Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici

Abstract

U trećem odseku Zasnivanja metafizike morala Kant nastoji da, na osnovu ideje o nužnom pretpostavljanju slobode, pruži dedukciju vrhovnog moralnog principa i da dokaže njegovo objektivno važenje. Tri godine kasnije, u Kritici praktičkog uma, on eksplicitno poriče mogućnost izvođenja navedene dedukcije i promenom metodoloških postavki pokušava da pokaže da svest o moralnom zakonu kao činjenici uma predstavlja osnovu za dedukciju slobode. U ovom radu ćemo zastupati stav da direktan kontrast između dva Kantova teksta jasno pokazuje da je došlo do radikalnog preokreta u njegovoj misli. Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže da je Kant imao razloge da bude nezadovoljan dedukcijom moralnog zakona ponuđenom u Zasnivanju metafizike morala, što ga je navelo da promeni svoj argumentativni tok prilikom pisanja druge Kritike.

In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant's two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.