Moral Autonomy and Existence of God

Abstract

The topic of this paper is the relationship between God's existence and moral autonomy. I will present an argument showing that God does not exist because moral autonomy is incompatible with his existence. In James Rachel's formulation, this argument has the following structure: 1) If God exists, he must be an object of worship. 2) No being can be the object of worship because that would entail rejecting the autonomy of the beings who worship him. Therefore, God does not exist. The backbone of the mentioned argument is the concept of worship, which is the antithesis of the concept of autonomy. According to Rachels, worship is a belief that is demonstrated through a ritual by which theists position themselves asymmetrically in relation to god by unconditionally obeying god's commands. I will analyse Robert Oakes' counterargument that attacks the second premise of the argument against god's existence based on moral autonomy. His counterargument argues that autonomy could not be violated by worshiping a god, given that God is perfectly good. While Rachels understands uncritical obedience to God's commands as a violation of autonomy, Oaks interprets worship as deontological rigidity in respecting the moral law, which actually affirms autonomy. Using Sidgwick’s analysis of Kant’s understanding of the notion of freedom, I will attempt to defend the argument against god's existence based on autonomy by showing that Oakes' counterargument is based on the fallacy of equivocation.