Funkcionalizam i qualia
Functionalism and qualia
Апстракт
U savremenim raspravama, problem svesti se prikazuje kao problem eksplanaiornog jaza. Ustanovljene korelacije između fizičkih stanja mozga i svesnih iskustava daju nam razlog da verujemo kako su oni uzajamno zavisni ali nam same po sebi ne pružaju razumevanje odnosa između mentalnog i fizičkog. U prvom delu ovog članka, autor skicira dijagnozu trenutnog stan,a u sporu oko odnosa mentalnog i fizičkog. U drugom delu, on brani funkcionalistički pristup, sa uverenjem da nas on najviše približava rešenju problema. Naime, on tvrdi da nema apriornih razloga protiv mogućnosti funkcionalističke analize koja će izložiti funkcionalne uslove zadovoljive jedino od strane fizičkih sistema koji imaju qualia, Ovo tvrđenje je potkrepljeno jednim primer om koji pokazuje kako neko fizičko stanje sistema može igrati veoma određenu uzročnu ulogu (funkciju) zahvaljujući svom fenomenalnom obeležju.
The more recent mind-body debate depicts the problem of consciousness as a problem of the explanatory gap. Established correlations between physical brain states and particular conscious experiences may give us a strong reason to believe that one depends upon the other, but they don't in themselves give us an understanding of how the mental and the physical fit together. This paper falls into two main parts. In the first, the author outlines a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate. In the second, he defends a functionalist approach with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Namely, he argues that there are no a priori reasons against the possibility of a functionalist analysis that will characterize a set of functionalist conditions that could be satisfied only by systems with genuine qualia. This thesis is supported by an example which shows how a physical system's state could have very specific causa...l role (function) in virtue of its phenomenal property.
Кључне речи:
svest / qualia / mentalno / funkcionalizam / fizičko / eksplanatorni jaz / qualia / physical / mental / functionalism / explanatory gap / consciousnessИзвор:
Theoria, 2006, 49, 3, 7-26Издавач:
- Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Lazović, Živan PY - 2006 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/576 AB - U savremenim raspravama, problem svesti se prikazuje kao problem eksplanaiornog jaza. Ustanovljene korelacije između fizičkih stanja mozga i svesnih iskustava daju nam razlog da verujemo kako su oni uzajamno zavisni ali nam same po sebi ne pružaju razumevanje odnosa između mentalnog i fizičkog. U prvom delu ovog članka, autor skicira dijagnozu trenutnog stan,a u sporu oko odnosa mentalnog i fizičkog. U drugom delu, on brani funkcionalistički pristup, sa uverenjem da nas on najviše približava rešenju problema. Naime, on tvrdi da nema apriornih razloga protiv mogućnosti funkcionalističke analize koja će izložiti funkcionalne uslove zadovoljive jedino od strane fizičkih sistema koji imaju qualia, Ovo tvrđenje je potkrepljeno jednim primer om koji pokazuje kako neko fizičko stanje sistema može igrati veoma određenu uzročnu ulogu (funkciju) zahvaljujući svom fenomenalnom obeležju. AB - The more recent mind-body debate depicts the problem of consciousness as a problem of the explanatory gap. Established correlations between physical brain states and particular conscious experiences may give us a strong reason to believe that one depends upon the other, but they don't in themselves give us an understanding of how the mental and the physical fit together. This paper falls into two main parts. In the first, the author outlines a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate. In the second, he defends a functionalist approach with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Namely, he argues that there are no a priori reasons against the possibility of a functionalist analysis that will characterize a set of functionalist conditions that could be satisfied only by systems with genuine qualia. This thesis is supported by an example which shows how a physical system's state could have very specific causal role (function) in virtue of its phenomenal property. PB - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd T2 - Theoria T1 - Funkcionalizam i qualia T1 - Functionalism and qualia EP - 26 IS - 3 SP - 7 VL - 49 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_576 ER -
@article{ author = "Lazović, Živan", year = "2006", abstract = "U savremenim raspravama, problem svesti se prikazuje kao problem eksplanaiornog jaza. Ustanovljene korelacije između fizičkih stanja mozga i svesnih iskustava daju nam razlog da verujemo kako su oni uzajamno zavisni ali nam same po sebi ne pružaju razumevanje odnosa između mentalnog i fizičkog. U prvom delu ovog članka, autor skicira dijagnozu trenutnog stan,a u sporu oko odnosa mentalnog i fizičkog. U drugom delu, on brani funkcionalistički pristup, sa uverenjem da nas on najviše približava rešenju problema. Naime, on tvrdi da nema apriornih razloga protiv mogućnosti funkcionalističke analize koja će izložiti funkcionalne uslove zadovoljive jedino od strane fizičkih sistema koji imaju qualia, Ovo tvrđenje je potkrepljeno jednim primer om koji pokazuje kako neko fizičko stanje sistema može igrati veoma određenu uzročnu ulogu (funkciju) zahvaljujući svom fenomenalnom obeležju., The more recent mind-body debate depicts the problem of consciousness as a problem of the explanatory gap. Established correlations between physical brain states and particular conscious experiences may give us a strong reason to believe that one depends upon the other, but they don't in themselves give us an understanding of how the mental and the physical fit together. This paper falls into two main parts. In the first, the author outlines a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate. In the second, he defends a functionalist approach with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Namely, he argues that there are no a priori reasons against the possibility of a functionalist analysis that will characterize a set of functionalist conditions that could be satisfied only by systems with genuine qualia. This thesis is supported by an example which shows how a physical system's state could have very specific causal role (function) in virtue of its phenomenal property.", publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd", journal = "Theoria", title = "Funkcionalizam i qualia, Functionalism and qualia", pages = "26-7", number = "3", volume = "49", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_576" }
Lazović, Ž.. (2006). Funkcionalizam i qualia. in Theoria Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 49(3), 7-26. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_576
Lazović Ž. Funkcionalizam i qualia. in Theoria. 2006;49(3):7-26. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_576 .
Lazović, Živan, "Funkcionalizam i qualia" in Theoria, 49, no. 3 (2006):7-26, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_576 .