Kvajnov naturalistički empirizam protiv epistemološkog nihilizma

Abstract

Cilj ovog rada je da razmotrimo zašto, i na koji način se Kvajn pozicionira između logičkih pozitivista i epistemoloških nihilista u pogledu shvatanja empirijskog svedočanstva. Naime, on će na nov način formulisati kriterijume opservacionalnosti s namerom da prevaziđe probleme koji su za logički pozitivizam bili nepremostivi, a da time ne žrtvuje objektivnost nauke poljuljanu krahom tradicionalnog pristupa epistemološkim pitanjima. Privučeni provokativnošću Kvajnovog istovremenog ispoljavanja radikalnih, ali i konzervativnih tendencija, odnosno namere da održi balans između stanovišta tradicionalne filozofije i epistemološkog nihilizma, nastojaćemo da ispitamo koliko je Kvajn uspešan u svojoj zamisli. U zavisnosti od odgovora na to pitanje ocenićemo značaj i relevantnost kvajnovskog naturalističkog pristupa za empirističku epistemologiju.

The aim of this paper is, considering his naturalistic approach to the epistemology, to examine why and in which way Quine tries to put himself between logical positivists and epistemological nihilists in terms of understanding empirical evidence. Using a new method, he is going to form observational criteria with aim to overcome problems which were insurmountable for logical positivism, thus not sacrificing science objectivity shaken by the collapse of the traditional approach to epistemological issues. Intrigued by simultaneous expression of radical and conservative tendency of Quine’s thought, in other words, by his intention to maintain the balance between standpoints of traditional philosophy and epistemological nihilism, we will endeavor to examine how much he is successful in his design, and depending on the answers, we will evaluate the importance and relevance of Quinean naturalistic approach to epistemology.