Sokratovska intuicija i problem znanja

Abstract

Cilj je ovog izlaganja ukazati na načine na koje Platonovi uvidi, prije svega u dijalozima Menon i Teetet, oblikuju suvremene pristupe problemima znanja, odnosno ukazati na širi značaj njegovih uvida koji se neće ograničiti samo na njegove anticipacijeklasične definicije znanja kao opravdanog istinitog vjerovanja. Kao okosnicu naših razmatranja uzet ćemo primjere metode misaonog eksperimenta, kojom se testiraju predložene definicije znanja, da bismo pokazali značaj sokratovskih intuicija vezanih za odnos znanja i istinitog vjerovanja, kao i mjesta tih intuicija u suvremenim epistemološkim stanovištima.

The aim of this presentation is to point out the ways in which Plato's insights, particularly in the Meno and Theaetetus dialogues, form contemporary approaches to the problem of knowledge, i.e. to point out the wider significance of his insights, which will not be limited to only to his anticipations of the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. We will use examples of the use of the method of thought experiment, testing the proposed definitions of knowledge as the foundation of our reflection in order to demonstrate the significance of Socratic intuitions related to the relationship between knowledge and true belief, as well as the places of these intuitions in contemporary epistemological theories.