessment of importance of politics in life, readiness to get engaged in political life and to influence events in the society, positive evaluation of public engagement et al. Isolated discussion of the motivational component is primarily conducted for analytical purposes since the above-mentioned dispositions stand in complex, interdependent relations, not only mutually, but with other components of political culture as well, and also with some of the key socio-demographic variables.

One of the most important indicators of motivational component of political culture is citizens' interest in politics. That is understandable, bearing in mind the heuristic values of analysis of interests, as one form of values (Pantić, 1980; 1981a; Pantić et al., 1980). Citizens interested in politics are frequently described as an important part of a functional democratic system. In keeping with the conceptual status of interests in socio-psychological literature, this concept is first and foremost used to describe the readiness of an individual to pay attention to political topics and phenomena, at the expense of neglecting some other non-political contents (Lupia & Philpot, 2005). Political interests are connected with a number of other socially relevant attitudes. Citizens who follow politics and who are concerned about who wins, and who loses, will sooner be politically active (Verba, Scholzman and Bergman, 2003; Voogt & Saris, 2003). Besides, political interests are an important predictor of any kind of political knowledge (Delli, Michael & Keeter, 1996) and a reliable indicator of social involvement of an individual in the wider community to which (s)he belongs (Voogt & Saris, 2003). A certain level of political interest benefits both the society as a whole and an actual individual. In that context, theoretical and empirical discussions are steered more and more in the direction of analysing the degree of citizens' interests in a democratic system, while the decisive importance of political interests, at least on a minimal level, is not called into question (Van Deth & Elff, 2004).

Frequent usage of this indicator in our country offers the possibility of a longitudinal analysis of the self-assessment of the degree of interest in politics in the electorate of each of the relevant political parties. Political interest is only one of four kinds of indicators that are used in further analysis with the aim of comparing the voters of different parties with regard to the degree of development of motivational component of political culture. Empirical basis for the analysis are public opinion surveys in Serbia conducted in the period from 1990 to 2007. In order to achieve a better data arrangement, the available data are presented in two tables that refer to the data from two time periods – from 1992 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2007.

The average percentage of voters who were interested in politics in the first observed period (1990-2000) was high and in the case of every individual party more

than one half of the voters of the respective party (Table 19). In the case of DPS, DP and SRM about two thirds of voters were interested in politics, while the same applied for the simple majority of SPS and SRP supporters.

Table 19: Interest in politics and party orientation from 1992 to 2000 (in %)

Party followers	Year of conducting research						Range	Average
	1992	1993	1995	1996	1998	2000		
SPS	45	50	69	45	63	69	24	57
SRM	72	64	74	58	74	-	16	68
DP	64	54	73	43	79	73	36	64
DPS	61	77	76	45	83	62	38	67
SRP	54	49	66	49	62	62	18	57
DEMOS	62	58	-	-	-	-	4	60
Abstainers	21	31	50	15	35	24	35	29
Average	43	45	63	37	49	48	26	47

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who said that they were interested in politics; range refers to the absolute difference of maximal and minimal measure in the corresponding row; average is mean of the corresponding row, while the last row in the table refers to the percentage of those who are interested in the whole sample.

On the average, this indicator of motivational component of political culture in the first observed period was most expressed in SRM voters (68%), while it was least prominent in SRP and SPS voters (57%), excluding the abstainers (29%). The low level of interest in politics on the part of supporters of these two parties is in keeping with the findings of some studies that showed that the level of political interest negatively correlated with the approval of extreme political behaviour (Meredith, 1999; Peterson et al., 2002), which had largely characterised the politics of these two parties during the 1990s.

Individual observation by years of research does not paint a different picture. In each individual case, party supporters showed an above-average interest in politics, while the abstainers were consistently motivated below the average. By far the weakest development of the motivational component of political culture in the group of abstainers is in accordance with the findings that identify political interest as the chief line of cleavage in the structure of interests between abstainers and voters (Pavlović, 2007).

Although range as a measure of variability in descriptive statistics is somewhat imprecise, in this case it provides indicative data that are especially important for the aim of the analysis. As can be seen from Table 19, there are large inter-party differences regarding the percentage of voters that assessed themselves as interested in politics in the observed period. That especially applies to DP and DPS voters, in whom the percentage of motivated voters varied drastically. In the case of DP supporters, in the two-year period (1996-1998), the percentage of interested in politics had increased suddenly (36 percentage points). Similar applies both for the DPS supporters, for the same observed period, when almost 40% of voters perceived themselves as more interested in politics in 1998 than in 1996. Supporters of other analysed parties were far more homogenous, which especially applied for the electorate of SRP (range of 18 percentage points) and SRM (16). In this case as well, the critical period was between 1996 and 1998 when interest in politics suddenly rose and returned to the level from 1995.

If inter-group variations in the electorate are compared with the differences between supporters of individual parties, it is shown that differences within supporters are often bigger than the differences existing between the supporters of individual parties². For example, the difference in the degree of interest in politics among DP supporters in the two observed periods (1996-1998) or among SRP supporters in the same time span is bigger than the difference between these two groups of voters within each of the two observed research years. Bearing that in mind, as well as the characteristic up-down profile of change in the number of motivated (interest increases, then decreases, then increases again), which is a general trend for the supporters of more or less all parties analysed here, it seems that the factors that do not primarily refer to party orientation influenced the motivational component of political culture in larger degree. General social circumstances could have caused such a situation (electoral years when interest grew, interest in the outcome of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, general dissatisfaction with politics after that, 1996/7 street protests that could have brought about an increase of interest perceivable in 1998 et al.). Of course, although party orientation is not crucial, its significance is clearly noticeable because supporters of certain parties were consistently more interested in politics (DP, DPS) than others (SRP, SPS), despite the analogous structure of variations in the level of expression of motivational component, while interest in politics in party-oriented supporters was expressed more consistently than in the group of abstainers.

After the difficult period of the 1990s and the fall of Milošević's regime, the democratic forces came into power and the situation changed in the direction of the decrease of interest in politics in the electorate of almost all parties (Table 20).

Table 20: Interest in politics and party orientation after 2000 (%)

Party followers	Year of conducting research								Range	Average
	2001 Jan.	2001 Jul.	2001 Nov.	2002	2003	2004	2005	2007		
SPS	67	54	51	57	62	50	36	55	31	54
SRM	79	62	44	58	-	55	34	52	44	55
DP	76	66	47	69	67	59	63	52	28	62
DPS	68	45	57	51	58	62	55	56	23	56
SRP	65	54	57	55	56	59	58	48	20	57
PSU	54	60	-	56	-	-	-	-	6	56
CAS	60	67	39	88	-	-	-	-	49	63
NS	-	51	-	64	-	47	68	28	36	52
G17	-	-	-	-	57	58	52	51	7	55
Abst.	33	21	17	26	23	33	28	20	16	25
Average	59	47	41	48	50	47	46	38	21	47

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who said that they were interested in politics; range refers to the absolute difference of maximal and minimal measure in the corresponding row; average is mean of the corresponding row, while the last row in the table refers to the percentage of those who were interested in the whole sample.

² Differences between the supporters were also determined via range. For each analysed period the range between minimal and maximal values between the supporters of different parties was calculated. For each year a certain range was obtained. By counting the average we obtained an average range of interest in politics for the whole observed period. Abstainers were excluded from the analysis. The biggest inter-party differences existed in 1993 (29 percent points), while average difference was somewhat lower (26 percent points).

Still, on the average, more than half of voters of each party were interested in politics, but the level of interest was lower compared to the period of the 1990s. Only SRP voters were an exception to this trend. This practically means that the level of development of motivational component of the supporters of this party had remained, on the average, practically the same, which cannot be said for the supporters of other parties that were analysed in Table 19 (SPS, SRM, DP, DPS), since they became significantly less interested in politics. However, in spite of the decrease in prominence of interest in politics, DP voters were in the current circumstances still one of the two groups characterised by the largest level of expression of motivational component (right behind CAS, for which data are unreliable due to the small share in the total sample and small number of observed periods), while SRP supporters from the least motivated during the 1990s made it to the third place regarding the expression of motivational component.

General observations from the analysis of the period of the 1990s apply to the period of initial years of democracy in Serbia as well. Large inter-group variations were still present, which especially applied for CAS supporters (sudden increase of interest in 2002 compared to 2001) and SRM (sharp decline from 2001 to 2005), while SRP supporters remained the most homogenous behind the G17 plus and PSU voters. Except for the three most homogenous groups (SRP, G17, PSU), where intra-party variations were smaller than inter-party, all the other groups of supporters often demonstrated larger fluctuation in the level of expression of motivational component between the two periods than in comparison with the supporters of other parties (both within the period and on the average level).

Data that are definitely worthy of attention refer to the fact that in certain periods voters of certain parties demonstrated a below-average interest in politics (compared to the average in the whole population). That applied for PSU supporters (54% - January 2001), DPS (45% - July 2001) and CAS (39% - November 2001) in the first year after ousting Milošević, but also for SPS voters (36%) and SRM (34%) in 2005 or NS voters (28%) in 2007. Abstainers still showed a consistent below-average interest in politics because, on the average, only every fourth of them said that (s)he was interested in politics (25%)³. These data speak strongly in favour of the thesis that party orientation and participation cannot be exclusively explained by (dis)interest in politics (which plays a very important role in the so-called cognitive model of electoral participation). Since in every observed case a certain (often not that

³ The available data from other countries show that citizens of Serbia are generally characterised by a relatively low expression of interest in politics. Namely, the data collected in the third wave of World Values Survey (conducted in the period 1994-1999; encompassed over 50 countries) and the fourth wave (conducted in the period 1999-2004; encompassed over 70 countries) indicate that low interest in politics on the level of population places Serbia in both observed periods at the bottom of the list of analysed countries with regard to this. During the mid-1990s (1996) the intensity of development of political interests in citizens of Serbia was higher than the level recorded in Moldova, Russia, Spain, Macedonia, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, El Salvador, Brazil and Columbia, but by far less expressed than in the case of the majority of European countries. This piece of data is in keeping with some findings that indicate that the level of political interest is highly dependent on the level of economic development of one society (Van Deth&Elff, 2004). However, the data from the fourth wave of World Values Survey (conducted in Serbia in 2001, after democratic changes in the country) do not speak in favour of such a standing point. According to the expression of political interests, out of 73 countries Serbia was at the 56th place at the beginning of the new millennium, below the majority of European countries, but above some developed European democracies such as Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In both observed periods, the intensity of expression of political interests in Serbia is below the "world" average which is identical in the two waves (45%).

small) percentage of supporters of analysed parties was not interested in politics, it is obvious that some other factors are important as well (socio-demographic characteristics of an individual, general social context et al.). Finally, that is indicated by, on the average, one quarter of abstainers who were interested in politics, but still remain abstainers.

It is obvious that big “turbulences” in the political scene of Serbia, large waves of voters’ overflow from one party into another, emergence of new parties, dissatisfaction with the initial effects of democratisation due to the unrealistically high expectations et al. influenced the electorate to become significantly less interested in politics, which resulted in the fall of intensity of expression of motivational component for the majority of parties. Party identification still remained an important determinant of motivational component since voters were still (mildly) above average interested in politics. The linkage between party orientation and interest in politics is the most intensive in the supporters of two parties, namely, DP and SRP, who managed to retain the level from the 1990s and profile additionally, thus exerting a more significant influence on their considerably larger electorate.

By far the biggest interest in supporters of all political parties was aroused by information regarding political events in the country, both in the mid-1990s and in the period after 2000 (Table 21). In the mid-1990s voters were more interested in political events in the world than in their region, but the situation reversed after 2000 – political events in the region came before political events in the world, which is a trend that has remained since today.

Table 21: Interest in special kinds of political information and party orientation (%)

Party followers	Type of political information								
	Political information from the region			Political information from the country			Political information from the world		
	1995	2001	2005	1995	2001	2005	1995	2001	2005
SPS	44	67	72	78	86	75	60	43	45
SRM	39	84	76	82	84	80	66	74	63
DP	37	78	66	84	89	76	69	67	60
SRP	34	77	64	81	92	73	55	62	46
DPS	45	78	67	76	84	78	71	55	52
Abstainers	37	47	41	70	54	47	53	29	32
Average	38	68	57	77	80	65	60	47	44

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who said that they were interested in following information from all of the three mentioned areas; the last row of the table refers to the level of interest in general population.

Strong homogeneity of supporters speaks about the absence of decisive influence of political preference on interest in a different type of political information, although its influence is obvious if one bears in mind the group of abstainers or the average on the level of general population. Although preference of certain parties influenced the intensity of interests regarding any kind of information (for example, SPS supporters were consistently less interested in political events in the world, especially after 2000), at the most general level the structure was more-less identical: politics in the country first, then local environment and the world.

Interest in politics in local environment had suddenly risen after 2000 only to fall afterwards, but the percentage of those interested a decade after the first


observation was significantly higher. The similar trend also applied for interest in events in the country. On the other hand, interest in international political events was in a constant decrease.

Thorough social changes that had occurred after Milošević's fall, primarily awoke interest in events in the country, and then in local environment as well, and in such a way diverted attention of both the voters and the whole public from political events on the global level. The fall in interest in all three areas in supporters of almost all parties was probably a part of the general process of lack of motivation for political events.

The indicator closely connected to political interests, but of a significantly different content, shows significantly different data as well. Compared to the professed interest in political topics, a significantly smaller portion of the electorate of analysed parties assessed politics as a very important part of their life (Graph 10).

Except the followers of SRM in 2006, there was no case in which the simple majority of voters considered politics important in life in any of the categories of respondents. In the first observed period, the majority of those who found politics important belonged to the group of the supporters of two parties which had, so to speak, marked the political scene during the mid-1990s – SPS (35%) and SRM (37%). On the other hand, the supporters of DP (26%) and SRP (23%) assigned to politics the smallest importance that was below the average of population and, in the case of SRP supporters, even below the level registered in abstainers (24%).

Graph 10: Assessment of importance of politics in life and party orientation (%)



Source: Third, fourth and fifth wave of World Values Survey.

Note: Percents refer to the respondents who considered politics important in life.

After the democratic changes in the country, there was an additional fall in the importance assigned to politics at the level of population, which, however, did not apply to the majority of groups of supporters of analysed parties. Except the DPS supporters and abstainers who exhibited a decrease of importance of politics, politics became a more important part of life for the supporters of SRM (48%), SRP (35%) and DP (39%). SPS supporters remained at the identical level (35%). In the last

observed period, the importance of politics in life manifests a further decrease in every group of followers, except the followers of SRM.

Low evaluation of politics is, it seems, a relatively stable characteristic of both the supporters of analysed parties and the general population of Serbia⁴. This piece of data, in the context of intensity of interest in politics in the same period, points out to the characteristic conflict of orientations, since in the case of all analysed parties a larger part of the electorate was interested in politics than the number that valued it as an important part of life. In other words, they were interested in something they did not consider important in their life, which is opposed to the usual understanding of interests as preoccupation by favourite contents (Rot, 1994; Pantić, 1980). In the context of turbulent social circumstances in the last decade of the twentieth century, citizens were probably “forced” to be interested in political events that had a most immediate effect on their everyday life, but politics dealt with them more than they dealt with politics. In that sense, politics was probably considered important for life (and hence the interest in it), but not an important part of life of an individual.

Analysis of positive evaluation of different kinds of social (politically relevant) engagement brings about sharp cleavages in the electorate (Table 22). Based on the public opinion research in Serbia in the period 1996-2007, we identified several indicators that demanded the respondent to assess the readiness for certain kinds of political behaviour (but not participation in the actual events).

Table 22: Positive evaluation of social engagement and party orientation (%)

Party followers	Forms of public engagement							
	Free expression of opinion in the street		Protest	Protests against government	Public rallies	Free expression of opinion in the street	Engagement in NGO	Signing petition
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2004	2007
SPS	92	28	4	2	1	39	16	22
SRM	-	-	39	77	-	53	46	40
DP	98	-	38	79	55	48	44	36
SRP	98	56	13	22	2	57	37	37
DPS	100	61	25	67	46	51	26	36
Abst.	93	61	13	39	13	42	27	19
Average	95	55	13	56	24	41	35	29

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who expressed readiness to participate in the above-mentioned forms of public engagement or support them; the last row in the table refers to acceptance of statements at the level of the whole sample.

It can be said that in the mid-1990s there existed a general consensus regarding the advocating of freedom of speech because in every analysed category

⁴ Available data point out that the importance of politics in life for citizens of Serbia was far smaller than for the majority of European and world countries that data are available for. In the mid-1990s, out of 54 countries included in the third wave of World Values Survey, in only five cases importance assigned to politics was lower than in the case of Serbia (Albania - 23% ; Chile – 20%, Finland – 20%; Pakistan – 20%; Slovenia – 15%). Similar applies to the data obtained in the fourth wave of World Values Survey, conducted five years later. Out of the 73 countries involved in that study, there were eight where politics is less valued as an important part of life than in Serbia (Argentina – 24%; Latvia – 24%; Spain – 22%; Estonia – 21%; Finland – 19%; Hungary – 19%; Slovenia – 15%; Pakistan – 14%).

over 90% of respondents supported free expression of opinion in the street. That is most prominent in supporters of DPS (100%), DP (98%) and SRP (98%), but similar also applied to the supporters of the regime party – SPS (92%). Since protection of freedom of speech was also supported by 93% of abstainers, and bearing in mind the level recorded in the general population (95%), it seems that the support of this democratic principle during the mid-1990s was not a direct consequence of influence of party orientation.

Only a year later, the situation was significantly different. Immediately before the parliamentary election in 1997, after which the coalition SPS-YUL-SRP was formed, public expression of opinion in the street was accepted by only every third SPS supporter (28%), unlike the majority of voters of DPS (61%), but SRP as well (56%). One year later, protesting as an unconventional form of political engagement was accepted by a far smaller number of SPS supporters (4%) and 13% of SRP supporters, which were at the time the two ruling parties. The supporters of the then opposition political parties accepted the possibility of protesting in a far greater degree, although there were substantial differences among them as well. Around 40% of SRM and DP supporters expressed readiness for participation in a protest, as well as every fourth supporter of DPS (25%).

With the deterioration of the quality of life in Serbia and catastrophic consequences of Milošević's politics, more severe changes among the supporters of individual parties occurred. On the one side, SRM, DP and DPS supporters largely accepted the possibility of participation in rallies against the then authorities – two thirds of DPS voters (67%) and over three quarters of voters of SRM (77%) and DP (79%). On the other side were the fierce opponents of such a possibility – voters of SPS (2%) and SRP (22%). The situation was identical with regard to the preference of forms of communication of political parties and voters, whereby DP and DPS voters formed one group (accepting a more active form of public rallies), and SPS and SRP voters belonged to the other (expressly against public rallies). The presented data are understandable with regard to the fact that the voters of the then opposition parties (SRM, DP, DPS) had more frequently and in practice participated in public rallies against the unsatisfactory regime (and thus toppled Milošević's regime in 2000), while the voters of ruling parties (SPS, SRP) probably saw the danger of ousting the parties they supported in such activities.

A similar trend continued in the past couple of years as well. Engagement in the NGO sector was highly unpopular among the supporters of SPS (16%), DPS (26%) and SRP (37%) and somewhat more popular among the voters of DP (44%) and SRM (46%).

The data from the last analysed research point out to the specific homogenisation regarding the readiness to participate in an unconventional form of political action – signing petition. Except SPS supporters in which such readiness was expressed by approximately every fifth person (22%), percentage of electorate of other parties regarding this issue was more-less identical. Readiness for signing petition was expressed by 40% of SRM supporters, 36% of DP supporters, that is, DPS, but also 37% of SRP supporters.

Although it is difficult to draw conclusions based on the incomplete longitudinal data that, basically, do not have an identical content, it seems that after the democratic changes in the country, there was a decrease of potential for political behaviour in the supporters of all analysed parties. The consequence of that was the minority of voters of each of the parties that declared readiness for engagement, regardless of the form or intensity of activities. Such a trend was somewhat expected

because it was a consequence of sobering effects of early democratisation and unrealistic expectations from democracy encouraged by living in authoritarian society, while, at the same time, the need for participation of enormous proportions had vanished (Inglehart & Cotteberg, 2003).

If all four analysed groups of indicators are taken into account, it can be said that motivational component of political culture has been relatively developed in supporters of political parties. In comparison with abstainers and the level of interest in general population, party supporters show an above-average interest in politics (primarily in political events in the country) despite the decrease of interest in politics after 2000 and large variations within the supporters of one and the same party. We can speak about two large groups of supporters that primarily differ in the intensity of expression of interests and quality of evaluation of social engagement. One is formed by voters of DP, DPS and SRM, where, on the average, two thirds of voters are interested in politics and positively evaluate various forms of social engagement, unlike the voters of SRP and SPS, where simple majority is interested in politics and where evaluation of social engagement is mostly negative.

V ACTION COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Although it played a relatively small part in the tradition of political theory, analysis of political participation has grown into one of the most important subfields of political science. In literature on political culture, there is a deeply rooted standpoint according to which a good citizen is the one who feels obligated to participate and to act not only for one's own and the benefit of one's family, but also for the benefit of the wider community to which (s)he belongs. It is expected from an ordinary man to take active participation in activities in public sphere, to be aware how decisions are made and to be a part of the decision-making process, but also to make it possible to the public to find out about his/her personal viewpoint in such a way. Democracy depends on and can be developed only through political participation of its citizens. What can be heard very often is the suggestion that democracy can be strengthened by stimulating the development of civil society through enlarged civic participation. Verba, Schoolman, and Brady (1995) have identified civic participation as being "*at the heart of democracy*" (p. 1).

Verba et al. (1995) have defined political participation as an "*activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action - either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies*" (p. 38). By this definition they emphasise that political participation is voluntary rather than obligatory; that it includes action, rather than just being attentive to politics; and that the action is directed at a public official or institution. Examples of political participation include voting, volunteering to work on a campaign, contacting a public official or organisation, contributing to a campaign or cause, taking part in a protest, engaging in informal community work, serving as a member of a local board, or affiliating with a political organisation. Among these activities, voting would be considered the least intensive and individually demanding activity. In other words, Verba and Nie show that participation is not a one-dimensional concept, but consists of different forms, based on which they identify four kinds of conventional participation: campaigning, voting, communal activities and particularised contacting (Verba & Nie, 1972).

Analyses of these authors reflect understanding of participation as an attempt to influence elites (Teorell, 2006), that is, understanding of participation as an instrumental action (Scaff, 1975). Such a viewpoint observes participation as a representation mechanism, a means by which citizens endeavour to influence those who make decisions and to make the political system respond to their demands. The aim of such an action is a redistribution of power, and all that in the function of protecting rights, maximising interests and ensuring legitimacy (Scaff, 1975).

A different standpoint views participation first and foremost as an interaction, which reflects a particularly romantic understanding the roots of which go back as far as Aristotle, who placed participation in the centre of political life and the classic model of Greek democracy. In keeping with this viewpoint, participation has more of a character of affirmation of belonging than simple exercising of legal rights and obligations. Participation is reflected in taking part directly in decision-making, and not in influencing those making the decisions (Scaff, 1975; Teorell, 2006). Authority of individuals, in other words, is not represented, but they practice it themselves.

Unlike instrumental understanding of participation that, above all, implies taking part in something, participation as interaction is based on sharing, reciprocity and communication among the citizens of one community with the aim of sharing equality, rights and justice among its members, as well as promotion of self-realisation, increase in the level of political knowledge and development of political virtues.

Finally, besides conceptual differences in understanding participation, there are also differences in the kinds of activities this concept comprises. Participation is often equalled with voting, that is, conventional forms of participation such as those pointed out by Verba and Nie. However, it can also be spoken about the non-conventional forms of political behaviour – from writing letters to government officials or peaceful demonstrations to violence (Richert, 1974).

Forms of behaviour indicative of the intensity of involvement in political life and activities in public sphere, as well as in the society to which the individual belongs, comprise a wide spectre of forms of political participation that are here subsumed under action component of political culture. Action component of political culture is actualised political behaviour with regard to the intensity, span and kind of engagement. This component is actually a manifestation of the latent potential for political behaviour, i.e. a bundle of dispositions encompassed by the motivational component. Action component includes a wide span of activities such as self-assessment of respondents about their activities, frequency of discussing politics, intensity of activities in socio-political organisations, number of forms the individual participated in, taking part in public criticism of someone or something et al.

For the purposes of this paper, several groups of indicators of the action component of political culture were identified from earlier public opinion studies in Serbia. Based on these it was possible to compare the supporters of different political parties in a longer time span.

Frequency of discussing politics is one of the most often used measures of action component of political culture that is different in many aspects from the traditional forms of political participation (taking part in elections, party activities, membership in organisations et al.). According to some standpoints, larger intensity of discussions about politics produces important consequences on their participants – more thoroughly considered and better grounded decisions, strengthening of faith in and commitment to democratic process, larger tolerance for different points of view, larger inclusion in the community, increase of political knowledge etc. (Jackman & Sniderman, 2006). Discussion, on the one hand, directly depends on the level of expression of motivational component (in the first place of interest in politics), but, on the other, it is an important channel for learning about politics and current political topics in general, and therefore has a direct influence on the level of development of the cognitive component. In certain contexts, discussion can encourage learning, openness towards different alternatives or strengthening of argumentation for judgments made (Luskin et al., 2002). Certain authors see in this element of action component the main determinant of the so-called politically relevant social capital, whereby the main consequence of political interactions is facilitation of political engagement and increased readiness for political participation (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Low level or absence of discussion about politics is a fairly reliable indicator of political passivity or apathy (Solf, 2008). Finally, discussing politics makes it easier to engage in other forms of political participation and is one of the key predictors of political participation in general (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Kim, Wyatt and Katz, 1999; Scheufele, 2000).

With regard to the frequency of political discussions with closest friends, there are no major differences among the supporters of different parties (Table 23). The most active are definitely SRM voters, since for the observed period averagely only 14% of voters of this party say that they rarely discuss politics with friends. On the level of average for the whole observed period, both the voters of DPS (84%) and DP (83%) are characterised by an equally high level of political discussion, since in both of these cases less than one seventh of voters of these parties say that they rarely discuss politics. Somewhat more passive are the voters of SRP (76%) and SPS (76%) although interpretation is somewhat difficult, since there is no group of voters that is consistently more active, that is, more passive than others.

Table 23: Intensity of political discussion and party orientation (in %)

Parties	Year of conducting research					Average
	1995	1996	1998	2001	2002	
SPS	84	69	86	82	57	76
SRM	89	87	96	79	78	86
SRP	89	60	85	87	60	76
DP	83	87	97	80	66	83
DPS	93	82	100	91	56	84
Abstainers	77	56	72	56	31	58
Average	83	70	81	79	50	73

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who said that they often or sometimes discussed politics with their friends; the last column of the table is an average for the corresponding row; the last row of the table refers to the frequency of discussion in the whole sample.

Observed in isolation according to research years, it can be perceived that there were large differences both between the supporters of the analysed parties and within them. Supporters of all parties, except DP, were characterised by an increase of passivity within only one year (from 1995 to 1996), whereby it is prominent somewhere (e.g. almost three times more passive voters in the electorate of radicals), and only indicative somewhere else (e.g. SRM voters). After that, as indicated by 1998 data, there was once again an increase in the number of active voters (DP voters manifested increasingly higher levels of activity from 1995 onwards).

The last available data indicate that, except for SRP voters where the percentage of the passive has been decreasing since 1996, voters of all other parties became less active in a smaller or larger percentage, whereby the registered levels of the passive portion of the electorate of certain party were higher than those in the first observed period (in 1995).⁵

Still, there are two facts speaking in favour of the party orientation playing a certain role. First, abstainers were consistently far more passive than those who voted.

⁵ One should especially bear in mind that the intensity of development of the analysed forms of political participation in groups of voters is largely influenced by socio-demographic characteristics of voters as well. Time, money and civic skills, that is, the differences in socioeconomic status, are the essential resources for political participation in the sense that higher socioeconomic status implies higher level of participation (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995). Besides, an irrefutable conclusion of numerous studies is that participation is the lowest in young age and reaches its climax in middle age, after which it declines again (Beck&Jennings, 1979; Jankowski&Strate, 1995; Jennings, 1979; Strate et al., 1995; Salamon & Van Evera, 1973; Tingsten, 1937). These findings gain an additional importance if one bears in mind that electorate of certain parties, especially SPS and SRP, consists of old, low educated and poor strata of the society (see Appendix).

On the other hand, with certain exceptions (DP voters in 1995; SPS and SRP voters in 1996), in comparison with the level of activities in the whole population, those who were party oriented constantly manifested the above-average levels of expression of this component of political culture. Registered data are important for one more reason. Not only in groups of supporters of certain political parties, but also in population as a whole, the intensity of political discussions was fairly high. Prominence of political discussions in Serbia is not in keeping with some theoretical viewpoints claiming that intensification of political discussions is the function of socioeconomic development of a certain society (Inglehart, 1990), that is, it is deeply rooted in certain cultural patterns and characteristic of Anglo-Saxon and Protestant countries (Dekker, Ester & Vinken, 2003). The registered level is probably the consequence of the dramatic social circumstances and changes that had occurred in Serbia in the observed period⁶.

The fundamental act of political participation is taking part in the election. Universal suffrage is a historical achievement and a defining property of developed democracies of today. However, not everyone peruses that right, so the turnout varies significantly through time, but also between different societies and individuals. Numerous analyses have shown that turnout in various European countries is decreasing (Kostadinova, 2003; Linstead & Gronflaten, 2007; Rose, 2004; Sloam, 2007), that is, that one of the most important, if not the most important, determinant of participation is level of education of respondents (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Martikainen, Martikainen and Wass, 2005; Tenn, 2007a; 2007b). The process of political liberalisation and democratisation creates possibilities for facing a large number of frequently unknown and insecure options. Voters are faced with many opposed alternatives and have to decide whether and how to react to the changed transitional circumstances (Kostadinova, 2003). Since elections are primarily a matter of representing interests of certain social groups, the changes in electoral behaviour can have a disturbing effect on fair representation of social interests, which can have destabilising effects on the process of further development of the country.

Based on available data, it was possible to observe the level of participation of supporters of various parties in parliamentary elections during the 1990s, and even after that, as the second element of action component of political culture and an indicator of the intensity of the conventional type of participation. In other words, supporters of political parties were compared with regard to the level of participation in the last parliamentary election held before the actual public opinion research (Table 24).

By far the most active and most disciplined during the 1990s were the voters of SPS, whereby the level of activity gradually increased in order for almost all voters of this party (99% voted) to vote in the 1997 parliamentary election. Only in 2003 and 2006 the percentage of those who said that they had voted in the last election fell below 90%. For the whole observed period supporters of the party that had been in power longest manifested a constant, extremely high level of political participation.

⁶ The influence of the changed social circumstances is perceivable in the comparative perspective as well. In the mid-1990s, the level of political passivity in Serbia (expressed by the percentage of respondents who said that they never talked about politics) had been among the highest in Europe. The level of passivity was higher in only three European countries that data are available for – Poland, Spain and Ukraine. The level registered immediately after democratic changes showed an opposite situation, since the percentage of politically passive citizens in population of Serbia was among the lowest in Europe.

Table 24: Turnout in the previous election and party orientation (%)

Parties	Year of conducting research									
	1992	1993	1995	1996	1997	1999	2000	2001	2003	2006
SPS	96	96	97	97	93	99	97	93	87	83
SRP	85	90	87	92	84	100	94	86	94	86
SRM	79	94	91	90	86	-	90	97	80	93
DPS	80	100	91	92	90	75	80	91	88	90
DP	83	84	93	98	92	57	65	96	85	81
Abstainers	74	51	48	38	26	53	54	53	53	57
Average	77	80	80	72	81	81	82	90	85	84

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the respondents who said that they participated in the previous parliamentary election; the last row of the table refers to the assessments on the level of the whole sample.

A somewhat opposite trend is manifested by the supporters of opposition parties during the 1990s. Starting from the maximal level of activity in the 1992 election, DPS voters became consistently more passive and until the end of the 1990s reached the level of one quarter of the electorate that was passive. The most passive voters at the beginning of parliamentarism in Serbia (DP supporters), after a short increase in the number of the active in 1997 election, remained by far the most passive portion of the electorate – 43% of voters in 1999 research said that they did not vote in that election. Data are understandable if one bears in mind the fact that the leaders of DP and DPS called for a boycott of 1997 parliamentary election.

In general, until the second half of the 1990s (1997), it cannot be spoken about more significant differences regarding the level of political participation among the supporters of analysed parties. All groups of supporters were characterised by a more-less the same level of high political participation. Although there were differences both between the supporters of different parties within the observed periods, and among the voters of the same parties between the periods, the general conclusion is that during the 1990s, regardless of party orientation, only approximately every tenth respondent said that (s)he had not voted in the previous election.

Since 1999 somewhat bigger differences between the supporters of individual parties can be observed. They are primarily the consequence of the fact that SPS and SRP supporters retained a high level of political participation, which could be said also for the supporters of SRM and DPS, while the DP voters in the two periods manifested a below-average level of political participation. Only somewhat more than one half of voters of DP (57%) said in 1999 that they had voted in the previous election, and two thirds of them in 2000 (65%), which is the level below the one registered in general population in the corresponding time periods.


In the whole observed period the percentage of supporters who said that they had voted in the previous election was unusually high. This fact is best illustrated by data on population level that are far above the turnout that was actually registered in the appropriate period⁷. That is a finding of considerable significance because, it

⁷ The non-updated election lists make it difficult to say what the true turnout in the previous elections in Serbia was. Official data show that the turnout had never exceeded 70% of the electorate (see Appendix). However, it is highly probable that the true turnout was basically higher than the one registered, for several reasons: many registered voters live abroad and do not vote; it takes a long time for the authorities to remove the deceased from the election lists; some people are registered at more than one polling station etc. It can be heard often that the number of voters in Serbia is overestimated

seems, it indicates that self-declaration of the respondent about whether (s)he voted in the last election is a poor measure of turnout rate and changes regarding it, and consequently of the analysed form of political participation. These data are not surprising. As a consequence of the tendency to give socially desirable answers, considerably more people say that they voted than it is actually the case. As some findings indicate, about 20% more people say that they took part in the election than it really did (Highton, 2005). That particularly applies to the elections with a high turnout rate (Karp & Brockington, 2005).

Probably somewhat closer to truth are the data presented in Graph 10 that refer to the general estimation of election turnout in the past couple of years before the moment of research (2003). It can be noticed that there are larger differences between the supporters of different parties. The most active were the voters who supported ruling parties – supporters of SRP (78%) and SPS (77%). Slightly less active were the voters of DPS (68%), SRM (63%) and DP (60%). That could also be a consequence of massive tampering with elections and manipulating election results during the 1990s, which could have had a demotivating effect on the voters of the then opposition parties, resulting in the lower turnout rate of supporters of these parties.

Graph 11: Regular voting in the elections and party orientation (%)



Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who said that they regularly voted in the election held the previous year.

In the context of the general fall in participation in traditional forms, difference is very often made between the conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Some authors think that the changed content of political participation is reflected primarily in the decrease of formal forms of behaviour directed by the elites and at the same time the increase of informal forms of political engagement directed towards criticising political elites (Dekker, Ester and Vinken, 2003; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). It has been empirically confirmed that there is a connection between participation in informal forms of political activity and acceptance of democracy (Guerin et al., 2004), that is, that turnout rate shows one

for approximately one million people. However, in the above-presented table, according to the self-assessment of respondents, turnout was never under 70% in any analysed period, which is a persuasive piece of evidence in favour of the existence of inclination of respondents to overestimate their level of political participation.

pattern of change over time, while other indicators of political participation follow a different trajectory (Listhang & Gronflaten, 2007; Sloam, 2007).

With the aim of identifying the intensity of unconventional activities, we studied a bundle of indicators concerning participation in informal political activities – signing petition, approved demonstrations and unannounced strike.

As far as participation in informal forms of political activity is concerned, as regards signing petition, it can be noticed that there are large differences among the supporters of different parties. What is immediately perceived from Table 25 is a low level of taking part in this form of participation in the supporters of almost all political parties.

Only in one case, namely that of SRM supporters in 2001, a simple majority of supporters participated in signing petition. The most active with regard to this form of participation were the very voters of SRM in each of the observed periods, although there were large variations in the electorate of this party. On the other hand, SPS voters consistently expressed the largest level of passivity which was below the level registered in abstainers or general population. After their party had been ousted, the electorate of this party became considerably more active – the number of active ones doubled in the period 2000-2001 and has been on the increase since. This definitely has something to do with the sudden loss of support in the electorate at the 2000 election that is fairly responsible for this kind of picture. Besides SPS supporters, the least active were SRP voters, although there were large variations within the electorate of this party between different periods.

Table 25: Taking part in signing petition and party orientation (%)

Parties	Year of conducting research			
	1996	2000	2001	2007
SPS	11	7	15	22
SRM	48	37	55	35
DP	32	35	34	38
SRP	25	19	36	22
DPS	36	36	35	25
Abstainers	33	11	20	14
Average	22	21	29	21

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of supporters who took part in signing petition; the last row refers to the corresponding data for the whole sample.

DP and DPS voters were the most stable with regard to the percentage of those who took part in signing petition. In both cases, on the average, around one third of the electorate of these two parties was active in this form of participation, noting that in case of DPS supporters in the last observed period a significant fall can be noticed – from one third to one quarter of the electorate⁸.

⁸ Available data from the World Values Survey indicate that, in comparative perspective, great changes occurred in the position of Serbia regarding the percentage of citizens who took part in signing petition in the period from 1996 to 2001. In the mid-1990s the percentage of Serbian citizens who took part in signing petition was among the lowest in comparison with all countries data are available for. More precisely, Serbia was in the group of former communist countries characterised by a low distribution of this type of activities, together with the countries such as Bulgaria, Belarus, Estonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine et sl. Experiences in opposing Milošević's regime in the second half of the 1990s also resulted in an increase in the percentage of voters who took part in signing petition that was,

Taking part in somewhat more intensive forms of political participation, such as demonstrations or unannounced strike, caused similar divisions in electorate of Serbia (Table 26). By far the least active regarding that were SPS voters. Whether we are dealing with taking part in demonstrations or strike, the percentage of those who participated in those kinds of activities in the electorate of this party was far below the average or the level recorded in abstainers. In best case, only every tenth voter of SPS took part in demonstrations, that is, approximately only every twentieth in strike. Data are understandable, considering that it was to be expected that the supporters of the party that represented government would not largely participate in demonstrations against the current regime. Ousting of SPS did not lead to raising the level of participation of its voters in these forms of unconventional activities. Similar applied also for SRP supporters. Although they were more consistently active from SPS supporters, the level of activity was still lower than that of the supporters of other three parties. SRP becoming opposition influenced the raising of the level of activity, in the first place concerning taking part in demonstrations. In the period 1999-2001 the number of SRP supporters who took part in this form of participation tripled.

Table 26: Taking part in demonstrations and strike and party orientation (%)

Party	Taking part in demonstrations				Taking part in strike			
	Year of conducting research				Year of conducting research			
	1996	2000	2001	2006	1996	2000	2001	2006
SPS	5	10	8	14	3	4	4	11
SRM	21	52	59	40	12	24	9	21
DP	8	62	34	32	8	20	33	23
SRP	15	23	30	23	13	15	15	19
DPS	15	30	31	14	4	30	20	13
Abstainers	14	14	12	17	9	12	4	13
Average	9	24	24	25	5	15	8	18

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of supporters who took part in demonstrations; the last row refers to the corresponding data for the whole sample.

The most active participants of demonstrations, as in the case of taking part in signing petition, are SRM voters who were consistently the most active in comparison with the supporters of other parties. The most drastic changes regarding this issue occurred in the electorate of DP (difference of 54 percentage points from 1996 to 2000, then fall by 28 percents in the period 2000-2001), which was probably caused by the fact that after 2000 one portion of (passive) electorate belonging to the other parties joined the consistent DP voters.

There is no doubt that the influence of party orientation on taking part in the unconventional forms of participation is important. That is noticeable if one bears in mind the abstainers and distribution of engagement in general population, which was below the level of party oriented, although that is not a rule, primarily because of an extremely low level of participation in this form of activity manifested by SPS supporters⁹.

at the beginning of the new millennium, far above the one registered in the group of the above-mentioned countries of Eastern Europe.

⁹ Similar to taking part in signing petition, the percentage of Serbian citizens who took part in strike was among the lowest in Europe in the mid-1990s, although higher than in the majority of former

However, if one bears in mind all three analysed forms of participation (signing petition, taking part in demonstrations and strike), it is obvious that those kinds of activities are poorly developed in Serbian electorate. Such a conclusion can be drawn from a simple finding that it is extremely rare that more than a half of the electorate of a certain party is characterised by the development of these forms of political participation. In addition to that, those examples are restricted to the supporters of only two parties – SRM and DP – but in the case of these parties as well that is more of an exception than a stable characteristic of the electorate. Besides the generally low level of informal participation, obtained data were also affected by the instability of political scene in Serbia - large overflow of voters between different parties, but also the appearance of new parties whose supporters were not the subject of analysis, and which could have gathered the supporters who were consistently characterised by a certain level of activity, that is, passivity. This caused large changes in the electorate of an actual party regarding the characteristics analysed here and at the same time made a meaningful interpretation difficult.


Finally, as the last indicator of action component of political culture we analysed membership in various organisations – religious, cultural and art related, professional, political and syndicate. Membership in various organisations is considered one of the most important indicators of social capital (Ferguson, 2006). The importance of social capital, and by that membership in organisations as well, for political behaviour is almost never called into question. Putnam's study was the first systematic research that connected social capital with the success of democratic government (Putnam, 1993). Comparing the government in Northern Italy with the one in Southern, Putnam ascribes the larger success of the Northern to the quality of their civil society reflected in the strength of their civic associations. Putnam (1993, p. 167) classifies these kinds of attitudes as forming key dimensions of "social capital," which are "*features of social organisation such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.*" Although some later analyses in different social contexts showed that only membership in certain type of organisations (and not any type of organisations, as implicitly assumed by Putnam) is significant for democratic behaviour (Seligson, 1999), the general conclusion that social capital is connected with democracy remains. Further elaborations showed that the ways in which social capital affects democracy are the influence on economic growth (Whitley, 2000), differentiation of the so-called politically relevant social capital (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998) and the influence on various forms of civil activism (Crystal & De Bell, 2002). Participation in the non-political civil society leads to political participation because people are exposed to political stimuli in those occasions, because of which their worldview expands (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978) and a general readiness for participation in politics increases. Participation promotes democracy since it teaches people the social skills

communist countries (Bulgaria, Belarus, Estonia, Moldova, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine). After democratic changes in the country in 2001, that percentage was higher than the one registered in all other countries data are available for, except the one registered in Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, South Africa and the United States of America. Data about citizens' participation in demonstrations are even more illustrative. While the percentage of Serbian citizens who took part in this form of activities during the mid-1990s was higher only than the one registered in Croatia, El Salvador and Uruguay (therefore, among the lowest in Europe), in 2001 situation became considerably different because the percentage of citizens who took part in demonstrations was lower only than the one registered in the developed democracies of Western Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden). It is obvious that registered changes are the consequence of massive participation of Serbian citizens in political events in the second half of the 1990s.

and attitudes necessary to make democracy deeply rooted in certain environment (Pateman, 1970).

With regard to the membership in various types of social organisations there are no prominent differences between individual groups of supporters (Graph 12).

Graph 12: Membership in social organisations and party orientation (%)



Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of supporters who were members of at least one organisation.

Low level of such a form of engagement was widely spread in every observed period. That especially refers to the period of 2001 when, except for the SPS voters who were at the border (52%), more than one half of the electorate of each of the analysed parties were not members of any of the analysed social organisations. The same applies for the data from the last observed period (2006), when the intensity of this form of engagement was at approximately the same level in each group.

Active membership declined, since in 2001 in the electorate of each of the parties there was considerably more of those who were not members than in 1996 (SPS voters were an exception, but the changes are minimal – 1 percentage point). The most extreme were DPS voters who demonstrated a considerable increase of passivity in the five-year period (difference of 31 percentage points). In addition to that, the differences between the parties within each of the periods are less expressed than the changes within the voters of the same party between two periods, which indicates that party orientation is not a decisive determinant of this kind of activity, but is significant, which is indicated by the comparison with the group of abstainers.

Analysis of the development of action component of political culture does not offer unequivocal results as in the case of motivational component, although these are closely connected. Politically relevant social capital (political discussions) and formal kinds of political behaviour (voting) are highly developed elements of action component, whereby there is a conditional homogeneity of the supporters of different parties, although the first mentioned is primarily the characteristic of the voters of DP, DPS and SRM, while SPS and SRP voters are the ones who took part in the elections

most regularly. Informal kinds of political activity are the least developed elements of action component, whereby there is also conditional homogeneity of voters (small inter-party differences), with considerable differences within the supporters of the same party between the observed periods, probably due to the large wave of overflow of voters. A poorly developed element of action component is also engagement in social organisations. Low social capital is a characteristic of the whole electorate, whereby, especially after 2000, there are no significant differences among the supporters of different parties. It is possible that some macro-factors (cultural, economic etc.) play a significant role in determining this form of political participation, as some cross-cultural comparisons, based on World Values Survey, indicate.

Finally, since there is a general homogeneity in the electorate, that is, small inter-party differences in the structure of activities (the formal the most developed, the informal the least developed, membership in organisations the poorest), the level of development of certain elements of action component of political culture depends more on the nature of those elements than on party affiliation. In other words, party identification exerts different influence on different forms (of politically relevant) behaviour.

VI COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Until recently, the analysis of the level of citizens' political knowledge has not been particularly extensive and sophisticated. It was Neuman (1986), one of the more distinguished authors in this field, who noticed that in the National Election Study there were around 2500 items about personal characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of the representative sample of the American citizens, while only ten items directly concerned political knowledge. In other words, political knowledge of citizens has been until recently the least studied aspect of citizenship (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1991).

There are several reasons for this "omission" (Lambert et al., 1988). The early Gallup research that, in a restricted measure, tested knowledge about politics shattered the romantic notion about an informed citizen. Relatively low levels of political knowledge which were pointed out by scarce empirical research over and over again provided the basis for a general belief that citizens know so little about politics that the facts they do (not) know definitely do not have a more considerable influence on their behaviour. Closely connected to that is also a classic belief (a peculiar agnosticism) that it is far more important for the behaviour of respondents what they subjectively believe, and not whether that what they believe is right. This resulted in far more developed studies of politically relevant attitudes, beliefs and values, at the expense of politically relevant knowledge. Finally, there is one practical reason as well. Expressed lack of political knowledge of a respondent can have a demoralising effect on him/her, but also seriously impair the established contact between the interviewer and the respondent, which is, for many researchers, a strong enough reason to leave out the indicators that refer to political knowledge.¹⁰

However, in the past two or three decades political knowledge has become one of the central variables in studying political behaviour. Numerous researchers invested significant efforts in order to explain variations in the level of knowledge of an individual and the consequences that it produces on political behaviour. Various aspects of political knowledge were analysed: what people know and do not know about politics and how the level of political knowledge changes over time (Bennet, Flickinger and Rhine, 2000; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996); the connection between the level of political knowledge and frequency of political discussions (Eveland & Thompson, 2006); predictive value of political knowledge for political participation (Gronlund & Milner, 2006; Howe, 2006; Inglehart, 1979; Krampen, 2000); individual variations in the level of political knowledge and its determinants (Gronlund & Milner, 2006; Kwak, 1999; Prior, 2005; Rhine, Bennett and Flickinger, 2001; Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, 1970; Vettehen, Hagemann and Snippenburg, 2004; McCann & Lawson, 2006) etc. More and more numerous findings about the importance of political knowledge for the political behaviour of an individual led certain authors to

¹⁰ Some authors see the solution to this problem in "encouraging" the answers such as "I do not know" (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993). In practice, that is manifested in several ways: by formulating instructions ("*Many people do not know answers to these questions...*", "*Do you happen to know...*"), by instructing interviewers not to insist on getting an answer etc. For the same reason it is suggested to use questions with offered answers instead of open-ended questions, and even to prompt respondents to try and guess the right answer if they are not sure about it (Mondak, 2001).

the conclusion that „*political knowledge is to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the currency of citizenship*“ (DelliCarpini & Keeter 1996:8).

It seems that the overview of relevant literature provides basis for several general conclusions regarding political knowledge. First, there is no doubt that political knowledge facilitates political behaviour, above all participation and involvement in politics. Increased political knowledge is related to more active participation in various political activities (Inglehart, 1979; Klingemann, 1979; Bennett, 1986; Neuman, 1986). Understanding of political world and formulation of attitudes about politics that are consistent with basic values and orientations of an individual is impossible without a certain level of political knowledge. Political knowledge of citizens facilitates their „*ability to link their policy views and choices to their assessments of politicians and parties. Better-informed citizens can more easily identify with the parties and politicians whose policy positions are more consistent with their own views*“ (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 251). High level of citizens' political knowledge is one of the key aspects of democracy as well because of the importance it carries for the process of democratic decision-making. In order for democracy to function adequately, voters must have enough knowledge about political system and political participants in order to be able to make a rational and adequate decision. Pieces of information are also necessary for people to be capable to evaluate the achievement of those who represent them (Gronlund & Milner, 2006).

The level of political knowledge varies significantly between the members of certain political community and is more developed within certain segments of population. Especially important is the influence of three socio-demographic variables – education, age and socioeconomic status. It is shown that these factors are the main determinants of the level of political knowledge, so a large number of studies concluded that the more educated, older and males were more knowledgeable (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993; 1996; Gronlund & Milner, 2006; Kenski, 2002; Maghami, 1974; Tichenor & Donohue, 1970). As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) note, members of the upper classes are more likely than those from the lower classes to have the intellectual skills, motivation, and opportunity to become knowledgeable about government and politics. Formal education can increase the level of political knowledge either by giving concrete pieces of information about politics or by demonstrating the significance of political world, but also indirectly – by developing interest in politics and skills that facilitate learning of political information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1991). Besides, education creates permanent receptiveness for subsequent acquisition of knowledge, which is one of the main reasons of the perceived differences.

Finally, it is indubitable that influence of media on the level of political knowledge is considerable. Following informational contents in the media diminishes the differences in political knowledge between different educational groups (Kwak, 1999) or respondents of different social status (Rhine, Bennett and Flickinger, 2001). However, the findings about effects of media are not unequivocal since dissemination of information by mass-media often leads to deepening of the already existing differences in the level of political knowledge between different segments of population. Tichenor et al. (1970) first articulated the “knowledge gap” hypothesis which stated that “as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease” (pp. 159-160). Reasons for that can be found, in the first place, in the level of motivation

for following political contents in the media, but also different ability of acquiring and understanding political information.

The level of political knowledge, that is, cognitive component of political culture, is usually operationalised as the knowledge about what government is and what government does (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993). Neuman (1986) operationalises what government is as the basic structure of government, that is, the basic values, such as civil participation, government of the majority, division of power, civil liberties, as well as its main elements, such as two-party system, two chambers of Parliament, role of judiciary and organisation of cabinets. What is also expected from a democratic citizen is to know what government does, to be well informed about political topics. (S)he should know what are the topics, what is their past, what are the relevant facts, which are the suggested alternatives, what each party stands for, what are the most likely consequences of certain political measures et al. (Berelson et al., 1954).

Some other fields seem equally important. Knowledge about political leaders, political parties and current political alignments seems essential for effective citizenship. Finally, the knowledge about related fields such as political history or political economy presents an important context for understanding current politics.

In accordance with this general division, political knowledge is very often divided into knowledge about leaders, national and international (e.g. *Who is the current Prime Minister?*, *Who is the current Foreign Affairs Minister?*, *Who is Nelson Mandela?* etc.), party (e.g. *Which party has the majority of seats in the Parliament?*, *What is the attitude of a certain party regarding some topic?* etc.) and civic knowledge (e.g. *How long does the Presidential mandate last?*, *Who appoints judges?* etc.). Very often it is spoken about textbook knowledge or learned facts, as opposed to knowledge about surveillance facts or the facts from recent political history (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993; Jennings, 1996). Finally, very often a distinction is made between different knowledge levels, so there is a factual and conceptual knowledge (Lambert et al., 1988). In that context, Neuman (1986) speaks about political sophistication consisting of three related dimensions. The first is political salience and it regards interest of respondents in politics in general and current events in particular. Knowledge about political figures, themes, structures and groups forms a second element which could be understood as an indicator of the level of factual knowledge. The third variable is political conceptualisation and it refers to respondents' ability to apply various political concepts in different ways on his/her political environment and, further, to integrate and organise political ideas. Relevant research points out to the knowledge of different kinds of facts, that is, that different levels of knowledge are decisively influenced by different factors (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1991; 1993; Feldman & Price, 2008; Gronlund & Milner, 2006; Jennings, 1996; Lambert et al., 1988), which speaks in favour of the justifiability of such classifications of political knowledge.

With regard to everything said previously, the most reliable and valid measure of the cognitive component of political culture are knowledge tests about politically relevant contents. Rare usage of this type of indicator in classic public opinion studies that mostly involve indicators of attitudinal type presents a large obstacle to direct assessment of level of knowledge of supporters of political parties in Serbia in the observed period. In this particular case, analysis is focused on three types of indicators: self-assessment of respondents about the level of information, knowledge about political facts, relevant and current in certain time period, but also intensity of following press as a characteristic indirect measure. Although following daily press

does not necessarily imply a higher information level and higher level of political knowledge (because one can follow different contents in press for different motives), it is a reasonable assumption that frequent following of informational columns in daily press, in the worst case, at least positively correlates with the level of political knowledge. The findings of some studies actually point out to the conclusion that preference of informational contents in the media is a good predictor of political knowledge (Prior, 2005).

If self-assessment of respondents is observed as an indicator of the level of information about politics, significant differences can be perceived among the supporters of different parties. The majority of well-informed, on the average, can be found among DP (27%) and SRM (29%) voters, while the supporters of SRP (20%) and SPS (21%) are among the most poorly informed (Table 27).

Table 27: Self-assessment regarding the level of information about politics (%)

Parties	Year of conducting research						Average
	1999	2000	2001	2004	2005	2007	
SPS	19	26	11	26	18	24	21
SRM	30	23	23	51	8	36	29
SRP	19	17	14	19	25	27	20
DP	30	31	27	20	26	27	27
DPS	23	28	13	26	27	27	24
Abstainers	15	10	10	19	13	15	13
Average	24	15	14	17	17	21	18

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of respondents who said that they were well-informed about politics; the last column of the table refers to the average of the corresponding row; the last row refers to the percentage of well-informed on the level of the whole sample.

However, the most important finding is that, at best, only somewhat more than one quarter of the electorate of appropriate parties assess that they are well-informed about politics. Although the influence of party orientation is obvious if voters are compared with abstainers, only the DP supporters were consistently better informed through all analysed periods than the level manifested in general population. In general, a certain level of information is more or less a stable characteristic in the electorate of analysed parties, since more prominent differences among the observed periods are absent (the exception to that is a drastic decline in the assessment of level of information in the SRM electorate between 2004 and 2005). Democratic changes in the country and the waves of large voters' overflow obviously did not influence this characteristic, which is, probably, the consequence of the low level of information about politics on the level of general population.

Indirect measure of the degree of political knowledge can be provided by the data about following informational columns in daily press (Table 28). The percentage of the electorate of various parties that followed informational columns varied significantly among the supporters of analysed parties, but also during the observed period. On the average, it can be spoken about two groups of supporters that have appeared earlier as well. On the one side would be SRM, DP and DPS supporters, who followed information in press somewhat more intensively (on the average around two thirds of the electorate) as opposed to SPS and SRP supporters (on the average one half of the electorate). However, the differences are not prominent since both groups are characterised by an above-average intensity of following informational

columns. Besides, it is noticeable that there are large changes within the electorate of one and the same party – for example, in 2002 51% of DP supporters said that they followed information in daily press, while one year later almost 91% of the voters of this party said the same thing¹¹. In that sense, there is practically no party whose supporters were consistently better informed, that is, whose followers were characterised by a stable level of information. Followers of every party were characterised by an up-down or zigzag profile of change – the percentage of the informed ones increased, then decreased, and then increased again or vice versa.

Table 28: Following information in daily press (%)

Parties	Year of conducting research								Average
	1992	1996	1998	2001	2002	2003	2005	2007	
SPS	50	79	54	67	34	76	35	40	46
SRM	58	88	78	62	55	87	36	48	64
DP	64	86	86	64	51	91	56	52	69
DPS	54	83	92	58	48	91	43	51	65
SRP	56	93	54	55	44	88	43	38	49
Abstainers	50	51	59	44	40	73	33	40	49
Average	51	68	61	54	44	85	42	39	56

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Percents refer to the number of those who said that they regularly read informational columns in daily press (every or almost every day); the last row refers to the corresponding data for the whole sample.

However, these data are only indicative because they contradict the data presented in the previous Table – a vast majority of supporters of practically the same parties followed information in daily press, but at the same time assessed that they were poorly informed about politics. This contradiction cannot be solved based on the data presented here and definitely deserves further analyses. It is possible that we are dealing with the consequence of criticism regarding the assessment of one’s own level of information, but it is also possible that information in daily press and the field of politics (as something abstract, distant, and to an ordinary man incomprehensible phenomenon) are not equal in respondent’s consciousness, the consequence of which is the perceived discrepancy.

Knowledge tests about politically relevant topics are the best way to objectively assess the level of information. For the purposes of this paper some claims were selected from previous studies in which respondents were not asked to express the attitude towards a certain topic, but to provide specific information about certain political topics that were current at the given moment. Although we are dealing with isolated indicators, these can serve as an independent measure of the development of cognitive component of political culture in the supporters of individual parties¹².

In the beginning of political pluralism in Serbia, the most informed were SRM voters – 71% of voters of this party knew the name of the Chairman of the Executive

¹¹ The reasons for this sudden increase in press following (not just in the case of DP followers, but in the general population as well), could be explained by certain situational factors. Namely, in 2003 Zoran Đinđić was murdered, which was followed by the state of emergency, transitional government and new election.

¹² In the remainder, the answer such as “I do not know” on certain indicators that asked the respondent to provide actual information and explicated, but wrong answers will be observed as one category. About the correctness of this procedure and certain methodological dilemmas regarding this approach see: Mondak, 1999; 2001.

Council of Republics, as opposed to 60% voters of DP and the minority (44%) of SPS supporters (Table 29). Similar applied also for information regarding the measures of the Federal Executive Council, although there were significant differences among the supporters of analysed parties. However, during the 1990s, the knowledge about politically relevant topics was largely the function of the concreteness of the topic that was being known. When it comes to concrete data of everyday-politics nature, the level of knowledge was high in all groups of voters, which was probably the consequence of intensive following of informational columns in daily press. Conditions for lifting sanctions in 1992 were not familiar to, in the worst case, one quarter of the electorate of individual parties. Similar also applied for the question about the number of refugees – although the level of knowledge was lower than in the first case, the number of those who did not know the actual information ranged from 36% (SPS voters) to 17% (DPS voters). Supporters of SRM (80%), DP (90%) and DPS (79%) were by far more informed about the demonstrations against the annulling of election results during the mid-1990s, that is, about regrouping of political (opposition) parties.

Table 29: Unfamiliarity with everyday-politics events and party orientation (%)

Year		Party followers						Average
		SPS	SRM	DP	DPS	SRP	Abst.	
1990	Does not know who is the President of the Executive Council of Republics	56	29	40	-	-	-	49
	Is not informed about the measures of FEC	56	50	70	-	-	-	74
1992	Has no knowledge about the conditions for lifting sanctions	11	21	26	27	22	29	15
	Wrong assessment of the number of refugees in Serbia	36	27	29	17	28	35	37
1996	Has no knowledge about demonstrations because of annulling of election results	31	20	10	21	45	52	35

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Data refer to the percentage of respondents who did not know the corresponding fact; the last column refers to the corresponding data for the whole sample.

However, the level of knowledge about the more abstract political principles is significantly lower and that refers to the supporters of all parties (Table 30). Unlike knowledge about actual facts where the majority knew them, unfamiliarity with some of the basic principles of democracy leads to the predominance of those who did not know that and points out to the low level of political knowledge. Especially surprising is the finding that the supporters of the two parties that fought for establishing democracy as opposition parties in the 1990s and later were the foundations of it (SRM and DPS) in the simple majority showed unfamiliarity with the elementary principles of democracy – 56% of DPS supporters are not familiar with the two analysed principles of democratic procedure; the same applied for the majority of SRM electorate.

Knowledge about smaller political parties without a significant political influence or particular individuals from the world of politics (Tables 30 and 31) is on a considerably higher level. In 2000, Demo-Christian Party of Serbia was unknown to every third supporter of SPS (33%), every fourth supporter of SRP (26%), as well as

approximately every tenth DP voter (12%), that is, approximately every fifth DPS supporter (18%). Similar applied also for familiarity with the existence of New Democracy, noting that the general level of knowledge was somewhat higher in comparison with familiarity with DCPS, with analogous divisions in the electorate – SPS and SRP voters (not so familiar) as opposed to DP and DPS voters (far more familiar).

The percentage of supporters of individual parties who were not informed about the actual individuals from the world of politics who were more or less present in public life was scarce. Regarding the familiarity with Boris Tadić (DP), Žarko Korać (SDU), Ivica Dačić (SPS) and Dragan Maršićanin (DPS) significant differences among the supporters of different parties are practically absent. Only several percents of people within the electorate of analysed parties said that they had not heard of the individuals in question.¹³

Table 30: Unfamiliarity with everyday-politics events and party orientation (%)

Year		Party followers						Average
		SPS	SRM	DP	DPS	SRP	Abst.	
1996	Does not know any of the parties from the coalition “Together”	39	9	0	12	43	45	30
1997	Does not know how much democracy is connected to the freedom of speech	44	74	-	56	49	42	51
	Does not know how much democracy is connected with equality before the law	29	62	-	56	43	32	42
2000	Does not know that the Constitution of FRY was changed	34	21	10	14	17	41	32
	Has not heard of DCPS	33	24	12	18	26	30	31
	Has not heard of ND	21	10	0	4	17	15	17
2001	Does not know about the platform for FRY	67	37	44	47	82	87	70

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Data refer to the percentage of respondents who did not know the corresponding fact; the last column refers to the corresponding data for the whole sample.

As opposed to good knowledge about parties and leaders, we have a “massive” lack of knowledge regarding current (at the given moment) political processes and affairs in public sphere. After 2000 and ousting of SPS and SRP, 67% of the supporters of the former and 82% of the latter party were not familiar with the platform for FRY (Table 30), that is, with the details of the agreement about the reorganisation of the Federation (Table 31). The supporters of these two parties also lagged behind in knowledge about the measures for joining the EU (63% of SPS

¹³ Even despite that, it is surprising that there existed, truly, a small number of supporters of certain parties that had never heard about the prominent officials of the parties that they identified themselves with. So 4% of DPS supporters had never heard of Boris Tadić, 3% of SPS supporters had never heard of Ivica Dačić, 5% of DPS supporters had not heard about Dragan Maršićanin. We are dealing with very small percentages here that are at the level of statistical error, so it is not possible to draw valid conclusions. However, it seems that they indicate that in the electorate of any party there are voters who lack fundamental knowledge about elementary facts from political life, such as those concerning who are the people who lead and make up the party they identify with and vote for.

supporters; 51% of SRP supporters) or NGO functioning (approximately two thirds of SPS and SRP followers).

The level of knowledge of the supporters of the second group of parties, DP, DPS and SRM, although for the most part higher than in the case of SPS and SRP followers, was still not impressive. While the majority of the supporters of each of these parties were familiar with the platform for FRY (Table 30), they were not familiar with the details about the agreement for the reorganisation of the Federation (53% of DP supporters, 57% of DPS and 62% of SRM). Similarly, approximately one half of the supporters of the parties that vehemently advocated joining the EU after 2000 were not informed about the measures undertaken by the Government for those purposes; that they were not informed about that said 48% of SRM supporters, 50% of DP supporters and 52% of DPS supporters. That is barely above the level in general population (53% were not informed about the measures) and the one registered in the population of abstainers (55%).

Table 31: Unfamiliarity with everyday-politics events and party orientation (%)

Year		Party followers						Average
		SPS	SRM	DP	DPS	SRP	Abst.	
2002	Does not know details about the reorganisation of S&M	59	68	62	53	57	75	41
2003	Has never heard of Boris Tadić	4	6	6	4	4	9	6
	Has never heard of Žarko Korać	6	8	6	3	5	10	7
	Has never heard of Ivica Dačić	3	4	0	2	3	10	5
	Has never heard of Dragan Maršićanin	3	2	4	3	5	11	7
2004	Not informed about the measures for joining the EU	63	51	48	50	52	55	53
	Not informed about NGO work	66	63	57	44	60	53	53

Source: CPSPOR research.

Note: Data refer to the percentage of respondents who did not know the corresponding data; the last column refers to the corresponding data for the whole sample.

Since the level of political knowledge of abstainers or the level recorded in general population is often higher than the one demonstrated by those who took part in the elections, in any of the analysed periods, it seems that the general conclusion must be that being a supporter of a certain party does not necessarily imply a larger degree of political knowledge on which election decision itself is made (of course, there is a possibility that the criterion of assessment of the level of political knowledge of abstainers is less strict).

While in the early 1990s it is possible to talk about the developed cognitive component of political culture in supporters of individual parties, at the end of 1990s and after 2000 the available data indicate a vague general trend, making it difficult to provide a meaningful interpretation. First and foremost, that is a consequence of the lack of adequate indicators in public opinion research and impossibility of longitudinal following of indicators of factual type. High frequency of following informational rubrics in daily press brings about good knowledge about everyday-politics and current events, actual parties or party officials, but at the same time we have a high level of unfamiliarity with more abstract political principles of democracy (partly also as a consequence of experience with democracy). In addition to that, a large portion of the electorate of all analysed parties perceived themselves as poorly informed about politics. It is difficult to provide a valid assessment of the level of

development of the cognitive component of political culture, but the combination of the indicators used points out towards the conclusion that cognitive component of political culture of voters of DP, DPS and SRM is more developed than that of SRP and SPS voters, regardless of the form and kind of analysed indicators or the observed period. In the worst case, we are dealing with the indications of possible relations since the perceived levels of political knowledge within the electorates of the analysed parties are largely a consequence of the corresponding socio-demographic characteristics, first of all, the differences in the level of education that has a decisive influence on interests, adoption and maintenance of political knowledge.

VII CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aim of this book was twofold: to assess the utility of the notion of political culture in Serbia in the context of the turbulent political events in the past few decades and to analyse the main characteristics of political culture of voters in Serbia in the period from 1990 to 2007, based on numerous empirical research from that period. The obtained results showed that political culture is a very useful instrument for understanding and explaining political behaviour of an individual or a group of people, as well as that it could be a context in which some specific features of political processes in Serbia gain its (additional) meaning. First and foremost, the differences between the followers of the relevant political parties in the dominant patterns of political culture showed that political culture could be a very useful concept in empirical research in the field of political and social psychology.

Analysis presented on previous pages has some clear limitations since it is based on secondary processing of data obtained in surveys conducted for other purposes, which only partly tackled the topics that were the subject of this study. One of the most obvious is the shortage of quality indicators of individual components of political culture (for example, cognitive), that is, the absence of the same indicators in different periods, necessary for valid longitudinal analysis. Still, since it is based on the surveys on representative and adequate samples of Serbian population and covers the period of almost two decades, at the same time it provides the possibility of drawing relevant conclusions and implications regarding the diachronic (longitudinal) and synchronic (transversal) aspect of analysis regarding the components of political culture in Serbia.

At the beginning of parliamentarism in Serbia, the profiles of the followers of relevant political parties with regard to dominant value orientations were insufficiently differentiated in terms of values. The main axes of cleavages among them were vague, but one should bear in mind that this judgement is pronounced only on the basis of some value contents relevant for this component of political culture. However, the differences in the electorate of the three main parties at the time (SPS, DP, SRM) and two parties formed somewhat later (SRP, DPS) pointed out to possible directions of further value profiling of supporters.

Already at the time of second parliamentary election (1992), the supporters of relevant parties in Serbia were relatively differentiated with respect to some values important for discussion of the type of political culture. DP, DPS and SRM supporters at the time demonstrated a mixture of nationalist values (with considerable distribution of xenophobia) and certain liberal-democratic values, while SPS and SRP followers expressed the elements of a more coherent value system (traditionalism), which pointed out to still deeply rooted parochial political culture. Differentiation of voters that had happened after only two years from implementation of political pluralism is the consequence of the fact that values preceded the formation of political parties and were an important selection factor of the followers of political parties since the latter started only later, through their programmes and activities, leaders' actions and election campaigns, as well as depending on the success in elections, to reversibly shape the values of their followers, acting as a tertiary agent of political socialisation.

Starting from the 1990s, there began a further inclination of citizens towards five relevant parties that were clearly divided into two opposed blocks. Xenophobia, nationalism, radicalism, authoritarianism, statism, traditionalism – started to become more and more distinctive features of the supporters of the so-called “red-and-black” coalition (SPS, SRP). Those distinguished them sharply from the supporters of DP, DPS and SRM who were characterised by opposite poles of some of the enumerated values – modernism, non-authoritarianism, rejection of radicalism, nationalism and statism. Value profile of supporters of political parties in the middle of the previous decade had already been formed in a large degree.

On the eve of watershed presidential and parliamentary election in September, that is, December 2000, value profiles of the supporters of political parties were differentiated and relatively synchronised with electoral platforms of the parties. The main characteristic of values of party supporters was the formation of two antagonised blocks of voters, reflecting the division into the authorities at the time (SPS, SRP) and opposition (DOS). This division reflected a typical contrast we had already spoken about, that is Töennis' dichotomy into “Gemeinschaft”, that is, “community” as opposed to “Gesellschaft” or “society”, more precisely, the values of civic political culture. Formation of democratic government in Serbia in 2000 marked the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, but the nature of political culture was slightly changed compared to the state in the period of Milošević's regime because the distribution and intensity of critical values were only somewhat changed. Xenophobia was reduced compared to the situation a year before, but authoritarianism was still considerably spread, while the need for a strong leader started to increase. One could still distinguish between two blocks with certain intensification of value differences, and, similar to the 1990s, it can be spoken about “patriotic” or “social-national” (SPS and SRP – the ruling parties during the 1990s) as opposed to democratic block (DP, DPS, SRM – opposition parties during the 1990s, G17+, LDP et al.- formed after 2000). In recent political past in Serbia, the important line of cleavage became the attitude towards further European integrations of Serbia, and it is frequently spoken about pro-European or reform as opposed to anti-European or non-reform parties. This division was particularly expressed in the period of the two mandates of Koštunica's Government, from 2003 to 2007, when there was a break in the negotiations with the EU, as well as in the last presidential election in 2008, which had a character of a referendum – for (Tadić) or against Europe (Nikolić).

The voters from these two blocks were divided not only in terms of values, but also with regard to the development of other three components. As far as motivational component is concerned, we can speak about two large groups of supporters that primarily differ in the intensity of expression of interests and quality of evaluation of social engagement. One is formed by voters of DP, DPS and SRM, where, on the average, two thirds of voters are interested in politics and positively evaluate various forms of social engagement, unlike the voters of SRP and SPS, where simple majority is interested in politics and where evaluation of social engagement is mostly negative.

Analysis of the development of action component of political culture does not offer unequivocal results as in the case of motivational component, although these are closely connected. Politically relevant social capital (political discussions) and formal kinds of political behaviour (voting) are highly developed elements of action component, whereby there is a conditional homogeneity of the supporters of different parties, although the first mentioned is primarily the characteristic of the voters of DP, DPS and SRM, while SPS and SRP voters are the ones who took part in the elections most regularly.

Finally, it is difficult to provide a valid assessment of the level of development of the cognitive component of political culture, but the combination of the indicators used points out towards the conclusion that cognitive component of political culture of voters of DP, DPS and SRM is more developed than that of SRP and SPS voters, regardless of the form and kind of analysed indicators or the observed period.

In brief, DP, DPS and SRM voters are more interested in politics, positively evaluate social engagement and manifest highly developed politically relevant social capital, as well as the higher levels of knowledge about politically relevant facts. SPS and SRP supporters are, in the first place, disciplined voters who regularly vote in the election, although they are interested in politics in a considerably smaller degree, and, in keeping with that, have less knowledge about it.

Since analogous divisions of voters occur in all four analysed components of political culture, integrative approach implying the combination of isolated components speaks about a deep division of integrative political culture of Serbian electorate inclining towards a two-party system, which is at the present moment reflected in the conflict between SRP and DP, which have become the two most influential parties after the last parliamentary election in 2008¹⁴. The division according to the criterion of socio-psychological variables partly also reflects the more basic division according to the criterion of socio-demographic variables – between the strata in a heterogeneous society in Serbia nowadays. The conflict refers, in the first place, to the conflict of interests of lower strata (who are mostly the voters of SPS and SRP) and middle strata who see one of the parties of democratic block as their representative in the sphere of interests. Among other things, this implies that socio-demographic factors are important determinants of characteristics of political culture. After democratic changes in 2000, one of important distinctions in the similar sense is the division into transition winners and losers, which likewise reflects the differences based on class or strata belonging. That is how parties of primarily lower strata in the society (SPS, SRP) gather around the voters who perceive themselves as transition losers, while transition winners are more inclined towards identifying with some of the pro-democratic parties on Serbian political scene, those that generally also attract higher society strata.

Despite these divisions and homogeneity of the supporters within the two blocks and within individual parties within each of the blocks, it seems that homogeneity is relative and conditional, that is, conditioned by a number of interdependent factors, out of which patriotic orientation is just the first factor among equals, not always the most important one. That is indicated by large variations in the electorate of every individual party from time to time in the observed period with regard to any of the analysed components of political culture. Intragroup variations (within the supporters of the same party between the two observed periods) are sometimes more prominent than intergroup variations (among the supporters of different parties in one moment). There are three groups of relevant factors

¹⁴ It is debatable whether SRP would preserve the role of the biggest opponent to the currently ruling DP or that role would be taken over by the fraction of Tomislav Nikolić, the newly formed Serbian Progressive Party (SPP). That possibility might be indicated by election results at recently held local election in several towns in Serbia, in which SPP won more votes from SRP. Public opinion study conducted by Strategic Marketing agency in November 2008 showed that Nikolić's fraction had a larger support in Serbian electorate (20% voters) than SRP (10%). However, while it is realistic to expect further regrouping of radical voters into Šešelj's or Nikolić's option, and even overflow of voters towards some other parties (for example, towards DPS), it is not probable that this would bring about the reduction of differences in the dominant patterns of political culture of the two opposed groups in Serbian electorate.

responsible for such a state of affairs, which, conditionally, can be divided into factors that refer to general social circumstances, the political parties in Serbia, but voters themselves as well.

Regarding the first, the most important are definitely situation-contextual factors that had a considerable influence on political culture in Serbia as a whole, but also on components singled out analytically. The war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s, international isolation, sanctions, poverty and unemployment, conflicts in Kosovo, NATO intervention in 1999, the fall of Milošević's regime, the murder of Zoran Đinđić, separation of Montenegro, breakup in negotiations with the EU, proclamation of Kosovo independence – these are only some of the wider social factors that shook Serbia to the ground and in a larger or smaller degree present politically loaded contents, relevant in the analysis of political culture. The influence of these factors on some of the components selected analytically (for example, on motivational component, that is, citizens' interest in politics that increased in situations of crisis) is obvious, while, for instance, a high level of authoritarianism registered in the observed period becomes understandable in the context of prominent socio-political instability and insecurity, as an understandable reaction to irrational circumstances. Some of the above-mentioned events produced such deep consequences that they led towards a characteristic value regression or retraditionalisation of political culture in the case of supporters of all political parties. Most often, that was reflected in the appearance of xenophobia, strengthening of radicalism, hyper-patriotism, religiosity, nationalism, intensification of authoritarianism etc. These characteristics in some periods in the immediate Serbian political history were so spread, that it can be spoken about peculiar trans-party constants. Therefore, the supporters of certain political parties were actually often different only quantitatively, that is, with regard to the intensity of expression of, in the population dominant, characteristics. Still, some of these value deviations were only temporary period-effects, conformist and non-intensive in its nature, so the situation would very quickly return to its original state. On the other hand, very often those were general value systems, such as conservatism, deeply rooted both culturally and economically and politically, whose inertia even in Serbia today presents a giant obstacle towards a more efficient democratisation of the country and the basis for still widely spread preference of the right-wing political parties.

Political parties in Serbia gave their own contribution to deep divisions and large heterogeneity in the electorate, since one of the basic characteristics of the political scene in Serbia is instability. Political parties are, in the first place, numerous (currently there are over 400 registered political parties in Serbia, although a far smaller number plays an important role in the Serbian political life); they appear and disappear, suddenly enlarge their electorates or suddenly lose it; they change their electoral platforms and form ideological or unprincipled coalitions; they are often characterised by generality, incompleteness and inconsistency of party determinations about many fundamental questions et al. All that produces a confusing effect on an average voter, who faces the dilemma who to give his/her vote to. The consequence of that is often a large gap between the values manifested by the voters of certain parties and official declaration of parties on the level of programme platforms and creeds or their only partial overlapping. Maybe the best illustration for this is the case of SPS, whose voters, both during the 1990s and nowadays are characterised by many values typical for right-wing and conservatively oriented voters, and not progressively and left-wing, as this party declares itself. Numerous empirical studies point out to the discrepancy between the relevant characteristics of political culture, especially value

component, and self-concept and declaration of parties that often perceive themselves differently and therefore do not achieve the expected support from voters. It is necessary for the parties themselves to integrate, profile more precisely, but also to work more on promoting political culture of the citizens, all with the aim of stabilising the Serbian political scene. However, the current political events do not indicate significant progress with respect to this. During 2008, two important events happened that can have significant effects on Serbian political scene in the future – the division in the top of SRP and return to power of SPS. It will be possible to judge about concrete consequences of those events as soon as the next parliamentary election takes place.

Finally, one part of explanation is also concealed in the very electorate that has been analysed here. Large overflows of voters from one into another political option are one of the most important factors regarding the perceived heterogeneity. Except for a certain number of the most loyal party supporters, that is, the core of certain parties that is practically impossible to identify directly, almost all parties have, in one moment or another during the observed period, faced the dwindling or inflow of the electorate (maybe the best example for that was a loss of million of votes of SPS and SRP in 2000 election and sudden increase of support to DPS). That practically implies that there is a large probability that during the observed period of analysis, the electorate of relevant parties was not comprised by the same people, in the sense of their consistent attachment to a particular party, and hence large heterogeneity within the supporters of the same parties, that is, small differences among the followers of different parties. Guided by current circumstances that caused a different perception of different parties (which is often not taken into account), the voters, focused in the first place on the leadership nature of the parties that is compatible with the predominant type of subject political culture, often changed their party preferences and joined the consistent voters of a particular party, thus creating large inter-group and reducing intra-group variations. Therefore, it is understandable that the supporters of once very close DP and DPS drifted apart after 2000, when, due to the large inflow of voters, DPS became the largest, but also the most heterogeneous political party, which soon faced the problem of seeking for the new political identity. Besides all said above, it should also be taken into account that perceived differences in (un)development of certain components or integral political culture are fairly refined due to the fact that, mostly, they are based on the analysis of characteristics of one half of the electorate. Namely, since the first parliamentary election in 1990, on the average 20% of the electorate consisted of declared abstainers, while around 30% of the electorate were undecided. Therefore, the perceived differences refer to those decided in terms of parties, which make up approximately one half of the electorate. However, large differences on used indicators still suggest the conclusion that there are really distinctive characteristics of political culture of the followers of political parties, that is, that belonging to political parties is an important ground for differentiation in the structure of political culture.

Causes of characteristics of the dominant political culture in Serbia in the observed period, registered in this study, should be sought in the complex interrelations of the three mentioned groups of factors.

This analysis opened up numerous questions that deserve further research and interpretation. These primarily refer to the comparison of the quality of political culture with the countries of former SFRY and former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe facing similar problems on the way towards democratisation of the society. It seems that this is precisely the dominant topic in the increased

theoretical and empirical corpus of cross-cultural studies offering valuable insights into the nature of political culture and relation between political culture and democracy.

Besides that, there remains an open question with regard to the possibility of typology of integrative political culture in Serbia (regarding the interrelation between certain components in the electorate of parties, but also in general) and question of importance, that is, contribution of individual components, and all with the aim of meaningful interpretation of the current processes, prediction of the directions of further development and introduction of larger rationality into the instable political life in Serbia. For those purposes, on the level of method of analysis, the approach of other kind is necessary that surpasses the scope of this book.

Finally, a separate study of equal volume should be devoted to the question of characteristics of political culture of the young in Serbia, the population segment that as early as in their formative period experienced a revolutionary change of socio-political circumstances. Analysis of political culture of the young would provide important insights into the effects that democratisation of the society produces on patterns of political culture of the young, that is, into the scope and limitations of possible re-socialisation of certain segments of population. That would lead towards a better understanding of the process of formation and change of political culture, that is, of the relation between political culture and democracy, but also, at least in indications, point out to possible directions of development and dominant patterns of political culture in Serbia in the future.

It would be the role of some future research to provide answers to these questions and the questions stemming from this study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Almond, G. (1956): Comparative political system, *Journal of politics*, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 391-409.
- Almond, G. (1990): Političko istraživanje kulture – osvrt i prikaz (Political Research of Culture – Review and Description), *Treći program Radio Beograda*, No. 3-4, pp. 63-75.
- Almond, G. & G. Powell (1966): *Comparative Politics*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Almond, G. & S. Verba (1989 [1963]): *The Civic Culture*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Almond, G. & S. Verba (eds.) (1980): *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Antonić, S. (2006): *Elita, gradjanstvo i slaba država* (Elite, Citizenry and Weak State). Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Arts, W., J. Hagenaars and L. Halman (eds.) (2003): *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity*. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Atlagić, S. (2007): *Partijska identifikacija kao determinanta izborne motivacije – teorijske kontoverze i problemi empirijskog istraživanja* (Party Identification as Determinant of Electoral Motivation – Theoretical Controversies and Problems of Empirical Research). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Fakultet političkih nauka.
- Baćević, Lj. et al. (1991): *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici* (Yugoslavia at the Turning Point of Its Crisis). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Baćević, Lj. et al. (1994): *Javno mnjenje* (Public Opinion). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Baker, S. (1990): *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnard, F.(1969): Culture and Political Development: Herder's Suggestive Insights, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXII, No. 2, pp. 379-397.
- Barton, A., B. Denitch and C. Kadushin (1973): *Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia*. New York: Praeger.
- Beck, P. A. & M. Jennings (1979): Political Periods and Political Participation, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 737-750.
- Beer, S. & A. Ulam (1974): *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems in Europe*. New York: Random House.
- Bennett, S. E., R. S. Flickinger and S. L. Rhine (2000): Political Talk Over Here, Over There, Over Time, *British Journal of Political Science*, 30, pp. 99-119.
- Bennett, W. L. (1980): *Public Opinion in American Politics*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Berelson, B., P. Lazarsfeld and W. McPhee (1954): *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bertch, G. & G. Zaninovich (1974): A Factor Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures: The Multinational Yugoslav Case, *Comparative Political Studies*, Jan., 219-244.

- Bolčić, S. (2003): Blocked Transition and Post-Socialist Transformation: Serbia in the nineties, *Review of Sociology* (Budapest), Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 29-49.
- Branković, S. (1992): Determinante političkog javnog mnjenja u Srbiji (Determinants of Political Public Opinion in Serbia), in M. Pečuljić: *Radanje javnog mnjenja i političkih stranaka u Srbiji* (pp. 191-235). Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Branković, S. (1994): Socijalno-klasna pripadnost i političko opredeljenje građana Srbije (Social-Class Belonging and Political Orientations of Serbian Citizens), *Gledišta*, No. 1-6, pp. 43-55.
- Branković, S. (1995): *Serbia at War with Itself*. Belgrade: Sociological Society of Serbia.
- Brown, A. & M. Gray (eds.) (1979): *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. London: Macmillan.
- Butigan, V. (2000): *Politička kultura na Balkanu* (Political Culture in the Balkans). Niš: Filozofski fakultet.
- Campbell, A., Ph. E. Converse, W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes (1960): *American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Chilton, S. (1988): Defining Political Culture, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 419-445.
- Chuprov, V. (1982): The Political Culture and Labour Activity of the Young, *International Sociological Association*, 3231.
- Cohen, L. (2001): *Serpent in the Bosom*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Converse, P. E. (1964): The Nature of Belief System in Mass Publics, in D. Apter (ed.): *Ideology and Discontent* (pp. 206-261). New York: Free Press.
- Conway, M. (ed.) (1990): *Political Participation in the United States*. Washington: CQ Press, A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.
- Cvijić, J. (1970): *Balkansko poluostrvo* (Balkan Peninsula). Beograd: SANU i drugi izdavači, knjiga II, pp. 325-517.
- Čičkarić, L. (2004): Politička kultura iz generacijske perspektive (Political Culture from Generational Perspective), *Sociološki pregled*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, pp. 561-582.
- Čuilig, B., N. Fanuko and V. Jerbić (1982): *Vrijednosti i vrijednosne orijentacije mladih* (Youth Values and Value Orientations). Zagreb: Centar društvenih djelatnosti saveza socijalističke omladine Hrvatske.
- Dahl, R. (1961): *Who Governs?*. New Haven: Yale University.
- Dahl, R. (1966): *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University.
- Dalton, R. (1988): *Citizens Politics in Western Democracies*. New Jersey: Chatham House.
- Dalton, R. (2000): Citizens' Attitudes and Political Behaviour, *Comparative political studies*, Vol. 33, pp. 912-940.
- Daugnad, M. & D. Mehl (1983): Elite, Sub-elite and Counter-Elite, *Social Science Information*, No. 22, pp. 817-865.
- Dekker, P., P. Ester and H. Vinken (2003): Civil Society, Social Trust and Democratic Involvement, in W. Arts, J. Hagenaars and L. Halman (eds.): *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity* (pp. 217-249). Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Delli Carpini, M. & S. Keeter (1991): Stability and Change in the U.S. Public's Knowledge of Politics, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 583-612.

- Delli Carpini, M. & S. Keeter (1993): Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting First Things First, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 1179-1206.
- Delli, C., X. Michael & S. Keeter (1996): *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Devine, D. (1972): *The Political Culture of the United States*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Diamond, L. (ed.) (1993): *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. London: Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
- Dittmer, L. (1977): Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, *World Politics*, 29.
- Dogan, M. (1995): Erosion of Class Voting and the Religious Vote in Western Europe, *International Social Science Journal*, No. 146, pp. 525-538.
- Dvorniković, V. (1939): *Karakterologija Jugoslovena* (Characterology of Yugoslavs). Beograd: Geca Kon.
- Džuverović, B., S. Mihailović and S. Vuković (1994): *Izborna upotreba medija* (Use of Media for Electoral Purposes). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja.
- Easton, D. (1965): *A System Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Elazar, D. (1972): *American Federalism: A View From the States*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Elazar, D. J. (1966): American Federalism, in D. J. Elazar & J. Zikmund II, (eds.): *The Ecology of American Political Culture: Readings: A View from States*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Elkins, D. J. & R. E. B. Simeon (1979): A Cause in Search of Its Effect or What Does Political Culture Explain?, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 pp. 127-145.
- Engell, K. (1983): Das Konzept 'Politische Kultur', *Soziologenkorrrespondenz*, No. 10, pp. 314-363.
- *European and World Values Surveys Four-wave Integrated Data File, 1981-2004*, v. 20060423 (2006). Tilburg: The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1954): *Psychology of Politics*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Fagen, R. (1969): *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Feldman, L. & V. Price (2008): Confusion or Enlightenment?: How Exposure to Disagreement Moderates the Effects of Political Discussion and Media Use on Candidate Knowledge, *Communication Research*, Volume 35, No 1, pp. 61-87.
- Ferguson, K. M. (2006): Social Capital and Children's Wellbeing: A Critical Synthesis of the International Social Capital Literature, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Vol. 15, pp. 2-18.
- Formisano, R. R. (2001): The Concept of Political Culture, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 393-426.
- Gagnon, V. (1994): Serbia's Road to War, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 117-131.
- Gibbins, G. (ed.) (1989): *Contemporary Political Culture*. London: Sage.

- Girvin, B. (1989): Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture, in J. R. Gibbins (ed.): *Contemporary Political Culture* (pp. 31-51). Sage: London.
- Goati, V. (1981): Ideološka opredeljenja članova SK (Ideological Orientations of the LCY Members), in A. Milić et al.: *Svest i angažovanost komunista*. Beograd: Mladost.
- Goati, V. (1984): *Savremene političke partije, komparativna analiza* (Contemporary Political Parties, Comparative Analysis). Beograd: Partizanska knjiga.
- Goati, V. (1994): Demokratska tranzicija u Srbiji (1990-1994) (Democratic Transition in Serbia (1990-1994)), *Gledišta*, XXXV, No. 1-6, pp. 5-22.
- Goati, V. (ed.) (1995): *Challenges of Parliamentarism – The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*. Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences.
- Goati, V. (2001): *Elections in FRY – From 1990 to 1998*. Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.
- Goati, V. (2002): Partije Srbije od 1990. do 2002. u komparativnoj perspektivi (Serbian Parties from 1990 to 2002 in Comparative Perspective), in V. Goati (ed.): *Partijska scena Srbije posle 5. oktobra 2000* (pp. 9-44). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Goati, V. (2006): *Partijske borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju* (Party Struggles in Serbia in Post-October Period). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Goati, V. (ed.) (1998): *Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990-1996*. Berlin: Sigma.
- Goati, V. (ed.) (2002): *Partijska scena Srbije posle 5. oktobra 2000* (Party Scene in Serbia after October the 5th 2000). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Goati, V., Z. Slavujević i O. Pribičević (1993): *Izborne borbe u Jugoslaviji 1990-1992* (Election Struggles in Yugoslavia 1990-1992). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Radnička štampa.
- Golubović, Z., B. Kuzmanović and M. Vasović (1995): *Socijalni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba* (Social Character and Social Changes in the Light of Ethnic Conflicts). Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju.
- Gronlund, K. & H. Milner (2006): The Determinants of Political Knowledge in Comparative Perspective, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 386-406.
- Grupa autora (1994): *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka* (Serbia in Modernisation Processes of the 20th Century). Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- Highton, B. (2005): Self-reported Versus Proxy-reported Voter Turnout in the Current Population Survey, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 113-123.
- Howe, P. (2006): Political Knowledge and Electoral Participation in the Netherlands: Comparison with the Canadian Case, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 137-166.
- Huckfeldt, R. & J. Sprague (1995): *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Inglehart, R. (1977): *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1979): Political Action: The Impact of Values, Cognitive Level and Social Background, in S. Barns & M. Kaase (eds.): *Political action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (pp. 343– 380). Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Inglehart, R. (1988): The Renaissance of Political Culture, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 1203-1230.
- Inglehart, R. (1990): *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1995): Changing Values, Economic Development and Political Change, *International Social Science Journal*, No. 145, pp. 379-403.
- Inglehart, R. (1997): *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economical, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (ed.) (2003): *Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy*. Willowdale: De Sitter Publications.
- Inglehart, R. (ed.) (2004): *Human Values and Beliefs*. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editors.
- Inglehart, R. & C. Welzel (2005): *Modernization, Culture Change, and Democracy – The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackman, R. & R. Miller (1996): A Renaissance of Political Culture?, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 632-659.
- Jackman, S. & P. M. Sniderman (2006): The Limits of Deliberative Discussion: A Model of Everyday Political Arguments, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 272-283.
- Jacob, P. et al. (1971): *Values and Active Community: A Cross-Cultural Study of the Influence of Local Leaders*. New York: Free Press.
- Jakšić, B. (1997): *Granice – Izazov Interkulturalnosti* (Frontiers – The Challenge of Interculturality). Beograd: Forum za etničke odnose.
- Jakšić, B. (1998): *Interkulturalnost versus rasizam i ksenofobija* (Interculturalism versus Racism and Xenophobia). Beograd: Forum za etničke odnose.
- Janjić, D. (ed.) (1997): *Serbia between the Past and the Future*. Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences and Forum for Ethnic Relations.
- Jankowski, T. & J. M. Strate (1995): Modes of Participation over Adult Life Span, *Political Behavior*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 89-106.
- Jennings, M. (1979): Another Look at the Life Cycle and Political Participation, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 755-771.
- Jennings, M. (1996): Political Knowledge Over Time and Across Generations, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 228-252.
- Joksimović, S. (1986): *Mladi u društvu vršnjaka* (The Young in the Company of Their Peers). Beograd: Prosveta.
- Joksimović, S. (ed.) (2005): *Vaspitanje mladih za demokratiju* (Youth Education for Democracy). Beograd: Institut za pedagoška istraživanja.
- Jovanović, Dj. (1995): *Sunovrat u zajednicu* (Precipitation into the Community). Niš: Gradina.

- Jovanović, M. (1997): *Izborni sistemi – izbori u Srbiji 1990-1996* (Electoral Systems – Elections in Serbia 1990-1996). Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Karasimeonov, G. (ed.) (2004): *Political Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Eastern Europe*. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute for Political and Legal Studies.
- Kavanagh, D. (1972): *Political Culture*. London: Macmillan.
- Kavanagh, D. (1983): *Political Science and Political Behaviour*. London: Allen&Unwin.
- Kenski, K. (2002): Testing Political Knowledge: Should Knowledge Questions Use Two Response Categories or Four?, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 192-200.
- Kim, J., Wyatt, R. O., and Katz, E. (1999): News, Talk, Opinion, Participation: The Part Played by Conversation in Deliberative Democracy, *Political Communication*, 16 (4), pp. 361 – 385.
- Kincaid, J. (1982): *Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States*. Philadelphia: Publius Books.
- Klingemann, H. D. (1979): The Background of Ideological Conceptualization, in S. Barns, & M. Kaase (eds.): *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (pp. 255– 277). Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Klingemann, H. D. & R. Hofferbert (1995): Germany: A New Wall in the Mind, *Journal of Democracy*, 145, pp. 379-403.
- Komšić, J., D. Pantić and Z. Slavujević (2003): *Osnovne linije partijskih podela i mogući pravci političkog pregrupisanja u Srbiji* (Basic Lines of Party Cleavages and Possible Directions of Political Regroupings in Serbia). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Kostadinova, T. (2003): Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-communist Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, 42, pp. 741-759.
- Krampen, G. (2000): Transition of Adolescent Political Action Orientations to Voting Behaviour in Early Adulthood in View of a Social-Cognitive Action Theory Model of Personality, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 277-293.
- Kreml, W. P. (1977): *The Anti-Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Kuzmanović, B. (1987): Problemi motivacionih osnova samoupravljanja (Problems of Motivational Bases of Self-management), *Psihološka istraživanja*, knjiga 3, pp. 466-546.
- Kuzmanović, B. (1994): Autoritarnost (Authoritarianism), in M. Lazić et al.: *Razaranje društva* (pp. 151-173). Beograd: Filip Višnjić.
- Kuzmanović, B. (1995a): Uvodna razmatranja za istraživanje promena vrednosnih orijentacija mladih u Srbiji (Introduction for Research of the Youth Value Orientations in Serbia), *Psihološka istraživanja*, br. 7, str. 9-15.
- Kuzmanović, B. (1995b): Društvene promene i promene vrednosnih orijentacija učenika (Social Changes and Changes of Students' Value Orientations), *Psihološka istraživanja*, br. 7, str. 17-47.
- Kuzmanović, B. (1995c): Preferencija društvenih ciljeva (Preference of Social Goals), *Psihološka istraživanja*, br. 7, str. 49-69.
- Kuzmanović, B. (2003): Autoritarna svest kao ometajući činilac u razvoju demokratskih institucija (Authoritarianism as an Obstacle to Development of

- Democratic Institutions), u D. Pantić (red.): *Promene vrednosti i tranzicija u Srbiji: pogled u budućnost* (123-130). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Kwak, N. (1999): Revisiting the Knowledge Gap Hypothesis, *Communication Research*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 385-413.
 - La Due Lake, R., R. Huckfeldt (1998): Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 567-584.
 - Laitin, D. D. & W. Wildavsky (1988): Political Culture and Political Preference, *American Political Science Review*, 82, 589-597.
 - Laitin, D.D. (1995): The Civic Culture at Thirty, *American Political Science Review*, 89, No. 1.
 - Lenart, S. (1994): *Shaping Political Attitudes: The Impact of Interpersonal Communication and Mass Media*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
 - Lijphart, A. (1968): *The Politics of Accommodation*. Berkley: University of California Press.
 - Lipset, S. M. (1969): *Politički čovek (Political Man)*. Beograd: Rad.
 - Lipset, S. M. (1981): *Political Man*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
 - Lipset, S. M. et al. (1954): The Psychology of Voting, in G. Lindzey (ed.): *Handbook of Social Psychology* (pp. 1124-1175). Vol. 2, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.
 - Lupia, A. & T. S. Philpot (2005): Views From Inside the Net: How Websites Affect Young Adults' Political Interest, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 1122-1142.
 - Luskin, R. C., J. S. Fishkin and R. Jowell (2002): Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain, *British Journal of Political Science*, 32, pp. 455-487.
 - Lutovac, Z. (ed.) (2005): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (Democracy in Serbian Political Parties). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
 - Lutovac, Z. (ed.) (2006): *Političke stranke i birači u državama bivše Jugoslavije (Political Parties and Voters in the States of Former Yugoslavia)*. Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
 - Lutovac, Z. (ed.) (2007): *Političke stranke u Srbiji i Evropska unija (Political Parties in Serbia and the European Union)*. Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Fakultet političkih nauka.
 - Lutovac, Z. (ed.) (2007): *Ideologija i političke stranke u Srbiji (Ideology and Political Parties in Serbia)*. Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Institut društvenih nauka and Fakultet političkih nauka.
 - Macridis, R. (1961): Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis, *Journal of Politics*, XXIII, 40.
 - Maghami, F. G. (1974): Political Knowledge among Youth: Some Notes on Public Opinion Formation, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 334-340.
 - Marsh, A. (1977): *Protest and Political Consciousness*. London: Sage.
 - Martikainen, P., T. Martikainen and H. Wass (2005): The Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on Voter Turnout in Finland: A Register-based Study of 2.9 million Voters, *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, pp. 645-669.

- Matić, J. (2007): *Televizija protiv birača* (Television against Voters). Beograd: Dobar naslov.
- Matić, M. (ed.) (1993): *Enciklopedija političke culture* (Encyclopaedia of Political Culture). Beograd: Savremena administracija.
- Matić, M. et al. (1968): *Skupštinski izbori 1967* (Parliamentary Elections in 1967). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Matić, M. et al. (1970): *Skupštinski izbori 1969* (Parliamentary Elections in 1969). Beograd : Institut društvenih nauka.
- Matić, M. & M. Podunavac (1994): *Politički sistem: teorije i principi* (Political System: Theory and Principles). Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- McCann, J. A. & C. Lawson (2006): Presidential Campaigns and the Knowledge Gap in Three Transitional Democracies, *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 13-22.
- Mihailović, S. (ed.) (1991a): *Od izbornih rituala do slobodnih izbora* (From Elections Rituals to Free Elections). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Mihailović, S. (1991b): Apstinencija u prvim višestranačkim izborima u Srbiji (Abstention in the First Multi-party Elections in Serbia), *Gledišta*, 3-4, Beograd, pp. 103-114.
- Mihailović, S. (1994a): Ideološki profil stranačkih pristaša (Ideological Profile of Party Followers), *Sociološki pregled*, 1, pp. 27-36.
- Mihailović, S. (1994b): Parlamentarni izbori 1990, 1992. i 1993 (Parliamentary Elections in 1990, 1992 and 1993), *Gledišta*, XXXV, No. 1-6, pp. 33-42.
- Mihailović, S. (1996): Stranački identitet i izborne orijentacije građana Jugoslavije (Party Identity and Election Orientations of Yugoslav Citizens), *Gledišta*, No.1-2, pp. 69-89.
- Mihailović, S. (ed.) (1997): *Između osporavanja i podrške – Javno mnjenje o legitimitetu treće Jugoslavije* (Between Denial and Support – Public Opinion on the Legitimacy of the Third Yugoslavia). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Mihailović, S. (1998): Politička kultura i javno mnjenje (Political Culture and Public Opinion), in M. Vasović (ed.): *Fragmenti političke kulture* (pp. 115-130). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Mihailović, S. (2006): Vrednosne orijentacije stranačkih pristalica (Value Orientations of Party Followers), in Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (pp. 143-168). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Mihailović, S. (ed.) (2007): *Parlamentarni izbori u 2007 – Okolnosti i rezultati* (Parliamentary Elections in 2007 – Circumstances and Results). Beograd: Službeni glasnik and CESID.
- Mihailović, S., B. Džuverović i S. Vuković (1993): *Interesovanja i vrednosti omladine* (Youth Interests and Values). Beograd: Fokus (manuscript).
- Milić, A. et al. (1981): *Svest i angažovanost komunista* (Communist Consciousness and Activism). Beograd: Mladost.
- Milić, A. & L. Čičkarić (1998): *Generacija u protestu* (Generation in Protest). Beograd: Institut za sociološka istraživanja filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu.

- Milić, V. (1992): Socijalni lik političkog javnog mnjenja (Social Face of Political Public Opinion), in M. Pečuljić et al.: *Rađanje javnog mnjenja i političkih stranaka* (pp. 99-158). Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Milosavljević, O. (2002): *U tradiciji nacionalizma* (In Nationalist Tradition). Beograd: Helsinčki odbor za ljudska prava.
- Milošević-Đorđević, J. (2005): Činioci izborne apstinencije u Srbiji (Determinants of Election Abstinance in Serbia), in Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Političke stranke u Srbiji – struktura i funkcionisanje* (pp. 137-156). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Mondak, J. J. (1999): Reconsidering the Measurement of Political Knowledge, *Political Analysis*, 8:1, pp. 57-82.
- Mondak, J. J. (2001): Developing Valid Knowledge Scales, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 224-238.
- Nemanjić, M (1993): Kulturni obrasci i nacionalni indentitet (Cultural Patterns and National Identity), *Zbornik instituta za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja*, God. XXII, br. 1, pp. 169-178.
- Nettl, P. (1967): *Political Mobilisation*. London.
- Neuman, W. (1986): *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Nie, N., S. Verba and J. Petroick (1976): *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Niemi, R. G. & H. F. Weisberg (1993): *Controversies in Voting Behaviour*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Orlović, S. (2006): Nedemokratičnost parija i demokratizacija društva (Non-democracy in Parties and Democratisation of Society), u Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (pp. 95-120). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Pammet, J. & M. Whittington (1976): *Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada*. Toronto: Mac Millan of Canada.
- Pantić, D. (1974): Neke vrednosne orijentacija omladine (Some Youth Value Orientations), in S. Joksimović et al.: *Stavovi i opredeljenja jugoslovenske omladine* (pp. 25-53). Beograd: Mladost.
- Pantić, D. (1977): Vrednosti i ideološke orijentacije društvenih slojeva (Values and Ideological Orientations of Social Strata), in M. Popović et al.: *Društveni slojevi i društvena svest* (pp. 269-406). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Pantić, D. (1980): *Priroda interesovanja* (Nature of Interests). Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije.
- Pantić, D. (1981a): Struktura interesovanja (Structure of Interests), *Psihologija*, God. XIV, No. 1-2, pp. 40-75.
- Pantić, D. (1981b): *Vrednosne orijentacije mladih u Srbiji* (Youth Value Orientations in Serbia). Beograd: IIC SSO and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Pantić, D. (1983): Osobine ličnosti kao determinante društveno-političkog angažovanja članova SK u Beogradu (Personality Traits as Determinants of Socio-Political Activism of LCY Members in Belgrade), in V. Goati et al.: *Determinante društveno-političkog angažovanja članova SK* (pp. 53-77). Beograd: MC OSK.
- Pantić, D. (1985): Uticaj crta ličnosti na diferenciranje društveno-političkog angažovanja (Influence of Personality Traits on Differentiation of Socio-

- Political Activism), in V. Goati et al.: *Političko angažovanje u jugoslovenskom društvu* (pp. 201-277). Beograd: NIRO Mladost.
- Pantić, D. (1987a): *Politička kultura radnika – kvalitativna analiza* (neobjavljeni rukopis) (Political Culture of Workers – Qualitative Analysis; manuscript). Novi Sad: Centar PKSKV za političke studije.
 - Pantić, D. (1987b): Politička kultura članova SK (Political Culture of LCY Members), *Marksistička misao*, No. 5-6, pp. 187-215.
 - Pantić, D. (1988a): *Klasična i svetovna religioznost* (Classic and Secular Religiosity). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnjenje.
 - Pantić, D. (1988b): *Politička kultura mladih u Srbiji* (Youth Political Culture in Serbia). Beograd: IIC SSO and Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnjenje (mimeo).
 - Pantić, D. (1990a): 13. Vrednosti mladih u vreme krize – anomična generacija (pp. 173-202) (Youth Values in Times of Crisis – Anomic Generation) i 14. Prostorne, vremenske i socijalne koordinate religioznosti mladih u Jugoslaviji (pp 203-228) (Space, Time and Social Coordinates of Youth Religiosity in Yugoslavia), in S. Mihailović et al.: *Deca krize*. Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
 - Pantić, D. (1990b): Politička kultura mladih u Srbiji (Youth Political Culture in Serbia), in Grupa autora: *Omladina krajem osamdesetih* (pp. 59-77). Beograd: IIC SSO.
 - Pantić, D. (1990c): *Promene vrednosnih orijentacija mladih u Srbiji* (Changes of Youth Value Orientations in Serbia). Beograd: IIC SSO.
 - Pantić, D. (1990d): Karakteristike moderne ličnosti i psihološka struktura modernizma kao vrednosne orijentacije (Characteristics of Modern Personality and Psychological Structure of Modernism as Value Orientation), *Psihologija*, No. 3-4, pp. 5-26.
 - Pantić, D (1991): B. Širina grupnih identifikacija građana Jugoslavije (pp. 233-240) (Width of Group Identifications of Yugoslav Citizens) i C. Religioznost građana Jugoslavije (241-257) (Religiosity of Yugoslav Citizens), in Lj. Baćević: *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici*. Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
 - Pantić, D. (1993): Promene religioznosti građana Srbije (Changes in Religiosity of Serbian Citizens), *Sociološki pregled*, No. 1-4, pp. 173-204.
 - Pantić, D. (1994): A Review of Empirical Studies of Values in Yugoslavia, in D. Voich & L. Stepina (eds.): *Cross-Cultural Analysis of Values and Political Economics Issues* (pp. 137-160). Praeger: Westport.
 - Pantić, D. (1995a): Voters' Value Orientations, in V. Goati (ed.): *Challenges of Parliamentarism: The Case of Serbia* (pp. 93-140). Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, pp. 93-140.
 - Pantić, D. (1995b): Dominantne vrednosne orijentacije u Srbiji i mogućnosti nastanka civilnog društva (Dominant Value Orientations in Serbia and the Possibility of Emergence of Civil Society), u V. Pavlović et al.: *Potisnuto civilno društvo* (pp. 71-103). Beograd: EKO-Centar.
 - Pantić, D. (1996): Konflikti vrednosti u zemljama tranzicije (Value Conflicts in Transitional Countries), in Grupa autora: *Socijalni konflikti u zemljama tranzicije* (pp. 119-147). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Ruska akademija nauka, Moskva.

- Pantić, D. (1998a): Politička kultura i vrednosti (Political Culture and Values), in M. Vasović (ed.): *Fragmenti političke kulture* (pp. 38-79). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnjenje.
- Pantić, D. (1998b): Value Orientations of the Electorate, in V. Goati (ed.): *Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990-1996* (69-85). Berlin: WZB: Founding Elections in Eastern Europe, Sigma.
- Pantić, D. (1998c): Vrednosti i procesi socijalne integracije i dezintegracije (Values and Processes of Social Integration and Disintegration), in Grupa autora: *Integrativni i dezintegrativni procesi u zemljama tranzicije* (pp. 227-238)., Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka i Ruska akademija nauka, Moskva.
- Pantić, D. (2000): Promene vrednosti i razvoj demokratije u zemljama tranzicije (Value Changes and the Development of Democracy in Transitional Countries), in Grupa autora: *Procesi demokratizacije u zemljama tranzicije* (pp. 93-116). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Ruska akademija nauka, Moskva.
- Pantić, D. (2002): Vrednosti birača pre i posle demokratskog preokreta 2000. godine (Values of Voters before and after the Democratic Revolution in 2000), in V. Goati (ed.): *Partijska scena Srbije posle 5. oktobra 2000* (pp. 79-130). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Pantić, D. (2003): Value System, Civil Society and Tolerance as Prerequisites for Democratic Development in Serbia, in S. Kuhnle & Dž. Sokolović, eds.: *The Balkans: Searching for Solutions*. Bergen: Rokkansenteret, Bergen University.
- Pantić, D. (2004): Proreformska i antireformska orijentacija građana u Srbiji (Pro-Reform and Anti-Reform Orientation of Serbian Citizens), in V. Vukotić et al.: *Kultura i razvoj* (pp. 111-125). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za ekonomska istraživanja.
- Pantić, D. (2005): Da li su vrednosti građana bivših komunističkih zemalja slične? (Are Values of the Citizens of Former Communist States Similar?), *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, No. 118-119, pp. 46-69.
- Pantić, D. (2006): Vrednosna i stavovska homogenost pristalica političkih partija u Srbiji na kraju 2005 (Value and Attitudinal Homogeneity of Political Party Followers in Serbia at the End of 2005), in Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (pp. 169-187). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Pantić, D. (2007): Prihvaćenost programskih opredeljenja među pristalicama partija: Na primeru nekih aktuelnih spoljnopolitičkih dilema (Acceptance of Programme Commitments among Party Followers: on the example of some current foreign policy dilemmas), in Z. Lutovac, ed.: *Ideologija i političke stranke u Srbiji* (pp. 299-322). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Pantić, D., S. Joksimović, B. Džuverović and V. Tomanović (1980): *Interesovanja mladih* (Youth Interests). Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije.
- Pantić, D. & Z. Pavlović (2006): Stranačke pristalice i komponente političke kulture u Srbiji (Party Followers and Components of Political Culture), u Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Političke stranke i birači u državama bivše Jugoslavije* (pp. 41-112). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.

- Pantić, D. & Z. Pavlović (2007): *Javno mnjenje – koncept i komparativna istraživanja (Public Opinion – Concept and Comparative Research)*. Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Parkin, F. (1972): *Radical Subordinate and Dominant Cultures*. London: Paladin.
- Parsons, T. & E. Shils (eds.) (1951): *Toward a General Theory of Action*. New York: Harper&Row.
- Pateman, C. (1970): *Participation and democratic theory..* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pateman, C. (1971): Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change, *British Journal of Political Science*, 1, 291-305.
- Patrick, G. M. (1984): Political Culture, in G. Sartori (ed.): *Social Science Concepts* (265-314). London: Sage.
- Pavlović, V. (ed.) (1995): *Potisnuto civilno društvo (Suppressed Civil Society)*. Beograd: Eko Centar.
- Pavlović, Z. (2006). Vrednosti u Srbiji u drugom dobu modernizma. *Sociološki pregled*, XXXX, No.2, pp. 247-262.
- Pavlović, Z. (2006). Izborna orijentacija kao faktor stavova o srpskom državnom pitanju. In Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (pp. 237-250). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Pavlović, Z. (2007). Demokratska politička kultura u Srbiji pre i posle demokratskih promena. *Nova srpska politička misao*, (u štampi).
- Pavlović, Z. (2007). Uticaj izborne participacije na strukturu interesovanja. In Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Birači i apstinenti u Srbiji* (pp. 97-112). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Institut društvenih nauka and Fakultet političkih nauka.
- Pavlović, Z. (2009). *Vrednosti samoizražavanja u Srbiji – u potrazi za demokratskom političkom kulturom*. Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Podunavac, M. (1982): *Politička kultura i politički odnosi (Political Culture and Political Relations)*. Beograd: Radnička štampa.
- Podunavac, M. (1998): *Princip građanstva i poredak politike (Civic Principle and the Order of Politics)*. Beograd: Princip i Fakultet političkih nauka.
- Popović, M. et al. (1977): *Društveni slojevi i društvena svest (Social Strata and Social Consciousness)*. Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Powell, G. B. (1986): American Voting Behaviour in Comparative Perspective, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80.
- Prior, M. (2005): News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 577-592.
- Putnam, R. (1993): *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pye, L. (1968): Political Culture, in E. Sills (ed.): *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (pp. 218-225). New York: Macmillan.
- Pye, L. (1972): Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 285-296.
- Pye, L. & S. Verba (eds.) (1965): *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Reisinger, W. (1995): The Renaissance of Rubric: Political Culture as Concept and Theory, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 7, 328-352.
- Richert, J. P. (1974): Political Participation and Political Emancipation: The Impact of Cultural Membership, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 104-116.
- Robertson, R. & F. Lechner (1985): Modernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems Theory, *Theory, Culture and Society*, 2 (3), pp. 103-118.
- Robinson, J. et al. (1968): *Measuring of Political Attitudes*. Michigan: Survey Research Center, Ann Arbor.
- Rokeach, M. (1973): *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: The Free Press.
- Rose, R. (1985): *Politics in England: Change and Persistence*. London: Macmillan.
- Rose, R. (2004): *Voter Turnout in Western Europe*. International IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Rosenbaum, W. (1975): *Political Culture*. New York: Praeger.
- Rot, N. (1994): *Osnovi socijalne psihologije* (The Basics of Social Psychology). Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.
- Rot, N. & N. Havelka (1973): *Nacionalna vezanost i vrednosti kod srednjoškolske omladine* (Ethnic Affiliation and Values among High School Generation). Beograd: Institut za psihologiju and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Sajc, A. (1996): Osnovne koncepcije o determinaciji izbornog ponašanja (Basic Conceptions about the Determination of Electoral Behaviour), *Gledišta*, Vol. IV, No. 1-2, Beograd, pp. 59-68.
- Scaff, L. (1975): Two Concepts of Political Participation, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 447-462.
- Scheufele, D. A. (2000): Talk or conversation? Dimensions of interpersonal discussion and their implications for participatory democracy, *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 77, pp. 713 – 729.
- Seligson, A. (1999): Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Test of Putnam Thesis, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 342-362.
- Seligson, M. (2002): The Renaissance of Political Culture or Renaissance of Ecological Fallacy, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34., No. 3, pp. 273-292.
- Slavujević, Z. (2002): Socijalna utemeljenost političkih stranaka pre i posle izbora 2002 (Social Bases of Political Parties before and after Elections in 2002), in V. Goati (ed.): *Partijska scena Srbije posle 5. oktobra 2000*. (pp. 159-194). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Slavujević, Z. (2005a): Promena socijalne utemeljenosti i socijalne strukture pristalica relevantnih političkih stranaka u Srbiji prvih godina XXI veka (Changes in Social Base and Social Structure of the Political Party Followers in Serbia at the Beginning of the 21st Century), in Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (pp. 189-236). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Slavujević, Z. (2005b): *Politički marketing* (Political Marketing). Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka.

- Slavujević, Z. (2007): *Izborne kampanje: Pohod na birače – slučaj Srbije od 1990. do 2007. godine* (Electoral Campaigns: Chasing Voters – the Case of Serbia from 1990 to 2007). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Institut društvenih nauka and Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd.
- Slavujević, Z. & S. Mihailović (1999): *Dva ogleđa o legitimitetu* (Two Studies on Legitimacy). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Sloam, J. (2007): Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the UK, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 548-567.
- Smith, D. et al. (1980): *Participation in Social Political Activities*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Solf, F. (2008): Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 48-60.
- Somers, T. (1995): What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere?, *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 113-144.
- Spasić, I & M. Subotić (eds.) (2001): *R/Evolucije i poredak* (R/Evolutions and Order). Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju.
- Stevanović, B. (2008): *Politička kultura i kulturni identitet na Balkanu* (Political Culture and Cultural Identity in the Balkans). Niš: Filozofski fakultet.
- Stojiljković, Z. (2005): Demokratija (još) ne stanuje ovde (Democracy Does Not Live Here (Yet)), u Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije* (pp. 121-142). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Stojiljković, Z. (2006): *Partijski sistem Srbije* (Party System of Serbia). Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Stojković, B. (ed.) (2004): *Kulturna politika i kulturna raznovrsnost* (Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity). Beograd: Zavod za proučavanje kulturnog razvitka.
- Strate, J., S. Parrish, S. Elder and C. Ford (1989): Life Span Civic Development and Voting Participation, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 443-464.
- Šiber, I. (1971): Motivaciona struktura aktivnosti birača u izbornim procesima (Motivational Structure of Voters' Activity in Electoral Processes), *Psihologija*, No. 1-2, pp. 59-68.
- Šiber, I. (1992): Politička kultura i tranzicija (Political Culture and Transition), *Politička misao* (Zagreb), No. 3, pp. 93-110.
- Šiber, I. (2006): Političko ponašanje hrvatskih birača u izborima 1990 – 2003 (Political Behaviour of Croatian Voters in Elections from 1990 to 2003), in Z. Lutovac (ed.): *Političke stranke i birači u državama bivše Jugoslavije* (pp. 323-362). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
- Šram, Z. (2006): Socijalni stavovi i osobine ličnosti kao komponente političke culture (Social Attitudes and Personality Traits as Components of Political Culture), in S. Mihailović et al.: *Pet godina tranzicije u Srbiji II* (pp. 200-218). Beograd: SD Klub and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Tenn, S. (2007a): The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout, *Political Analysis*, 15, pp. 446-464.
- Tenn, S. (2007b): An Alternative Measure of Relative Education to Explain Voter Turnout, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 271-282.

- Teorell, J. (2006): Political Participation and Three Theories of Democracy: A Research Inventory and Agenda, *European Journal of Political Research*, 45, pp. 787-810.
- Therborn, G. (1995): *European Modernity and Beyond*. London: Sage.
- Tichenor, P. J., G. A. Donohue and C. N. Olien (1970): Mass Media Flow and Differential Growth in Knowledge, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34, pp. 159-170.
- Tingsten, H. (1937): *Political Behaviour*. London: P. S. King & Son
- Tomanović, V. (1977): *Omladina i socijalizam* (Youth and Socialism). Beograd: Mladost.
- Topf, R. (1989): Political Culture and Political Change in Britain, in J. R. Gibbins (ed.): *Contemporary Political Culture* (52-80). London: Sage.
- Tucker, R. (1973): Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 173-190.
- Van Deth, J. W. & M. Elff (2004): Politicization, Economic Development and Political Interest in Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, pp. 477-508.
- Vasović, M. (1991): Vrednosna opredeljenja Jugoslovena (Yugoslavs' Value Orientations), in Lj. Bačević (ed.): *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici* (pp. 197-232). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka.
- Vasović, M. (ed.) (1998): *Fragmenti političke culture* (Fragments of Political Culture). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za politikološko i ispitivanje javnog mnjenja.
- Vasović, M. (2007): *U predvorju politike* (In the Lobby of Politics). Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Vasović, V. & V. Goati (1994): *Izbori i izborni sistemi* (Elections and Election Systems). Beograd: IBN Centar.
- Verba, S. (1965): Germany: the Remaking of Political Culture, in L. Pye & S. Verba (eds.): *Political Culture and Political Development* (pp. 130-170). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Verba, S. & N. Nie (1972): *Participation in America*. New York: Harper&Row
- Verba, S., N. Nie and J. Kim (1978): *Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Verba, S., K. Schoolman and H. Brady (1995): *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Vettehen Hendriks, P. G., C. P. Hagemann and L. B. Van Snippenburg (2004): Political Knowledge and Media Use in the Netherlands, *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 415-424.
- Voogt, R. J. & W. E. Saris (2003): To Participate or Not To Participate: The Link Between Survey Participation, Electoral Participation and Political Interest, *Political Analysis*, 11, pp. 164-179.
- Vujadinović, D. et al. (eds.) (2003): *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy – Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia – Institutional Framework*. Beograd: CEDET.
- Vujadinović, D. et al. (eds.) (2005): *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy – Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia – Civil Society and Political Culture*. Beograd: CEDET.
- Webb, S. & B. Webb (1936): *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?*. New York: Charles, Scribner's Sons.

- Whiteley, P. F. (2000): Economic Growth and Social Capital, *Political Studies*, Vol. 48, pp. 443-466.
- Wiatr, J. (1980): The Civic Culture From a Marxist-Sociological Perspective, in G. Almond & S. Verba (eds.): *The Civic Culture Revisited* (pp. 103-123). Boston: Little Brown.
- Wilson, R. (1997): American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective, *Political psychology*, Vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 483-502.
- World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20081015, 2008. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). *Aggregate File Producer*: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.
- Zaninovich, G. (1970): Party and Non-Party Attitudes on Societal Change, in B. Farrell: *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (pp. 294-334). Chicago: Aldine.
- Zaninovich, G. (1971): The Case of Yugoslavia: Delineating Political Culture in a Multi-Ethnic Society, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 4, No.1, pp. 58-70.
- Zaninovich, G. (1973): Elites and Citizenry in Yugoslav Society: A Study of Value Differentiation, in C. Beck et al.: *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (pp. 226-297). David McKay.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ON IMPORTANT POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITIONS IN SERBIA

Democratic Party (DP)

Democratic Party is the party with the longest tradition in Serbia. It was founded on February 16th 1919 in Sarajevo when the party of independent radicals, progressives, liberals and the Serbian part of the Croatian-Serbian coalition united. Its first leader was Ljubomir Davidović. In the political life of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, DP had a great influence, but was in power only in 1919 and 1924, less than a year in total. After Davidović passed away in 1940, Milan Grol became the DP leader. In 1945, after the Second World War, and the establishment of the new, socialist state of Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia, the communists won the November election and they prohibited the work of all other parties and DP disappeared from political life. More than fifty years later, a group of intellectuals announced the revival of the work of Democratic Party. Establishing Assembly was held on February 3rd 1990 and Dragoljub Mićunović was elected DP president. Four years later, Zoran Đinđić was elected its new leader and remained in that position until his assassination on March 12th 2003. During the 1990s, DP had been one of the most important opposition parties and often took part in democratic coalitions in order to finally obtain power as leader of DOS coalition. Its president Djindjić became the Prime Minister of Serbian government in 2000. After the assassination of Zoran Đinđić, Zoran Živković temporarily became the party's leader until the election of the new one. In the election for DP president in February 2004, the Assembly of the party elected Boris Tadić, the then vice-president of DP and Minister of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro, for its new leader by a wide majority. Tadić became the DP candidate in presidential election in June 2004 and was elected the President of Serbia, which he has been ever since. Currently, DP is the main party of the ruling coalition *For European Serbia*. DP is a leading party of socio-democratic orientation in Serbia nowadays with the largest support in the electorate, the member of Socialist International and Party of European Socialists.

Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS)

Democratic Party of Serbia stems from Democratic Party. Because of the idea of coalition with the Serbian Renewal Movement and independent intellectuals named DEMOS, in 1992 one wing of the party in favour of this idea separated and on July 26th formed the Democratic Party of Serbia, electing as its president Vojislav Koštunica. The party took part in the second and third parliamentary elections, but managed to win a small number of mandates. In 1996 the party joined the coalition "Together" only to leave it soon afterwards, and until 2000 DPS rarely participated in the protests against the authorities at the time. In 2000, the party became a part of DOS coalition, and Vojislav Koštunica became the opposition candidate for the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the election held on September 24th. Vojislav Koštunica managed to defeat in that election the current president of the FRY and candidate of the ruling party, Slobodan Milošević. In August 2001, DPS stepped out of the government and ruling coalition. They became a ruling party again after the election held on December 28th 2003, in coalition with G17 plus and SRM-NS. Vojislav Koštunica became the Prime Minister, which he remained in the next

mandate, after parliamentary election held in 2007. After the last parliamentary election, DPS joined the ranks of opposition. It is a conservative party, the member of International Democratic Union and European Popular Party.

G17 plus (G17+)

G17 plus is one of the younger political parties in Serbia, founded in December 2002 from a non-governmental expert organisation. The leader of the party from its foundation until 2006 was Miroljub Labus, who resigned from that position because of the break-up in negotiations with the European Union. After that, Mlađan Dinkić became party president. Already at the first election since its foundation, the party entered the parliament and government, and remained its integral part in the following two convocations as well. Currently G17+ is one of the members of the ruling coalition. According to its basic programme tenets, G17+ is in many aspects similar to DP.

Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP)

The party was created from a fraction of Democratic Party, on November 5th 2005 in Belgrade. Čedomir Jovanović, the former vice-president of Democratic Party and Serbian Government at the time of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, was elected president. In 2007 Civic Alliance of Serbia merged into LDP. Forming a part of pre-election coalitions with kindred parties (SDU, LSDV), it entered the parliament after 2007 parliamentary election, as well as the last parliamentary election, but does not participate in government.

Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM)

Serbian Renewal Movement was founded on March 14th 1990 in Belgrade, by uniting of Serbian National Renewal and Serbian Freedom Movement. The president of the party, since its foundation, has been Vuk Drašković. During the 1990s, SRM was one of the key opposition parties fighting against the regime of Slobodan Milošević, and the leader of the majority of protests: anti-government demonstrations on March 9th 1990, demonstrations after Vidovdan Assembly in 1992, large-scale three-month protests across Serbia in winter 1996/1997 etc. There were two unsuccessful attempts of assassination on SRM leader in that period as well. Independently or as part of coalitions, SRM participated in all parliamentary elections, and did not manage to enter the parliament on two occasions – after the historic parliamentary election in 2000 (since it was not a part of DOS and took part in the election independently) and seven years later in 2007. At the last parliamentary election, SRM participated as part of the coalition *For European Serbia*, together with DP, G17+, LSDV and SDP, and currently forms a part of the ruling coalition. Serbian Renewal Movement is the right-centre national party, of democratic, but also Christian-traditional orientation, which is especially reflected in its advocating the introduction of monarchy.

New Serbia (NS)

New Serbia was created by separating from Serbian Renewal Movement. The leader of New Serbia, Velimir Ilić, had until 1997 been the vice-president of SRM, and stepped out of it because of the conflict with Vuk Drašković and founded New Serbia

in Čačak in 1998. Velimir Ilić was one of the heroes of demonstrations of October 5th 2000, which ousted Milošević and his regime. Still, they became a part of the government only in 2003, by forming a pre-election coalition with DPS, where they remained in the following mandate, after 2007 parliamentary election. After 2008 parliamentary election, DPS-NS coalition became opposition. NS is a right-centre nationalist party.

Serbian Radical Party (SRP)

Serbian Radical Party was formed in Kragujevac, on February 23rd 1991. In 1992, SRP took part in the election for Serbian parliament for the first time, after which it participated in all elections and entered the Parliament each time. During the 1990s, SRP was very close to the ruling SPS and a part of ruling coalition after the parliamentary election in 1997. After the democratic changes in the country, it became the leading opposition party and the party with the largest support in the electorate. President of the party, Vojislav Šešelj, has been in the Hague Tribunal since January 2003, facing the charges for crimes against humanity and violation of the laws and customs of warfare. After Šešelj's departure for The Hague, Tomislav Nikolić became the first man of Serbian Radical Party. He was SRP candidate in presidential elections two times, in 2004 and 2008, but he lost both in the run-off ballot from Boris Tadić. SRP is a right-wing party, of prominent nationalist ideology.

Serbian Progressive Party (SPP)

Serbian Progressive Party is the youngest party on the political scene of Serbia, created from the fraction of Serbian Radical party led by Tomislav Nikolić. The relations between Nikolić and Šešelj worsened during 2008, in the first place because Nikolić's fraction advocated the adoption of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in Serbian parliament. On September 6th 2008, Nikolić resigned from the position of the chief of representatives' group and deputy of the president of Serbian Radical party and founded the representatives' group "Ahead Serbia". Soon after, the top of SRP loyal to Vojislav Šešelj expelled Nikolić and his supporters from Serbian Radical Party. With his followers, including the former Secretary General of SRP, Aleksandar Vučić, he founded the Serbian Progressive Party at the congress held on October 21st 2008. At this congress, Nikolić was elected president, and Vučić vice-president of the party. The division in the top of SRP is considered an important event on Serbian political scene, since it is assumed that it could lead to the cleavage in the electorate of the biggest opposition party. At recent local election held in several Serbian towns, the newly-formed Nikolić's party won a considerably larger number of votes than its parent-party SRP.

Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)

Socialist Party of Serbia was formed in July 1990, when Slobodan Milošević was elected president of the party. SPS is the party that marked the political life of Serbia in the 1990s and was in power continuously from 1990 to 2000. In the same period, party's officials held the position of Serbian President: Slobodan Milošević was the President of Serbia in the period 1990-1997 and Milan Milutinović from 1997 to 2000, which enabled SPS to have an absolute government over the country. During this period, the party had the largest support in Serbian electorate. In the watershed

election in 2000, SPS lost a vast number of voters, while Milošević was defeated in presidential election by Vojislav Koštunica. Soon after that, the new democratic regime decided to arrest and extradite Milošević to the Hague Tribunal, where he faced charges for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the custody of the Hague Tribunal, Milošević passed away in 2006. Ivica Dačić became the president of SPS. Ever since the democratic changes in 2000, the electorate of SPS has continuously dwindled and the party, forming pre-election coalitions, barely managed to cross the election threshold. However, it still remained an important political factor. After 2003 parliamentary election, it provided support to the minority government of Vojislav Koštunica, while after the 2008 parliamentary election it formed a post-election coalition with the coalition *For European Serbia* and currently actively participates in government.

Yugoslav United Left (YUL)

Yugoslav United Left was established in 1994 as a coalition of 23 left-wing and communist parties, led by the League of Communists/Movement for Yugoslavia. In the period from 1996 to 2000, Yugoslav Left was a part of the ruling coalition in Serbia and FRY. After 2000 election, YUL did not play an important role in Serbian political scene. President of Yugoslav United Left was Ljubiša Ristić, while the real leader was actually Mirjana Marković, the wife of President Slobodan Milošević. During the 1990s, Yugoslav Left did not take part in the elections independently, but mostly in coalition with Socialist Party of Serbia.

Party of Serbian Unity (PSU)

Party of Serbian Unity used to exist as a political party in Serbia. It was founded in November 1993, and its first president was Željko Ražnatović „Arkan“. After the murder of Ražnatović in January 2000, Borislav Pelević became the new leader of the party. In December of the same year, in early election for Serbian Parliament, PSU won 14 mandates, which was a considerable surprise. However, in early parliamentary election in December 2003, PSU, as part of a coalition, did not manage to obtain a single seat in the Parliament. At the beginning of 2008, the party merged into Serbian Radical Party. Pelević became a member of the newly-formed representatives' group “Ahead Serbia” of the former vice-president of SRP Tomislav Nikolić.

United Serbia (US)

United Serbia was founded on February 15th 2004 in Jagodina. The founder of the party is Dragan Marković, known as Palma, formerly an official of Party of Serbian Unity. The party did not achieve significant election results until the last parliamentary election in 2008, in which it took place as a part of the pre-election coalition with SPS and Party of United Pensioners, and entered the coalition government.

Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS)

Civic Alliance of Serbia is a former parliamentary party in Serbia, of liberal and socio-democratic commitment. It was registered as a party under this name in 1992,

by uniting of Republican Club and Reform Party. In the beginning, the leader of CAS was Vesna Pešić. During the 1990s, CAS had actively participated in democratic fight against Milošević's regime, by taking part in coalitions DEMOS, Together, Alliance for Changes. From March 1999, the president of CAS was Goran Svilanović. After democratic changes in 2000, as part of DOS coalition, it participated in government on the federal, republican and local level. In parliamentary election held after that period they managed to cross election threshold, but as part of coalitions with DP and LDP. In December 2004, Nataša Mičić became the new CAS president. In April 2007, CAS Assembly decided to merge with LDP and thus CAS disappeared from Serbian political scene.

Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (AVH)

AVH is a Hungarian political party in Serbia. One of its founders and a long-standing president was Jožef Kasa. President of the party at present is Ištvan Pastor. AVH was founded on June 18th 1994 in Senta as citizens' association, and on June 17th 1995 it was transformed into a political party.

League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSDV)

LSDV was founded on July 14th 1990 in Novi Sad. The president and one of the founders of League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina is Nenad Čanak. In 2007 parliamentary election, in coalition with LDP, CAS and SDU, it won 4 mandates in the National Assembly of Serbia. In parliamentary election held on May 11th 2008, as part of coalition *For European Serbia*, the League won 5 seats in the Parliament.

Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP)

It was founded in 1996 by separating from the Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak, and its leader is Rasim Ljajić, currently the Minister of Labour and Social Politics in Serbian government. In 2007 parliamentary election, Sandžak Democratic Party won 3 mandates, participating in the election list together with DP. In 2008 election, Sandžak Democratic Party joined the coalition with DP, G17 plus, LSDV and SRM and won 4 mandates.

Social-Democratic Union (SDU)

It was formed in 1996 by separating from Civic Alliance of Serbia, after the decision of that party to join the coalition Together. Its president and one of the founders is Žarko Korać. In 2007 parliamentary election, SDU, as part of a coalition with LDP, CAS and LSDV, won one mandate in the Serbian Parliament.

New Democracy (ND)

New Democracy was established at the beginning of the 1990s in Valjevo. In early years of its existence, it formed a part of coalition DEMOS, together with SRM, DPS and CAS. It used the support of representatives from that list to become a part of the government of Mirko Marjanović. Having rejected the cooperation with SRP, it became opposition in 1997, after the election in which it took part in the election list SPS-YUL-ND. After democratic changes in 2000 and participation in the DOS

election list, its president Dušan Mihajlović became vice-president of the Government and Minister of Internal Affairs, where he remained until 2004. After that, the party changed its name into Liberals of Serbia, and Mihajlović withdrew from the position of the president. Radivoje Lazarević became the new president. In 2007 election, ND formed a part of SRM election list, but did not manage to cross election threshold.

Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS)

Party of United Pensioners was established on May 10th 2005. Its president is Jovan Krkobabić. In 2008 parliamentary election, PUPS participated in the coalition with SPS and US, after which it entered coalition government.

Social-Democratic party (SDP)

SDP is a small party that achieved significant election results only in 2003, when it won three mandates in the Parliament in coalition with G17 plus. Its president is Nebojša Čović.

Party of Democratic Action (PDA)

PDA is a party of Bosniaks, established in May 1990. From July 1990, Sulejman Ugljanin has been its president. In the last parliamentary election, it participated as part of coalition Bosniak List for the European Sandžak and won two mandates.

Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEMOS)

DEMOS coalition was formed prior to the 1992 parliamentary election and it consisted of SRM and ND. In that election, DEMOS won 50 mandates. One year later, in 1993 parliamentary election, CAS joined the coalition and DEMOS won 45 mandates.

Coalition „Together“

Coalition *Together* consisted of SRM, DP, CAS and DPS. It was formed several months before 1996 parliamentary election. The coalition managed to win 22 mandates in the parliament.

Alliance for Changes

Alliance for Changes was formed in 1998, gathering not only individual parties, but also political groups of parties, citizens' associations, syndicates and some eminent experts. The original members were DP, CAS, DA, DCVH, NS, SDP, Association of Free and Independent Syndicates, Dragoslav Avramović and Milan Panić. Later it gathered more than thirty parties and citizens' associations.

Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)

DOS is a coalition established on January 10th 2000 on the initiative of Serbian Renewal Movement and consisted of 19 parties that were opposition to the regime of Slobodan Milošević. The strongest parties in the newly formed DOS were SRM and

DP, but after the attempt of assassination on SRM leader Vuk Drašković, 18 DOS parties rejected the agreement signed by all DOS leaders formerly and decided to participate in the upcoming election without SRM. DOS candidate in the election for FRY president was Vojislav Koštunica from Democratic Party of Serbia. Besides DP and DPS, the members of DOS also were: Democratic Alternative, New Serbia, Civic Alliance of Serbia, Demo-Christian Party of Serbia, League of Socio-Democrats of Vojvodina, Socio-democratic Union, Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, Reformists of Vojvodina, Sandžak Democratic Party, Coalition Vojvodina, Socio-democracy, Movement for Democratic Serbia, League for Šumadija, New Democracy and Democratic Centre. G17+ and Resistance also supported DOS.

In regular election for FRY Assembly, local government of Serbia and early election for FRY president on September 24th 2000, DOS managed to win, but by a small margin. DOS candidate for FRY President, Vojislav Koštunica defeated the SPS/YUL candidate and the FRY president at the time, Slobodan Milošević. However, the authorities refused to concede the election. During ten days of protests throughout the country, the central DOS rally took place in Belgrade on October 5th 2000. Around a million people protested in front of the Federal Assembly and Slobodan Milošević was forced to admit the defeat. DOS thus came into power.

After the defeat in federal election, the government of Mirko Marjanović resigned and until the new election, there was a transitional government formed by DOS, SRM and SPS. President of the transitional government was the socialist Milomir Minić. On December 23rd 2000, early parliamentary election was held, in which DOS won 176 mandates (out of 250) and had a two-third majority in the parliament. DP and DPS had 40 mandates each, while the remainder was divided among the smaller parties.

In February 2003, FRY was transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Thus Koštunica lost his position in the state and his party joined the ranks of opposition. On March 12th 2003, Zoran Đinđić, the Prime Minister and the main leader of the ruling coalition, was assassinated in front of the Government Building. Zoran Živković, the vice-president of Democratic Party and federal Minister of Internal Affairs at the time, was elected the new Prime Minister. Opposition parties (DPS, SRP, SPS) began to regain their power and urge the Parliament to call an early election, which eventually happened. Democratic Party decided to participate in the December election independently, with Boris Tadić, the vice-president of the Party, as their leader. That was the end of DOS, since the parties from that coalition did not jointly participate in the election ever again.

Resistance

Resistance was a youth movement in Serbia, which used revolutionary methods and Western financial aid to oust Slobodan Milošević in 2000. It was formed in October 1998 as a response to the new laws on university and the media which did not suit the young. After NATO air campaign against FRY, Resistance started a political campaign aimed at Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević. During the presidential campaign later on, in September 2000, they started their campaign “He is finished!”, thus expressing their disagreement with Milošević. After Milošević had been ousted, Resistance was transformed into a political party. In parliamentary election in 2003 they won only 1.6% of votes. Eventually, it merged into Democratic Party in September 2004. National movement Resistance inspired many national youth organisations of Eastern Europe, as well as in Georgia, Ukraine, Albania, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Croatia etc.

APPENDIX 2: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SERBIA¹⁵

In the period from 1990 to 2008 parliamentary elections were held eight times in Serbia. Multi-party election for the National Assembly, the first after the Second World War, was held on December 9th 1990. Out of 7.036.303 registered voters, 5.030.440 participated in the election, that is, 71,49%. Out of 44 election lists, 14 parties crossed the election threshold of 5% of obtained votes out of the number of voters that participated in election. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS - Slobodan Milošević) achieved a dominant victory by winning 194 out of 250 seats in the Parliament; Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM – Vuk Drašković) got 19 seats, Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (DAVH) 8, citizen groups candidates 8, Democratic Party (DP - Zoran Đinđić) 7 seats etc. Government was formed two months later and Dragutin Zelenović, the candidate of SPS, became the Prime Minister. Along with parliamentary election, presidential election was held on the same day and Slobodan Milošević was elected the President of the Republic of Serbia.

The second parliamentary (early) election for the National Assembly and the President of the Republic was held on December 20th 1992, after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the formation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 27th 1992. 69,7% voters participated in the election. SPS won in this election as well, but the victory was less dominant, since they obtained 101 mandates in the Parliament. Serbian Radical Party (SRP - Vojislav Šešelj), which took part in the elections for the first time, became the most numerous party in the Parliament after SPS, while the coalition Democratic Movement of Serbia, formed by SRM and New Democracy (ND), won one fifth of the seats in the Parliament (50). Prime Minister of the new government was Nikola Šainović. In the same year, Slobodan Milošević was elected President again.

Structure of the Parliament remained similar after the third, also early, parliamentary election. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and the fact that, at the end of 1993, the domestic product of Serbia and Montenegro was only 39% of the one achieved in 1989, along with the continuous drastic deterioration of economic conditions in the country, did not affect the election results significantly. In the election held on December 19th 1993, the SPS won the majority of votes again (123 seats), DEMOS (consisting of SRM, ND and CAS) followed with 45 seats, then Serbian Radical Party (39) and Democratic Party (29 seats in the Parliament). SPS formed the Government again, with the help of the representatives of New Democracy. Mirko Marjanović became the head of Serbian Government and remained the Prime Minister in the next convocation of Parliament as well. The number of abstainers increased, since 61,3% of registered voters participated in the election.

The fourth regular election for members of parliament was held on September 21st 1997. This election, as well as the elections held up to then, was marred by irregularities (ballot box stuffing, scarce presence of opposition parties in the media etc.). The consequence was boycott by numerous opposition parties, including DP and DPS. 57,4% registered voters participated in the election. SPS formed a coalition with YUL and ND for this election and won 110 seats in the Parliament. SRP won 32,8%

¹⁵ For more detailed analyses of parliamentary and presidential elections see Mihailović, 1991a; 1991b; 1994; 2007; Goati, 1994; 1995; 2001; 2002; 2006;

votes (82 seats), SPO – 45 seats, etc. After March 1998 and the formation of coalition government of SPS, YUL and SRP (the so-called “red-and-black coalition”), “pseudo democracy” (Goati, 2002: 14-16), which had characterised the regime in Serbia until that moment, was replaced by a “pure authoritarian regime”. It practically meant revoking media freedom and university freedom, systematic repression of opposition and non-governmental organisations (Goati, 2002: 15). At the same time, after two rounds of failed elections for Serbian President (less than 50% registered voters took place in the election), SPS candidate Milan Milutinović was elected President of Serbia.

Milošević’s regime, thriving on the flourishing of enflamed nationalism, managed to achieve a victory over more or less disunited opposition in all the elections during the 1990s. The difficult period of the 1990s, international isolation, unprecedented hyper-inflation, wars in neighbouring countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia), a drastic decline in the standard of living, conflicts in Kosovo, NATO intervention in 1999 et al. led to the increased dissatisfaction of Serbian citizens, who started massive protests on October 5th 2000 and thus forced Milošević to admit the defeat in the election for the President of the country on the federal level held on September 24th 2000. The winner of this election was Vojislav Koštunica, the candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Soon followed the fifth parliamentary election held on December 23rd 2000 in which the old regime was ousted, which was the change that had occurred a whole decade later than in the majority of other post-communist states. 57,6% of voters participated in the election. SPS and SRP lost one million and one hundred votes together and won 37 (SPS), that is, 23 (SRP) seats. Democratic Opposition of Serbia, consisting of 19 lists (among which the most important were DP and DPS) won 176 seats, which made an absolute majority in the Parliament, and formed the Republican Government which lasted, as DOS itself, from January 25th to August 17th 2001. The Prime Minister of the new Government was Zoran Đinđić, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Serbia.

Two rounds of failed presidential elections followed, held on September 29th, that is, October 13th 2002, won by Vojislav Koštunica. Repeated presidential elections took place on December 8th the same year, and the majority of votes once again went to Koštunica, but since the turnout was insufficient, the elections were once again called failed. The conflict between the DP and DPS, the two key parties in the then DOS, resulted in the rift in coalition. The murder of Prime Minister Đinđić brought about the formation of transition government led by Zoran Živković, who called the sixth (early) parliamentary election for December 28th 2003. These election, with the turnout of 58,7%, brought about large changes in the relations of political forces. Out of 19 lists that participated in the election, only seven parties managed to cross the election threshold and enter the Parliament. Two opposition parties achieved the greatest success – SRP, which won 82 seats and DPS that won 53. Democratic Party, the key party of the ruling coalition in the previous convocation of the parliament, fell to the third place by winning 37 seats. Other parties that managed to cross the election threshold were the newly formed G17 plus (34 seats), SPS (22) and the coalition SRM-NS (22). Minority government with the Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica was formed by the coalition consisting of DPS, G17 plus and SRM-NS, with the support of SPS, while DP and SRP remained opposition parties. Immediately before parliamentary election, another round of failed presidential election was held (on November 16th 2003), where the majority of votes went to the candidate of SRP Tomislav Nikolić.

During the term of this Government, there was a break in the negotiations with the European Union, and that was the reason for one of the coalition partners, G17 plus, to step out of the Government in September 2006. In the meantime, the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was passed, which led to the calling of the early, sixth parliamentary election that was held on January 21st 2007. The turnout was 60,56% (4.029.286 voters). The same as four years ago, the majority of votes went to SRP (28,59% votes - 81 seats), but after six-month negotiations, DP, DPS-NS and G17 plus formed a post-election coalition, half an hour before the deadline expired. Vojislav Koštunica remained in the Prime Minister's position, even though DP had the largest number of seats in the Parliament after SRP. There were two important events in the Serbian political scene that marked this election. The main opposition party during the 1990s, SRM did not manage to cross the election threshold (3,3% of votes). On the other hand, with 15 seats won, the newly formed pre-election coalition (LDP-LSV-SDU-CAS), led by the Liberal Democratic Party, the party originally stemming from DP, managed to get into the Parliament. Minority parties also entered the Parliament (to them, the election threshold did not apply, but the so-called natural threshold): Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (3 seats), List for Sandžak (2), and the Union of Roma of Serbia, Coalition of Albanians from Preševo Valley and Roma Party – one seat each. All the above-mentioned parties, together with SRP and SPS, remained opposition parties.

However, the ruling coalition did not last a full year. Unresolved conflicts between DP and DPS, government coalition partners, and important political events that happened in Serbia in the meantime, first and foremost, the declaration of Kosovo independence (February 17th 2008) and the announcement of the possibility of signing the Agreement on Stabilisation and Association with the European Union brought about further political instability to the country and the new early parliamentary election. The seventh (early) election held on May 11th 2008, which was often characterised as a referendum (for or against Europe) in the media, registered the largest turnout since 2000 (61,35% of registered voters). Contrary to the expectations based on public opinion polls that SRP was going to win, the largest number of votes went to the pre-election coalition "For the European Serbia" (DP, G17 plus, SRM, SDP) and it was 38,4% of the total of votes, that is 102 seats, which made this coalition the largest in the Parliament. Although perceived as the election loser, SRP won approximately the same percentage of votes (29,45%), that is, seats (78), as in the previous election. Besides the minority parties (Hungarian coalition, Coalition of Albanians from Preševo Valley, Bosniak List for the European Sandžak), the parties that entered the Parliament were DPS-NS (30 seats), SPS-PUPS-US (20) and LDP (13). Two months after the election, two coalitions "For the European Serbia" and SPS-PUPS-US with ethnic minority parties - Bosniak List for the European Sandžak and the Hungarian coalition – achieved an agreement about forming the new Serbian government which is currently in power and is led by the Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković.

APPENDIX 3: SOCIAL BASE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SERBIA

The classic model of answering the question why people vote in a certain way found its explanatory foothold in social characteristics of an individual (occupation, level of income, membership in organisations), and very often combined it with some of the demographic characteristics deemed relevant (gender, age, education, religiosity, racial and national background). The best known form of this model is the one that emphasises class voting – choosing the party depending on class position of an individual determined via one or more indicators (Sajc, 1996; Slavujević, 2002; Milošević-Dorđević, 2005). Several modalities can be distinguished within this model, and so we speak about family, generation, group voting et al. (Slavujević, 2005b: 101-110).

The thesis that “the man is politically what he is socially”, which was partly confirmed in now already classic sociological (Lipset, 1969) and psychological analyses (Eysenck, 1960), is current today in the form of analyses of social base and social structure of voters of certain parties, although it is considered only a part of the explanation of voting behaviour (participation and orientation) because it has some important shortcomings regarding the difficulties in explaining the so-called “cross-voting” and changes in voting orientation, the indirect model of electoral orientation et al. (Sajc, 1996; Mihailović, 1991b; Mihailović, 1996).

At the basis of the thesis about social base of political parties is the idea that certain social groups have specific interests and values and that certain parties advocate their accomplishment. Members of a certain social group see the party in question as an instrument for accomplishing their interests and values, and the party perceives the group in question as voters that will provide to it the possibility of participation in changing the distribution of power in the society. Political parties are the channels for expression and accomplishment of interests and values of different social groups, whereby social base indicates “*the attractiveness of party for the members of certain social groups*” (Slavujević, 2002: 161).

The results of analyses of socio-demographic structure of supporters of relevant parties in Serbia indicate that there is an insufficient interest profiling of party programmes and large social heterogeneity of their election supporters. That results in an aggravated perception of parties as representatives of interests of certain social groups, although many parties imply by their names that they advocate the accomplishment of interests of certain strata (attributes such as “working-class”, “peasant” et al.). The main reasons for that are undeveloped processes of social structuring in socialism; instable party scene of Serbia (appearance and disappearance of parties, overflowing of voters), socialisation in one-party system (both in the period before pluralism and in the first years of multi-party system), inequality of conditions for presentation of parties (media abuse, see Džuverović et al, 1994), the nature of the most important parties as leader and *catch all* parties et al. (Slavujević, 2002).

However, it can be said that certain parties get profiled, especially after 2000 and that voters themselves also become somewhat aware of the roles of political parties in accomplishing the interests of wider strata. According to the findings of a research from 2005, 30% of voters say that they vote for the party that guarantees certain benefits to the voter and 20% for the party whose programme and politics are suitable for their social group (Stojiljković, 2006). The tendency of profiling after 2003 especially applies to SRP and DP that, in spite of the massive increase of their

supporters, have not acquired the characteristics of conglomerate parties (Slavujević, 2005a).

Bearing in mind the assessments of party relevance¹⁶ (Goati, 2002; Mihailović, 1994) and available analyses (Slavujević, 2002; 2005a), what follows is the presentation of data that primarily refer to seven political parties – Democratic Party of Serbia, Democratic Party, Socialist Party of Serbia, Serbian Radical Party, Serbian Renewal Movement, G17 plus and Liberal Democratic Party.

- **Democratic Party of Serbia.** Until the beginning of the year 2000, when it had a significantly smaller support in Serbian electorate, it was a party of more educated and younger voting population, experts, clerks and technicians. Along with an increase in the number of supporters, from the end of 2000, DPS started facing sudden de-intellectualisation, whereby the share of supporters without and with primary education tripled (due to the inflow of the former supporters of SPS and SRP). Since 2001 DPS started losing the supporters, which drastically influenced the social structure and predominance of non-employed groups – pensioners and housewives. Today the voters of DPS are mostly the respondents older than 50, of average financial status, with education on the level of secondary school (45,2%).

- **Democratic Party.** It has been a party with a relatively large number of college and university educated supporters all the time. Since 2000 it has had an above-average share of voters from urban areas, younger people with secondary and university education and opulent voters, experts, pupils and students – the most educated and most dynamic social groups, from middle and higher social strata. During 2003 the appearance of the party G17 plus, and one year later the founding of LDP, had a serious influence on voters' structure of DP. Soon after that, the structure stabilised and has practically remained unchanged.

- **Socialist Party of Serbia.** Starting from the first parliamentary election in 1990, the party had been facing a constant dropout of supporters and was very quickly transformed from a predominantly working-class party (1990-1992) into a rural party, party of farmers, the inactive part of electorate, the oldest, less educated and poor voters. Currently, two thirds of the electorate of SPS (62,5%) consist of voters older than 60, which makes the electorate of this party by far the oldest. Closely connected with that is a predominant share of the respondents of the lowest educational (46,9%) and low financial status (57%), mostly from rural areas (53%).

- **Serbian Radical Party.** Similar to SPS, during the 1990s, when it was very numerous, SRP was primarily a party of urban and male voters, mostly of elementary and secondary education. After the 2000 election, it suddenly lost support and became more prominently based in the male, less educated, working-class, retired and unemployed part of voting population. SRP is a party with the largest share of the poorest voters in supporters' structure, which is a trend that has continued until today – in the 2007 research one half of SRP voters (50%) said that they can hardly provide money for anything else but food. The massive increase in the number of party followers at the end and after 2003 did not change the structure of the supporters. At the end of 2004 the voters with secondary education and below formed around 95% of

¹⁶ During the mid-1990s Mihailović (1994) concluded that there were five relevant parties on the Serbian political scene: SPS, SRM, SRP, DP, DPS. Although political life in Serbia has changed significantly since, Goati (2002) draws a similar conclusion, singling out the five mentioned parties along with the Party of Serbian Unity, using as the criterion crossing of election threshold (5% out of the total number of those who voted) at least in one parliamentary election in the period 1990-2002. It is worth mentioning that there are 420 registered political parties in Serbia, but less than twenty actively participate in the political life.

party supporters, while three years later the percentage of voters belonging to these educational categories in the group of SRP voters has remained practically unchanged (90%).

- ***Serbian Renewal Movement***. For a long time, it had been a party of younger voting population, workers, clerks and technicians, especially during the 1990s, when it had the status of the strongest opposition party. After 2000 the share of pupils and students, pensioners and housewives increased, as well as of the oldest supporters. Huge changes on the Serbian political scene and massive overflow of voters had as a consequence the temporary withdrawal of SRM from political life (the party did not cross the threshold in the election held on January 21st 2007). However, this did not cause more significant changes in the structure of voters of this party, although it is noticeable that there is an increase of middle-aged voters, that is, voters with secondary education.

- ***G17 plus***. One of the younger parties on Serbian political scene. It was formed in 2002 from a non-governmental expert organisation. Forming of this party brought about the fall in the number of supporters of the kindred Democratic Party. This enabled G17 plus to cross the election threshold in 2003 parliamentary election already, with the significant support in the electorate, and enter the parliament. Although the fall in the number of supporters occurred after that, G17 plus has remained a relevant political party since. The structure of G17 plus supporters mostly reflects the structure of the kindred DP. Dominant among voters are young people and people from urban areas, with secondary and university education, as well as experts of various profiles, and also a large number of the unemployed.

- ***Liberal Democratic Party***. It is one of the younger parties in the current convocation of Parliament, since it was formed in 2004 as a separated fraction of the Democratic Party, to which it remained similar both in programme objectives and the structure of voters. LDP is a party of prominently urban population (urban population comprises almost three quarters of voters of this party), and its electorate is formed of the youngest strata of the society and those of secondary and college/university education.

From the point of view of this paper, the most important finding is that the profiling processes that started during the 1990s have continued, at least when it comes to the two currently strongest parties in Serbia – DP and SRP, and that, on a higher plane, these are indicative of the existence of two large groups within Serbian electorate. The less educated and inactive voters are on the one side, belonging to the lower and middle strata (in which SRP is primarily based, and then also SPS), while on the other side we have DP as a party of more educated, dynamic voters, of middle and higher strata, which can be accompanied by G17 plus and LDP. These findings are supported by the data from the latest available research conducted in June 2007. Although socio-demographic variables indirectly influence party orientation by primarily determining structure of motives and needs, the “cleavages” of analogous type have been identified also with regard to other politically relevant contents (Komšić et al., 2003), which indicates the validity of this division.

APPENDIX 4: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

- AVH – Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians
- CAS – Civic Alliance of Serbia
- CESID – Centre for Free Elections and Democracy
- CPSPOR – Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research
- CPY – Communist Party of Yugoslavia
- DAVH - Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians
- DCPS - Demo-Christian Party of Serbia
- DCVH – Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians
- DDI – Data Documentation Initiative
- DEMOS – Democratic Movement of Serbia
- DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia
- DP – Democratic Party
- DPS – Democratic Party of Serbia
- EU – European Union
- FES – For European Serbia
- FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
- ISS – Institute of Social Sciences
- LC/MY – League of Communists/Movement for Yugoslavia
- LCY - League of Communists of Yugoslavia
- LDP – Liberal-Democratic Party
- LSDV – League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina
- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- ND – New Democracy
- NEDA – National Empirical Data Archive
- NS – New Serbia
- PDA – Party of Democratic Action
- PSU – Party of Serbian Unity
- PUPS – Party of United Pensioners of Serbia
- SDP – Social-Democratic Party
- SDU – Social-Democratic Union
- SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
- SNR – Serbian National Renewal
- SPP – Serbian Progressive Party
- SPS – Socialist Part of Serbia
- SRM – Serbian Renewal Movement
- SRP – Serbian Radical Party
- SSM – Serbian Strength Movement
- UN – United Nations
- UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
- US – United Serbia
- USA – United States of America
- WVS – World Values Survey
- YUL – Yugoslav United Left

AUTHORS INDEX

A

Adorno, T. 90
Almond, G. 11, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 113

B

Baker, S. 38
Barnard, F. 22
Barton, A. 13, 51
Beck, P. A. 13, 176
Beer, S. 35, 46
Bennett, S. E. 192, 194
Bennett, W. L. 193
Berelson, B. 195
Bertch, G. 13
Brady, H. 171
Branković, S. 82
Brown, A. 46
Butigan, V. 39

C

Campbell, A. 73, 79
Chilton, S. 28, 37
Chuprov, V. 36
Converse, P. E. 73
Cvijić, J. 47

D

Dahl, R. 46
Dalton, R. 23, 73
Daugnad, M. 45
Dekker, P. 176, 181
Delli Carpini, M. 156, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196
Denitch, B. 13, 51
Devine, D. 34
Diamond, L. 46
Dittmer, L. 28, 29, 35
Dogan, M. 73
Donohue, G. A. 192, 193
Dvorniković, V. 48

DŽ

Džuverović, B. 262

E

Easton, D. 40
Elazar, D. 27, 34
Elff, M. 156, 161
Elkins, D. J. 29, 36
Engell, K. 36
Ester, P. 176, 181
Eysenck, H. J. 72, 93, 261

F

Fagen, R. 34, 40, 41
Feldman, L. 196
Ferguson, K. M. 186
Flickinger, R. S. 192, 194
Formisano, R. R. 25, 28, 29, 42

G

Gagnon, V. 76
Gibbins, G. 31, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45
Girvin, B. 37, 45
Goati, V. 14, 15, 60, 77, 256, 262
Golubović, Z. 76, 88, 91, 96, 100
Gronlund, K. 192, 193, 196

H

Hagemann, C. P. 192
Havelka, N. 52, 91
Highton, B. 180
Hofferbert, R. 81, 87, 110
Howe, P. 192
Huckfeldt, R. 174, 177, 187

I

Inglehart, R. 11, 23, 45, 46, 63, 73, 74, 96, 113, 114, 150, 151, 159, 176, 181, 192, 193

J

Jackman, R. 28
Jackman, S. 174
Jacob, P. 13, 51
Jankowski, T. 176
Jennings, M. 176, 195, 196

K

Kadushin, C. 13, 51
Katz, E. 174
Kavanagh, D. 37, 39
Keeter, S. 156, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196
Kenski, K. 193
Kim, J. 174, 187
Kincaid, J. 36
Klingemann, H. D. 73, 81, 87, 110, 193
Komšić, J. 140, 153, 265
Kostadinova, T. 177
Krampen, G. 192
Kreml, W. P. 91
Kuzmanović, B. 54, 76, 88, 91, 96, 100
Kwak, N. 192, 194

L

Laitin, D. D. 29
La Due Lake, R. 174, 177, 187
Lawson, C. 192
Lijphart, A. 46
Lipset, S. M. 49, 72, 79, 261
Lupia, A. 155
Luskin, R. C. 174

M

Macridis, R. 33
Maghami, F. G. 193
Marsh, A. 45
Martikainen, P. 177
Martikainen, T. 177
Matić, M. 38, 46, 49
McCann, J. A. 192
Mehl, D. 45
Michael, X. 156
Mihailović, S. 38, 79, 81, 91, 139, 143, 144, 153, 256, 261, 262
Milić, V. 82
Miller, R. 23, 28
Miller, W. E.
Milner, H. 192, 193, 196
Milošević-Đorđević, J. 261
Mondak, J. 192, 200

N

Nettl, P. 34
Neuman, W. 191, 193, 194, 195
Nie, N. 73, 172, 176, 187
Niemi, R. G. 79

O

Olien, C. M. 192

P

Pammet, J. 35, 42
Pantić, D. 27, 39, 46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 69, 81, 83, 85,
90, 91, 140, 141, 149, 153, 155, 166
Parkin, F. 45
Pateman, C. 187
Patrick, G. M. 39
Pavlović, Z. 65, 151, 153, 158
Philpot, T. S. 156
Podunavac, M. 41, 46
Powell, G. B. 34, 36, 40
Pribičević, O. 77
Price, V. 196
Prior, M. 192, 196
Putnam, R. 186
Pye, L. 11, 34, 40, 41

R

Rhine, S. L. 192, 194
Richert, J. P. 173
Robertson, R. 37
Robinson, J. 85
Rokeach, M. 72, 117, 138
Rose, R. 29, 37, 177
Rosenbaum, W. 35
Rot, N. 52, 91, 166

S

Sajc, A. 261
Saris, W. E. 156
Scaff, L. 172
Scheufele, D. A. 174
Schoolman, K. 156, 171
Seligson, A. 187
Seligson, M. 23
Simeon, R. E. 29, 36
Slavujević, Z. 77, 140, 261, 262

Sloam, J. 177, 182
Smith, D. 68, 79
Sniderman, P. M. 174
Solf, F. 174
Somers, T 29, 38
Sprague, J. 174
Stepina, L. 13
Stevanović, B. 38, 39
Stojiljković, Z. 262
Strate, J. M. 176

Š

Šiber, I. 38, 49
Šram, Z. 65, 139

T

Tenn, S. 177
Teorell, J. 172
Therborn, G. 73
Tichenor, P. J. 192, 193, 194
Tingsten, H. 176
Tomanović, V. 52
Topf, R. 37
Tucker, R. 40

U

Ulam, A. 35

V

Van Deth, J. W. 156, 161
Vasović, M. 63, 76, 88, 91, 96, 100
Vasović, V. 77
Verba, S. 22, 25, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42, 113, 156, 171, 172, 176, 187
Vettehen Hendriks, P. G. 192
Vinken, H. 176, 181
Voich, D. 13
Voogt, R. J. 156

W

Wass, H. 177
Webb, B. 22
Webb, S. 22
Weisberg, H. F. 79
Welzel, Ch. 74, 150, 151, 181
Whiteley, P. F. 187

Whittington, M. 35, 42
Wiatr, J. 36
Wilson, R. 26, 38
Wyatt, R. O. 174

Z

Zaninovich, G. 12, 50, 60, 85
Zikmund, J. 34

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dragomir J. Pantić is a senior research fellow and the director of the Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. He obtained his PhD in 1977 at the Department of Psychology of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, defending the PhD thesis entitled “*Value orientations, personality traits and class belonging*” under the mentorship of Professor Nikola Rot. He continued his professional improvement at Columbia University, New York in 1969 and in Canada in 1974/5. He has worked at the Institute of Social Sciences since 1968, and was its director from 1989 to 2002. The Association of Psychologists of Serbia granted him the annual award for scientific contribution in psychology (1982) for the study on the nature of interests and research on values of the young in Serbia. The Russian Academy of Social Sciences elected him as a member in 1999. He has dealt with the problems of values, public opinion, political culture, interests, religiosity, elections and political parties. He taught methodology of social research and sports psychology at several institutions. He published over eighty papers in scientific journals and chapters in books. He is the author of four books and co-author of fifteen studies. He was a member of the editorial staff of the journal “*Psihologija*” (Psychology), the organ of Association of Psychologists of Serbia, the editor-in-chief of the publication “*Psychologists in Serbia*” (1978), the president of the programme board of the Scientific Meeting of Psychologists of Serbia dedicated to studies of youth. He participated in twenty international projects and over two hundred public opinion surveys. He was a participant of numerous scientific conferences, symposia and congresses held in Serbia, the countries of former Yugoslavia and abroad (New York, Washington, Montreal, Bergen, Moscow, Klagenfurt, Budapest etc.)

Zoran M. Pavlović has been a research associate with the Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, since 2006. He obtained his M.A. degree in 2008 at the Department of Psychology of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, defending the M.A. thesis entitled “*Structure, factors and dynamics of change of self-expression values in Serbia*”, under the mentorship of Bora Kuzmanović, professor of social psychology. He is currently a PhD candidate with the topic regarding the nature of political culture of Serbian youth. The main field of his scientific interests are values, political culture and political socialisation, as well as other fields of political psychology, especially forms of national commitment, research methodology, cross-cultural research, data archiving etc. He participated in several scientific conferences and published a dozen of articles. He is the author of the book “*Self-expression Values in Serbia – Searching for Democratic Political Culture*” and co-author of two other books.