Belief inhibition during thinking: not so fast
Апстракт
The present study is a conceptual replication of De Neys & Franssen's (2009) study about the role of belief inhibition in reasoning, operationalized as the change in reaction times to different categories of words presented after a syllogistic reasoning task. As in the original study, we examined the accessibility of cued beliefs after syllogistic reasoning, by presenting participants (N=145) with incongruent (heuristic and normatively correct answers differ) and congruent categorical syllogisms, and lexical decision tasks comprising cued and unrelated words, and imposed methodological restrictions within the original procedure. Mean RT was overall shorter to cued than to unrelated words, and for all combinations of both syllogism congruency and response accuracy on the preceding syllogism, indicating that the full neglect of content is not necessary for correct evaluation of logical status. We registered shorter RTs for words cued by incongruent syllogisms after correct than after inc...orrect evaluation, which indicates that participants actively process the content of the syllogism while reasoning, as a form of cognitive control. The successfully conducted Type 2 reasoning enhances lexical access to the cued content, rather than impairing it. In short, the findings of the original study were replicated for the priming effects, but not for the inhibition of content.
Кључне речи:
syllogistic reasoning / belief bias / inhibition / lexical access paradigm / dual processesИзвор:
Studia Psychologica, 2022, 371-389Издавач:
- Center for Open Science
Финансирање / пројекти:
- Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије, институционално финансирање - 200163 (Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет) (RS-MESTD-inst-2020-200163)
Институција/група
Psihologija / PsychologyTY - GEN AU - Damnjanović, Kaja AU - Ilić, Sandra PY - 2022 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4727 AB - The present study is a conceptual replication of De Neys & Franssen's (2009) study about the role of belief inhibition in reasoning, operationalized as the change in reaction times to different categories of words presented after a syllogistic reasoning task. As in the original study, we examined the accessibility of cued beliefs after syllogistic reasoning, by presenting participants (N=145) with incongruent (heuristic and normatively correct answers differ) and congruent categorical syllogisms, and lexical decision tasks comprising cued and unrelated words, and imposed methodological restrictions within the original procedure. Mean RT was overall shorter to cued than to unrelated words, and for all combinations of both syllogism congruency and response accuracy on the preceding syllogism, indicating that the full neglect of content is not necessary for correct evaluation of logical status. We registered shorter RTs for words cued by incongruent syllogisms after correct than after incorrect evaluation, which indicates that participants actively process the content of the syllogism while reasoning, as a form of cognitive control. The successfully conducted Type 2 reasoning enhances lexical access to the cued content, rather than impairing it. In short, the findings of the original study were replicated for the priming effects, but not for the inhibition of content. PB - Center for Open Science T2 - Studia Psychologica T1 - Belief inhibition during thinking: not so fast EP - 389 SP - 371 DO - 10.31234/osf.io/xzn4d ER -
@misc{ author = "Damnjanović, Kaja and Ilić, Sandra", year = "2022", abstract = "The present study is a conceptual replication of De Neys & Franssen's (2009) study about the role of belief inhibition in reasoning, operationalized as the change in reaction times to different categories of words presented after a syllogistic reasoning task. As in the original study, we examined the accessibility of cued beliefs after syllogistic reasoning, by presenting participants (N=145) with incongruent (heuristic and normatively correct answers differ) and congruent categorical syllogisms, and lexical decision tasks comprising cued and unrelated words, and imposed methodological restrictions within the original procedure. Mean RT was overall shorter to cued than to unrelated words, and for all combinations of both syllogism congruency and response accuracy on the preceding syllogism, indicating that the full neglect of content is not necessary for correct evaluation of logical status. We registered shorter RTs for words cued by incongruent syllogisms after correct than after incorrect evaluation, which indicates that participants actively process the content of the syllogism while reasoning, as a form of cognitive control. The successfully conducted Type 2 reasoning enhances lexical access to the cued content, rather than impairing it. In short, the findings of the original study were replicated for the priming effects, but not for the inhibition of content.", publisher = "Center for Open Science", journal = "Studia Psychologica", title = "Belief inhibition during thinking: not so fast", pages = "389-371", doi = "10.31234/osf.io/xzn4d" }
Damnjanović, K.,& Ilić, S.. (2022). Belief inhibition during thinking: not so fast. in Studia Psychologica Center for Open Science., 371-389. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/xzn4d
Damnjanović K, Ilić S. Belief inhibition during thinking: not so fast. in Studia Psychologica. 2022;:371-389. doi:10.31234/osf.io/xzn4d .
Damnjanović, Kaja, Ilić, Sandra, "Belief inhibition during thinking: not so fast" in Studia Psychologica (2022):371-389, https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/xzn4d . .