


XXV NAUČNI SKUP

EMPIRIJSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA U PSIHOLOGIJI

29 – 31. MART 2019.

FILOZOFSKI FAKULTET, UNIVERZITET U BEOGRADU



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
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Programski odbor:

Orlando M. Lourenço, Kai Ruggeri, Claus-Christian Carbon, Agostini Tiziano, Milica Vukelić, Ivana Stepanović Ilić, Dejan Todorović, Sunčica Zdravković, Iris Žeželj, Zoran Pavlović, Zvonimir Galić, Kirsten E. Bevelander, Dušica Filipović Đurđević, Slobodan Marković, Jérémy Lemoine, Dragica Pavlović Babić, Ksenija Krstić, Jasmina Kodžopeljić, Dražen Domijan, Ljiljana Lazarević, Oliver Tošković, Pavle Valerjev, Denis Bratko, Petar Čolović, Janko Međedović, Anja Wertag, Dragana Stanojević, Maja Savić, Nataša Simić, Maša Popović, Marina Videnović, Goran Opačić, Aleksandar Kostić, Nenad Havelka, Kaja Damnjanović (predsednica)

Organizacioni odbor:

Ljiljana Lazarević, Slobodan Marković, Olga Marković Rosić, Ivana Stepanović Ilić, Predrag Nedimović, Ksenija Mišić, Oliver Tošković, Marko Živanović, Kaja Damnjanović

Lektura i prelom: Ksenija Mišić

results implicate that SSD model may predict modulation of the entropy effect, however, it is unable to predict the exact effect change which is a great limitation of its predictive power.

Keywords: semantic ambiguity, entropy, polysemy, Semantic Settling Dynamics

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DA LI OČNI POKRETI ODGOVARAJU SADRŽAJU MENTALNIH PREDSTAVA?

Marija Petrović

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu | maka.petrovic@gmail.com

Tijana Tomić

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Uroš Savić Kain

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Ksenija Krstić

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Vanja Ković

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Poznato je da postoje veze između očnih pokreta prilikom mentalnog predstavljanja i stvarnog rasporeda objekata u neposrednom iskustvu. Prethodna istraživanja su pokazala da očni pokreti oslikavaju pozicije objekata kada ispitanici gledaju određenu sliku, slušaju određeni opis ili prepričavaju jedno od ova dva (Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006), kao i da je disperzija očnih pokreta negativno povezana sa skorom na spacijalnom mentalnom predstavljanju (Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2011). Cilj ovog istraživanja je replikacija nalaza Johansona i saradnika. Pošto je navedeno istraživanje prvo koje je demonstriralo ove efekte sa složenim stimulusima, potrebna je replikacija istraživanja, kako bi se utvrdila stabilnost fenomena i stvorila šira empirijska građa.

Ispitanici ($N = 36$; 86% žena, uzrast 19/20 god.) su bili podeljeni u dve grupe –gledali su sliku ili slušali opis određenog prizora. Njihov zadatak je bio da prepričaju ono što su videli/čuli gledajući u beli ekran, a beležen je obrazac njihovih očnih pokreta. U analizi su praćene globalna korespondencija (GK; usklađenost celokupnog obrasca očnih pokreta) i lokalna korespondencija (LK; očni pokreti samo idu u odgovarajućem pravcu, ali ne oslikavaju opšti raspored prizora) očnih pokreta. Prikupljene su i mere ispitanika na OSIVQ upitniku koji meri kognitivne stilove tj. preferirani tip mentalnog predstavljanja (objektni, spacijalni ili verbalni). Rezultati pokazuju da GK između očnih pokreta i prepričavanja postoji samo u grupi koja je posmatrala sliku (28-68% poklapajućih objekata, $V = 131$, $p < .05$). Kod onih koji su slušali opis prizora postoji značajna samo LK (53% poklapajućih objekata, $V = 154$, $p < .05$). Rezultati pokazuju i da disperzija očnih pokreta nije povezana ni sa jednim od kognitivnih stilova u grupi koja je posmatrala sliku, dok u drugoj grupi postoji umerena negativna korelacija ($r = -.48$) između disperzije i objektnog mentalnog predstavljanja, koje karakteriše živopisnost mentalnih slika. Rezultati originalnih studija su samo delimično potvrđeni i ukazuju na to da je moguće da razlike potiču od modaliteta izlaganja sadržaja, gde se GK pre vezuje za sadržaj koji je izložen vizuelno, te je stoga bliži stvarnom vizuelnom opažanju. Takođe, postojanje veze između spacijalnog mentalnog predstavljanja i disperzije očnih pokreta nije potvrđeno. Uzeti zajedno, ovi rezultati sugerišu da pitanje očnih pokreta i mentalnog predstavljanja još nije sasvim rešeno.

Ključne reči: mentalno predstavljanje, očni pokreti, mentalne reprezentacije, percepcija

This study was a replication of two previous studies which explored the relationship between mental imagery and eye movements (Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006, 2011). Participants either looked at an image or listened to a spoken description and both groups recalled what they experienced afterwards. Eye movements were recorded at all times. Afterwards, participants completed a questionnaire of preferred mental imagery type. Results show that overall correspondence during recall was only present in the group with the image ($V = 131, p < .05$), while the other group only demonstrated directional correspondence between eye movements and recall ($V = 154, p < .05$). Dispersion of eye movements was related to object imagery ($r = -.48$), as opposed to spatial imagery in the original study, but only in the group with the spoken description. Hence, the original results were only partially replicated which suggests the relationship between eye movements and mental imagery is not as clear as it seems.

WHO SAID IT: HOW CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION INFLUENCE PERCEIVED
PROFUNDITY OF REAL QUOTES AND PSEUDO-PROFOUND BULLSHIT

Vukašin Gligorić

Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam | vukasin.gligoric@student.uva.nl

Ana Vilotijević

Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade | ana.vilotijevic96@gmail.com

In the era of online social networks, bullshit is prevalent in our lives. As prominent New Age figures illustrate, it might be lucrative to practice pseudo-profound bullshit which consists of randomly arranged buzzwords with proper syntactic structure. Psychological research on this topic has only recently begun; for example, neoliberals, those with lower intelligence and paranormal ideation are more prone to this type of bullshit.

Our study had two goals. First, we wanted to examine pseudo-profound bullshit in relation to different contexts and real meaningful quotes. Second, we wanted to replicate findings for neoliberals and to investigate the association with disintegration.

A total of 144 participants (102 females, 42 males, $M_{\text{age}} = 24.5, S = 7.55$) completed 5-item support for free-market scale and 20-item disintegration scale. They also rated profundity of 7 meaningful quotes (presented with or without author), 14 items from Bullshit Receptivity Scale (presented with an alleged famous author, isolated or as a vignette) and 4 mundane items presented as quotes. We constructed four forms and randomly included items. Across forms, most of the scales showed satisfactory reliability (18 of 20 had $\alpha s > .62$). Forms did not differ on any of the dependent variables ($F_s < 1.86, p_s > .14$)

A two-way repeated ANOVA showed the interaction between type of quote (real quote or pseudo-profound) and context (with or without author), $F(1, 143) = 10.66, p = 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.07$. Real quotes were rated as more profound than the bullshit, $F(1, 143) = 138.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = 0.49$, and quotes with authors were rated as more profound than those without, $F(1, 143) = 7.50, p < .01, \eta^2 = 0.05$. Pseudo-profound bullshit presented as vignette was not rated differently from bullshit with author ($t(143) = 1.93, p = .055$), nor bullshit without author ($t(143) = -1.97, p = .05$).

We failed to replicate the relationship with the support for the free market ($r = .05, p > .05$) but found the association with disintegration ($r = .29, p < .001$). All results held the same pattern when we controlled for the ratings of mundane items as a measure of bias to profundity.

Overall, our results demonstrate that contextual information (such as author's name) affects ambiguous and vague quotes, but do not affect meaningful quotes that have the merit of their