Protivčinjenički kondicionali, uzročnost i asimetrija vremena

Abstract

Asimetrija vremena koja se ogleda u intuiciji da je prošlost, u nekom značajnom smislu, ‘fiksna’ a budućnost ‘otvorena’ predmet je velikog broja analiza u filozofskoj literaturi. U ovom radu ću razmatrati pokušaj Dejvida Luisa da objasni ovu intuiciju pozivanjem na njegovu analizu protivčinjeničkih kondicionala. Kao reprezentativnu kritiku ovog pokušaja, analiziraću odgovor Penelopi Maki i pokazaću da su različiti argumenti koje ona nudi neuspešni u osporavanju Luisove teze. Značajna implikacija ovog razmatranja je činjenica da se Luisovo zasnivanje intuicija o asimetriji vremena mora osloniti i na njegovu protivčinjeničku teoriju uzročnosti. Ovo ima za posledicu da je svaka od velikog broja kritika Luisove teorije uzročnosti ujedno i kritika njegove analize asimetrije vremena.

Among the prominent aspects of our experience of time is its asymmetry which can be pointed at by using somewhat vague notions of fixity of the past and openness of the future. Among the influential attempts to explain this asymmetry is an analysis by David Lewis, based on his influential similarity semantic analysis of counterfactual conditionals. I examine Lewis’ attempt and criticisms it was exposed to in the literature. By focusing on the criticism by Penelope Mackie, I show that Lewis’ analysis can be fortified in a way consistent with his basic project so that it withstands the examined criticisms. However, one important consequence of this fortification is that its success depends on his counterfactual theory of causation. This means that every (successful) criticism of Lewis’ theory of causation is a fortiori a (successful) criticism of his analysis of the relevant asymmetry of time.