Semantika indikativnih kondicionala - kontraprimer za potkovicu

Abstract

U radu se navodi kontraprimer za Potkovicu (teoriju po kojoj indikativni kondicionali '→' imaju iste istinosne uslove kao i materijalna implikacija '?'), koji je modifikovana verzija 'kondicionala sa igrališta' koje je konstruisao Džejson Deker. Pokazuje se zašto Dekerov primer nije dobar ako se prikaže u izvornoj formi, a zatim se, uz pomoć misaonog eksperimenta sa inverznim spektrom, nudi poboljšana verzija Dekerovog primera. Na kraju rada se ukazuje da modifikovani primer 'kondicionala sa igrališta' ne predstavlja problem za epistemičku verziju dvodimenzionalne semantike (E2-D), i da u tom smislu treba dati prednost E2-D u razumevanju semantike indikativnih kondicionala.

The paper examines a counterexample of the horseshoe analysis of indicative conditionals (according to which indicative conditionals '→' have the same truth-conditions as the material implication '?'). The example is a modified and improved version of Jason Decker’s 'playground conditionals' case. The paper aims to show why Decker’s original example is wrong, and how it can be improved by using the inverted spectrum thought experiment. It is also shown in this paper that playground conditionals do not pose any problems to the epistemic version of the two-dimensional semantics (E2-D), which leads to the conclusion that we should prefer E2-D to the horseshoe analysis of indicative conditionals.