Sosa's Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism
Samo za registrovane korisnike
2021
Članak u časopisu (Objavljena verzija)
Metapodaci
Prikaz svih podataka o dokumentuApstrakt
This paper aims to show that Sosa's theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa's theory and safety condition, as well as its differences and similarities with Nozick's sensitivity condition and Dretske's condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa's theory in the light of Comesana's counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa's analysis of knowledge and safety condition.
Ključne reči:
Sensitivity / Safety / Counterfactual conditionals / Conclusive reasonIzvor:
Philosophia, 2021, 49, 1, 421-435Izdavač:
- Springer, Dordrecht
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0
ISSN: 0048-3893
WoS: 000556442500002
Scopus: 2-s2.0-85085901388
Institucija/grupa
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Stamenković, Bogdana PY - 2021 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3310 AB - This paper aims to show that Sosa's theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa's theory and safety condition, as well as its differences and similarities with Nozick's sensitivity condition and Dretske's condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa's theory in the light of Comesana's counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa's analysis of knowledge and safety condition. PB - Springer, Dordrecht T2 - Philosophia T1 - Sosa's Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism EP - 435 IS - 1 SP - 421 VL - 49 DO - 10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0 ER -
@article{ author = "Stamenković, Bogdana", year = "2021", abstract = "This paper aims to show that Sosa's theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa's theory and safety condition, as well as its differences and similarities with Nozick's sensitivity condition and Dretske's condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa's theory in the light of Comesana's counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa's analysis of knowledge and safety condition.", publisher = "Springer, Dordrecht", journal = "Philosophia", title = "Sosa's Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism", pages = "435-421", number = "1", volume = "49", doi = "10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0" }
Stamenković, B.. (2021). Sosa's Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism. in Philosophia Springer, Dordrecht., 49(1), 421-435. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0
Stamenković B. Sosa's Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism. in Philosophia. 2021;49(1):421-435. doi:10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0 .
Stamenković, Bogdana, "Sosa's Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism" in Philosophia, 49, no. 1 (2021):421-435, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0 . .