The Value Ladenness of Scientific Practice: “Covidization” of Research and Trust in Science
Vrednosno opterećena naučna praksa: „Kovidizacija” istraživanja i poverenje u nauku
Поглавље у монографији (Објављена верзија)
Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
In recent years, philosophers of science, including social epistemologists, have increasingly begun to focus on the role of value judgments in research activities and their consequences on the epistemic integrity of scientific inquiry. These considerations initiated a series of new practical and theoretical challenges, and “revived” old descriptive and prescriptive disagreements over the form of the relationship between values and scientific practice. In this article, we will attempt to frame the way in which values in science are discussed today, point to concrete examples that serve to illustrate the pervasiveness of value judgments in the scientific endeavour, and consider the question of how it is possible to ensure credibility in science and protect its epistemic integrity in the light of a value-laden framework.
U poslednjih nekoliko godina, radovi iz filozofije nauke i socijalne epistemologije nauke su sve više počeli da se fokusiraju na pitanja kakvi su status i uloga vrednosnih sudova u sprovođenju naučnih aktivnosti i kakve posledice njihova prisutnost može imati u pogledu epistemičkog integriteta naučnih istraživanja. Ova razmatranja su inicirala niz novih teorijskih i praktičnih nedoumica i,,oživela” stara kako deskriptivna, tako i preskriptivna neslaganja u pogledu
poimanja odnosa između vrednosti i naučnoistraživačke prakse. U ovom članku
tematizovaćemo način na koji se danas diskutuje o vrednostima u nauci, ukazati
na primere koji jasno svedoče o uplivu vrednosti u aktuelnu naučnoistraživačku
praksu te razmotriti pitanje kako je moguće u svetlu pristupa koji uzima u obzir
vrednosnu opterećenost naučnoistraživačkog rada očuvati poverenje u nauku i
zaštiti njen epistemički integritet.
Кључне речи:
science / value-neutrality / the credibility of scientific results / public knowledge / nauka / vrednosna neutralnost / kredibilitet naučnih rezultata / javno mnjenjeИзвор:
Virtues and Vices – Between Ethics and Epistemology, Zbornik radova, Filozofski fakultet u Beograd, 2023, 2023, 329-341Издавач:
- Faculty of Philosophy University of Belgrade
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - CHAP AU - Pavličić, Jelena PY - 2023 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4945 AB - In recent years, philosophers of science, including social epistemologists, have increasingly begun to focus on the role of value judgments in research activities and their consequences on the epistemic integrity of scientific inquiry. These considerations initiated a series of new practical and theoretical challenges, and “revived” old descriptive and prescriptive disagreements over the form of the relationship between values and scientific practice. In this article, we will attempt to frame the way in which values in science are discussed today, point to concrete examples that serve to illustrate the pervasiveness of value judgments in the scientific endeavour, and consider the question of how it is possible to ensure credibility in science and protect its epistemic integrity in the light of a value-laden framework. AB - U poslednjih nekoliko godina, radovi iz filozofije nauke i socijalne epistemologije nauke su sve više počeli da se fokusiraju na pitanja kakvi su status i uloga vrednosnih sudova u sprovođenju naučnih aktivnosti i kakve posledice njihova prisutnost može imati u pogledu epistemičkog integriteta naučnih istraživanja. Ova razmatranja su inicirala niz novih teorijskih i praktičnih nedoumica i,,oživela” stara kako deskriptivna, tako i preskriptivna neslaganja u pogledu poimanja odnosa između vrednosti i naučnoistraživačke prakse. U ovom članku tematizovaćemo način na koji se danas diskutuje o vrednostima u nauci, ukazati na primere koji jasno svedoče o uplivu vrednosti u aktuelnu naučnoistraživačku praksu te razmotriti pitanje kako je moguće u svetlu pristupa koji uzima u obzir vrednosnu opterećenost naučnoistraživačkog rada očuvati poverenje u nauku i zaštiti njen epistemički integritet. PB - Faculty of Philosophy University of Belgrade T2 - Virtues and Vices – Between Ethics and Epistemology, Zbornik radova, Filozofski fakultet u Beograd, 2023 T1 - The Value Ladenness of Scientific Practice: “Covidization” of Research and Trust in Science T1 - Vrednosno opterećena naučna praksa: „Kovidizacija” istraživanja i poverenje u nauku EP - 341 SP - 329 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4945 ER -
@inbook{ author = "Pavličić, Jelena", year = "2023", abstract = "In recent years, philosophers of science, including social epistemologists, have increasingly begun to focus on the role of value judgments in research activities and their consequences on the epistemic integrity of scientific inquiry. These considerations initiated a series of new practical and theoretical challenges, and “revived” old descriptive and prescriptive disagreements over the form of the relationship between values and scientific practice. In this article, we will attempt to frame the way in which values in science are discussed today, point to concrete examples that serve to illustrate the pervasiveness of value judgments in the scientific endeavour, and consider the question of how it is possible to ensure credibility in science and protect its epistemic integrity in the light of a value-laden framework., U poslednjih nekoliko godina, radovi iz filozofije nauke i socijalne epistemologije nauke su sve više počeli da se fokusiraju na pitanja kakvi su status i uloga vrednosnih sudova u sprovođenju naučnih aktivnosti i kakve posledice njihova prisutnost može imati u pogledu epistemičkog integriteta naučnih istraživanja. Ova razmatranja su inicirala niz novih teorijskih i praktičnih nedoumica i,,oživela” stara kako deskriptivna, tako i preskriptivna neslaganja u pogledu poimanja odnosa između vrednosti i naučnoistraživačke prakse. U ovom članku tematizovaćemo način na koji se danas diskutuje o vrednostima u nauci, ukazati na primere koji jasno svedoče o uplivu vrednosti u aktuelnu naučnoistraživačku praksu te razmotriti pitanje kako je moguće u svetlu pristupa koji uzima u obzir vrednosnu opterećenost naučnoistraživačkog rada očuvati poverenje u nauku i zaštiti njen epistemički integritet.", publisher = "Faculty of Philosophy University of Belgrade", journal = "Virtues and Vices – Between Ethics and Epistemology, Zbornik radova, Filozofski fakultet u Beograd, 2023", booktitle = "The Value Ladenness of Scientific Practice: “Covidization” of Research and Trust in Science, Vrednosno opterećena naučna praksa: „Kovidizacija” istraživanja i poverenje u nauku", pages = "341-329", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4945" }
Pavličić, J.. (2023). The Value Ladenness of Scientific Practice: “Covidization” of Research and Trust in Science. in Virtues and Vices – Between Ethics and Epistemology, Zbornik radova, Filozofski fakultet u Beograd, 2023 Faculty of Philosophy University of Belgrade., 329-341. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4945
Pavličić J. The Value Ladenness of Scientific Practice: “Covidization” of Research and Trust in Science. in Virtues and Vices – Between Ethics and Epistemology, Zbornik radova, Filozofski fakultet u Beograd, 2023. 2023;:329-341. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4945 .
Pavličić, Jelena, "The Value Ladenness of Scientific Practice: “Covidization” of Research and Trust in Science" in Virtues and Vices – Between Ethics and Epistemology, Zbornik radova, Filozofski fakultet u Beograd, 2023 (2023):329-341, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4945 .