Sceptical Doubts - Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?
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2020
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The goal of this paper is to explore two different accounts of the mechanisms by which epistemic standards change, as a basis for the explanation of how arguments for radical scepticism get their appearance of legitimacy and persuasive power. The discussion begins with a presentation of arguments for the view that our epistemic practice contains a mechanism that raises the epistemic standards, to illustrate how sceptical hypotheses pose challenges to the truth value of our ordinary knowledge claims. Then, the discussion moves to a critique aimed to show that raising the standards approach is not well-suited to the job because it does not truly account for the radical form of philosophical scepticism. We take that these arguments pose serious problems with raising the standards approach and have to be dealt with. We examine an alternative account of changing epistemic standards, changing the angle of scrutiny, in line with which epistemic standards are interpreted as conditioned by disc...iplinary fields within which we conduct our research. After that, we compare the two highlighted approaches based on their success in providing an adequate description of actual epistemic practice. We conclude by arguing in favour of a latter approach as a superior conception and also as a promissory framework for an explanation of the phenomenology of our involvement with philosophical scepticism. Finally, we will close with some questions for both accounts.
Кључне речи:
level of scrutiny / knowledge claims / epistemic standards / angle of scrutinyИзвор:
Synthesis Philosophica, 2020, 35, 2, 453-469Издавач:
- Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb
DOI: 10.21464/sp35210
ISSN: 0352-7875
WoS: 000631286600011
Scopus: 2-s2.0-85104343384
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Pavličić, Jelena PY - 2020 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3093 AB - The goal of this paper is to explore two different accounts of the mechanisms by which epistemic standards change, as a basis for the explanation of how arguments for radical scepticism get their appearance of legitimacy and persuasive power. The discussion begins with a presentation of arguments for the view that our epistemic practice contains a mechanism that raises the epistemic standards, to illustrate how sceptical hypotheses pose challenges to the truth value of our ordinary knowledge claims. Then, the discussion moves to a critique aimed to show that raising the standards approach is not well-suited to the job because it does not truly account for the radical form of philosophical scepticism. We take that these arguments pose serious problems with raising the standards approach and have to be dealt with. We examine an alternative account of changing epistemic standards, changing the angle of scrutiny, in line with which epistemic standards are interpreted as conditioned by disciplinary fields within which we conduct our research. After that, we compare the two highlighted approaches based on their success in providing an adequate description of actual epistemic practice. We conclude by arguing in favour of a latter approach as a superior conception and also as a promissory framework for an explanation of the phenomenology of our involvement with philosophical scepticism. Finally, we will close with some questions for both accounts. PB - Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb T2 - Synthesis Philosophica T1 - Sceptical Doubts - Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle? EP - 469 IS - 2 SP - 453 VL - 35 DO - 10.21464/sp35210 ER -
@article{ author = "Pavličić, Jelena", year = "2020", abstract = "The goal of this paper is to explore two different accounts of the mechanisms by which epistemic standards change, as a basis for the explanation of how arguments for radical scepticism get their appearance of legitimacy and persuasive power. The discussion begins with a presentation of arguments for the view that our epistemic practice contains a mechanism that raises the epistemic standards, to illustrate how sceptical hypotheses pose challenges to the truth value of our ordinary knowledge claims. Then, the discussion moves to a critique aimed to show that raising the standards approach is not well-suited to the job because it does not truly account for the radical form of philosophical scepticism. We take that these arguments pose serious problems with raising the standards approach and have to be dealt with. We examine an alternative account of changing epistemic standards, changing the angle of scrutiny, in line with which epistemic standards are interpreted as conditioned by disciplinary fields within which we conduct our research. After that, we compare the two highlighted approaches based on their success in providing an adequate description of actual epistemic practice. We conclude by arguing in favour of a latter approach as a superior conception and also as a promissory framework for an explanation of the phenomenology of our involvement with philosophical scepticism. Finally, we will close with some questions for both accounts.", publisher = "Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb", journal = "Synthesis Philosophica", title = "Sceptical Doubts - Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?", pages = "469-453", number = "2", volume = "35", doi = "10.21464/sp35210" }
Pavličić, J.. (2020). Sceptical Doubts - Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?. in Synthesis Philosophica Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb., 35(2), 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Pavličić J. Sceptical Doubts - Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?. in Synthesis Philosophica. 2020;35(2):453-469. doi:10.21464/sp35210 .
Pavličić, Jelena, "Sceptical Doubts - Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?" in Synthesis Philosophica, 35, no. 2 (2020):453-469, https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210 . .