Russia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfare
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Russia’s relations with the EU and NATO, and the candidate states, were based on the idea
of undermining liberal democracy by supporting populist leaders and movements, in order
to and renew Russia’s political and strategic influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The
Second Cold War between Russia and the West was announced already during the 1999
NATO intervention in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia has failed to stop NATO and EU
enlargement, and decided to carry out hybrid actions using corruption of the Western
political and business establishment, and campaigns of deception and lies in the media and
social networks. The weaknesses in EU foreign and security policy, after 2008, and
obviously since 2012, enabled Russia to establish three points of strategic pressure in
response to EU and NATO enlargement in Eastern and South-eastern Europe: Baltic,
Ukraine and Western Balkans. Simultaneously, Russia affected gradual rejection of the EU
values and standards within the Visegrá...d Group states. Every major populist leader and
movement in EU member states enjoyed official Russia’s support. Successful EU integration
of Eastern European states 2004—2007 was followed by political, financial and strategic
crises (2008 finansial crisis, 2014 Ukraine, 2015 migrant crisis, 2016 Brexit). While EU was
giving weak and hesitant answers, WB states were becoming objects of malign influences
of Russia, China and Turkey. In general perspective, none of the EU strategic objectives
have been achieved: Russia has not become a democratic state, WB were not fully
integrated in the EU. Russia has also managed to secure secure economic and political
strongholds in Hungary and Croatia, and produce political confusion in Serbia, Bosnia,
Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania, especially manipulating the Kosovo crisis.
Kosovo was another EU failure of a poor leadership and weak political authority. Here are
particularly underlined patterns of disinformation campaigns ran by Russian state agency
Sputnik.
Кључне речи:
Russia / hybrid war / populism / Western Balkans / EU Foreign and Security PolicyИзвор:
Contemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe, 2022, 91-116Издавач:
- Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar
Финансирање / пројекти:
- No 822682 POPREBEL: Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo.feudalism
Институција/група
Istorija / HistoryTY - JOUR AU - Samardžić, Nikola PY - 2022 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4398 AB - Russia’s relations with the EU and NATO, and the candidate states, were based on the idea of undermining liberal democracy by supporting populist leaders and movements, in order to and renew Russia’s political and strategic influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The Second Cold War between Russia and the West was announced already during the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia has failed to stop NATO and EU enlargement, and decided to carry out hybrid actions using corruption of the Western political and business establishment, and campaigns of deception and lies in the media and social networks. The weaknesses in EU foreign and security policy, after 2008, and obviously since 2012, enabled Russia to establish three points of strategic pressure in response to EU and NATO enlargement in Eastern and South-eastern Europe: Baltic, Ukraine and Western Balkans. Simultaneously, Russia affected gradual rejection of the EU values and standards within the Visegrád Group states. Every major populist leader and movement in EU member states enjoyed official Russia’s support. Successful EU integration of Eastern European states 2004—2007 was followed by political, financial and strategic crises (2008 finansial crisis, 2014 Ukraine, 2015 migrant crisis, 2016 Brexit). While EU was giving weak and hesitant answers, WB states were becoming objects of malign influences of Russia, China and Turkey. In general perspective, none of the EU strategic objectives have been achieved: Russia has not become a democratic state, WB were not fully integrated in the EU. Russia has also managed to secure secure economic and political strongholds in Hungary and Croatia, and produce political confusion in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania, especially manipulating the Kosovo crisis. Kosovo was another EU failure of a poor leadership and weak political authority. Here are particularly underlined patterns of disinformation campaigns ran by Russian state agency Sputnik. PB - Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar T2 - Contemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe T1 - Russia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfare EP - 116 SP - 91 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4398 ER -
@article{ author = "Samardžić, Nikola", year = "2022", abstract = "Russia’s relations with the EU and NATO, and the candidate states, were based on the idea of undermining liberal democracy by supporting populist leaders and movements, in order to and renew Russia’s political and strategic influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The Second Cold War between Russia and the West was announced already during the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia has failed to stop NATO and EU enlargement, and decided to carry out hybrid actions using corruption of the Western political and business establishment, and campaigns of deception and lies in the media and social networks. The weaknesses in EU foreign and security policy, after 2008, and obviously since 2012, enabled Russia to establish three points of strategic pressure in response to EU and NATO enlargement in Eastern and South-eastern Europe: Baltic, Ukraine and Western Balkans. Simultaneously, Russia affected gradual rejection of the EU values and standards within the Visegrád Group states. Every major populist leader and movement in EU member states enjoyed official Russia’s support. Successful EU integration of Eastern European states 2004—2007 was followed by political, financial and strategic crises (2008 finansial crisis, 2014 Ukraine, 2015 migrant crisis, 2016 Brexit). While EU was giving weak and hesitant answers, WB states were becoming objects of malign influences of Russia, China and Turkey. In general perspective, none of the EU strategic objectives have been achieved: Russia has not become a democratic state, WB were not fully integrated in the EU. Russia has also managed to secure secure economic and political strongholds in Hungary and Croatia, and produce political confusion in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania, especially manipulating the Kosovo crisis. Kosovo was another EU failure of a poor leadership and weak political authority. Here are particularly underlined patterns of disinformation campaigns ran by Russian state agency Sputnik.", publisher = "Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar", journal = "Contemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe", title = "Russia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfare", pages = "116-91", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4398" }
Samardžić, N.. (2022). Russia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfare. in Contemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar., 91-116. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4398
Samardžić N. Russia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfare. in Contemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe. 2022;:91-116. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4398 .
Samardžić, Nikola, "Russia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfare" in Contemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe (2022):91-116, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4398 .