Šta pokazuje Kantov "kompas"?

Abstract

U ovom tekstu, autor ukazuje na jednu donekle zanemarenu Kantovu metaforu - metaforu "moralnog kompasa". Zamisao "moralnog kompasa" nije ništa drugo nego zamisao samog moralnog zakona kao "kategoričkog imperativa". Autor sugeriše da ova jednostavna metafora ukazuje na dve stvari koja se često zaboravlja u interpretaciji Kantove etike: 1) da Kant smatra da je moralno saznanje dostupno doslovno svakom, i 2) da se put saznanja u moralu razlikuje od puta moralnog saznanja u Kantovoj opštoj epistemologiji. Konačno, autor na primeru "lažnog obećanja" nudi objašnjenje mehanizma delovanja "moralnog kompasa".

In this article, the author points to a somewhat neglected Kant's metaphor - a metaphor of the "moral compass." The idea of a "moral compass" is nothing more than the concept of the moral law itself as a "categorical imperative." The author suggests that this simple metaphor points to two things that are often forgotten in the interpretation of Kant's ethics. Firstly, Kant believes that moral knowledge is available literally to everyone. Secondly, the path of acquiring knowledge in morality differs from the path of moral knowledge in Kant's general epistemology. Finally, the author, for example, offers an explanation of the mechanism of "moral compass."