Skeptik može da živi svoj skepticizam

Abstract

There is a way for the Pyrrhonean skeptic to respond to the general objection that his skepticism is unlivable. First, he is forced to accept beliefs about how things appear to him. He can suspends beliefs about the matters of objective fact, but he is not able to withhold assent from just one type of beliefs, those about appearance statements. The beliefs about his appearance statements form the basis of his actions and his entire behaviour. This poses a problem for the mature Pyrrhonist, the one whose suspension of belief has seized to be an act of will. Even if he does not believe in the propositions p contained in his appearance statements 'It appears that p', there is always an element of a tendency for one to believe in p present. However, I argue, there is a sense in which the appearance statements could be interpreted as phenomenological and 'non-epistemic', and not implying any tendency to believe. The mature Pyrrhonist's actions rest on the assent to the non-epistemic appearances or impressions. His suspension of belief is, more accurately, a mental attitude permeating every aspect and every moment of his life. .