Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism
Apstrakt
The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls' moralist approach. I then move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories - Sleat's realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination - that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a po...litical theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism - because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies - but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy - by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn't do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists.
Ključne reči:
Political realism / political moralism / legitimacy / democracy / deliberationIzvor:
Filozofija i društvo, 2016, 27, 4, 920-937Izdavač:
- Univerzitet u Beogradu - Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd
Finansiranje / projekti:
- Logičko-epistemološki osnovi metafizike (RS-MESTD-Basic Research (BR or ON)-179067)
Institucija/grupa
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Šoć, Andrija PY - 2016 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2177 AB - The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls' moralist approach. I then move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories - Sleat's realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination - that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a political theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism - because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies - but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy - by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn't do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists. PB - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd T2 - Filozofija i društvo T1 - Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism EP - 937 IS - 4 SP - 920 VL - 27 DO - 10.2298/FID1604920S ER -
@article{ author = "Šoć, Andrija", year = "2016", abstract = "The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls' moralist approach. I then move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories - Sleat's realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination - that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a political theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism - because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies - but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy - by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn't do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists.", publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd", journal = "Filozofija i društvo", title = "Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism", pages = "937-920", number = "4", volume = "27", doi = "10.2298/FID1604920S" }
Šoć, A.. (2016). Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism. in Filozofija i društvo Univerzitet u Beogradu - Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd., 27(4), 920-937. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604920S
Šoć A. Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism. in Filozofija i društvo. 2016;27(4):920-937. doi:10.2298/FID1604920S .
Šoć, Andrija, "Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism" in Filozofija i društvo, 27, no. 4 (2016):920-937, https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604920S . .