Југословенски програм српске владе и Русија на почетку Првог светског рата

Abstract

У чланку се прати став званичне Русије према југословенском програму српске владе, од избијања Великог рата до отпочињања преговора Антанте са Италијом, средином марта 1915. године. Гледишта руске дипломатије која се узимају у обзир највише су се испољавала у вези са обећањима територијалних добитака Србији, у замену за уступке Бугарској ради њеног уласка у сукоб. У почетку су предвиђене компензације имале само посредне додирне тачке са програмом уједињења у формирању, да би временом добијалe одређеније облике у контексту планова српске владе. Пажња је посвећена и контактима које су југословенски емигранти из Аустро-Угарске успоставили са руском дипломатијом у првим месецима Првог светског рата. Рад је написан на основу необјављене грађе из руских, македонских и српских архива, објављених извора и литературе.

Until the outbreak of the First World War, Russia was not quite familiar with the ideas of political uniϐication of the South Slavs. During the ϐirst months of the war, Russian diplomacy touched on the matter only indirectly, in relation to promises of territorial gains to Serbia (limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the exit to the sea) in exchange for its territorial concessions to Bulgaria. However, the Serbian government quickly began to shape the Yugoslav program as its war aim. It came to the attention of Russian diplomats and statesmen only gradually. Neither Russia nor its allies wanted to give precise promises of territorial gains to Serbia, because that would reduce the chances of concluding a separate peace with Austria-Hungary or attracting Italy and Romania to their side. Russians were also informed about the national program of the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary by Croatian politicians in emigration. In December 1914, the Serbian National Assembly declared that “the liberation and uniϐication” of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became Serbia’s war aim. Russia, France and Great Britain were timidly informed about this declaration, but they simply ignored it. At the beginning of 1915, they continued to consider territorial promises to Serbia, and some other territories besides Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Adriatic coast were mentioned. Tsar Nicholas II and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov spoke about the breakup of Austria-Hungary in informal conversations with allied diplomats. Nevertheless, Russia did not have a deϐined position regarding the Yugoslav program, and the religious and cultural differences between the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats and Slovenes caused some doubts. The beginning of the Gallipoli Campaign persuaded neutral Italy to start negotiations about its entry into the war. With Sazonov’s memoir to Tsar Nicholas on March 15 regarding the negotiations with Italy, Russia’s ofϐicial stance towards the uniϐication of the South Slavs began to take shape. The interests of the Serbs, as proven allies of Russia, were put ϐirst, while the interests of the Croats were intended to be partially sacriϐiced, and the possibility of creating their common state was only vaguely allowed.