Problem nesvesnih perceptivnih stanja

Abstract

Prema tradicionalnom gledištu, veza između naših perceptivnih stanja i svesnosti je pojmovno nužna. U ovom radu ću pokušati da predstavim argumentaciju koja ovu tezu dovodi u pitanje. Rad je podeljen na dva glavna dela. U prvom delu se detaljno analizira pojam nesvesne percepcije, kao i nekoliko fenomena u savremenoj kliničkoj literaturi koji pružaju empirijsku podršku tvrđenju da slučajevi nesvesnih perceptivnih stanja zaista postoje. Diskusija u prvom delu rada će mi omogućiti da razmotrim neke od osnovnih teza dve popularne teorije u savremenoj filozofiji percepcije—reprezentacionalizma i relacionalizma. Glavna teza koju ću nastojati da odbranim u drugom delu rada je da u kontekstu filozofskog problema nesvesnih perceptivnih stanja, reprezentacionalističkoj poziciji treba dati značajnu prednost u odnosu na relacionalizam.

According to the traditional view—most commonly associated with G. E. Moore—the relation between our perception and consciousness is conceptually necessary. This paper argues against this view. The first part of the paper discusses the concept of unconscious perception, as well as several interesting phenomena in the recent clinical literature that give us persuasive evidence against the thesis that, as a matter of conceptual or a priori necessity, perception cannot occur without consciousness. The second part of the paper provides a thorough critical analysis of the two popular positions in the philosophy of perception—namely, representationalism and relationalism—in order to determine whether and how successfully they can account for the claim about the existence of unconscious perceptual states. I conclude that, at least in the context of the philosophical debate about unconscious perception, there are strong reasons to favour the representationalist account.