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The utilitarian justification of prepunishment
dc.creator | Milevski, Voin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-15T21:07:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-15T21:07:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1897-1652 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5321 | |
dc.description.abstract | According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is committed. I will first analyze New’s argument, along with the epistemic conditions for practicing prepunishment. I will then deal with an important conceptual objection, according to which prepunishment is not a genuine kind of ‘punishment’. After that, I will consider retributivism and present conclusive reasons for the claim that it cannot justify prepunishment without leading to paradoxical results. I shall then seek to establish that from the utilitarian point of view it is possible to provide a plausible justification of this practice. Finally, I shall attempt to defend the claim that the fact that utilitarianism can justify prepunishment in a satisfactory way is clearly a favourable characteristic of this ethical position. | sr |
dc.language.iso | en | sr |
dc.publisher | Jagiellonian University in Kraków | sr |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179041/RS// | sr |
dc.rights | openAccess | sr |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Polish Journal of Philosophy | sr |
dc.title | The utilitarian justification of prepunishment | sr |
dc.type | article | sr |
dc.rights.license | BY | sr |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.volume | 8 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5840/pjphil20082219 | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/13102/bitstream_13102.pdf | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | sr |