Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona
Peter Railton's moral realism
Апстракт
Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruž...a jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja.
Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.
Кључне речи:
vrednosni standard / reformišuća definicija / reduktivna osnova / redukcionizam / objektivni interes / naturalizam / moralni realizam / reforming definition / reductive basis / reductionism / objective interest / naturalism / moral realism / evaluative standardsИзвор:
Theoria, 2011, 54, 2, 79-103Издавач:
- Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Milevski, Voin PY - 2011 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1194 AB - Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruža jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja. AB - Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards. PB - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd T2 - Theoria T1 - Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona T1 - Peter Railton's moral realism EP - 103 IS - 2 SP - 79 VL - 54 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194 ER -
@article{ author = "Milevski, Voin", year = "2011", abstract = "Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruža jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja., Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.", publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd", journal = "Theoria", title = "Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona, Peter Railton's moral realism", pages = "103-79", number = "2", volume = "54", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194" }
Milevski, V.. (2011). Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona. in Theoria Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 54(2), 79-103. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194
Milevski V. Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona. in Theoria. 2011;54(2):79-103. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194 .
Milevski, Voin, "Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona" in Theoria, 54, no. 2 (2011):79-103, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194 .