Izborna kolebljivost u Srbiji - poređenje i objašnjenje

Abstract

U prvom delu članka vršim poređenje izborne promenljivosti (volatility) u Srbiji sa onom u drugim zemljama. Izračunao sam da Pedersenov količnik za Srbiju 1990-2003 iznosi 19,6, što je visoka izborna promenljivost. Ali ona je prosečna u odnosu na ostale zemlje u tranziciji. Stoga zaključujem da razlozi visoke kolebljivosti u Srbiji ne mogu biti naročiti, već zajednički sa ostalim poslekomunističkim zemljama. U drugom delu članka razmatram opšte razloge povećane izborne promenljivosti. To su: veliki broj stranaka koje učestvuju u političkom životu i nedovoljno vremena, proteklog od obnavljanja višestranačja, da bi se birači ozbiljnije vezali za partije, odnosno da bi se stranke bolje društveno ukotvile (anchored). U trećem delu članka razmatram posebne razloge povećane izborne promenljivosti koji postoje, pre svega, u Srbiji i drugim poslekomunističkim društvima. To su: brza promena društvene strukture, koja dovodi do opšteg osećaja društvene i lične nesigurnosti, kao i veoma rašireno nezadovoljstvo raskorakom između rasta društvene nejednakosti i broja društvenih dobitnika, što povećava udeo protestnog glasanja. Na kraju, zaključujem da će, sa protokom vremena, neki od ovih činioca verovatno izgubiti na značaju, pa će se izborna kolebljivost u Srbiji smanjiti. Ali do njenog značajnijeg opadanja teško da može da dođe pre sredine sledeće decenije.

In the first part of this article the electoral volatility in Serbia is compared to those in other countries. The Pedersen’s Index for Serbia from 1990 to 2003 is 19.6, which means there is high electoral volatility. However, compared to other countries in transition, the volatility in Serbia turns out to be average. Therefore, I conclude that the causes of high volatility in Serbia could not be specific, but similar to the reasons in other post-communist countries. In the second part, I analyze the general reasons for the increased volatility. They are: the large number of parties participating in political life, and insufficient time, passed since the restoration of multiparty elections, for the voters to become more seriously tied to the parties, or for the parties to become socially anchored. In the third part, I analyze the particular causes of the increased volatility that are specific, first of all, for Serbia and other post-communist societies. They are: the fast change of social structure, which leads to a general feeling of social and personal insecurity, as well as the widespread dissatisfaction with the gap between the increase of social inequality and the number of social winners, which increases the frequency of protest voting. At the end, I conclude that, in time, some of these factors would probably lose their significance, so the volatility in Serbia would decrease. However, a noticeable decrease could hardly be expected during the next ten years at least.