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Kalam cosmological argument and the actual infinity

dc.creatorStojanović, Igor
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-20T12:20:13Z
dc.date.available2023-11-20T12:20:13Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5351
dc.description.abstractTip kosmološkog argumenta koji je u filozofskoj i teološkoj literaturi poznat kao Kalam argument je dobio posebnu pažnju u savremenoj filozofiji religije nakon argumenata koje je u prilog njegovoj verziji ponudio Vilijam Lejn Krejg. A priori argumenti koje Krejg nudi se pozivaju na kontraintuitivnost implikacija pojma aktuelne beskonačnosti i ideje sukcesivne izgradnje aktuelno beskonačnog uređenog skupa događaja. Prigovori upućivani Krejgu ukazuju na konzistentnost i primenljivost egzaktnog tretmana kom je pojam beskonačnosti podvrgnut u matematici kao na faktor koji čini neobičnost implikacija ovog tretmana nevažnom. U ovom radu nastojim da ukažem na propuste konkretnih zamerki upućenih Krejgu i da pokažem da matematička analiza koju njegovi protivnici koriste ne vodi uvek do zaključaka koje na osnovu nje izvode. Nakon ove odbrane Krejgovih argumenata, pokazaću da veću pretnju po njegovu argumentaciju predstavljaju izvesne simetrije koje, po nekim metafizičkim analizama vremena, postoje između prošlosti i budućnosti.sr
dc.description.abstractThe kalam cosmological argument has received a renewed attention in philosophical literature after several presentations and defenses of its versions offered by William Lane Craig. The crux of the debate about Craig’s a priori arguments in its favor has had mainly to do with the analysis of the concept of actual infinity and its implications for the possibility that the universe has an infinite past. While Craig’s arguments point to the counter-intuitiveness of the implications of the existence such a past, his critics offer reasons to think that his analysis is flawed in different respects, mostly due to inappropriate application of mathematical concept of an infinite set. I aim to show that the criticisms on offer have flaws of their own and, hence, fail to show that Craig’s reasoning is insufficient to offer serious reasons to doubt the coherence of the notion of the infinite past. I argue that a more serious threat to Craig’s arguments lies in certain types of symmetry between the past and the future.sr
dc.language.isosrsr
dc.publisherFilozofsko društvo Srbijesr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceTheoriasr
dc.subjectKalam argumentsr
dc.subjectaktuelna beskonačnostsr
dc.subjectkosmološki argumentsr
dc.subjectpostojanje Bogasr
dc.subjectV. L. Krejgsr
dc.subjectmetafizika vremenasr
dc.subjectbeskonačni nizovisr
dc.subjectactual infinitysr
dc.subjectcosmological argumentsr
dc.subjectexistence of Godsr
dc.subjectW. L. Craigsr
dc.subjectmetaphysics of timesr
dc.subjectinfinite setssr
dc.titleKalam kosmološki argument i aktuelna beskonačnostsr
dc.titleKalam cosmological argument and the actual infinitysr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBYsr
dc.citation.epage164
dc.citation.issue1
dc.citation.spage141
dc.citation.volume66
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2301141S
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/12154/bitstream_12154.pdf
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr


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