Kvajnova dilema: Naturalizam naspram empirizma i realizam naspram antirealizma

Abstract

U početnom delu predavanja bih ukratko izložila Dijem−Kvajnovu tezu o subdeterminaciji. O subdeterminaciji govorimo u onim okolnostima kada trenutno dostupni empirijski podaci ne omogućavaju da jednoj od dve suprotstavljene teorije damo prednost. U takvim slučajevima nismo u stanju da na osnovu svedočanstava odlučimo koja teorija je istinita i/ili bolja, zato što postoji mogućnost konstruisanja alternativnih podjednako uspešnih teorija. Nakon toga, izložila bih Kvajnovu dilemu, pod čime se u literaturi podrazumeva njegova nesigurnost u pogledu toga da li u slučaju subdeterminacije treba obe teorije smatrati istinitim (ekumenski odgovor) ili samo jednu od njih (sektaški odgovor). Ova dilema je značajna zbog toga što usvajanje ekumenskog odgovora predstavlja problem za Kvajnov naturalizam, dok usvajanje sektaškog protivreči njegovim empirističkim i antirealističkim shvatanjima. Kvajn se kolebao između ova dva odgovora i nije najjasnije kojem se priklonio. Planiram da izložim dva najuspešnija rešenja Kvajnove dileme, od kojih je jedno pružio Donald Dejvison, a drugo Rodžer Gibson. Dejvidson se opredelio za ekumenski odgovor, jer je smatrao da istinitost zavisi od jezika, a ne od teorija. On je ponudio rešenje prema kojem obe teorije možemo smatrati istinitim ukoliko se mogu predstaviti istim jezikom. Nasuprot njemu, Gibson pruža rešenje prema kojem se naturalizam shvata kao jedna globalna teorija koja u datom trenutku određuje šta ćemo smatrati istinom. Zbog toga što je nemoguće zastupati istovremeno više od jedne globalne teorije, Gibson smatra da je za Kvajna racionalnije da prihvati sektaški odgovor. Nakon razmatranja oba rešenja, tvrdiću da bi za Kvajna bilo racionalnije da prihvati Dejvidsonovo i to iz dva razloga. Najpre zbog toga što nam ono omogućava da očuvamo i empirizam i (u nekoj meri izmenjen) naturalizam, dok nas Gibsonovo obavezuje da se u potpunosti odreknemo empirizma. Drugi razlog je taj što smatram da je Dejvidsonov odgovor više u skladu sa savremenom filozofijom nauke, koja je mahom lišena realističkih pretpostavki.

In the initial part of the presentation, I will briefly present Diem-Quine's thesis on underdetermination. We speak of underdetermination in circumstances in which currently available empirical data does not warrant preference for one of the two opposing theories. In such cases, we are unable to decide which theory is true, and/or better, because there is a possibility of constructing alternative equally successful theories. After that, I would outline Quine's dilemma, which is understood in the literature as his uncertainty regarding whether, in the case of underdetermination, both theories should be considered true (ecumenical response) or only one of them (sectarian response). This dilemma is significant because the adoption of an ecumenical response poses a problem for Quine's naturalism while the adoption of a sectarian response contradicts his empiricist and anti-realist views. Quine vacillated between these two answers, and it was not clear which one he favored. I plan to outline the two most successful solutions to Quine's dilemma, one provided by Donald Davison and the other by Roger Gibson. Davidson opted for an ecumenical response because he believed that truth depended on language, not on theories. He offered a solution according to which we can consider both theories to be true if they can be presented in the same language. In contrast, Gibson offers a solution according to which naturalism is understood as a global theory that determines what we consider to be true. Because it is impossible to advocate more than one global theory at one time, Gibson thinks it is more rational for Quine to accept the sectarian answer. After considering both solutions, I will argue that it would be more rational for Quine to accept Davidson's solution for two reasons. First, because it allows us to preserve both empiricism and (somewhat modified) naturalism while Gibson's solution requires us to completely renounce empiricism. Another reason is that I find Davidson's answer more in line with the modern philosophy of science, which is largely devoid of realist assumptions.