Utemeljenje "nove ontologije" u filozofiji Nicolaia Hartmanna kao kritika necjelovitih filozofskih sustava

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study the significance of Nicolai Hartmann's contribution to ontology and, furthermore, to point out the consequences of his laying the groundwork for a "new ontology" which fact may be interpreted as a direct criticism of certain exceptionally well-represented philosophical perspectives up until his time; also, however, of new trends which escalated in philosophical circles in the period of Hartmann's creative productivity. We encounter in Hartmann's work "New Ways of Ontology" an explanation of the real world derived from layers and categories of being. To his way of thinking, the errors of many of the contemporary philosophical approaches consist in giving preference to one layer of the real world at the expense of others, which results in the development of a reductionist perspective; furthermore, it can cause teleology to evolve into a closed system, something advocated by those who give preference to the highest, that is, the spiritual layer. One consequence of the cited conflicting views is a disagreement regarding the issue of what renders a philosophical perspective acceptable, and so the dispute ensues as to whether acceptance of a philosophical system requires that the criteria of relevance and exactness prevail. Since discord arises indirectly from giving preference to one layer with respect to other layers of the real world, both perspectives appear to be erroneous.