Stefan Janković[1]
Andrej Kubiček[2]
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Belgrade

BETWEEN LATENCY AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: (CON)FIGURATIONS OF THE ETHNO-NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AMONG THE BUREAUCRATIC-POLITICAL ELITE OF SERBIA[3]

Između latencije i političke mobilizacije: (kon)figuracije etno-nacionalne identifikacije među birokratsko-političkom elitom Srbije

ABSTRACT: *Paper illuminates ethno-national identifications of Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite, assuming its (con)figurative principles and diverging forms oscillate between capacities for political mobilization while simultaneously reflecting latency of social order(s). The analysis rests on the data obtained in survey of Serbia's political elite conducted in 2015, by using Bourdieu's concept of (political) field and locating these (con)figurations of ethno-national identification as expression of particular (dis)positions and social relations. Prior to the analysis, insufficiencies contained in dominant conceptualizations of identity are exposed, followed by reassessment of theories of nation and ethnicity by highlighting blurred line discontinuity between ethnos/nation has, due to processes of historical (de) politicization. The analysis first detects objective structure of Serbia's bureaucratic-political field. Through construction of scale of ethno-national valence it is shown that detected divergent degrees of ethno-national attachment correspond to structure of bureaucratic-political field, conforming the particular positions of political groups. Divergent contents of ethno-national identification among political groups are extensively analyzed and interpreted as a reflection of field-structure and capacity for political mobilization. In conclusion, it is noted that (con)figurations of ethno-national identity among Serbian bureaucratic-political elite differentiate around ethnic, but converge around etatist dimensions, reflecting the opposing conceptions of „valid" political community.*

KEY WORDS: *ethno-national identification, bureaucratic-political elite, field, latency, mobilization.*

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1   stefanjankovic87@hotmail.com

2   andrejkubichek@gmail.com

APSTRAKT: *Rad osvetljava etno-nacionalne identifikacije birokratsko-političke elite Srbije, pretpostavljajući da njeni (kon)figurativni principi i divergentne forme osciliraju između kapaciteta političke mobilizacije, istovremeno odražavajući latenciju društvenih poredaka. Analiza počiva na empirijskim podacima dobijenim u istraživanju političke elite Srbije sprovedenom 2015. godine, korišćenjem Burdijeovog koncepta (političkog) polja i lociranjem ovih (kon)figuracija etno-nacionalne identifikacije kao izraza posebnih (dis)pozicija i društvenih odnosa. Pre analize, izlažu se nedostatnosti sadržane u dominantnim konceptualizacijama identiteta, a zatim se iznova ocenjuju teorije nacije i etniciteta, isticanjem zamagljene linije diskontinuiteta između etnosa i nacije, usled procesa istorijske (de)politizacije. Analiza najpre detektuje objektivnu strukturu birokratsko-političkog polja. Konstrukcijom skale etno-nacionalne valencije, pronalazi se da divergentne etno-nacionalne identifikacije odgovaraju strukturi birokratsko-političkog polja, u skladu sa posebnim pozicijama političkih grupa. Divergentni sadržaji etno-nacionalne identifikacije među dominantnim grupama detaljno se analiziraju i tumače kao odraz specifičnog ustrojstva datog polja i kao kapacitet političke mobiizacije. Na kraju, zapaža se da se (kon)figuracije etno-nacionalnog identiteta među birokratsko-političkom elitom Srbije diferenciraju između etničke, ali i konvergiraju oko etatističke dimenzije, odražavajući suprotstavljene koncepcije „validne" političke zajednice.*

KLJUČNE REČI: *etno-nacionalna identifikacija, birokratsko-politička elita, polje, latencija, mobilizacija.*

Beyond the logic of *representativism*

By becoming academic, political and everyday *colloquialism*, identity remained caught in endless ambivalences and vagueness, serving as a mere mental test tube for collecting those tiny and diverse particles – ranging from collective groupings and actions to individual acts of (self-)representation. These ambivalences are additionally surrounded with an endorsement of what Charles Taylor denotes as *representativism* (Taylor, 2001), where identity becomes grasped as nothing more than a mere representation and nomination, thus threatening to evoke a *transparency* of social life and to make a mental concession by retaining on manifest plane of existence. Still, it seems that identity has something more to reveal about the social mechanisms which produce it and horizons it shapes. Even by primarily residing within the world of representations, associations and categorizations, identity nonetheless encompasses the problematic of recognition, sense and meaning, inevitably presenting a meaningful (cognitive) apparatus, that, as a „potent set of social arrangements" (Tilly, 2003: 608), surrounds the *practical logic*, delimits social world and thus, creates a certain *social topography*. As symbolic forms, identity and identification profoundly round up social relations and reversibly form organization of social space, encompassing *not only a simple plane of representation*, but a way of (self-)categorizing objectified in relatively stable and socially (un)acknowledged categories of (practical) validity,

established as an *expression* and *function* of (relative) position in social space (Descola, 1996; Cherni, 2001). Therefore, behind representativism, there is a peculiar logic of social mechanisms that gives particular shape and form to these (self-)representations, affiliations and affections, thus reflecting the very *latency* of orders in which they're anchored.

Accordingly, by emerging as an expression of social conformation(s), identity might help us in deciphering the very dynamics of social relations. This particularly goes for a specific form of identification and social classification of the world surrounded with an *ethno-national* portent. Against treating it as a simple cause or consequence, our aim is to investigate (con)figurations of ethno-national identification among the bureaucratic-political elite of Serbia in order to expose its particular forms and content, but interpreting them *further from a mere expression of self-classification*. Namely, we'll seek to explore these historically specific forms of ethno-national identification as a *moral projection*, assuming its degree, content, extension and definition equally indicate a projected *vision of political community* and thus, a *validated or disputed affiliating-form*. Ethno-national identifications and their (altering) shapes, more specifically, might help us in deciphering of the *latency* of political life. As being adapted to a state of (this) social conformation and reflecting its social dynamics, we presuppose its ramifications indissolubly *correspond to* and *evolve* as an expression of particular social positions and interests elite groups have. Consequently, we are seeking to examine how this particular symbolic form enmeshed in specific historical conditions, re-emerges and alters by political relations to which it is being subjugated to, exactly by creating the prospects for an effective *political mobilization*. Analysis will be performed on data obtained in the survey of Serbia's political elite conducted in 2015, by using specific theoretical model based on Bourdieu's concept of (political) field (Bourdieu, 1991) in rather *heterological* manner: through a set of positions emerging as an objective assemblage consisting in appropriation of differentiated bureaucratic mechanisms and delegated authorities, their group, party, and thus, culturally-particular constituents, mediated by divergent habituses, assuming they profoundly shape the ethno-national identifications. Prior to the analysis, we will first expose the insufficiencies contained in dominant conceptualizations of identity in order to emphasize the character of *moral reciprocity* that substantially underlines it, as well reassess theories of nation and ethnicity by highlighting the blurred line discontinuity between ethnos and nation has, due to processes of *historical (de)politicization*.

Locating identity:
a geography of social statuses and functions

Recent conceptual turns have located identity within vocabulary of *new neoliberal vulgate*, embroiling it with other euphemisms of (postmodern) academic jargon that only have an appearance of scientific reason while actually concealing their political grounding. These (conceptual) transformations, still,

indicate fundamental ideas about the world which identity became subordinated to. While they emerge from logical and metaphysical questions that dissociated identity from the classical sense of term linked to entities' sameness now confronted with the logic of volatility and *difference* (Ricouer, 1991; Wittgenstein, 1922; Deleuze, 1994; Jenkins, 2008), the story begins with linking these ontological and epistemological problems with the self, *ipseity* and personal identity. This upheaval has severely burdened the concept of identity with the problematic of (symbolic) representations and recognition, ethical-aesthetic (dis)qualifications and their subjective variations emerging on political horizons of modern (western) countries. By responding to demands overwhelming the markets of academic and political products with so-called „identity politics” (Calhoun, 1994; Fuss, 1995; Dunn, 2007; Jenkins, 2008; Nicholson, 2008), concept of identity thus became gradually surrounded with cultural mysticism – *inter alia* leading some authors to pessimistic conclusions about its analytical uselessness (Kaufmann, 2011; Brubaker, Cooper, 2000; Brubaker, 2004), and even ideological and „manipulative” character it evokes (Malešević, 2006) – thus reflecting particular problematic (of expressiveness and differences), inscribed in the *new political eschatology*.[4]

Tensions besetting the concept of identity and eventually provoking endless ambivalences and vagueness, still, have been primarily initiated with the reprobation of *realistic hypostatizing* identity was surrounded within *essentialism*. What eventually appeared as problematic with essentialism was the setting of identity *prescriptively*, in a manner of relatively stable and immutable form of symbolizing, thus outside the methodical questioning of its (trans) formative frames and principles and means historically shaping it (Brubaker, Cooper, 2000; Brubaker, 2004; Lloyd, 2005; Dunn, 2007). Identity gradually became troublesome and submitted to an unpleasant (intellectual) accusations for *essentialism*, naturalization and renewal of nature/culture dualism (Markova, 2007; Nicholson, 2008; Hall, 2005; Lloyd, 2005; Somers, 1994; Calhoun, 1994; Dunn, 2007), that are, as a reflection of particular *diacrysis* of categorization, being refuted by (nowadays prevailing) *constructivist* theories of identity.

Although diverse, constructivist approaches are centered *against the datum of identity* which outcomes from the pursuit to overcome old metaphysical learning of identity as unity, in favor of subjective oscillations (of meaning). Still, besides saturating the concept of identity with spectacularism and hollow mystification of difference, „multiplicity” and „fluidity” – now seen as opposed to (continuous) homogeneity and unity that gradually started flooding textbooks, constructivism smuggled numerous problems concerning its *formation* and

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4   *Epistemo-politically*, conceptual binding with "politics of identity" evoked particular experiences and ethnocentric views that deeply reflect the issues of political representation, mobilization and activism, present from the 1960s in the Western countries (Nicholson, 2008; Jenkins, 2008). Still, what is set behind this vision resembling "postmodernist bourgeois liberalism" Richard Rorty exquisitely recognized (Rorty, 1983), is nothing else than a "transplanting" effect of particular problems designed as academic ones, hypostatized through a normative-evaluative matrix which becomes a measurement value for political (un)successfulness in adoption of *cultural pluralism* inside the assumed *political eschatology*.

manifestation, as well as *form* and *content*. Dubiousness starts with conceiving of identity-formation in rather *reactive* and *adaptive* manner, either through lens of *histori(ci)sm*, where identity emerges as a response to „ontological uncertainty" and challenges initiated by an overall, societal logic (Bauman, 2007; Giddens, 1991; Castells, 2010; Featherstone, 1995; Wetherell, 2009),[5] or as a *situational adaptation*, emerging from individual mastery of self-representation (Kaufmann, 2011; Kofman, 2010; Sommers, 2008; White, 2008).[6] But what first catches the eye is a *radical nominalism*, as the horizons of *formation* and *manifestation* of identity are primarily grasped as the re-location within an abstract space of discursive formations, respectively, termination of meaning imposed by and inscribed with *regulatory regimes* (Butler, 1999; Hall, 2005, Fuss, 1990). Shaped through the (de)constructive break with totalizing *signification* and in behoof of ontological dissolution, identity became *exclusively* associated with *self-representation* emerging through the key *form* of mediation: *discourse* and *narrative*. Still, individual investment in discursive and narrative shaping of identity, as its key *form* and *content*, reflects the questionable constructivist privileging of (choice and) individual processing (through reflexivity) (Giddens, 1991; Kaufmann, 2011; Kofman, 2010; Ricouer, 1991; Somers, 1994; Zeman, 2007; Brockmeier, Carbaugh, 2001). Moreover, this aggressive insistence on decomposition directed by intentionality of subjective oscillation (Jenkins, 2008), has not only locked identity on the plane of *inscriptive* vs. *reactive* manifestation where it gets sparked only negatively – in the form of *exclusion* (Butler, 1999). It has simultaneously resolved identity from social constrains and social grounds, as well as social mechanisms to which it is submitted.

As much as essentialism pulls into the trap of naturalization, by deabsolutizing the (giveness of) identity constructivist alternative ends up eliminating exactly the *effectiveness* it has in *practical affairs*. Further from being solely a *mechanism of (self-)representation,* in its multiple forms (discourses, representations, perceptual and cognitive schemes that are materially rounded) identity as also presents a principal form of world-designing, *functioning* as a mean for (cognitive and affective) *signification* and *comprehension*, that is, *identification* (Jenkins,

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5   The latter set of theories (Bauman, 2007; Castells, 2010; Cherni 2001; Giddens, 1991; Kaufmann, 2011; Kaufman, 2010) relies on historicist generalization of identity (formation) as a response to an overall societal logic (of (post)modernity and globalization). Although the value of these positions stimulates observation of (psychological) responses to the transformation of social relations that are (like Habermas' idea of *Lebenswelt*'s colonization (Habermas, 2012)) set as (ontological) construction of certainty and quest for meaning, they are based upon fictitious generalization of (particular) logic and inherent "resistance". Again, greatest illusion found here is that identity is an inherently "modern phenomenon", which, according to the postulated capacity of *naturalized* reception and reaction, owns generality but rather, as Nicholson's recognizes, effects of denaturalization of identification-categories that became questionable under complex epistemo-political turnovers emerging in 20th century symbolic struggles (Nicholson, 2008).

6   These approaches (Brockmeier, Carbaugh, 2001; Kaufmann, 2011; Kofman, 2010; Sommers, 2008; White, 2008) also introduce a problematic teleology in identity-construction, deposited on *inherent intentionality* aimed at "control of insecurity" emerging from locating oneself into a communicative-interactive network of identities. Identity, thus, emerges as an almost perfectly naturalized capability of adaptation to *re-present oneself*, but nonetheless, through a calculative weighing aimed at maximization.

2008; Cote, Levine, 2002), i.e. not only how the actors and groups nominate themselves, but also, how the identify the world around them. Moreover, made through implicit procedures (Descola, 1996; Campbell, Rew, 1999; Jenkins, 2008; Cote, Levine, 2002) (and amended) in the game of receptivity and aversion, identity reveals a permanent (re)composition of social orders, by emerging as an *integral continuum* between (current) *social positions* and *ideas* surrounding this symbolic tool for (collective) (self-)classification and world-designing (Cherni, 2001). This is why identity – against the old ambivalences besetting the „problem" of identity – particularly of unity and difference (Ricouer, 1991, Fuss, 1995) constructivists further extended, consequentially reflects the *latency* of social relations to which it is constituent and expresses their variations and (a) symmetries of power.

But the core of identity and identification is indissolubly grounded in processes, acts and justified meanings and *beliefs in validity* surrounding it, that – as a tool (self-)classification, reciprocally compound the social world. As Charles Taylor points out, identity is *far more than a mere nomination and representation*, as it is „defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose" (Taylor, 2001: 27). Taylor insofar insists on identity as a spiritual orientation which is nothing else but a *qualitative distinction*. Moral and even aesthetic (dis)qualifications thus become the focal point of identity. Taylor assumes a *symbiotic attachment*, according to which (self-)identification closely corresponds to the *belief* in the validity. However, the identity is *by no means* a solitary act. Although a source of meaning, *contrary to uniform subjectivist views* (as well as the simple system of structural oppositions), Taylor points out that identity could be determined *only in the set of (social) relations* and by orientation towards the *moral space* and the moral character of the action, which opens on this horizon. Insofar, the axes of identifications echo its socio-historical constituencies, while the self-understanding of identity results from the (validated) possibility of (re)cognition (ibid).

Social space thus represents a „geography of social statuses and functions" (ibid: 35) designed primarily through *principal forms of identity and identification*, that, by implying a *moral validity* and *reciprocity* embodied in collective (self-) representation, emerge as an *expression* of social relations. Again, identity does not only (linearly) follow the effects of (group-making) power and categorization of subjects through imposition/acceptance (Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1999). Contrary, virtual and actual (Goffman, 1965) aspects of *identification* accompany the practical affairs as moral outlooks threaded through (*naturalized* and *implicit*) belief in validity of these operations. Therefore, the struggles concerning identity – as a *form of classifying self and objects* in the social world – often pursued in language of moral and aesthetic (dis)qualifications, is not only a result of the disparity of social power. It also comes as a *reciprocity* that provides a *sense* of affirmation, confirmation as well as obligations it entails, which are produced from the (particular) perspective of *social position*. Comprehended in this way, identity might expose the specific *latency* of social orders, as the ones ensembled on ethno-national grounds: a key interest of our paper.

Identification in (trans)formative key:
a *politicization* of ethno-national

By being caught in variability of representations determined by certain dynamics of social relations while simultaneously determining them in the manner of an autonomous force, this peculiar sorting of social world contained in ethno-national identification, presents a complex object of study. In first place, examining this kind of identity appears as highly sensitive to (de)valorizing interests that particularly follow the lines of social conflicts on the political horizons (of states) (Bilig, 1995), as their historical assemblage resembles status-like *hierarchy of prestige* (Weber, 1978, I). Confusion in the most of research about ethnicity and nations is further extended with the acceptance of naïve logic of *representativism*, incapable of acknowledging anything outside explicit and manifested, as it rests primarily on registering only elementary nominations of groups and banal (self)identification, that suddenly finds its way to an effective political mobilization – exactly in the manner which Brubaker describes as illusory logic of „groupism" (Brubaker, 2004; 2015). Still, the core weakness dominant theories of ethnicity and nations (Smith, 1986; 1991; 2008; 2009; Gellner 1983; Hroch 1985; Anderson, 1991; Malešević, 2004; 2006) remain locked within the (de)valorizing activity that relies on the establishment of *historicist* lines of (dis)continuity between ethnic/national, instead of their *(trans)formative intertwining* found in practical conduct in social world and properties that have as *identification categories* which, in diverging (historical) varieties, becomes a force of *(de)politicization*, and thus of (re)composing the social world.

Emanation of these problems is particularly visible in the gap between ethnic and national. Different ways of interpreting the national are often conducted by construction of ideal types of *civic* and *ethnic nationalism*. This division is somewhat related to the differences between two most respected theoretical traditions in the studies of ethnicity: *modernism* and *ethno-symbolism*. Nationalism, which *diminishes identification with ethnic sentiments*, in the first model is interpreted largely as a part of economic and social processes. Seen from this perspective, modern, civil state and nationalism are intrinsically linked. Civic nationalism is considered as a strong integrative force that swept feudal and other differences and united the bourgeoisie, legitimating its control over the state, as diverging (ethnic) groups are (now) unified through a common official language, equal rights and obligations, and through developed division of labor that requires standardized competencies of the labor force, the army and administration (Gellner 1983; Hroch 1985; Anderson, 1991: Gorski, 2000). *Ethno-symbolism*, on the other hand, gives a *chronological* and *ontological priority to ethnic sentiments*, believing that common symbols, discourses and feelings somehow precede the nation, by which it essentially can be determined, although it generally recognizes a significant difference between pre-modern and modern ethnic ties. In this model, nationalism is interpreted as a set of binding and pre-reflexive norms, and as a closed system of beliefs that distinguishes compatriots and strangers, and ethnicity as an externally imputed and unchanging. Ethnicity

is an imposed vision of solidarity which, although significantly altered, survives in modern era (Smith, 1983; 1986; 1991; 2008).

Seductive as it might appear – by seemingly drawing the precise coordinates for *classifying* the lines of historical (dis)continuities, division of civic and ethnic nationalism presents only the *ethnocentric projection*, that censors consideration of *(trans)formative basis* these *means of identification* acquire in conflicting processes of shaping the political community different groups take.[7] Nation is not only a free community of „historical destiny” and „proclaimed equality” (Friedman, 1994; Campbell, Rew, 1999), but also of the common moral norms and sentiments that draw their legitimacy from *either identifying particular qualities of ethnos as valid* or *false*, or *making sense of belonging permanent through recalling of „national” symbols*. If the first case was correct, it would be very difficult to explain how the ethno-national identity survived until today, and more importantly, how it influenced actions of its followers, as Norbert Elias stresses in *The Germans* (Elias, 1997). Elias also adds that national affection represents those same emotions one feels towards close people, only carried to the symbolic and abstract contents (Elias, 2007), as every nationalist discourse may display certain political community from the past as essentially „ethnic” one (state of Nemanjić dynasty as „a state of Serbian people „). Remembering of real or fictional fate is just one of the many factors that can become the basis for national sentiment and identification – whether it adjusts to ethnic sentiments or diminishes them through the process of *(de)politicization*, similarly converted into deontological demands that imply sentimental content of emotion and faith, thus, *gaining the same character of belief as an „ethnic” attachment*.

As *nationalism* – even if not originating directly from particular *ethnos, cannot be dissociated from multiple relations it establishes with ethnos*, particularly, its *historical ordering and sorting*, mostly related to etatistic transformation, *neither ethnic group makes much sense without associated nationalism*. Following Weber, it might be assumed that „ethnic membership [Ger. *Gemeinsamkeit*] does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind” (Weber, 1978, I: 389), and in particular, of the *political community*. He rightly emphasizes that there are no *essential* or *trans-historical properties* of ethno-national groups, but that „almost any kind of similarity or contrast of physical type and of habits can induce the *belief that affinity or disaffinity exists* between groups that attract or repel each other” (ibid: 388, *emphasis added*). So, although ethnicity is often presented as a historical precursor of national and core of its sentiment for

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7   What this dualism (which Eastern European intellectuals were so eager to uncritically engulf in past quarter of century) imputes, is an easy-going bourgeois apologia, where the westernized conception of civic nation(alism) - by consecrating the hollow individualism (of choice) and category of citizenry (Friedman, 1994), creates a fictively unified political horizon and clearly distinguishes it from an "uncivilized" ethnos. Particular hypocrisy this dualism hides - itself being a political act that establishes social order in accordance with specific *class affinities*, is that historical processes of converting or suspending the "ethnical" differences, was never truly absorbed as they continued their existence and brutal hierarchization in various social spheres (as it goes for multiple de-privileging of Afro-Americans). Still, this constant redefining of "ethnic" cannot be articulated outside the "national".

political association, it should be noted that very core of *ethnos* and ethnicities is constantly being *(re)defined* by national (and nationalistic) world-views, constructs, identities and through *political associations and community* – whether by making its core or being contrasted to it. Ethnicity and „ethnic characteristics" can exist as an ethnological *objectivity* (language, set of customs, way of dressing, eating, etc.) – internalized and subjectively identified as the basis of communion, but the key question is how it is shaped within political community and whether this ethnic identity – as is in modern societies, becomes a political force and phenomenon that blends into everyday life? Even the process of *politicization* of such cultural characteristics and formations (previously) perceived as „ethnic" is neither simple nor linear (Friedman, 1994; Campbell, Rew, 1999), it substantially becomes determined by the *problematic of coexistence* within political association, both internally and externally.

Against conceptual misunderstanding originating from their separation, ethnic and national are substantially related, mutually dependant and reversibly associated categories of identification, reflected as a prism that compounds *particular sorting and ordering the social world* in *accordance with the moral projection*, and thus, *interests of particular group*. Thus a major form of their intertwining might be found not in mutually exclusive dualism between „ethnic" and „civic" nationalism, but more closely in conflation and embroidering of „ethnic" elements into etatistic conceptions, that – through *particular (de) politicization*, creates a diverging framework, i.e. *internal and external ordering principles of a „national", political community*. For these reasons, the issue of *trans-substantiation* of ethno-national is especially important on the level of *production of group self-identification* and moral qualifications contained within it, as it reflects the valid composition of political communities.

Therefore, the porosity of ethnic and national boundaries primarily results from *historical (de)politicization* of various (symbolic and material) elements within *differentiated* social relations (political, economic, cultural), that compound *current* and *particular* forms and contents of ethno-national identification. Having the same traits as every ordering principle of social domain Descola detects, ethno-national identifications similarly function as *moral qualifications* that indicate the valid (in)compatibility „between bodily substances and between discrete elements defining the ascription and transmission of rights and identity" (Descola, 1996: 87). Thus, the *genuine question is* how ethnic affection and national habitus, through various figurations (Elias, 1997; 2001), actually conform the *perspectives of particular social groups* concerning *the valid shape of political community and its structure*. These transformations, of course, are of particular *relevancy for* the (political) *horizon of the state* through struggles within the political field and the prospects of *effective mobilization*. To interpret the ethno-national identification and its variations among the bureaucratic-political elite of Serbia, thus, means considering it as a *latency* of social relations, where the (trans)formations of *ethno-national* comes as a capacity of political mobilization and potential resource in political struggles, as well as reciprocal moral obligation perceived as valid.

The field of *political* production: situating the ethno-national (con)figurations of bureaucratic-political elite

Beyond a mere verbal association and nomination, ethno-national identification echoes a totality of social orders and figurations in which the conditions of its (discursive) re-constituting and effectiveness are anchored into. Namely, as much as the genesis of perspectives and divisions underlining the *ethno-national habitus* owes to history, its (class) ramifications and segmentations that produce heterogeneity are (temporary) products of social struggles revolving around the *defining of variations of ethno-national*, as a mean of (moral) categorization of social world – one Durkheim clearly recognized as a group commitment and its desirable shape (Dirkem, 2007; Durkheim, 1992). Our quest for moduses and principles of shaping the ethno-national identification of Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite, thus, has to be located within specific *ensemble of social relations* and *micro-versums* – in this case, the political one. Such a venture somewhat entails centering within Bourdieu's theory (of field) of political representation.

Pursuant to a whole of his work and epistemological assumptions he undertakes, Bourdieu's theory of political field (primarily offered in *Language and Symbolic Power*) (Bourdieu, 1991) rests neither on the overstatement of *general societal* logic and the manageability of things through social immanence, nor on *substantialist individualism*. Contrary, it implies ontological primacy of relations where the rest of his analytical apparatus – delineated with concepts of body, habitus, capital, and to a lesser extent, practice is conjoined in inter-dependency (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 1991; 2000; 2014). Political field, thus, encompasses a „microcosm" of differentiated social relations emerging as a result of a particular history that bequeaths it with a relative degree of autonomy and specific logic. Insofar, Bourdieu follows Weber's line of thought which rests upon detection of external and internal conditions of politics, manifested in *professionalization* and the advent of specialized producers (Weber, 1994, Weber, 1978, II), who deprive *many* for the production of *discourses* and *representations* of the social world, on the basis of belief in their *legitimacy* (Bourdieu, 1994; 2005; 2014). Realizing the political field as a field of forces that determine the *mode of production of political representation* (due to which it is always in relation with an, although differentiated, external necessity of correspondence with the represented), Bourdieu (indirectly) assumes an unequal distribution of instruments of political production and seeks to recognize how the „abdication" of rights in favor of *delegation* is performed, despite the (tacitly taken) socio-economic and cultural differences.

Dynamics and specific logic of political field – particularly the one setting the principles of production and given products (discourses) in the form of (mutually) conflicting, still, (inter)changeable (op)positions, antagonisms and differences, is possible to be grasped only within relational modus of thinking. Representative institutions (such parties are), particularly characterize these differences which, by being taken as logical, appear simultaneously in *mental* and

objective sense. Centering of this dynamics occurs regarding the*(re)distribution* of political capital, as one of the forms of *symbolic capital* which insofar forms an *objective structure* of field and particular form of power. Established on (previous) recognition and other various strategies and operations (such are „informal networks", conversions of material and symbolic gains into a political positions) that enable the disposal of political representation, objectivation of *political capital* is primarily immaterial and delegatory, arising from subjective acts of recognition and their existence through representations and identifications – belief, trust and obedience. Imminently linked to a *justification of social existence* of a given group (Bourdieu, 1991; 2005; 2014; Wacquant, 2005a; 2005b) – whether it's professional, status, ethno-national etc, these symbolic products rounded with particular *moral principles of identification* guarantee a basic sustenance in the field.

Inasmuch, even if monopolization of political production encompasses different, historically established techniques and strategies of acquisition and conservation of political power, Bourdieu nonetheless, escapes from a vulgar and conspiratorial conception of political world by reciprocally linking its constitution with the external demands. Counterbalance to (internal) antagonism of political actors, thus is found in an essential dependence on *external mobilization*. Thereby, (produced) discourse isn't exclusively subject to internal characteristics, but also on the *extent of its (external) recognition and demands* – primarily measured by the degree of *mobilizing-power* (i.e. number of support). Ideas become a political movement only when recognized – either tacitly or explicitly – outside the circle of professionals through *mobilization* as well a certain form of *reciprocity*, *necessities* and *pressures* emerging from the entire social conformation. This dynamics converges external with the internal field dynamics (arranged through a structure of (dis)positions and position-takings), thus absorbing a type of radicalism that operates (only) as (self-)exclusionary, because the *survival* and *participation* in the field essentially depends on a certain *degree of adaptation*, ensured by external diffusion of ideas. Bourdieu locates these practices in between two opposed modes of convergence. On the one side, *diffuse principle* is specifically enshrined in those practices that lean towards *realpolitik*, while the *radical principle* favors originality and authenticity of ideas. This intermediation is at the center of the very dynamics of field for Bourdieu, and it is expressed through specific political stance or „position-taking" (puritanism, vanguard etc.), streamed into words and presented through slogans and *principal forms of identification*, which in effect produce and imply „di-visions" of social world, and consequentially, found the social order (Bourdieu, 1991).

Thus, the *theory of political representation* contains several important segments, lodged deeply relationally. First, political representation is hereby set at a plane of specific production and within the matrix of specific relations. Under the general proposition of Bourdieu's field theory, they get caught in the oscillation between *autonomy* – where the relations and practices (of discourse production) follow an inherent logic and *heteronomy*, where they become subordinated to the diversity of (external) requirements, interests and resources. Bourdieu thus

leaves a wide degree of theoretical variability, as politics becomes understood not only as a simple reflection of social forces (such as submission to economic interests or the interests of „ruling class"),[8] but first as an effect of internal forces and then by the degree of *reciprocity* acquired through external recognition. Still, what Bourdieu sets as dynamics of the web of social relations within the field, could be found inside the *triad* of *positions*, *dispositions* and *position-takings*. In short, while *positions*, determined by a specified level of (validated) capital produce an *objective configuration* of field, *dispositions*, mediated by habitus, form the basis of *subjective*, durable and transmittable set of categories of understanding and identification. Together, these two segments establish *position-takings* – a specific mode of production within the field, i.e., the transformation of material and symbolic resources – in case of political field, programs, manifestoes, discourses and identities utilized not only to locate (oneself) within the field (in the sense of double determination related to the external recognition), but to re-create „inputs" – *identifiable* symbolic forms that categorize social world (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 2000; 2005; 2014).

However, struggles emerging in the political field cannot be grasped as a world of *self-sufficient fetishism*, but rather as aiming for objectified disposal of *(symbolic and material) coercion of the state*. What Bourdieu omits is a primary legitimacy of political authority, as the temporal political constellations are revolved around an ultimate fetishism – bureaucratic field of the state as an (seemingly unquestionable) authority, recognized as an almost supreme object of *political appropriation*. Thus, series of operations guaranteeing the legitimacy to political delegation and representation are imminently bind to disposal of bureaucratic authority and accessing institutions of *legitimate politics* and this particular *intertwining embodied in bureaucratic-political field*. They are imminently linked to ethno-national *identification*, which emerges not only as a historically constituted pattern for drawing the *symbolic, legitimate boundaries* of bureaucratic-political fields. More substantially, being a *classification* and *sorting* circumscribed in the set of *(dis)affinities* groups have to each other, thus defining the „valid" shapes and principles of exchange in particular social relation, it functions as one of major forms of *political ordering*.

Therefore, a vision inscribed in ethno-national identification might help us deciphering differentiated of political ordering elite-groups assume as valid. Our *initial hypothesis* is that ethno-national identifications represent and reveal the *valid conceptions of political community* various political groups tacitly accept in a *manner of position-taking*, as well that diverging forms and content *exactly correspond to the very structures of power* constitutive to Serbia's bureaucratic-political field. In that sense, it appears as necessary first to delineate *the overall structure of the field*, by detecting the dispersion of political and bureaucratic capital, seen as an appropriation of *hierarchically set of positions* in *different*

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8   By no means radically displaced from social relations and interconnections with other fields, (relative) autonomy rests on supremacy of particular *nomos*, due to which, as Bourdieu himself points out, politicians aren't simply "puppets" of capital, neither the politics is an epiphenomenon of socio-economic forces (Bourdieu, 1991).

bureaucratic and institutions of political representation, in order to detect the key groups and oppositions. Afterwards, we will construct a *scale of ethno-national valence* by synthesizing 5 empirical statements measured with five-point Likert's scale, in order to examine (through a *post hoc* interpretation) an (in)direct „anchor in common symbols" (Elias, 2007: 116) and understanding of *boundaries* and *characterization* of ethno-national relations, as specific set of social relations which acquires particular *affective* and *cognitive* connection, and to briefly allocate the groups according to the particular position-takings they have on this scale. Afterwards, we will try to trace *dispositional schemes* that produce differences regarding ethno-national identification, by tracing the *class conditions inscribed in diverging habituses* of political actors. Still, we *assume* that its varying and opposing shapes, primarily come not from external (class) conditions, but from adaptations of dispositions within the field, *supposing ethno-national identifications emerge and reveal the latency* of social orders. We will subsequently offer an explanation why *the diverging forms of ethno-national identification* substantially *reflect* the conformation of power-relations among Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite, through analysis of the vision inscribed in empirical statements they endorse or oppose, assuming its temporal shapes present an ability to take *advantage* of similarities and extract *political mobilization* – thus becoming a *resource* which happens to be utilized and somehow *altered* by the states and dynamics of field– in other words, *(de)politicized*. Finally, we will extract two major and opposing conceptions that underline the particular ethno-national identifications among elite groups – one privileging the „ethnic" and other privileging „etatistic" view. In conclusion we will seek to address these findings by answering why these particular forms of ethno-national identification somehow conform not only an internal structure of bureaucratic-political field – being a possibility to extract political mobilization, but also the particular class affinities they subsume.

Bureaucratic-political elite of Serbia and (con)figurations of ethno-national identifications

The world of politics rests upon a complex plexus of relations, simultaneously including systems of validation/legitimation of (political) authority, but first, a network of (mutually dependant) (op)positions and external dependencies. Even initial insight into components and structure of ethno-national identification among Serbia's *bureaucratic-political elite* – as a mean of *position-taking* encapsulated with discourses and representations of social world and thus, set as a mediation of *(dis)positions*, reveals the very latency of social order(s). This, however, provokes unraveling of (trans)formative matrix where that ethno-national *to be* is being (con)figured.

Structure of Serbia's bureaucratic-political field, organized according to differential principles of (political) *capital accumulation* and the systems of validation, extends over several fundamental spheres where the – *hierarchically* and *inter-dependently* – installed authorities and institutions through which

primarily the *objective disposal* of bureaucratic mechanisms of coercion and legitimate *political representation* takes place.[9] *Primary accumulation principle* of bureaucratic capital comes from appropriation and distribution of positions („functions"), which seemingly takes place (only) through elections as they only mediate in a series of operations that culminate in tenures.[10] Again, this principle yields the dominant redistribution of *bureaucratic-political capital* and exactly 88% of positions (of respondents in our research) in different bureaucratic authorities – primarily in the institutions of representation (republic and provincial assemblies), government and local authorities originate from delegation of political groups (parties) and establishment of *dominant*

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9   Data obtained from the survey of political elites in Serbia conducted in 2015 by the research team of Institute of Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy - Belgrade, based on *nationally-representative* sample of 192 actors occupying key positions in state's executive and regulatory bodies, as well in institutions of political representation – ranging from government officials (12.0%), national, provincial and local MP's (67.2%), local representatives of major cities, judges, state's regulatory-bodies officials and high-ranking party officials.

10   Oblivion of process logic and permeations social life implies, takes sociology in compliance with paradoxical world of appearances and reduction to a manifest plane, which together blur the logic of domination, hiding behind the instruments of knowledge and construction of reality. Thus, giving the primacy to *logic of event* - in this case the elections, leaves an entire system of disposal of political representations unexplained and conceded to noise, often presented as a symphony, of so-called political analysis of "democratization" or "democratic consolidation". This noise prevents asking questions about constituencies of politics and political thought, as much as it leads to inevitable mystification and substantial de-politicization concealed with ethics - common for every mythological characterization of democratic religions, thus excluding a complex network of (class) relations that stand at the core of their constitution. Dressed as a bourgeois *apologia*, it culminates in consecration of the institution of "choice" - deposited on the idea of possibility for (equal) "expression of interest", supported by illusory assumption of belief in its consensual acceptance. Not otherwise, it comes from work of contemporary *literati* equipped with infrastructure for reading of "election results", "fluctuations", "democratic culture" and the like. Hidden behind a mask of scientific reason, these actors of legitimation are deeply committed to drawing the valid lines of space/time divisions, and first and foremost, valid forms of practice, when talking about the termination of "authoritarian democracy" and establishment of "electoral democracy", giving almost normative instructions for "free and fair elections", or discussing the substantive features of "left" and "right" etc. Historical work of these "intermediaries" irresistibly resembles the position of prophets Weber recognizes in entire hierocracy. Originating from the lower and middle classes and being placed between priests - who have fixed doctrines and layman - deprived for knowledge of these doctrines (Veber, 2015), these intermediaries present themselves as the bearers of the discovery of salvation by insisting on responsibility (elections) and fetishization of intellectual problems, apart from (empirical) perception of political problems. However, mediative forces placed between the (final) allocation of positions are far more complex, and indicate series of tacit and explicit operations and interpenetration with other structures, such as intra-party constituents, accumulation of reputation, prestige, influence, all the way to external demands of "large capital" and what Weber called "interest in subjection" (Weber, 1994) - which refers to (tacit) expectation of material and symbolic compensation for personal investment in the institution, as a collective force shaped through demands and expectations of the party clerks. Thus, the data we obtained show that only 41.2% of positions in the field is (for the first time) "filled" between the last two "election years" (2012 and 2014) - and mostly among Progressive Party, suggesting differentiated strategies that are being implemented in retaining and reconversion of (political) capital.

representation. Although quantitatively underrepresented, *secondary principle* of selection reflects a specific logic of state reason and rationalization, so 12% of positions covered by sample are being constituted mainly by (middle-class) logic of possession of competencies – what applies to juridical sphere, and to a lesser extent, in executive and regulatory bodies.[11]

Dominant form of representation, arising from ascendancy over the key institutions of political representation (the National Assembly) and a number of other authorities, allows *direct access* to state monopolies to a multitude of actors and groups – (currently) „ruling parties" (Progressive Party – SNS, Socialist Party of Serbia – SPS, etc.), in a coalition at the republic level. This group, formed by association of secondary ones, insofar occupies a third of the sample and their concentration is most visible in those positions that provide direct control of state monopolies and thus, guarantee domination in the bureaucratic-political field. However, access to mechanisms of production of *legitimate politics* also includes those who are colloquially called *opposition*. Respectively, members of these parties (Democratic Party – DS, Social Democrats – SDS, Democratic Party of Serbia – DSS, etc.), compose a less than a third of the sample, representing the parliamentary minority or holding some of the local/regional authorities under control. Although (spatial) hierarchy of authorities implies certain dispersion and mediations,[12] overall structure of the field is composed exactly through objective and *hierarchical* positioning, showing the *scale* and *degree* of social power among dominant groups: the *ones holding the levers of state authority and political representation* („parties-in-power"), from *those (only) disposing with means of legitimate political representation* („opposition"), as well from an *echelon of state appointees* („bureaucratic professionals").

Differential positioning within the (objective) structure of bureaucratic-political field becomes substantially reflected in conceptions of ethno-national identification. What a construction of a five-degree *scale of ethno-national valence* synthesizing different evaluations of ethno-national ordering reveals,[13]are the key

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11 For the holders of judicial authority (a total of 4.1% in sample) logic of competence sets as primary; some holders of executive (ministers, state secretaries and mayors) and regulatory authority also owe their tenures to logic that deviates from the dominant redistribution of political capital (elections). However, tenures of the latter primarily come *ex post facto*, resulting from the establishment of dominant representation and monopoly over disposing the tenures dominant group has.

12 So the other, oppositional group(s) - except taking a position in the institutions of representation (Assembly), have a relative dominance at regional level (Parliament of AP Vojvodina).

13 *Scale of ethno-national valence* encompasses following statements, measured by five item Likert's scale: 1) "The survival of our people is the main task of every individual"; 2) "The common origin of our people is the basis of the trust";,3)"National mixed marriages must be more unstable than other marriages"; 4)"The man may feel completely safe only when living in an environment where the majority are members of his own nation"; 5) "Cooperation might be established among the nations, but not a complete trust". Designed with high reliability (Cronbach's α = 0.756), these were transformed into five-point scale, moving from positive poles, respectively, from the highest levels of ethno-national valence that concentrate accepting of particular value of ethno-national exclusivity, ranging from "ethnicization" to seclusion of political community, to lowest degree of ethnic attachment, signifying the repulsion of those beliefs. Quantitative variations of these connections are determined by the position in bureaucratic-political field – seen as an *interval*

(al)locating-modes of Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite in (this) *(mental) space* shaped through affective and cognitive (un)recognizing of identity significance and ethno-national (dis)qualification. Degree of variations found on *scale of ethno-national valence* is being reflected, as statistically significant differences (p=.000), not only through antinomy parties-in-power (61.1%) – opposition (26.8%). Also a division within opposition on „ethnic" (DSS, SDA etc.) (6.3%) and „a-ethnic" (DS, SDS, LSV) (20.5%) is found, along with seclusion of bureaucratic professionals (12.1%). Degree of ethno-national valence insofar corresponds to the *variable defining* position actors and groups are taking in objective structure of the field, seen through relatively strong correlation (r = 0.445), and ranging from *powerful* and *strong* to a *weak* or an *absence* of attachment, as we move from ethnic opposition, across parties-in-power, to a-ethnic opposition. Although the positioning on this scale is mostly moderate („*unspecified* ethno-national valence"), differences are becoming visible on the axis of *power-opposition*, where in the case of the parties-in-power, almost 40% of them shows either strong or powerful degree of ethno-national valence (towards their own ethnic group, predominantly Serbs), contrary to a-ethnic opposition, among whom – if it is not about ambiguity (29.0%), there is a predominant absence of an ethnic attachment (***Figure 1***).


Figure 1. Positioning of bureaucratic/political elite
on a scale of ethno-national valence.

Schematization shown presents a ***correspondence analysis*** of two-dimensional space, where *horizontal axe* presents a hierarchical ordering between positions within the bureaucratic field (measured by a degree of acquired political capital enabling disposal over state authority and political representation and transformed into interval

scale measuring disposal of means of bureaucratic-political production, which appears to be the best predictor of varieties of ethno-national identification (R = 0.427) – far more than other tested, such as age, education, geographic determinants, or class origin/position.

scale), while the *vertical one* encompasses degree of ethno-national (self-)identification. Among the four bureaucratic-political echelons, there are evident distances pursuant to position-takings regarding the object as ethno-national identification is. Showing the relatively *strong* to *powerful* attachment, the parties-in-power and ethnic opposition are being more prone to *politicize* and „ethnicize" the national as a *valid form of categorization* of the social world – by recalling the particular exclusivity of „common origin" and being more suspicious on the possibilities of ethno-national convergence. Contrary, a-ethnic opposition and bureaucratic professionals demonstrate a *weak* or *absent attachment*, *identifying* the *ethno-national* more inclusively and without particular personal affection. Again, this difference requires detection of *qualitative distinctions* that goes a step beyond the rudimentary registration of correlation to an illumination of how specific shape and form of ethno-national identity looks like. Latter task, on the other hand, initially provokes a search for a (trans)formative matrix from which such a structure of ethno-national identification stems, as the world of representations (as symbolic products) and affections insofar cannot be taken independently from social conformation, or more precisely, mediations embodied through *habitus*, reversibly constituted in specific social conditions.

As a *dispositional scheme* of affective attachment and principles of perception and categorization, occurring as a result of *practical adaptation to formative conditions and limitations*, habitus insofar involves a collective (class) harmonization, but also a social divergence. Adaptations molding the habitus come primarily from an enmeshing in *class trajectory* comprehended as an internal agreement among specific positions (occupations) in their succession. Class trajectory of bureaucrats/politicians insofar indicates that politics is not a field that „ruling class" (*quasi-dynastically*) occupies as a homogeneous group *per se*, as Serbia's political field eventually became an object of appropriation by the middle class and its fractions, now conjoined into upper class fraction(s). Thus, after establishment of (every) new constellation of relations, political field, for all the (sub)groups, was predominantly a magnet for attracting the actors that previously had primarily the *middle class* (lower-ranking managers, medium and small entrepreneurs and professionals) (82.3%), and only then the *upper class position* (politicians, large entrepreneurs and senior managers) (14.1%). Only 4.7% of those coming from upper class positions were throughout their whole careers in the political field. Again, temporal aspect of accession to the political field somewhat disperses composition of habitus, and (dis)continuities in political-bureaucratic professionalization are most evident in gradual establishment of a new group of specialized producers originating from the bourgeoisie, distinguished from an „old elite" – predominantly among the members of SPS and bureaucratic professionals, and also significantly, among (a)ethnic opposition.[14]

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14 Quantitative agreement found between class *position before elite* and *position in the first work-place* (r = 0.444), primarily indicates a relative continuity in the formation of habitus, as in both cases, there's a predominance of the middle class, that is, lower-ranking managers, middle and small entrepreneurs or professionals, with share of approximately four-fifths (82.3% and 78.6%). These conditions constitute the fundamental dispositions of bureaucrats and politicians - bound to specific segments of the social space structure, appearing as a

Gradual enmeshing into and adaptation to figurational forces of field, still, had a profound effect on schemes determining ethno-national identification. Namely, external formative grounds of habitus and its (temporal) dissociations are only indirectly reflected upon ethno-national identification, as dispositions shaping habitus became *adapted* to temporal (con)figurations and forces of bureaucratic-political field and the very possibility to acquire *political delegation* and group-making power, embodied in taking those operations as *valid*. According to field theory, *position-taking* – expressed through discourse, etiologies and divisions of social world here related to ethno-national identifications – primarily outcomes as practical adaptation and habituation to conditions and divisions imposed in the field. Therefore, an external composition of habitus and the mediational forces associated with an overall class conformation, respectively, dispositional set created through a general social trajectory, *do not possess* greater importance as far as ethno-national identification is in question. Conceptions of ethnicity are insofar shaped by forces and divisions which govern the field: *lines of party divisions* and *objective distribution of power*, measured by institutional access to monopolies. It means that (conceived) ethno-national identity and its shape come

general pattern, but also following the process by which habitus and accession to field became a result of *class appropriation*. Although only 4.9% of respondents in the sample were constantly found in bureaucratic-political field during their social trajectory, temporal dissociations are indicative. Thus, the quantitative agreement between class positions in 1990 and 2000 (r = 0.406), affirmatively shows middle-class appropriation of instruments of legitimate political production, but also a gradual formation of an upper class fraction, through continuous approach to politics and bureaucracy. Latter finding applies to 1990, when 35.8% of current SPS members and 18.8% of bureaucrats mere taking elite positions (as politicians, large entrepreneurs or senior managers). By 2000, share of these groups in elite positions further increases and 30.8% of them relatively were continuously part of higher strata in social space, of which more than half of current SPS members (55.6%), almost a third of professional bureaucrats (36.4%), and one-fifth of SNS (20.8%) and DS (20.0%) members. Special continuity in social trajectory is observed in one-fifth of SPS members, of which 12% were continuously occupying positions in bureaucratic-political echelon, and another 8% were upper class members before entering the field. Gradual formation of political-bureaucratic professionals (habitus), i.e. dispositional adjustment to figurational forces in the field, shows a *relative continuity in professionalization*: greatest continuity is observed in DS (77.3%), followed by SDS-a (90.9%), as well as the overwhelming majority of small number of parliamentary parties and bureaucratic professionals, of whom two-thirds held positions within the field before the establishment of new constellation of relationships. Contrary, among SNS members there's conspicuous participation of those who accessed the field in 2012 (62.0%) (equal to a quarter of sample), followed by a part of SPS members (42.9%). Still, most visible path discontinuities are with father's occupation, that is, the *class of origin*, showing a considerable heterogeneity in bureaucratic field as in 18.8% of cases, fathers were politicians or higher-ranking managers, in 44.0% of cases they were experts or lower-ranking directors, in 13.6% petty-bourgeois technicians and officials, while the 20.4% of cases, fathers were manual workers. The share of farmers is the smallest (3.1%). Again, it is indicative that a higher share of lower-class origin (where fathers where technicians and manual workers), occurs exactly among ethnic opposition (25% and 16.7%), and although their share in the sample is small, this ratio reveals a specific composition of relations that emerge in the appropriation of "ethnic". This particularly goes for Hungarian SVM and Albanian PzDD, but not for DSS, in which the "recruitment" happens mostly from the middle classes.

as an adoption of specific dispositions which, through prior *group identification* or party affiliation, determine its *strength* and *volume*, *form* and *content*.[15]

Imagery found among parties-in-power and ethnic opposition thus indicates a particular *qualitative* content of ethno-national identity, delineated as a moral obligation of individual commitment arising from common origin. Namely, repulsion of belief that „The survival of our people is the main task of every individual" proportionally declines as we move towards the government and ethnic opposition – insofar as a negative correlation is found (r_s = –0.555). Similar situation is with the statement „The common origin of our people is the basis of the trust" (r_s = –0.431). Again, speaking from the position of the parties-in-power, first attitude receives considerable recognition – as the answer „agree" appears in 42.6% of cases, „fully agree" in 40.9%, while in the case of ethnic opposition that relationship is 33.3%, respectively, 25.0%. As for second attitude, the form of (complete) affirmation is slightly lower and revolves around 40%; however, there is also a statistically significant antinomy with other political groups as in the first case.[16]

This molding of ethno-national identity essentially draws its moral force from positions of power revealing as self-legitimation and monopoly to speak in the name of the group. Although it shows that principles of ethnic definition are dispersed, parties-in-power and especially those who have taken upon themselves the monopoly of ethno-national delegation/representation, reveal that ethnicity is understood from the *position of speech* – both *about* and *in the name of* the group, but from inside. In the assumed definition, what is projected through moral beliefs and principles of proper group-design, is an „ethnic" continuity, embodied in referring to cultural tradition of „people" as a justification for leading-mission of the very people. Still, this conception requires a *reciprocal*

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15   Thus, differences in formation of ethno-national identification aren't mediated by a set of *primary characteristics* defining habitus - firstly, the position in the structure of class relations (indirectly established through profession, education and number of other factors) and their temporal transformations (trajectories), neither a set *of secondary features*, such as local, regional or gender differences, but primarily by those stemming from ideological background. Certainly, this constellation goes beyond the mystical effects of "party indoctrination" as it originates from combination of (subjective) belief in valid conception of social world and *possibilities of group-representation* and, on the other hand, *objective figurations of social space*.

16   Not only these two attitudes get mutual (statistical) attraction (r = 0.625), but also particularly show a significant differentiation of parties-in-power from other groups (p=.000), as 80% of SNS and SPS, but also 100% of PUPS, United Serbia, Socialist Movement and SPO members, sets the definition of ethnicity in form of individual commitments. Grounding the cultural tradition edged with common origin, however, takes about 40% of SPS and SNS members, while the remaining number or unspecified - 30%, or does not consider that this is foundation of trust. When looking at dispersion of these responses according to *hierarchy* and *structure* of (dis)positions in the field, largest concentration of affirmation is among MP's and party officials without government positions, while it decreases when it comes to the Government, as well as holders of local authority. Among the parties-in-power, a *lower degree of ethnic attachment* is determined by temporal constitution of habitus, as among those who are longer in field (as elite, or those who entered field from elite positions particularly in between 1990-2000), greater aversion to ethnic exclusivity is found.

moral obligation towards own group. Therefore, what is perceived as „good" is a *self-reproductive autonomy*, because it implies that for the group's survival, there must be an overall *emotional* and *practical* commitment embodied in *cultural continuity* (*through a common origin*), and the exclusive disposal over this tradition, conceived as basis of valid social relations that – instead of possible (internal) differences, give the primacy to *cultural unity*.

On the other side, this imagery gets (radically) inverted among *a-ethnic opposition* (and *bureaucratic professionals*, to lesser extent) through elimination of exclusivity entrenched in identification and sharp divisions following the lines of *ethnos*, as well as *depreciation* of ethnic tradition as a relevant moral qualification of social life and emotional investments it involves. In case of a-ethnic opposition group-speech appears only negatively from the set of (ideational) dispositions they speak, as *neither* individual commitment *nor* a common origin make valid demands. Certainly, position-taking of the latter (also) represents grounding for possible and desirable political mobilization (as for the parties-in-power), but with conceptual background closer to imagery of general uniformity of „citizenship" (and reminiscent to a concept of nation). Repulsion and denial of ethnic divisions and *de-politization of ethnos* on social and political horizon, for a-ethnic opposition, thus became followed with a dedication to *normative-etatistic* characterizations and general inclusivity – a peculiar *point of convergence* with other political groups.

Namely, the median response on *ethno-national valence scale*, indicates a significant *qualitative distinction* concerning identity (con)figuration embedded in possibilities of (ethno-national) coexistence that is endorsed by prevalent part of Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite. Thus, qualification and intellection of *nationally-mixed marriages* („National mixed marriages must be more unstable than other marriages"), then *perception of security*, which springs in coexistence with other ethnic groups („The man may feel completely safe only when living in an environment where the majority are members of his own nation"), as well as *possibility of cooperation* („Cooperation might be established among the nations, but not a complete trust") among all groups in bureaucratic-political field is not set as an objective limit of the social world – as the concentration of negative answers is predominant.[17] Consequently, ethno-national identification reaches its (temporary) point of convergence in the field –by not being exclusively designed along the lines of emotional demands and common (kinship) origin, but also by *inclusivity* and abilities of *accession*.

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17 Thus, (complete) disagreement on first statement is found in 43.2% and 42.6% of cases, followed by 37.4%, i.e. 41.1% of cases in second, while for third this ratio is 19.0% against 37.6%. The latter two attitudes are deeply related to national, state identity formation (cooperation among nations and security), so this appears as a result of general inclusiveness and acceptance of rules within field. But the last of these, reveals that one third of parties-in-power (27.8 and 6.8 %%), distrust of cooperation - as a form of exchange, mainly appears among SNS members who hold a diploma in humanities and social sciences, as well as those with a postgraduate degree.

Apparently approximating those who stand in opposition to each other in the field, this peculiar openness could be apprehended as a result of field's structure, indicating that order and principles of division rest on mutually-determined (dis) positional set. From the position of parties-in-power, ethno-national identification first reflects a basis of effectiveness due to capacity of *political mobilization* it provides in struggles for *(external) political recognition* and corresponds to field structure and aspirations to completely exhaust further possibilities of utilizing mobilization base and *traditional* type of authority. Embodied in endorsement of *diffuse principle of politics*, these groups and actors seek for multiplication and dilution of „hard idea" – as with „banal nationalism", what small monopolists and ideological puritans could hardly accept. These fissures open up (irrational) political maneuvering space where ethnic opposition dwells. However, creating an *identifiable* conception of ethno-national, from the perspective of those who hold the levers of government monopoly, above all reflects *restrictions* to power of governing the state apparatus (and the objective limitations existing in totality of social space) that (historically) necessitated adjustments and depreciation of radical ethnicization via *inclusiveness*. This inclusiveness is formed at the intersection with dominant matrix of identification (embodied in „equal rights of citizens") and historical shift of exclusivity, as well in relation to the objective position which includes the supremacy over state monopolies and a cultural univerzalisation of (previously ethnicized) state order, without denying different normative principles of group-forming, but (re)placing them with *practical commitment*, equally available to everyone ready to reconvert.

Conjoining of these stances came as an absorption into the forces of field that finally brings ethno-national world-ordering to trans-substantiation and (de)politicization that *re-define* the very social conformation and objective boundaries of political community. But, beyond a mere reference to diversifying conceptions of ethno-national identification, which, at their best present nothing but a *nomothetic fallacy* (embodied in a mere registering of an opposition between „ethnic" and „civic" nationalism), presented vision insofar corresponds to inclusivity, but more importantly, specific *etatisation*. On the level of fundamental differences among bureaucratic-political elite of Serbia, two key latent variables *underlining* the ethno-national identification could be found, *ethnic* and *etatist*, which profoundly define the „parameters" for a valid shape of political community.[18]

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18   These two main components extracted by factor analysis (rotation method) provide a percentage of variance explained of about 60%, and directly point to heterogeneous ethno-national conception. Thus, among first of two components there is a strong to moderate correlation with qualifications of valid political community framework, stressing the importance ("How much is important for a (given ethno-national group) to?") 1) be of Christian affiliation, 2) share cultural traditions of "the people", 3) have parents of same ethnicity and, above all, 4) feel of belonging to ethnic community. With reserves regarding religious affiliation, this component is based on more profound *ethnic* conceptualization of social world. Towards it, second component is far closer to *etatist* conceptualization, which (correlatively) rests upon 5) importance of birth in Serbia, 6) good knowledge of native language and 7) importance of citizenship (Serbia). All questions were measured

Although the appropriation of these conceptions is rather blurry –as no significant differences among the groups are detected, oscillation between these two poles, or better, *(re)combination* of their components, indicates the perception of things where an ethno-national (dis)continuity is set as the medium of differentiation that creates a subdivision of the population as a culturally identical or different „citizens". Ethnicity here appears as a key for redefining individual in *cultural specificity*. What can be observed among the parties-in-power and ethnic opposition is high internal consistency between the notion of ethnicity as an affective investment that is based first on the 1) commitment in form of feelings („feeling as Serb(ian)"), and then in insistence on 2) Christian heritage, 3) cultural tradition, but not exclusively. No wonder that the monopoly of ethnic group over disposal of ethnic is not fixed: it shows an effective capacity of political mobilization that calls for a minimum of emotional investment, allowing all „religious" (re)conversions and discontinuities, so it's equally likely 4) to be born outside Serbia, 5) not necessarily speak Serbian language or 6) have Serbian parents, to gain an access to *ethno-national community*.[19] While this perspective inevitably flirts with *etatistic* conception, it happens only as it's being colored with certain „ethnic" continuum. On the other hand, *etatisation* epitomized in importance of country of birth, language skills and citizenship is a segment of (moral) space of main focus for a-ethnic opposition and particularly, bureaucratic professionals. Nonacceptance of ethnic social organization found here – even not being resolved of ethnic roots (at least as a negation), appears rather as redefining and redesigning common tradition, history or origin, through the *state*.

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Far from being locked into a uniform oppositional set, *trans-substantiation* of ethno-national identification among Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite, in as much outcomes as an effect of a *particular historical* immersion into forces of field that re-introduce differential types of *valid political community*. As much as it doesn't operate as an autonomous force, resolved of both material and symbolic grounding, ethno-national identification similarly doesn't come as a

by four-level scale, ranging from estimations of "not important" to "very important" and both components extracted where also transformed into four-level scales, ranging from positive to negative Analysis (again) showed there are no statistically (significant) (cor) relations between these conceptions and social grounds, except the ones coming from the conformation of field.

19   While (almost) complete affirmation (34.1% and 53.5.%) of affective commitment among all groups might be explained as general inclusiveness that appears available to both own and other ethnic group, dominant group significantly differentiates from others (p=.000) when it comes to emphasizing of Christian affiliation and importance of sharing the culture of "own people". Here, about four fifths of parties-in-power members and members of ethnic opposition affirm them. Consensus found among all the groups on *irrelevance* on place of birth outside the Serbia (64.3%/28.1%), having the parents of same ethnicity (30.8%/31.4%) etc, on the other, reflects absorption of various groups into a political community, that even presenting a clear inclination towards ethnic conception, still becomes shaped through determinations of field.

simple reflection of an overall societal processes, that would totalize it into a single resultant – what a multitude of historicist teachings (particularly, theories of modernization) would imply. Exactly by being immersed into forces of specific social relations, this particular identification –passed on ((dis)positionally-mediated) validity of belief, affection and particular *moral (self-)classifying* exposed through prism of ethno-national, appear as equally deontological and utilitaristic capacity to extract *political mobilization* from social reciprocity. Still, it profoundly emerges as *latent* aspect of social order(s) to which it becomes *historically adapted*, through opposing, conflicting but also, intersecting representations over the valid compound of social world.

Diverging ethno-national identifications of Serbia's bureaucratic-political elite, thus, result not only as a principle of primary and secondary extraction of social power through political representation: they also originate in gradual enmeshing into a particular set of social relations, finally presenting a mediation of various social forces. Even it encompasses a sphere of relatively autonomous fetishism conditioned by professionalization and monopolization of political production, the field of politics and bureaucracy necessarily corresponds to (socio-historically imposed) demands and limitations existent in entire social space, among which ethno-national grounding imminently re-emerges. While for the ethnic opposition, qualitative distinction found in *ethnos* presents a unique symbolic corpus for legitimation – reaching its peak in monopoly over ethnic representation, the entire compound of political community had to be (at least, minimally) historically accorded to this ethno-national conformity. The reason of historical trans-substantiation of ethno-national, nonetheless, came as an extension of state power that somehow submerged and juxtaposed various ethnical „objectivities" under a specific state vector. This point is the closest to the one found in identification and normative characterizations of a-ethnic opposition and bureaucratic professionals, implying universalisation of „rights" through state, and thus, absorption and *de-politicization* of differences (with possible coexistence of „ethnic" specifities) and substitution of ethnic domination for a „national" omen. Close to impersonal *rational authority*, this vision, however, isn't resolved of power, as it is embodied in disposal of means for producing and delegating „rights" that this bourgeois layer of bureaucratic-political professionals acquires – somehow corresponding to „rational" and *mediative interests* middle classes have in the entire social conformity. As a historical product, it nevertheless opposes the vision close to dominant political group(s). The latter, although similarly identifying the ethno-national under etatist frame, still count on benefits and extracted political capital the continuum of „ethnic" affection and sentiments might fetch through *traditional authority*. Still, inclusivity – read off through entirety of ethno-national identification they gain, indicates an overall complexity of social order (of (co)existence) Elias properly hints (Elias, 2001): every (political) domination *demands investment* in acquired power, here embodied in trans-substantiation of „ethnic" exclusivity into political inclusivity, that finally lead this *principle of diffuse politics* to embracing of „banal nationalism".

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