Hjumovo shvatanje odnosa između skepticizma i filozofije
Hume's understanding of the relationship between scepticism and philosophy
dc.creator | Davidović, Aleksandra | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-12T12:40:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-12T12:40:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0351-2274 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2502 | |
dc.description.abstract | U ovom radu istražujem kako su se Hjumova gledišta o odnosu između skepticizma i filozofije razvijala i kako su sazrevala tokom njegovog filozofskog rada. Hjumovo prvo delo, Rasprava o ljudskoj prirodi, ostavlja otvoreno pitanje zašto bi se iko bavio filozofijom u svetlu otkrića da su skeptički argumenti neoborivi. Cilj mi je da pokažem da, iako se Hjumov stav o skepticizmu i njegova skeptička pozicija nisu suštinski menjali tokom godina, Istraživanje o ljudskom razumu i Dijalozi o prirodnoj religiji, kao i nekoliko njegovih kraćih spisa sadrže interesantne promene, dodatke i poboljšanja kada je reč o njegovom shvatanju toga na koji način skepticizam može da utiče na filozofiju. Tek u svom poslednjem delu Hjum nedvosmisleno tvrdi da skepti-cizam ostvaruje trajan i pozitivan uticaj na naše bavljenje filozofijom, a ovaj uticaj se pre svega ogleda u intelektualnoj skromnosti i ograničavanju predmeta filozofskog istraživanja. | SR |
dc.description.abstract | In this article I explore how Hume's views on the relationship between scepticism and philosophy developed and matured throughout his philosophical career. Hume's first work, A Treatise of Human Nature, leaves open the question of why would anyone pursue philosophy in light of the discovery that sceptical arguments are irrefutable. What I aim to show is that, although Hume's attitude to scepticism and his own sceptical position remain essentially unchanged over the years, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, along with a couple of his minor writings, contain interesting changes, additions and improvements to his thinking about the way scepticism can inform our philosophical enquiries. Only in his last work Hume unambiguously claims that scepticism does have a positive and lasting influence on our philosophising, and this influence consists in intelectual modesty and subject-matter limitations whithin philosophical investigations. | EN |
dc.publisher | Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd | |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179041/RS// | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.source | Theoria | |
dc.subject | skepticizam | SR |
dc.subject | pironizam | SR |
dc.subject | naturalizam | SR |
dc.subject | Dejvid Hjum | SR |
dc.subject | akademska filozofija | SR |
dc.subject | scepticism | EN |
dc.subject | Pyrrhonism | EN |
dc.subject | naturalism | EN |
dc.subject | David Hume | EN |
dc.subject | Academic philosophy | EN |
dc.title | Hjumovo shvatanje odnosa između skepticizma i filozofije | SR |
dc.title | Hume's understanding of the relationship between scepticism and philosophy | EN |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | ARR | |
dc.citation.epage | 118 | |
dc.citation.issue | 3 | |
dc.citation.other | 61(3): 93-118 | |
dc.citation.rank | M24 | |
dc.citation.spage | 93 | |
dc.citation.volume | 61 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/THEO1803093D | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/1222/2499.pdf | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |