Normativnost u tractatusu
Normativity in tractatus
Апстракт
Iako je Tractatus sačinjen od besmislenih rečenica, što Vitgenštajn i sam priznaje u pretposlednjem paragrafu, prema tradicionalnoj interpretaciji one nisu prost besmisao jer saopštavaju važne istine o zajedničkoj strukturi sveta i jezika. Ove istine ne mogu se iskazati, već se jedino mogu pokazati. Rezolutni tumači tvrde da je ideja značajnog ili prosvetljujućeg besmisla nespojiva s kontekstnim principom, koji je Vitgenštajn prihvatio u Tractatusu, i da je većina rečenica u njemu puki niz besmislenih slogova. U ovom članku braniću stanovište da je Vitgenštajn mislio da postoje besmislene rečenice koje pokazuju, samo da to što one pokazuju nisu istine, već pravila. Ovakve rečenice, u koje spadaju i one iz Tractatusa, normativne su i ne predstavljaju nikakva stanja stvari, pa se stoga ne mogu smisleno izraziti u čisto deskriptivnom jeziku koji razmatra Vitgenštajn. Njegovo tvrđenje da postoji nešto što se ne može smisleno iskazati, već se jedino može pokazati, prva je verzija teze o nes...vodivosti normativnih rečenica, koju je kasnije razvio u raspravi o sleđenju pravila.
Although the Tractatus is composed of meaningless sentences, as Wittgenstein himself acknowledges in the penultimate section, according to the traditional interpretation they are not just plain nonsense because they convey important truths about the common structure of language and reality. These truths cannot be said but can only be shown. Resolute readers claim that the notion of important or illuminating nonsense is inconsistent with the context principle, which Wittgenstein ascribed to in the Tractatus, and that most of its sentences are mere gibberish. In this paper I maintain that Wittgenstein thought there were meaningless sentences that show something, only what they show are not truths but rules. Such sentences, which comprise the Tractatus, are normative and do not represent any state-of affairs, therefore they cannot be meaningfully expressed in a purely descriptive language Wittgenstein considers in the Tractatus. His claim that there is something that cannot be said but ca...n only be shown is the first version of the thesis of nonreducibility of normative sentences, which he later developed in the rule-following considerations.
Кључне речи:
Tractatus / rezolutna interpretacija / razlika između onoga što se može reći i onoga što se može jedino pokazati / normativnost / besmisao / the Tractatus / the saying/showing distinction / resolute interpretation / normativity / nonsenseИзвор:
Theoria, 2011, 54, 3, 5-26Издавач:
- Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Jandrić, Andrej PY - 2011 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1196 AB - Iako je Tractatus sačinjen od besmislenih rečenica, što Vitgenštajn i sam priznaje u pretposlednjem paragrafu, prema tradicionalnoj interpretaciji one nisu prost besmisao jer saopštavaju važne istine o zajedničkoj strukturi sveta i jezika. Ove istine ne mogu se iskazati, već se jedino mogu pokazati. Rezolutni tumači tvrde da je ideja značajnog ili prosvetljujućeg besmisla nespojiva s kontekstnim principom, koji je Vitgenštajn prihvatio u Tractatusu, i da je većina rečenica u njemu puki niz besmislenih slogova. U ovom članku braniću stanovište da je Vitgenštajn mislio da postoje besmislene rečenice koje pokazuju, samo da to što one pokazuju nisu istine, već pravila. Ovakve rečenice, u koje spadaju i one iz Tractatusa, normativne su i ne predstavljaju nikakva stanja stvari, pa se stoga ne mogu smisleno izraziti u čisto deskriptivnom jeziku koji razmatra Vitgenštajn. Njegovo tvrđenje da postoji nešto što se ne može smisleno iskazati, već se jedino može pokazati, prva je verzija teze o nesvodivosti normativnih rečenica, koju je kasnije razvio u raspravi o sleđenju pravila. AB - Although the Tractatus is composed of meaningless sentences, as Wittgenstein himself acknowledges in the penultimate section, according to the traditional interpretation they are not just plain nonsense because they convey important truths about the common structure of language and reality. These truths cannot be said but can only be shown. Resolute readers claim that the notion of important or illuminating nonsense is inconsistent with the context principle, which Wittgenstein ascribed to in the Tractatus, and that most of its sentences are mere gibberish. In this paper I maintain that Wittgenstein thought there were meaningless sentences that show something, only what they show are not truths but rules. Such sentences, which comprise the Tractatus, are normative and do not represent any state-of affairs, therefore they cannot be meaningfully expressed in a purely descriptive language Wittgenstein considers in the Tractatus. His claim that there is something that cannot be said but can only be shown is the first version of the thesis of nonreducibility of normative sentences, which he later developed in the rule-following considerations. PB - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd T2 - Theoria T1 - Normativnost u tractatusu T1 - Normativity in tractatus EP - 26 IS - 3 SP - 5 VL - 54 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1196 ER -
@article{ author = "Jandrić, Andrej", year = "2011", abstract = "Iako je Tractatus sačinjen od besmislenih rečenica, što Vitgenštajn i sam priznaje u pretposlednjem paragrafu, prema tradicionalnoj interpretaciji one nisu prost besmisao jer saopštavaju važne istine o zajedničkoj strukturi sveta i jezika. Ove istine ne mogu se iskazati, već se jedino mogu pokazati. Rezolutni tumači tvrde da je ideja značajnog ili prosvetljujućeg besmisla nespojiva s kontekstnim principom, koji je Vitgenštajn prihvatio u Tractatusu, i da je većina rečenica u njemu puki niz besmislenih slogova. U ovom članku braniću stanovište da je Vitgenštajn mislio da postoje besmislene rečenice koje pokazuju, samo da to što one pokazuju nisu istine, već pravila. Ovakve rečenice, u koje spadaju i one iz Tractatusa, normativne su i ne predstavljaju nikakva stanja stvari, pa se stoga ne mogu smisleno izraziti u čisto deskriptivnom jeziku koji razmatra Vitgenštajn. Njegovo tvrđenje da postoji nešto što se ne može smisleno iskazati, već se jedino može pokazati, prva je verzija teze o nesvodivosti normativnih rečenica, koju je kasnije razvio u raspravi o sleđenju pravila., Although the Tractatus is composed of meaningless sentences, as Wittgenstein himself acknowledges in the penultimate section, according to the traditional interpretation they are not just plain nonsense because they convey important truths about the common structure of language and reality. These truths cannot be said but can only be shown. Resolute readers claim that the notion of important or illuminating nonsense is inconsistent with the context principle, which Wittgenstein ascribed to in the Tractatus, and that most of its sentences are mere gibberish. In this paper I maintain that Wittgenstein thought there were meaningless sentences that show something, only what they show are not truths but rules. Such sentences, which comprise the Tractatus, are normative and do not represent any state-of affairs, therefore they cannot be meaningfully expressed in a purely descriptive language Wittgenstein considers in the Tractatus. His claim that there is something that cannot be said but can only be shown is the first version of the thesis of nonreducibility of normative sentences, which he later developed in the rule-following considerations.", publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd", journal = "Theoria", title = "Normativnost u tractatusu, Normativity in tractatus", pages = "26-5", number = "3", volume = "54", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1196" }
Jandrić, A.. (2011). Normativnost u tractatusu. in Theoria Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 54(3), 5-26. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1196
Jandrić A. Normativnost u tractatusu. in Theoria. 2011;54(3):5-26. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1196 .
Jandrić, Andrej, "Normativnost u tractatusu" in Theoria, 54, no. 3 (2011):5-26, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1196 .