Dva izazova tradicionalnoj koncepciji moralne odgovornosti

Abstract

Iako je teško govoriti o opšteprihvaćenoj analizi pojma moralne odgovornosti, savremeni filozofi gravitiraju ka definiciji koja se sastoji od dva zahteva: epistemičkog uslova (posedovanje sposobnosti poput razumevanja moralnih principa, odlučivanja, navođenja razloga u prilog postupka i sl.) i uslova kontrole (npr. odsustvo prinude ili manipulacije). Uslovi su koncipirani na takav način da se nosiocem moralne odgovornosti može smatrati isključivo pojedinačna odrasla osoba. Savremeno društvo, koje karakterišu tehnološki razvoj i inovacije, suočava nas sa dva fenomena koji potencijalno predstavljaju problem za tradicionalno shvatanje moralne odgovornosti, proizvodeći jaz u odgovornosti. Uprkos izvesnim sličnostima, ove dve pojave na različite načine dovode do pomenutog jaza, te sugerišu različita rešenja. Prvi fenomen koji potencijalno dovodi do jaza je problem mnogih ruku, odnosno problem pripisivanja individualne odgovornosti u kolektivnim okruženjima. Mnogi autori tvrde da je jaz iluzoran i da ga možemo premostiti uvođenjem nove koncepcije odgovornosti: kolektivne moralne odgovornosti. Visok stepen tehničke autonomije sistema veštačke inteligencije implicira još jedan fenomen koji motiviše jaz u odgovornosti. Zahtev za premošćavanjem ovog jaza sugeriše još radikalnije reinterpretacije ustaljenih koncepcija moralne odgovornosti, te filozofi predlažu da u obzir uzmemo mogućnost da locus moralne odgovornosti bude postavljen na veštačkim sistemima. Oba rešenja su kontroverzna utoliko što nije jasno kako bi predloženi nosioci moralne odgovornosti mogli da ispune uslove za odgovornost koje propisuje tradicionalna koncepcija. Cilj je ispitati da li je pretpostavljeni problem jaza u odgovornosti dovoljan da nas motiviše da revidiramo naše ustaljene prakse pripisivanja odgovornosti.

Although it is difficult to talk about the generally accepted analysis of moral responsibility, contemporary philosophers lean towards a definition comprised of two requirements: an epistemic condition (possessing abilities such as understanding moral principles, making decisions, giving reasons for action, and alike) and a control condition (absence of coercion or manipulation). These two conditions are such that only an individual adult can be considered the bearer of moral responsibility. Contemporary society, characterized by technological development and innovation, confronts us with two phenomena that potentially represent a problem for the traditional understanding of moral responsibility, producing the so­called responsibility gap. Despite certain similarities, these two phenomena lead to the gap differently, suggesting distinct solutions. The first phenomenon that potentially leads to the gap is the problem of many hands, namely the problem of attributing individual responsibility in collective environments. Many authors claim the gap is illusory and that we may bridge it by introducing a new conception of responsibility: collective moral responsibility. A high degree of technical autonomy that artificial intelligence systems possess implies another phenomenon motivating the responsibility gap. The request to bridge this gap indicates even more radical reinterpretations of established conceptions of moral responsibility, and philosophers suggest considering artificial systems as the locus of moral responsibility. Both solutions are controversial insofar as it is not clear how the proposed bearers of moral responsibility could meet the conditions for responsibility prescribed by the traditional conception. The aim is to examine whether the problem of the responsibility gap is enough to motivate us to revise our established practices of attribution of responsibility.