Why are myths true: Plato on the veracity of myths
Само за регистроване кориснике
2020
Чланак у часопису (Објављена верзија)
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Distinguishing myths in terms of their veracity had almost been neglected in Plato's studies. In this article, the author focuses on Plato's controversial claims about the truth-status of myths. An attempt is made to elucidate what he really had in mind when assessing the veracity of myths. The author claims that Plato, while discussing the epistemic status of myths, actually distinguished three kinds of myths in regard to what they narrate. Additionally, it is argued that he endorses three different kinds of truth value for myths: they can be either true or false, probable, or factually false but conveying some valuable truths. In the Republic II and III, Plato implicitly distinguishes the truth value of theological myths from the truth value of aetiological and normative ones, each of which are explained in detail in the article. In Plato's view, the theological myths can be either true or false, because he determines the divine nature a priori. When ascribing the probable character ...to myths, Plato has in mind mostly aetiological myths. Given that we are unable to establish the truths on the origins and development of many phenomena, because they originated in the remote past, what we can do is to reconstruct plausible and consistent myths of these phenomena, which, among others, might contain the arguments and even proofs, such as the proof of the cosmic destruction in Plato's own myth in the Politicus. In the third case, when Plato says that myths are lies, yet containing some truth, he had in mind myths which might be the product of our imagination like eschatological myths, for example. Being a kind of fiction, they are false, in the sense they do not correspond to any real state of affairs. Since they convey profound ethical norms or religious insights, they can be regarded as true.
Кључне речи:
veracity / truth / the Republic / Plato / myth / falsehoodИзвор:
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta-Filosofiya I Konfliktologiya, 2020, 36, 3, 441-451Издавач:
- St Petersburg Univ Press, St Petersburg
Финансирање / пројекти:
- Историја српске филозофије (RS-MESTD-Basic Research (BR or ON)-179064)
- Логичко-епистемолошки основи метафизике (RS-MESTD-Basic Research (BR or ON)-179067)
DOI: 10.21638/spbu17.2020.302
ISSN: 2542-2278
WoS: 000596658800002
Scopus: 2-s2.0-85099112594
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Deretić, Irina PY - 2020 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3110 AB - Distinguishing myths in terms of their veracity had almost been neglected in Plato's studies. In this article, the author focuses on Plato's controversial claims about the truth-status of myths. An attempt is made to elucidate what he really had in mind when assessing the veracity of myths. The author claims that Plato, while discussing the epistemic status of myths, actually distinguished three kinds of myths in regard to what they narrate. Additionally, it is argued that he endorses three different kinds of truth value for myths: they can be either true or false, probable, or factually false but conveying some valuable truths. In the Republic II and III, Plato implicitly distinguishes the truth value of theological myths from the truth value of aetiological and normative ones, each of which are explained in detail in the article. In Plato's view, the theological myths can be either true or false, because he determines the divine nature a priori. When ascribing the probable character to myths, Plato has in mind mostly aetiological myths. Given that we are unable to establish the truths on the origins and development of many phenomena, because they originated in the remote past, what we can do is to reconstruct plausible and consistent myths of these phenomena, which, among others, might contain the arguments and even proofs, such as the proof of the cosmic destruction in Plato's own myth in the Politicus. In the third case, when Plato says that myths are lies, yet containing some truth, he had in mind myths which might be the product of our imagination like eschatological myths, for example. Being a kind of fiction, they are false, in the sense they do not correspond to any real state of affairs. Since they convey profound ethical norms or religious insights, they can be regarded as true. PB - St Petersburg Univ Press, St Petersburg T2 - Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta-Filosofiya I Konfliktologiya T1 - Why are myths true: Plato on the veracity of myths EP - 451 IS - 3 SP - 441 VL - 36 DO - 10.21638/spbu17.2020.302 ER -
@article{ author = "Deretić, Irina", year = "2020", abstract = "Distinguishing myths in terms of their veracity had almost been neglected in Plato's studies. In this article, the author focuses on Plato's controversial claims about the truth-status of myths. An attempt is made to elucidate what he really had in mind when assessing the veracity of myths. The author claims that Plato, while discussing the epistemic status of myths, actually distinguished three kinds of myths in regard to what they narrate. Additionally, it is argued that he endorses three different kinds of truth value for myths: they can be either true or false, probable, or factually false but conveying some valuable truths. In the Republic II and III, Plato implicitly distinguishes the truth value of theological myths from the truth value of aetiological and normative ones, each of which are explained in detail in the article. In Plato's view, the theological myths can be either true or false, because he determines the divine nature a priori. When ascribing the probable character to myths, Plato has in mind mostly aetiological myths. Given that we are unable to establish the truths on the origins and development of many phenomena, because they originated in the remote past, what we can do is to reconstruct plausible and consistent myths of these phenomena, which, among others, might contain the arguments and even proofs, such as the proof of the cosmic destruction in Plato's own myth in the Politicus. In the third case, when Plato says that myths are lies, yet containing some truth, he had in mind myths which might be the product of our imagination like eschatological myths, for example. Being a kind of fiction, they are false, in the sense they do not correspond to any real state of affairs. Since they convey profound ethical norms or religious insights, they can be regarded as true.", publisher = "St Petersburg Univ Press, St Petersburg", journal = "Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta-Filosofiya I Konfliktologiya", title = "Why are myths true: Plato on the veracity of myths", pages = "451-441", number = "3", volume = "36", doi = "10.21638/spbu17.2020.302" }
Deretić, I.. (2020). Why are myths true: Plato on the veracity of myths. in Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta-Filosofiya I Konfliktologiya St Petersburg Univ Press, St Petersburg., 36(3), 441-451. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2020.302
Deretić I. Why are myths true: Plato on the veracity of myths. in Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta-Filosofiya I Konfliktologiya. 2020;36(3):441-451. doi:10.21638/spbu17.2020.302 .
Deretić, Irina, "Why are myths true: Plato on the veracity of myths" in Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta-Filosofiya I Konfliktologiya, 36, no. 3 (2020):441-451, https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2020.302 . .