TY  - THES
AU  - Mijić, Jelena
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://uvidok.rcub.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5095
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4438
AB  - Predmet ove disertacije se u najširem smislu može posmatrati kao odgovor na meta-epistemološko pitanje o zadatku epistemologije i načinu na koji bi epistemološki projekat trebalo voditi. U radu prikazujemo i kritički analiziramo debatu savremenih metafilozofa o ulozi, a posledično i prirodi intuicija u savremenoj analitičkoj filozofiji.
Osnovni cilj našeg rada je da odbranimo stav da epistemičke intuicije igraju ulogu evidencije u okviru metoda analize pojma znanja. Ovaj stav deo je standardne slike o epistemološkoj metodologiji koja se poslednjih godina dovodi u pitanje, kako od strane naučno orijentisanih filozofskih naturalista, tako i filozofskih tradicionalista. Kao ključni problem izdvajamo neuspeh zastupnika standardne slike o filozofskoj metodologiji da ponude odgovor na pitanje prirode intuicija. Prema našem mišljenju ovaj neuspeh posledica je propusta koji prave kako zastupnici, tako i kritičari pozivanja na intuicije u filozofiji kada pristupaju ovoj metafilozofskoj debati. Jednom kada uvidimo da moramo podrobnije razumeti metode u okviru kojih se pozivamo na intuicije, uočićemo da filozofske intuicije ne smemo posmatrati kao homogenu klasu, već da ispitivanju njihove prirode moramo pristupiti u okviru pojedinačnih filozofskih disciplina.
Kada smo ovu strategiju primenili u našem istraživanju došli smo do zaključka da intuicije kao izraz pojmovne kompetencije igraju ulogu evidencije u metodima pojmovne analize i misaonog eksperimenta koji su karakteristični za savremenu analitičku epistemologiju.
AB  - The subject of this dissertation is broadly conceived as a meta-epistemological question of the task of epistemology and how the epistemological project should be conducted. We present and critically analyze the debate of contemporary metaphilosophers about the role and, consequently, the nature of intuitions in contemporary analytic philosophy.
The main goal of our work is to defend the position that epistemic intuitions play the role of evidence within the conceptual analysis of knowledge. This position is part of the standard view on the epistemological methodology that has been called into question in recent years, both by scientifically oriented philosophical naturalists and philosophical traditionalists. As a key problem, we single out the failure of representatives of the standard picture of philosophical methodology to answer the question of the nature of intuitions. In our opinion, this failure is a consequence of the omissions made by both advocates and critics of appeals to intuitions in philosophy when approaching this metaphilosophical debate. Once we thoroughly understand the methods referring to intuitions, we will see that philosophical intuitions should not be considered a homogeneous class. This implies that the question of their nature should be answered within the framework of individual philosophical disciplines.
When applied to epistemology, the strategy showed that intuitions as an expression of conceptual competence play the role of evidence in the methods of conceptual analysis and thought experiments common in contemporary analytic epistemology.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet
T1  - Uloga intuicija u epistemologiji
T1  - The role of intuitions in epistemology
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4438
ER  - 

@phdthesis{
author = "Mijić, Jelena",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Predmet ove disertacije se u najširem smislu može posmatrati kao odgovor na meta-epistemološko pitanje o zadatku epistemologije i načinu na koji bi epistemološki projekat trebalo voditi. U radu prikazujemo i kritički analiziramo debatu savremenih metafilozofa o ulozi, a posledično i prirodi intuicija u savremenoj analitičkoj filozofiji.
Osnovni cilj našeg rada je da odbranimo stav da epistemičke intuicije igraju ulogu evidencije u okviru metoda analize pojma znanja. Ovaj stav deo je standardne slike o epistemološkoj metodologiji koja se poslednjih godina dovodi u pitanje, kako od strane naučno orijentisanih filozofskih naturalista, tako i filozofskih tradicionalista. Kao ključni problem izdvajamo neuspeh zastupnika standardne slike o filozofskoj metodologiji da ponude odgovor na pitanje prirode intuicija. Prema našem mišljenju ovaj neuspeh posledica je propusta koji prave kako zastupnici, tako i kritičari pozivanja na intuicije u filozofiji kada pristupaju ovoj metafilozofskoj debati. Jednom kada uvidimo da moramo podrobnije razumeti metode u okviru kojih se pozivamo na intuicije, uočićemo da filozofske intuicije ne smemo posmatrati kao homogenu klasu, već da ispitivanju njihove prirode moramo pristupiti u okviru pojedinačnih filozofskih disciplina.
Kada smo ovu strategiju primenili u našem istraživanju došli smo do zaključka da intuicije kao izraz pojmovne kompetencije igraju ulogu evidencije u metodima pojmovne analize i misaonog eksperimenta koji su karakteristični za savremenu analitičku epistemologiju., The subject of this dissertation is broadly conceived as a meta-epistemological question of the task of epistemology and how the epistemological project should be conducted. We present and critically analyze the debate of contemporary metaphilosophers about the role and, consequently, the nature of intuitions in contemporary analytic philosophy.
The main goal of our work is to defend the position that epistemic intuitions play the role of evidence within the conceptual analysis of knowledge. This position is part of the standard view on the epistemological methodology that has been called into question in recent years, both by scientifically oriented philosophical naturalists and philosophical traditionalists. As a key problem, we single out the failure of representatives of the standard picture of philosophical methodology to answer the question of the nature of intuitions. In our opinion, this failure is a consequence of the omissions made by both advocates and critics of appeals to intuitions in philosophy when approaching this metaphilosophical debate. Once we thoroughly understand the methods referring to intuitions, we will see that philosophical intuitions should not be considered a homogeneous class. This implies that the question of their nature should be answered within the framework of individual philosophical disciplines.
When applied to epistemology, the strategy showed that intuitions as an expression of conceptual competence play the role of evidence in the methods of conceptual analysis and thought experiments common in contemporary analytic epistemology.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet",
title = "Uloga intuicija u epistemologiji, The role of intuitions in epistemology",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4438"
}

Mijić, J.. (2022). Uloga intuicija u epistemologiji. 
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4438

Mijić J. Uloga intuicija u epistemologiji. 2022;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4438 .

Mijić, Jelena, "Uloga intuicija u epistemologiji" (2022),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4438 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Akkad, Il
AU  - Radenović, Ljiljana
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5654
AB  - Questions about the nature of emotions and the role of emotional expressions have been
addressed frequently in the study of the history of emotions. However, the extent to which
emotional suffering is present in the cultures and societies of the past is seldom queried.
Our first goal is to identify criteria that historians of emotions can use to evaluate the
emotional suffering of the people they study. We locate these criteria not in the theory of
emotions, whether Norbert Elias’s psychoanalytic theory or William M. Reddy’s theory of
emotives, but in the theory of basic, universal human needs proposed by Richard M. Ryan
and Edward L. Deci. Although we agree with most contemporary historians of emotions
that emotions themselves can be understood only within the context of a particular culture, we propose that additional inquiry into basic needs and their satisfaction could help
historians of emotions cast more light on the inner lives of the members of the societies
they investigate. Our second goal is to apply these insights to the case of acedia, a peculiar psychological state experienced by the Desert Fathers. We examine what acedia was
for the Desert Fathers by analyzing Evagrius’s writings. Our goal here is to capture what
historians of emotions regularly do; that is, we aim to reconstruct how monks of the fourth
century felt, expressed, and thought about emotions from within their own monastic culture. In addition, we analyze acedia from the perspective of the theory of needs. In this
way, we hope to show how the theory of needs can help historians in their endeavors to
understand the past.
PB  - Middletown, Connecticut : Wesleyan University
T2  - History and Theory
T1  - History of Emotional Suffering: from emotions to needs in the history of emotions
EP  - 123
IS  - 61
SP  - 96
DO  - 10.1111/hith.12245
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Akkad, Il and Radenović, Ljiljana",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Questions about the nature of emotions and the role of emotional expressions have been
addressed frequently in the study of the history of emotions. However, the extent to which
emotional suffering is present in the cultures and societies of the past is seldom queried.
Our first goal is to identify criteria that historians of emotions can use to evaluate the
emotional suffering of the people they study. We locate these criteria not in the theory of
emotions, whether Norbert Elias’s psychoanalytic theory or William M. Reddy’s theory of
emotives, but in the theory of basic, universal human needs proposed by Richard M. Ryan
and Edward L. Deci. Although we agree with most contemporary historians of emotions
that emotions themselves can be understood only within the context of a particular culture, we propose that additional inquiry into basic needs and their satisfaction could help
historians of emotions cast more light on the inner lives of the members of the societies
they investigate. Our second goal is to apply these insights to the case of acedia, a peculiar psychological state experienced by the Desert Fathers. We examine what acedia was
for the Desert Fathers by analyzing Evagrius’s writings. Our goal here is to capture what
historians of emotions regularly do; that is, we aim to reconstruct how monks of the fourth
century felt, expressed, and thought about emotions from within their own monastic culture. In addition, we analyze acedia from the perspective of the theory of needs. In this
way, we hope to show how the theory of needs can help historians in their endeavors to
understand the past.",
publisher = "Middletown, Connecticut : Wesleyan University",
journal = "History and Theory",
title = "History of Emotional Suffering: from emotions to needs in the history of emotions",
pages = "123-96",
number = "61",
doi = "10.1111/hith.12245"
}

Akkad, I.,& Radenović, L.. (2022). History of Emotional Suffering: from emotions to needs in the history of emotions. in History and Theory
Middletown, Connecticut : Wesleyan University.(61), 96-123.
https://doi.org/10.1111/hith.12245

Akkad I, Radenović L. History of Emotional Suffering: from emotions to needs in the history of emotions. in History and Theory. 2022;(61):96-123.
doi:10.1111/hith.12245 .

Akkad, Il, Radenović, Ljiljana, "History of Emotional Suffering: from emotions to needs in the history of emotions" in History and Theory, no. 61 (2022):96-123,
https://doi.org/10.1111/hith.12245 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Stamenković, Bogdana
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4113
AB  - This paper provides epistemological support for one of Hume’s numerous critiques of the teleological arguments for God’s existence. Hume explores the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to the work of an intelligent creator? The answer, presented through the character of Philo, appears to be positive. I will try to defend this position. Following Hume’s theory of space, and exploring the relation between ideas of the whole and relation, I will show the universe can be seen as finite space with definite numbers of parts which are spatially and causally interconnected. Because all changes occur on the basis of Hume’s principle of causation, we can say the harmony of the universe is established and maintained precisely because of the changes happening on the basis of causation. If this is the case, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant.
AB  - Ovaj rad pruža epistemološku podršku jednoj od Hjumovih mnogobrojnih kritika
teleoloških argumenata za postojanje Boga. Hjum razmatra sledeće pitanje: da li
možemo objasniti opažljivu harmoniju univerzuma bez pozivanja na delovanje inteligentnog tvorca? Odgovor je predstavljen kroz lik Filona i on je, čini se, pozitivan.
Pokušaću da odbranim ovaj stav. Razmatrajući Hjumovu teoriju prostora i analizirajući
relaciju između ideja celine i relacije, pokazaću da se univerzum može posmatrati kao
konačan prostor sa određenim, konačnim brojem delova koji su međusobno povezani
prostornim i uzročnim relacijama. Ukoliko se sve promene dešavaju na osnovu Hjumovog principa uzročnosti, možemo reći da se harmonija univerzuma uspostavlja i
održava upravo zahvaljujući promenama koje su bazirane na ovom principu. No, ako
je to slučaj, uloga inteligentnog tvorca postaje suvišna.
PB  - Srpsko Filozofsko Društvo (Serbian Philosophical Society)
T2  - Theoria, Beograd
T1  - Hume, Dialogues and Harmony of the Universe
T1  - Hjum, Dijalozi i harmonija univerzuma
EP  - 89
IS  - 4
SP  - 77
VL  - 65
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2204077S
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Stamenković, Bogdana",
year = "2022",
abstract = "This paper provides epistemological support for one of Hume’s numerous critiques of the teleological arguments for God’s existence. Hume explores the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to the work of an intelligent creator? The answer, presented through the character of Philo, appears to be positive. I will try to defend this position. Following Hume’s theory of space, and exploring the relation between ideas of the whole and relation, I will show the universe can be seen as finite space with definite numbers of parts which are spatially and causally interconnected. Because all changes occur on the basis of Hume’s principle of causation, we can say the harmony of the universe is established and maintained precisely because of the changes happening on the basis of causation. If this is the case, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant., Ovaj rad pruža epistemološku podršku jednoj od Hjumovih mnogobrojnih kritika
teleoloških argumenata za postojanje Boga. Hjum razmatra sledeće pitanje: da li
možemo objasniti opažljivu harmoniju univerzuma bez pozivanja na delovanje inteligentnog tvorca? Odgovor je predstavljen kroz lik Filona i on je, čini se, pozitivan.
Pokušaću da odbranim ovaj stav. Razmatrajući Hjumovu teoriju prostora i analizirajući
relaciju između ideja celine i relacije, pokazaću da se univerzum može posmatrati kao
konačan prostor sa određenim, konačnim brojem delova koji su međusobno povezani
prostornim i uzročnim relacijama. Ukoliko se sve promene dešavaju na osnovu Hjumovog principa uzročnosti, možemo reći da se harmonija univerzuma uspostavlja i
održava upravo zahvaljujući promenama koje su bazirane na ovom principu. No, ako
je to slučaj, uloga inteligentnog tvorca postaje suvišna.",
publisher = "Srpsko Filozofsko Društvo (Serbian Philosophical Society)",
journal = "Theoria, Beograd",
title = "Hume, Dialogues and Harmony of the Universe, Hjum, Dijalozi i harmonija univerzuma",
pages = "89-77",
number = "4",
volume = "65",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2204077S"
}

Stamenković, B.. (2022). Hume, Dialogues and Harmony of the Universe. in Theoria, Beograd
Srpsko Filozofsko Društvo (Serbian Philosophical Society)., 65(4), 77-89.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204077S

Stamenković B. Hume, Dialogues and Harmony of the Universe. in Theoria, Beograd. 2022;65(4):77-89.
doi:10.2298/THEO2204077S .

Stamenković, Bogdana, "Hume, Dialogues and Harmony of the Universe" in Theoria, Beograd, 65, no. 4 (2022):77-89,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204077S . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Subotić, Vanja
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3411
AB  - Pre trideset godina, Vilijem Remzi, Stiven Stič i Džozef Geron su u zajedničkom radu izneli argument u prilog sledećeg kondicionala: ako konekcionistički modeli koji implementiraju paralelno distriburirano procesiranje predstavljaju vernu sliku ljudskih kognitivnih procesa, onda je eliminativizam u pogledu propozicijskih stavova ispravna teza. Korolar njihovog argumenta, ukoliko se pokaže kao zdrav, jeste da za zdravorazumsku psihologiju nema mesta u savremenoj kognitivnoj nauci. Ovakvo viđenje konekcionizma – kao hipoteze o kognitivnoj arhitekturi kompatibilne sa eliminativizmom – karakteristično je i za Pola Čerčlanda, radikalnog protivnika zdravorazumske psihologije. Cilj ovog rada je da se ispita u kojoj meri sadašnji metodološki rafinirani konekcionistički modeli, bazirani na neuronskim mrežama dugog kratkoročnog pamćenja, potvrđuju argumente kako Remzija i kolega, tako i Čerčlanda. Argumentovaću u prilog eliminativizma ograničenog uticaja. Naime, tvrdiću da to što konekcionistička kognitivna nauka nema potrebu za zdravorazumskom psihologijom qua teorijom ne povlači za sobom nelegitimnost zdravorazumske psihologije per se u drugim naučnim domenima, ukoliko se zdravorazumska psihologija shvati kao korisna heuristika.
AB  - Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Zdravorazumska psihologija, eliminativizam i sadašnjost konekcionizma
T1  - Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, And The Present State of Connectionism
EP  - 196
IS  - 1
SP  - 173
VL  - 64
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2101173S
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Subotić, Vanja",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Pre trideset godina, Vilijem Remzi, Stiven Stič i Džozef Geron su u zajedničkom radu izneli argument u prilog sledećeg kondicionala: ako konekcionistički modeli koji implementiraju paralelno distriburirano procesiranje predstavljaju vernu sliku ljudskih kognitivnih procesa, onda je eliminativizam u pogledu propozicijskih stavova ispravna teza. Korolar njihovog argumenta, ukoliko se pokaže kao zdrav, jeste da za zdravorazumsku psihologiju nema mesta u savremenoj kognitivnoj nauci. Ovakvo viđenje konekcionizma – kao hipoteze o kognitivnoj arhitekturi kompatibilne sa eliminativizmom – karakteristično je i za Pola Čerčlanda, radikalnog protivnika zdravorazumske psihologije. Cilj ovog rada je da se ispita u kojoj meri sadašnji metodološki rafinirani konekcionistički modeli, bazirani na neuronskim mrežama dugog kratkoročnog pamćenja, potvrđuju argumente kako Remzija i kolega, tako i Čerčlanda. Argumentovaću u prilog eliminativizma ograničenog uticaja. Naime, tvrdiću da to što konekcionistička kognitivna nauka nema potrebu za zdravorazumskom psihologijom qua teorijom ne povlači za sobom nelegitimnost zdravorazumske psihologije per se u drugim naučnim domenima, ukoliko se zdravorazumska psihologija shvati kao korisna heuristika., Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Zdravorazumska psihologija, eliminativizam i sadašnjost konekcionizma, Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, And The Present State of Connectionism",
pages = "196-173",
number = "1",
volume = "64",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2101173S"
}

Subotić, V.. (2021). Zdravorazumska psihologija, eliminativizam i sadašnjost konekcionizma. in Theoria
Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 64(1), 173-196.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2101173S

Subotić V. Zdravorazumska psihologija, eliminativizam i sadašnjost konekcionizma. in Theoria. 2021;64(1):173-196.
doi:10.2298/THEO2101173S .

Subotić, Vanja, "Zdravorazumska psihologija, eliminativizam i sadašnjost konekcionizma" in Theoria, 64, no. 1 (2021):173-196,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2101173S . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Subotić, Vanja
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3311
AB  - Cognitive scientists used to deem reasoning either as a higher cognitive process based on the manipulation of abstract rules or as a higher cognitive process that is stochastic rather than involving abstract rules. I maintain that these different perspectives are closely intertwined with a theoretical and methodological endorsement of either cognitivism or connectionism. Cognitivism and connectionism represent two prevailing and opposed paradigms in cognitive science. I aim to extoll the virtues of connectionist models of enthymematic reasoning by the following means: (1) via the phenomenon of creative enthymeme, viz. the inference where one cannot even articulate the missing premise, I introduce a connectionist mechanism of pattern recognition as underlying expertise; (2) via Gestalt switch or Gestalt click, I demonstrate how differences in pattern recognition of an expert and a novice can be construed as qualitatively different, and not merely a matter of faster reasoning.
PB  - Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb
T2  - Filozofska istraživanja
T1  - Logical Reasoning and Expertise: Extolling the Virtues of Connectionist Account of Enthymemes
EP  - 211
IS  - 1
SP  - 197
VL  - 41
DO  - 10.21464/fi41112
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Subotić, Vanja",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Cognitive scientists used to deem reasoning either as a higher cognitive process based on the manipulation of abstract rules or as a higher cognitive process that is stochastic rather than involving abstract rules. I maintain that these different perspectives are closely intertwined with a theoretical and methodological endorsement of either cognitivism or connectionism. Cognitivism and connectionism represent two prevailing and opposed paradigms in cognitive science. I aim to extoll the virtues of connectionist models of enthymematic reasoning by the following means: (1) via the phenomenon of creative enthymeme, viz. the inference where one cannot even articulate the missing premise, I introduce a connectionist mechanism of pattern recognition as underlying expertise; (2) via Gestalt switch or Gestalt click, I demonstrate how differences in pattern recognition of an expert and a novice can be construed as qualitatively different, and not merely a matter of faster reasoning.",
publisher = "Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb",
journal = "Filozofska istraživanja",
title = "Logical Reasoning and Expertise: Extolling the Virtues of Connectionist Account of Enthymemes",
pages = "211-197",
number = "1",
volume = "41",
doi = "10.21464/fi41112"
}

Subotić, V.. (2021). Logical Reasoning and Expertise: Extolling the Virtues of Connectionist Account of Enthymemes. in Filozofska istraživanja
Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb., 41(1), 197-211.
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi41112

Subotić V. Logical Reasoning and Expertise: Extolling the Virtues of Connectionist Account of Enthymemes. in Filozofska istraživanja. 2021;41(1):197-211.
doi:10.21464/fi41112 .

Subotić, Vanja, "Logical Reasoning and Expertise: Extolling the Virtues of Connectionist Account of Enthymemes" in Filozofska istraživanja, 41, no. 1 (2021):197-211,
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi41112 . .

TY  - THES
AU  - Kostić, Jovana
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=8363
UR  - https://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:24223/bdef:Content/download
UR  - http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=48617993
UR  - https://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/handle/123456789/18625
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3758
AB  - Ova doktorska disertacija bavi se samoreferencijom kao formalnim svojstvom intenzionalnogznacenja jezickih izraza, pre svega predikata. Formalna svojstva intenzionalnog znacenja predikatatrebalo bi da budu predmet nove logicke teorije koju je zamislio i u kratkim crtama opisaojedan od najznacajnijih logicara i matematicara prošlog veka, ali i uopšte - Kurt Gedel (KurtGödel). Pošto je koristio termin pojam za svojstva ili relacije koje cine intenzionalno znacenjepredikata, Gedel je tu teoriju nazvao teorija pojmova. Brojne, ali kratke i cesto zagonetne,Gedelove napomene svedoce o njegovom ocekivanju da ta teorija postane za logiku centralna.Osobina pojmova koja dobija poseban znacaj u kontekstu zasnivanja formalne teorije koja senjima bavi jeste upravo njihova samoreferencija, tj. mogucnost primene pojma na samog sebe,kao i ucestvovanja pojma u gra enju sopstvenog znacenja. Glavni zadatak ovog rada je boljerazumevanje uloge ta dva oblika samoreferencije u zasnivanju i razvoju teorije pojmova. Videcemoda ona može biti trostruka. Pre svega, samoreferencija u odnosu na odre eni objekat mogucaje upravo zahvaljujuci intenzionalnom znacenju tog objekta. Ona tako ukazuje na formalnekarakteristike intenzionalnog znacenja na kojima se zasniva njena mogucnost i koje ga suštinskirazlikuju od ekstenzionalnog znacenja. Osim toga, samoreferencija može imati i znacajnu uloguu definisanju pojmova i dokazivanju njihovih svojstava. Konacno, odre ene instance pojmovnesamoreferencije vode paradoksima koji mogu ciniti teoriju u kojoj su formulisani protivrecnom.Rešavanje tih paradoksa bi trebalo da omoguci postavljanje osnova teorije pojmova.Ova disertacija podeljena je u cetiri dela. U uvodnom delu razjasnicemo osnovne termine kojecemo koristiti u disertaciji. Tako e cemo u kratkim crtama opisati istoriju samoreferencije iuticaj koji je imala na razvoj matematike. Taj uticaj je u najvecoj meri ostvaren preko njeneuloge u formulisanju paradoksa unutar matematickih teorija. Potreba da se ti paradoksi izbegnudovela je do promene u razumevanju osnovnih matematickih pojmova, kojom je samoreferencijastavljena izvan polja matematickih istraživanja.U drugom delu rada srešcemo se sa drugacijim gledanjem na samoreferenciju i njene potencijalnoparadoksalne posledice. U tom delu bavimo se teorijama u kojima je samoreferencijapostala standardno metodološko sredstvo, a njene paradoksalne posledice osnova za dolaženjedo važnih, tipicno negativnih, rezultata. Videcemo da razliciti oblici samoreferencije koji se utim oblastima javljaju imaju zajednicko jezgro koje objašnjava njihovu ulogu u dolaženju do tihrezultata ali i u formulisanju paradoksa.Treci deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se približimo razumevanju odnosa samoreferencije iintenzionalnog znacenja objekta u odnosu na koji se ona javlja. Time bi trebalo da se približimoi razumevanju formalnih osobina pojmova. U ovom delu rada tako e cemo detaljnije opisatiparadokse kojima pojmovna samoreferencija vodi. Branicemo rešenje tih paradoksa koje sezasniva na ogranicavanju smislene primenljivosti pojma i redefinisanju komplementa pojma.Pokušacemo da pokažemo da to rešenje, ako je formulisano u okviru intuicionisticke logike,predstavlja solidnu osnovu teorije pojmova. Zakljucni deo rada sumira rezultate istraživanja i objašnjava Gedelovu filozofsku poziciju injenu vezu sa teorijom pojmova
AB  - This doctoral dissertation is a study of self-reference as a formal property that characterizesthe intensional meaning of some linguistic expressions, such as predicates. Formal propertiesof intensional meanings of predicates are supposed to be the subject matter of a new logicaltheory that is envisioned and briefly described by one of the most important logicians andmathematicians of the last century, and in general - Kurt Gödel. Since he used the term conceptto denote the properties or relations that form the intensional meaning of predicates, Gödeltermed such a theory the theory of concepts. His numerous, but short and often enigmatic,remarks show that he expected this theory to become central to logic.A property of concepts that assumes a special importance in the context of establishing aformal theory that studies them, is just their self-reference, i.e. the possibility of an applicationof a concept to itself, or of its containment in its own meaning. Better understanding of therole that both kinds of self-reference have in establishing and developing the theory of conceptswill be the main goal of this work. We will see that this role can be threefold. First of all, thepossibility of self-reference with respect to some object depends on its intensional meaning. Itcan thus expose some formal properties of intensional meaning on which it rests and whichcrucially distinguish it from the extensional meaning. Besides that, the self-reference can have asignificant methodological use in the future theory, where it can participate in the definitions ofconcepts and in the proofs of their properties. Finally, some instances of self-reference lead toparadoxes, that can make the theory in which they are formulated inconsistent. An appropriatesolution to these paradoxes should set the ground for the theory of concepts.This dissertation is divided into four parts. In the first part we explain the terms we will beusing throughout the work. We also briefly describe the history of self-reference and the influenceit had on the development of mathematics. This influence is accomplished mainly through therole that self-reference had in the formulation of paradoxes inside mathematical theories. Theneed to avoid these paradoxes has led to a change in the way some basic mathematical notionsare understood, which put the considerations of self-reference outside the field of mathematicalinvestigation.In the second part we see quite a different attitude towards the self-reference and its consequences,that became a standardly used tool in particular areas of logic. The apparentlyparadoxical consequences of self-reference are inside these theories transformed into some important,mostly negative, results. We will see that different forms of self-reference that appear inthese areas share a common core which explains their role in achieving these results, but also inderiving different paradoxes.The third part is an attempt at approaching the question of the connection between theself-reference with respect to some entity and its intensional understanding. This should bring uscloser to understanding the formal properties of concepts that embody this intensional meaning.This part also tries to trace an adequate solution to the intensional paradoxes, guided by theremarks Gödel made on the subject. We argue in favor of one particular solution accomplished byrestricting the meaningful applicability of concepts, and redefining the notion of a complementof some concept. We will try to show that, if developed inside intuitionistic logic, this solutionmakes for a solid basis of the future theory.vIn the final part we review the results of the investigation and describe Gödel’s philosophicalposition which explains his interest in the theory of concepts.
PB  - Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет
T2  - Универзитет у Београду
T1  - Samoreferencija i teorija pojmova
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18625
ER  - 

@phdthesis{
author = "Kostić, Jovana",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Ova doktorska disertacija bavi se samoreferencijom kao formalnim svojstvom intenzionalnogznacenja jezickih izraza, pre svega predikata. Formalna svojstva intenzionalnog znacenja predikatatrebalo bi da budu predmet nove logicke teorije koju je zamislio i u kratkim crtama opisaojedan od najznacajnijih logicara i matematicara prošlog veka, ali i uopšte - Kurt Gedel (KurtGödel). Pošto je koristio termin pojam za svojstva ili relacije koje cine intenzionalno znacenjepredikata, Gedel je tu teoriju nazvao teorija pojmova. Brojne, ali kratke i cesto zagonetne,Gedelove napomene svedoce o njegovom ocekivanju da ta teorija postane za logiku centralna.Osobina pojmova koja dobija poseban znacaj u kontekstu zasnivanja formalne teorije koja senjima bavi jeste upravo njihova samoreferencija, tj. mogucnost primene pojma na samog sebe,kao i ucestvovanja pojma u gra enju sopstvenog znacenja. Glavni zadatak ovog rada je boljerazumevanje uloge ta dva oblika samoreferencije u zasnivanju i razvoju teorije pojmova. Videcemoda ona može biti trostruka. Pre svega, samoreferencija u odnosu na odre eni objekat mogucaje upravo zahvaljujuci intenzionalnom znacenju tog objekta. Ona tako ukazuje na formalnekarakteristike intenzionalnog znacenja na kojima se zasniva njena mogucnost i koje ga suštinskirazlikuju od ekstenzionalnog znacenja. Osim toga, samoreferencija može imati i znacajnu uloguu definisanju pojmova i dokazivanju njihovih svojstava. Konacno, odre ene instance pojmovnesamoreferencije vode paradoksima koji mogu ciniti teoriju u kojoj su formulisani protivrecnom.Rešavanje tih paradoksa bi trebalo da omoguci postavljanje osnova teorije pojmova.Ova disertacija podeljena je u cetiri dela. U uvodnom delu razjasnicemo osnovne termine kojecemo koristiti u disertaciji. Tako e cemo u kratkim crtama opisati istoriju samoreferencije iuticaj koji je imala na razvoj matematike. Taj uticaj je u najvecoj meri ostvaren preko njeneuloge u formulisanju paradoksa unutar matematickih teorija. Potreba da se ti paradoksi izbegnudovela je do promene u razumevanju osnovnih matematickih pojmova, kojom je samoreferencijastavljena izvan polja matematickih istraživanja.U drugom delu rada srešcemo se sa drugacijim gledanjem na samoreferenciju i njene potencijalnoparadoksalne posledice. U tom delu bavimo se teorijama u kojima je samoreferencijapostala standardno metodološko sredstvo, a njene paradoksalne posledice osnova za dolaženjedo važnih, tipicno negativnih, rezultata. Videcemo da razliciti oblici samoreferencije koji se utim oblastima javljaju imaju zajednicko jezgro koje objašnjava njihovu ulogu u dolaženju do tihrezultata ali i u formulisanju paradoksa.Treci deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se približimo razumevanju odnosa samoreferencije iintenzionalnog znacenja objekta u odnosu na koji se ona javlja. Time bi trebalo da se približimoi razumevanju formalnih osobina pojmova. U ovom delu rada tako e cemo detaljnije opisatiparadokse kojima pojmovna samoreferencija vodi. Branicemo rešenje tih paradoksa koje sezasniva na ogranicavanju smislene primenljivosti pojma i redefinisanju komplementa pojma.Pokušacemo da pokažemo da to rešenje, ako je formulisano u okviru intuicionisticke logike,predstavlja solidnu osnovu teorije pojmova. Zakljucni deo rada sumira rezultate istraživanja i objašnjava Gedelovu filozofsku poziciju injenu vezu sa teorijom pojmova, This doctoral dissertation is a study of self-reference as a formal property that characterizesthe intensional meaning of some linguistic expressions, such as predicates. Formal propertiesof intensional meanings of predicates are supposed to be the subject matter of a new logicaltheory that is envisioned and briefly described by one of the most important logicians andmathematicians of the last century, and in general - Kurt Gödel. Since he used the term conceptto denote the properties or relations that form the intensional meaning of predicates, Gödeltermed such a theory the theory of concepts. His numerous, but short and often enigmatic,remarks show that he expected this theory to become central to logic.A property of concepts that assumes a special importance in the context of establishing aformal theory that studies them, is just their self-reference, i.e. the possibility of an applicationof a concept to itself, or of its containment in its own meaning. Better understanding of therole that both kinds of self-reference have in establishing and developing the theory of conceptswill be the main goal of this work. We will see that this role can be threefold. First of all, thepossibility of self-reference with respect to some object depends on its intensional meaning. Itcan thus expose some formal properties of intensional meaning on which it rests and whichcrucially distinguish it from the extensional meaning. Besides that, the self-reference can have asignificant methodological use in the future theory, where it can participate in the definitions ofconcepts and in the proofs of their properties. Finally, some instances of self-reference lead toparadoxes, that can make the theory in which they are formulated inconsistent. An appropriatesolution to these paradoxes should set the ground for the theory of concepts.This dissertation is divided into four parts. In the first part we explain the terms we will beusing throughout the work. We also briefly describe the history of self-reference and the influenceit had on the development of mathematics. This influence is accomplished mainly through therole that self-reference had in the formulation of paradoxes inside mathematical theories. Theneed to avoid these paradoxes has led to a change in the way some basic mathematical notionsare understood, which put the considerations of self-reference outside the field of mathematicalinvestigation.In the second part we see quite a different attitude towards the self-reference and its consequences,that became a standardly used tool in particular areas of logic. The apparentlyparadoxical consequences of self-reference are inside these theories transformed into some important,mostly negative, results. We will see that different forms of self-reference that appear inthese areas share a common core which explains their role in achieving these results, but also inderiving different paradoxes.The third part is an attempt at approaching the question of the connection between theself-reference with respect to some entity and its intensional understanding. This should bring uscloser to understanding the formal properties of concepts that embody this intensional meaning.This part also tries to trace an adequate solution to the intensional paradoxes, guided by theremarks Gödel made on the subject. We argue in favor of one particular solution accomplished byrestricting the meaningful applicability of concepts, and redefining the notion of a complementof some concept. We will try to show that, if developed inside intuitionistic logic, this solutionmakes for a solid basis of the future theory.vIn the final part we review the results of the investigation and describe Gödel’s philosophicalposition which explains his interest in the theory of concepts.",
publisher = "Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет",
journal = "Универзитет у Београду",
title = "Samoreferencija i teorija pojmova",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18625"
}

Kostić, J.. (2021). Samoreferencija i teorija pojmova. in Универзитет у Београду
Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18625

Kostić J. Samoreferencija i teorija pojmova. in Универзитет у Београду. 2021;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18625 .

Kostić, Jovana, "Samoreferencija i teorija pojmova" in Универзитет у Београду (2021),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18625 .

TY  - THES
AU  - Plećaš, Tamara
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=8171
UR  - http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=39966473
UR  - https://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/handle/123456789/18367
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/115
AB  - U ovoj disertaciji sprovodimo iscrpnu analizu ključnih segmenata Epiktetove etike. Glavni cilj nam je da utvrdimo u čemu se sastoji Epiktetov doprinos stoičkoj etici, a posredno i stoičkoj filozofiji, imajući u vidu da su etička razmatranja, još od perioda ranog stoicizma, blisko povezana sa pitanjima koja proučava logika i fizika. Pored toga, cilj nam je da utvrdimo u kojoj meri Epiktet sledi tradicionalnu stoičku argumentaciju i podelu etike, a samim tim, i u čemu se sastoji njegova inovativnost. Takođe, cilj nam je da ustanovimo koji su filozofi, osim ranih stoika i Musonija Rufa, formativno uticali ne samo na razvoj Epiktetove misli, već i na Epiktetov pedagoški i učiteljski rad. Tokom pisanja smo se služili uobičajenom metodologijom humanističkih nauka, sa posebnim fokusom na jezičko-pojmovnoj analizi, komparativnoj metodi i, na kraju, istorijsko-filozofskoj egzegezi. Razumevajući filozofiju i kao praktičnu aktivnost ili svojevrsno „umeće življenja“, odnosno kao poziv koji se ne iscrpljuje samo u tumačenju filozofskih tekstova, Epiktet u središte svojih etičkih razmatranja stavlja čovekov moralni karakter (προαίρεσις). Ukazaćemo da nije sporno da Epiktet u velikoj meri sledi filozofsku tradiciju iz koje je ponikao, što je i saglasno sa njegovom učiteljskom ulogom. Pokazaće se da je ono što Epikteta posebno izdvaja u odnosu na njegove stoičke prethodnike, insistiranje na dobrom προαίρεσις-u i slobodi koja vodi do moralne odgovornosti. Zaključićemo, pored toga, i da je podela etike koju predlaže Epiktet, drugačija u odnosu na podele ranih stoika, ali da je istovremeno reč o podeli koja, u velikoj meri, uključuje i sve najvažnije segmente tradicionalne stoičke etike.
AB  - In this dissertation we will provide a detailed analysis of the key segments of Epictetus' ethics. Our main goal is to determine how Epictetus contributed to Stoic ethics and, indirectly, to Stoic philosophy, having in mind that ethical thought in Stoicism has been closely tied to logic and physics since the period of early Stoa. In addition, we will attempt to determine to what extent Epictetus follows traditional Stoic argumentation and the division of ethical topics, and in which aspects he is an innovative thinker. Furthermore, we aim to find out which philosophers, besides the early Stoics and Musonius Rufus, influenced not only the development of Epictetus' philosophical thought but also his pedagogical work and teaching. In our research we apply the standard methodological tools of the humanities, with a focus on the philosophical method of conceptual analysis, comparative analysis, and a historical-critical exegesis. Epictetus considers philosophy not only a theoretical activity but at the same time a practical one, and he places moral character or προαίρεσις in the center of his ethical contemplation. We will show that Epictetus follows the philosophical tradition from which he originated, which is in accordance with his role as a teacher. It will be clear that what sets him apart from his predecessors is his insisting on good προαίρεσις and freedom that leads to moral responsibility. Besides that, we will conclude that although the division of ethical topics which Epictetus proposes is different than the ones proposed by the early Stoics, it is, at the same time, a division that encompasses to a great extent all of the most important segments of traditional Stoic ethics.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet
T1  - Epiktetova etika
T1  - Epictetus' ethics
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18367
ER  - 

@phdthesis{
author = "Plećaš, Tamara",
year = "2021",
abstract = "U ovoj disertaciji sprovodimo iscrpnu analizu ključnih segmenata Epiktetove etike. Glavni cilj nam je da utvrdimo u čemu se sastoji Epiktetov doprinos stoičkoj etici, a posredno i stoičkoj filozofiji, imajući u vidu da su etička razmatranja, još od perioda ranog stoicizma, blisko povezana sa pitanjima koja proučava logika i fizika. Pored toga, cilj nam je da utvrdimo u kojoj meri Epiktet sledi tradicionalnu stoičku argumentaciju i podelu etike, a samim tim, i u čemu se sastoji njegova inovativnost. Takođe, cilj nam je da ustanovimo koji su filozofi, osim ranih stoika i Musonija Rufa, formativno uticali ne samo na razvoj Epiktetove misli, već i na Epiktetov pedagoški i učiteljski rad. Tokom pisanja smo se služili uobičajenom metodologijom humanističkih nauka, sa posebnim fokusom na jezičko-pojmovnoj analizi, komparativnoj metodi i, na kraju, istorijsko-filozofskoj egzegezi. Razumevajući filozofiju i kao praktičnu aktivnost ili svojevrsno „umeće življenja“, odnosno kao poziv koji se ne iscrpljuje samo u tumačenju filozofskih tekstova, Epiktet u središte svojih etičkih razmatranja stavlja čovekov moralni karakter (προαίρεσις). Ukazaćemo da nije sporno da Epiktet u velikoj meri sledi filozofsku tradiciju iz koje je ponikao, što je i saglasno sa njegovom učiteljskom ulogom. Pokazaće se da je ono što Epikteta posebno izdvaja u odnosu na njegove stoičke prethodnike, insistiranje na dobrom προαίρεσις-u i slobodi koja vodi do moralne odgovornosti. Zaključićemo, pored toga, i da je podela etike koju predlaže Epiktet, drugačija u odnosu na podele ranih stoika, ali da je istovremeno reč o podeli koja, u velikoj meri, uključuje i sve najvažnije segmente tradicionalne stoičke etike., In this dissertation we will provide a detailed analysis of the key segments of Epictetus' ethics. Our main goal is to determine how Epictetus contributed to Stoic ethics and, indirectly, to Stoic philosophy, having in mind that ethical thought in Stoicism has been closely tied to logic and physics since the period of early Stoa. In addition, we will attempt to determine to what extent Epictetus follows traditional Stoic argumentation and the division of ethical topics, and in which aspects he is an innovative thinker. Furthermore, we aim to find out which philosophers, besides the early Stoics and Musonius Rufus, influenced not only the development of Epictetus' philosophical thought but also his pedagogical work and teaching. In our research we apply the standard methodological tools of the humanities, with a focus on the philosophical method of conceptual analysis, comparative analysis, and a historical-critical exegesis. Epictetus considers philosophy not only a theoretical activity but at the same time a practical one, and he places moral character or προαίρεσις in the center of his ethical contemplation. We will show that Epictetus follows the philosophical tradition from which he originated, which is in accordance with his role as a teacher. It will be clear that what sets him apart from his predecessors is his insisting on good προαίρεσις and freedom that leads to moral responsibility. Besides that, we will conclude that although the division of ethical topics which Epictetus proposes is different than the ones proposed by the early Stoics, it is, at the same time, a division that encompasses to a great extent all of the most important segments of traditional Stoic ethics.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet",
title = "Epiktetova etika, Epictetus' ethics",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18367"
}

Plećaš, T.. (2021). Epiktetova etika. 
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18367

Plećaš T. Epiktetova etika. 2021;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18367 .

Plećaš, Tamara, "Epiktetova etika" (2021),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_18367 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Perović, Slobodan
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3313
AB  - Ian Hacking has argued that the notions of experiment and observation are distinct, not even the opposite ends of a continuum. More recently, other authors have emphasised their continuity, saying it is futile to distinguish between them as they belong on a continuum of epistemic activities. I take a middle road by suggesting that in scientific practice, experiment and observation constitute a continuum, but we can identify methodological and pragmatic aspects that define it, as well as various points on it that meaningfully delineate scientific practices. I explain the implications of the location of research projects on the continuum for scientists' epistemic responsibilities and their ethical and funding concerns.
PB  - Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon
T2  - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
T1  - Observation, Experiment, and Scientific Practice
DO  - 10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Perović, Slobodan",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Ian Hacking has argued that the notions of experiment and observation are distinct, not even the opposite ends of a continuum. More recently, other authors have emphasised their continuity, saying it is futile to distinguish between them as they belong on a continuum of epistemic activities. I take a middle road by suggesting that in scientific practice, experiment and observation constitute a continuum, but we can identify methodological and pragmatic aspects that define it, as well as various points on it that meaningfully delineate scientific practices. I explain the implications of the location of research projects on the continuum for scientists' epistemic responsibilities and their ethical and funding concerns.",
publisher = "Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon",
journal = "International Studies in the Philosophy of Science",
title = "Observation, Experiment, and Scientific Practice",
doi = "10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038"
}

Perović, S.. (2021). Observation, Experiment, and Scientific Practice. in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon..
https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038

Perović S. Observation, Experiment, and Scientific Practice. in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2021;.
doi:10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038 .

Perović, Slobodan, "Observation, Experiment, and Scientific Practice" in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Stamenković, Bogdana
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3602
AB  - The aim of this paper is to analyse Alexander von Humboldt's
views on the theory of evolution and tackle the following question: Can
Humboldt be considered an evolutionist? I seek to show that Humboldt
acknowledges three essential Darwinian elements of the theory of
evolution: fossil records, the geographical distribution of species and the
struggle for survival. Further, Humboldt recognises a special relation
between the natural environment and organic life, and understands it in light
of his naturalistic holism. This holism reveals the unity of organic and
inorganic nature and highlights the agency of organic life whilst allowing it
to create and preserve the adaptive conditions in the natural environment.
Accordingly, I argue that Humboldt believes some kind of evolutionary
process happens in nature. However, due to the immense influence of
Kant’s transcendental study and the rigid utilisation of the empirical
method, Humboldt concludes that we cannot acquire knowledge of the
exact course of the evolutionary process. This, however, does not imply
Humboldt discredits the theory of evolution.
AB  - Cilj  ovog  rada  predstavlja  anliziranje  stavova Aleksandra  fon  Humbolta  o teoriji evolucije, kao i razmatranje sledećeg pitanja: da li se Humbolt može smatrati  evolucionistom?  Pokušaću  da  pokažem  da  Humbolt  prepoznaje  tri suštinska  darvinovska  elementa  teorije  evolucije:  evidenciju  putem  fosila, geografsku   rasprostranjenost   vrsta   i   borbu   za   opstanak.   Povrh   toga, Humbolt  uočava  specifičnu  relaciju  između  prirodne  sredine  i  organskog života koju tumači u svetlu svog naturalističkog holizma. Ovaj holizam nam otkriva  jedinstvo  organske  i  neorganske  prirode  i  naglašava  delovanje organskog života,  dok  mu  istovremeno  omogućava  da  kreira  i  održava adaptivne  uslove  u  prirodnoj  sredini.  Shodno  tome,  smatram  da  Humbolt veruje da se nekakav evolucioni proces dešava u prirodi. Ipak, zahvaljujući snažnom uticaju Kantovog transcendentalnog učenja, kao i stroge upotrebe empirijskog  metoda,  Humbolt  zaključuje  da  ne  možemo  imati  znanje  o tačnom toku  evolucionog procesa. Ovakav zaključak, pak, ne podrazumeva i potpuno diskreditovanje teorije evolucije.
PB  - Graphikon Teo, Dublin
T2  - The Nature of Science in Biology: A Resource for Educators
T1  - Alexander von Humboldt on Evolution of Natural Species
EP  - 214
SP  - 205
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_3602
ER  - 

@inbook{
editor = "McCloughlin, Thomas J.J.",
author = "Stamenković, Bogdana",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to analyse Alexander von Humboldt's
views on the theory of evolution and tackle the following question: Can
Humboldt be considered an evolutionist? I seek to show that Humboldt
acknowledges three essential Darwinian elements of the theory of
evolution: fossil records, the geographical distribution of species and the
struggle for survival. Further, Humboldt recognises a special relation
between the natural environment and organic life, and understands it in light
of his naturalistic holism. This holism reveals the unity of organic and
inorganic nature and highlights the agency of organic life whilst allowing it
to create and preserve the adaptive conditions in the natural environment.
Accordingly, I argue that Humboldt believes some kind of evolutionary
process happens in nature. However, due to the immense influence of
Kant’s transcendental study and the rigid utilisation of the empirical
method, Humboldt concludes that we cannot acquire knowledge of the
exact course of the evolutionary process. This, however, does not imply
Humboldt discredits the theory of evolution., Cilj  ovog  rada  predstavlja  anliziranje  stavova Aleksandra  fon  Humbolta  o teoriji evolucije, kao i razmatranje sledećeg pitanja: da li se Humbolt može smatrati  evolucionistom?  Pokušaću  da  pokažem  da  Humbolt  prepoznaje  tri suštinska  darvinovska  elementa  teorije  evolucije:  evidenciju  putem  fosila, geografsku   rasprostranjenost   vrsta   i   borbu   za   opstanak.   Povrh   toga, Humbolt  uočava  specifičnu  relaciju  između  prirodne  sredine  i  organskog života koju tumači u svetlu svog naturalističkog holizma. Ovaj holizam nam otkriva  jedinstvo  organske  i  neorganske  prirode  i  naglašava  delovanje organskog života,  dok  mu  istovremeno  omogućava  da  kreira  i  održava adaptivne  uslove  u  prirodnoj  sredini.  Shodno  tome,  smatram  da  Humbolt veruje da se nekakav evolucioni proces dešava u prirodi. Ipak, zahvaljujući snažnom uticaju Kantovog transcendentalnog učenja, kao i stroge upotrebe empirijskog  metoda,  Humbolt  zaključuje  da  ne  možemo  imati  znanje  o tačnom toku  evolucionog procesa. Ovakav zaključak, pak, ne podrazumeva i potpuno diskreditovanje teorije evolucije.",
publisher = "Graphikon Teo, Dublin",
journal = "The Nature of Science in Biology: A Resource for Educators",
booktitle = "Alexander von Humboldt on Evolution of Natural Species",
pages = "214-205",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_3602"
}

McCloughlin, T. J.J.,& Stamenković, B.. (2021). Alexander von Humboldt on Evolution of Natural Species. in The Nature of Science in Biology: A Resource for Educators
Graphikon Teo, Dublin., 205-214.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_3602

McCloughlin TJ, Stamenković B. Alexander von Humboldt on Evolution of Natural Species. in The Nature of Science in Biology: A Resource for Educators. 2021;:205-214.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_3602 .

McCloughlin, Thomas J.J., Stamenković, Bogdana, "Alexander von Humboldt on Evolution of Natural Species" in The Nature of Science in Biology: A Resource for Educators (2021):205-214,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_3602 .

TY  - CONF
AU  - Smajević Roljić, Milica
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4283
AB  - U ovom radu ispituje se Kantovo određenje prosvećenosti, kao i njegova 
aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji. Polazeći od Kantove čuvene definicije, prema kojoj 
samo onaj pojedinac koji se usudi da odbaci svoju nezrelost i poslušnost autoritetima može pretendovati da postane prosvećen, pokušaćemo da utvrdimo ko je glavni 
krivac za nedostatak prosvećenosti u modernim društvima. Iako svaki čovek snosi 
odgovornost za sopstvenu lenjost i nekorišćenje vlastitog uma, Kant naglašava veliku 
ulogu društvenog konteksta i državnog uređenja u kome pojedinac živi. Naime, svaka 
individua treba da bude autonomna prilikom mišljenja i donošenja odluka, ali lična 
autonomija može se ostvariti jedino u državi koja poštuje slobodu i jednakost svih svojih građana. Kant je verovao da samo republikansko državno uređenje ispunjava ove 
uslove i da se u njemu može garantovati slobodna javna upotreba uma svakom čoveku. 
Da bi se ostvarilo republikansko uređenje, potrebno je da se pređe iz prirodnog stanja u 
društveno stanje u kome je vlast podeljena na zakonodavnu, izvršnu i sudsku. Kant je 
smatrao da on ne živi u prosvećeno doba, nego u doba prosvećivanja, a opravdanje za 
ovu svoju tvrdnju nalazi u činjenici da Fridrih Drugi nije svojim podanicima nametao 
stavove vezane za pitanja religije, već im je dozvolio da se služe sopstvenim umom. 
Kantova definicija prosvećenosti aktuelna je i danas, jer zahtevi koje ona postavlja 
pred pojedinca i društvo i dalje predstavljaju ideale kojima težimo.
AB  - This paper examines Kant’s definition of enlightenment as well as its actuality in contemporary philosophy. Starting from Kant’s famous definition, according
to which only the individual who dares to reject his immaturity and obedience to authority can claim to become enlightened, we will try to determine who is the main
culprit for the lack of enlightenment in modern society. Although each man bears the
responsibility for his own laziness and not using his own reason, Kant emphasizes the
role of the social context and state system in which the individual lives. Namely, every
individual should be autonomous in thinking and making decisions, but this personal
autonomy can only be achieved in a state that respects the freedom and equality of all
its citizens. Kant believed that only a republican state system meets these requirements
and that it can guarantee free public use of reason to every man. In order to achieve a
republican order, it is necessary to move from a natural state to a social state in which
power is divided into legislative, executive and judicial. Kant believed that he does not
live in an enlightened age, but in an age of enlightenment, and the justification for this
claim lies in the fact that Friedrich II did not impose attitudes on matters of religion to
his citizens, but allowed them to use their own reason. Kant’s definition of enlightenment is still relevant today, because the demands it places on individuals and society
continue to be the ideals we strive for
PB  - Univerzitet u Nišu Filozofski fakultet
C3  - Nauka i savremeni Univerzitet 9
T1  - Prosvećenost u Kantovoj misli - metodološke pretpostavke i aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji
T1  - Enlightenment in Kant’s thought - methodological  assumptions and topicality in contemporary philosophy
EP  - 215
SP  - 205
DO  - 10.46630/nisun.9.2020
ER  - 

@conference{
author = "Smajević Roljić, Milica",
year = "2020",
abstract = "U ovom radu ispituje se Kantovo određenje prosvećenosti, kao i njegova 
aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji. Polazeći od Kantove čuvene definicije, prema kojoj 
samo onaj pojedinac koji se usudi da odbaci svoju nezrelost i poslušnost autoritetima može pretendovati da postane prosvećen, pokušaćemo da utvrdimo ko je glavni 
krivac za nedostatak prosvećenosti u modernim društvima. Iako svaki čovek snosi 
odgovornost za sopstvenu lenjost i nekorišćenje vlastitog uma, Kant naglašava veliku 
ulogu društvenog konteksta i državnog uređenja u kome pojedinac živi. Naime, svaka 
individua treba da bude autonomna prilikom mišljenja i donošenja odluka, ali lična 
autonomija može se ostvariti jedino u državi koja poštuje slobodu i jednakost svih svojih građana. Kant je verovao da samo republikansko državno uređenje ispunjava ove 
uslove i da se u njemu može garantovati slobodna javna upotreba uma svakom čoveku. 
Da bi se ostvarilo republikansko uređenje, potrebno je da se pređe iz prirodnog stanja u 
društveno stanje u kome je vlast podeljena na zakonodavnu, izvršnu i sudsku. Kant je 
smatrao da on ne živi u prosvećeno doba, nego u doba prosvećivanja, a opravdanje za 
ovu svoju tvrdnju nalazi u činjenici da Fridrih Drugi nije svojim podanicima nametao 
stavove vezane za pitanja religije, već im je dozvolio da se služe sopstvenim umom. 
Kantova definicija prosvećenosti aktuelna je i danas, jer zahtevi koje ona postavlja 
pred pojedinca i društvo i dalje predstavljaju ideale kojima težimo., This paper examines Kant’s definition of enlightenment as well as its actuality in contemporary philosophy. Starting from Kant’s famous definition, according
to which only the individual who dares to reject his immaturity and obedience to authority can claim to become enlightened, we will try to determine who is the main
culprit for the lack of enlightenment in modern society. Although each man bears the
responsibility for his own laziness and not using his own reason, Kant emphasizes the
role of the social context and state system in which the individual lives. Namely, every
individual should be autonomous in thinking and making decisions, but this personal
autonomy can only be achieved in a state that respects the freedom and equality of all
its citizens. Kant believed that only a republican state system meets these requirements
and that it can guarantee free public use of reason to every man. In order to achieve a
republican order, it is necessary to move from a natural state to a social state in which
power is divided into legislative, executive and judicial. Kant believed that he does not
live in an enlightened age, but in an age of enlightenment, and the justification for this
claim lies in the fact that Friedrich II did not impose attitudes on matters of religion to
his citizens, but allowed them to use their own reason. Kant’s definition of enlightenment is still relevant today, because the demands it places on individuals and society
continue to be the ideals we strive for",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Nišu Filozofski fakultet",
journal = "Nauka i savremeni Univerzitet 9",
title = "Prosvećenost u Kantovoj misli - metodološke pretpostavke i aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji, Enlightenment in Kant’s thought - methodological  assumptions and topicality in contemporary philosophy",
pages = "215-205",
doi = "10.46630/nisun.9.2020"
}

Smajević Roljić, M.. (2020). Prosvećenost u Kantovoj misli - metodološke pretpostavke i aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji. in Nauka i savremeni Univerzitet 9
Univerzitet u Nišu Filozofski fakultet., 205-215.
https://doi.org/10.46630/nisun.9.2020

Smajević Roljić M. Prosvećenost u Kantovoj misli - metodološke pretpostavke i aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji. in Nauka i savremeni Univerzitet 9. 2020;:205-215.
doi:10.46630/nisun.9.2020 .

Smajević Roljić, Milica, "Prosvećenost u Kantovoj misli - metodološke pretpostavke i aktuelnost u savremenoj filozofiji" in Nauka i savremeni Univerzitet 9 (2020):205-215,
https://doi.org/10.46630/nisun.9.2020 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Subotić, Vanja
AU  - Milojević, Miljana
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5345
AB  - Cilj ovog rada je da pruži novo viđenje uloge konekcionističkih modela 
u istraživanju ljudske kognicije kroz konceptualizaciju istorije konekcionizma – od najjednostavnijih perceptrona do savremenih dubokih konvolucionih neuronskih mreža, kao i kritika poteklih iz domena rivalske simboličke kognitivne nauke. Naime, konekcionistički pristup u kognitivnoj nauci bio je meta oštrih kritika simbolista koje su u više navrata uzrokovale njegovu marginalizaciju i skoro potpuno napuštanje njegovih pretpostavki u izučavanju kognicije. Kritike su uglavnom ukazivale na njegovu eksplanatornu neadekvatnost kao teorije kognicije ili na njegovu biološku neplauzibilnost kao teorije implemetacije, a od konkretnih nedostataka nekih konekcionističkih modela napredovalo se do zaključaka o nedostacima konekcionizma uopšte. 
U ovom radu želimo da pokažemo da obe vrste kritike počivaju na pretpostavci da su jedina prava objašnjenja u kognitivnoj nauci instance homunkularnog funkcionalizma i da uklanjajući ovu pretpostavku i usvajajući alternativnu metodologiju – eksplorativno mehanicističku strategiju, možemo da uklonimo i većinu prigovora konekcionizmu kao irelevantne, da objasnimo napredak konekcionističkih modela uprkos njihovim nedostacima i da skiciramo putanju njihovog budućeg razvoja. Usvajanjem mehanicizma i kritikom funkcionalizma odbacićemo prigovore eksplanatorne neadekvatnosti, karakterisanjem konekcionističkih modela kao skica generičkih mehanizama odbacićemo prigovore biološke neplauzibilnosti, dok ćemo pripisivanjem eksplorativnog 
karaktera takvim modelima pokazati manjkavost prakse generalizovanja od trenutnih ka opštim neuspesima konekcionizma.
AB  - This paper aims to offer a new view of the role of connectionist models in the study of human cognition through the conceptualization of the history of connectionism – from the simplest perceptrons to convolutional neural nets based on deep learning techniques, as well as through the interpretation of criticism coming from symbolic cognitive science. Namely, the connectionist approach in cognitive science was the target of sharp criticism from the symbolists, which on several occasions caused its marginalization and almost complete abandonment of its assumptions in the study of cognition. Criticisms have mostly pointed to its explanatory inadequacy as a theory of cognition or to its biological implausibility as a theory of implementation, and critics often focused on specific shortcomings of some connectionist models and argued that they apply on connectionism in general. In this paper we want to show that both types of critique are based on the assumption that the only valid explanations in cognitive science are instances of homuncular functionalism and that by removing this assumption and by adopting an alternative methodology – exploratory mechanistic strategy, we can reject most objections to connectionism as irrelevant, explain the progress of connectionist models despite their shortcomings and sketch the trajectory of their future development. By adopting mechanistic explanations and by criticizing functionalism, we will reject the objections of explanatory inadequacy, by characterizing connectionist models as generic rather than concrete mechanisms, we will reject the objections of biological implausibility, and by attributing the exploratory character to connectionist models we will show that practice of generalizing current to general failures of connectionism is unjustified.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Eksplorativni status postkonekcionističkih modela
T1  - The Exploratory Status of Postconnectionist Models
EP  - 164
IS  - 63
SP  - 135
VL  - 2
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002135M
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Subotić, Vanja and Milojević, Miljana",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Cilj ovog rada je da pruži novo viđenje uloge konekcionističkih modela 
u istraživanju ljudske kognicije kroz konceptualizaciju istorije konekcionizma – od najjednostavnijih perceptrona do savremenih dubokih konvolucionih neuronskih mreža, kao i kritika poteklih iz domena rivalske simboličke kognitivne nauke. Naime, konekcionistički pristup u kognitivnoj nauci bio je meta oštrih kritika simbolista koje su u više navrata uzrokovale njegovu marginalizaciju i skoro potpuno napuštanje njegovih pretpostavki u izučavanju kognicije. Kritike su uglavnom ukazivale na njegovu eksplanatornu neadekvatnost kao teorije kognicije ili na njegovu biološku neplauzibilnost kao teorije implemetacije, a od konkretnih nedostataka nekih konekcionističkih modela napredovalo se do zaključaka o nedostacima konekcionizma uopšte. 
U ovom radu želimo da pokažemo da obe vrste kritike počivaju na pretpostavci da su jedina prava objašnjenja u kognitivnoj nauci instance homunkularnog funkcionalizma i da uklanjajući ovu pretpostavku i usvajajući alternativnu metodologiju – eksplorativno mehanicističku strategiju, možemo da uklonimo i većinu prigovora konekcionizmu kao irelevantne, da objasnimo napredak konekcionističkih modela uprkos njihovim nedostacima i da skiciramo putanju njihovog budućeg razvoja. Usvajanjem mehanicizma i kritikom funkcionalizma odbacićemo prigovore eksplanatorne neadekvatnosti, karakterisanjem konekcionističkih modela kao skica generičkih mehanizama odbacićemo prigovore biološke neplauzibilnosti, dok ćemo pripisivanjem eksplorativnog 
karaktera takvim modelima pokazati manjkavost prakse generalizovanja od trenutnih ka opštim neuspesima konekcionizma., This paper aims to offer a new view of the role of connectionist models in the study of human cognition through the conceptualization of the history of connectionism – from the simplest perceptrons to convolutional neural nets based on deep learning techniques, as well as through the interpretation of criticism coming from symbolic cognitive science. Namely, the connectionist approach in cognitive science was the target of sharp criticism from the symbolists, which on several occasions caused its marginalization and almost complete abandonment of its assumptions in the study of cognition. Criticisms have mostly pointed to its explanatory inadequacy as a theory of cognition or to its biological implausibility as a theory of implementation, and critics often focused on specific shortcomings of some connectionist models and argued that they apply on connectionism in general. In this paper we want to show that both types of critique are based on the assumption that the only valid explanations in cognitive science are instances of homuncular functionalism and that by removing this assumption and by adopting an alternative methodology – exploratory mechanistic strategy, we can reject most objections to connectionism as irrelevant, explain the progress of connectionist models despite their shortcomings and sketch the trajectory of their future development. By adopting mechanistic explanations and by criticizing functionalism, we will reject the objections of explanatory inadequacy, by characterizing connectionist models as generic rather than concrete mechanisms, we will reject the objections of biological implausibility, and by attributing the exploratory character to connectionist models we will show that practice of generalizing current to general failures of connectionism is unjustified.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Eksplorativni status postkonekcionističkih modela, The Exploratory Status of Postconnectionist Models",
pages = "164-135",
number = "63",
volume = "2",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002135M"
}

Subotić, V.,& Milojević, M.. (2020). Eksplorativni status postkonekcionističkih modela. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 2(63), 135-164.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002135M

Subotić V, Milojević M. Eksplorativni status postkonekcionističkih modela. in Theoria. 2020;2(63):135-164.
doi:https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002135M .

Subotić, Vanja, Milojević, Miljana, "Eksplorativni status postkonekcionističkih modela" in Theoria, 2, no. 63 (2020):135-164,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002135M . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kostić, Jovana
AU  - Maksimović, Katarina
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3005
AB  - Psiholozi su počeli da se eksperimentalno bave deduktivnim zaključivanjem početkom 20. veka. Ipak, zbog načina na koji su eksperimenti bili osmišljeni, nije bilo značajnih pomaka u toj oblasti sve do relativno skoro. Smatramo da postoje dva glavna razloga zbog kojih dedukcija često nije bila ispitivana na adekvatan način. Prvi je taj što su psiholozi u velikoj meri ignorisali razvoj matematičke logike i bazirali svoja istraživanja na silogizmima. Drugi razlog je uticaj gledišta, koje i dalje preovladava u semantici i logici uopšte, da su kategorički pojmovi, kao što je pojam istine, važniji od hipotetičkih pojmova, kao što je pojam dedukcije. Uticaj te dogme na psihološka istraživanja je bio dvostruk. U studijama koje su se bavile shvatanjem logičkih veznika kod odraslih i kod dece, mnogo više značaja je pridavano semantičkim aspektima veznika - istinosnim funkcijama, dok su dedukcije stavljane u drugi plan. Sa druge strane, dogma je uticala čak i na istraživanja koja su pomoću formalnih sistema ispitivala deduktivno zaključivanje na taj način što je uslovljavala izbor sistema. Istraživači su uglavnom preferirali aksiomatske formalne sisteme naspram sistema prirodne dedukcije, iako su se za izučavanje dedukcije potonji pokazali kao daleko adekvatniji.
AB  - Psychologists have experimentally studied deductive reasoning since the beginning of the 20 th century. However, as we will argue, there has not been much improvement in the field until relatively recently, due to how the experiments were designed. We deem the design of the majority of conducted experiments inadequate for two reasons. The first one is that psychologists have, for the most part, ignored the development of mathematical logic and based their research on syllogistic inferences. The second reason is the influence of the view, which is dogmatically still prevalent in semantics and logic in general, that the categorical notions, such as the notion of truth, are more important than the hypothetical notions, such as the notion of deduction. The influence of this dogma has been twofold. In studies concerning logical connectives in adults and children, much more emphasis has been put on the semanti-cal aspects of the connectives-the truth functions, than on the deductive inferences. And secondly, even in the studies that investigated deductive inferences by using formal systems, the dogma still influenced the choice of the formal system. Researchers , in general, preferred the axiomatic formal systems over the systems of natural deduction, even though the systems of the second kind are much more suitable for studying deduction.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Ka dedukciji
T1  - Growing into deduction
EP  - 106
IS  - 1
SP  - 87
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2001087K
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Kostić, Jovana and Maksimović, Katarina",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Psiholozi su počeli da se eksperimentalno bave deduktivnim zaključivanjem početkom 20. veka. Ipak, zbog načina na koji su eksperimenti bili osmišljeni, nije bilo značajnih pomaka u toj oblasti sve do relativno skoro. Smatramo da postoje dva glavna razloga zbog kojih dedukcija često nije bila ispitivana na adekvatan način. Prvi je taj što su psiholozi u velikoj meri ignorisali razvoj matematičke logike i bazirali svoja istraživanja na silogizmima. Drugi razlog je uticaj gledišta, koje i dalje preovladava u semantici i logici uopšte, da su kategorički pojmovi, kao što je pojam istine, važniji od hipotetičkih pojmova, kao što je pojam dedukcije. Uticaj te dogme na psihološka istraživanja je bio dvostruk. U studijama koje su se bavile shvatanjem logičkih veznika kod odraslih i kod dece, mnogo više značaja je pridavano semantičkim aspektima veznika - istinosnim funkcijama, dok su dedukcije stavljane u drugi plan. Sa druge strane, dogma je uticala čak i na istraživanja koja su pomoću formalnih sistema ispitivala deduktivno zaključivanje na taj način što je uslovljavala izbor sistema. Istraživači su uglavnom preferirali aksiomatske formalne sisteme naspram sistema prirodne dedukcije, iako su se za izučavanje dedukcije potonji pokazali kao daleko adekvatniji., Psychologists have experimentally studied deductive reasoning since the beginning of the 20 th century. However, as we will argue, there has not been much improvement in the field until relatively recently, due to how the experiments were designed. We deem the design of the majority of conducted experiments inadequate for two reasons. The first one is that psychologists have, for the most part, ignored the development of mathematical logic and based their research on syllogistic inferences. The second reason is the influence of the view, which is dogmatically still prevalent in semantics and logic in general, that the categorical notions, such as the notion of truth, are more important than the hypothetical notions, such as the notion of deduction. The influence of this dogma has been twofold. In studies concerning logical connectives in adults and children, much more emphasis has been put on the semanti-cal aspects of the connectives-the truth functions, than on the deductive inferences. And secondly, even in the studies that investigated deductive inferences by using formal systems, the dogma still influenced the choice of the formal system. Researchers , in general, preferred the axiomatic formal systems over the systems of natural deduction, even though the systems of the second kind are much more suitable for studying deduction.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Ka dedukciji, Growing into deduction",
pages = "106-87",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2001087K"
}

Kostić, J.,& Maksimović, K.. (2020). Ka dedukciji. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 63(1), 87-106.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001087K

Kostić J, Maksimović K. Ka dedukciji. in Theoria. 2020;63(1):87-106.
doi:10.2298/THEO2001087K .

Kostić, Jovana, Maksimović, Katarina, "Ka dedukciji" in Theoria, 63, no. 1 (2020):87-106,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001087K . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kostić, Jovana
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3148
AB  - In this paper, we follow Gödel's remarks on an envisioned theory of concepts to determine which properties should a logical basis of such a theory have. The discussion is organized around the question of suitability of the classical predicate calculus for this role. Some reasons to think that classical logic is not an appropriate basis for the theory of concepts, will be presented. We consider, based on these reasons, which alternative logical system could fare better as a logical foundation of, in Gödel's opinion, the most important theory in logic yet to be developed. This paper should, in particular, motivate the study of partial predicates in a certain system of three-valued logic, as a promising starting point for the foundation of the theory of concepts.
PB  - Univerzitet u Novom Sadu - Filozofski fakultet - Odsek za filozofiju, Novi Sad
T2  - Journal of Philosophy ARHE
T1  - Logic for the theory of concepts2
EP  - 102
IS  - 34
SP  - 85
VL  - 27
DO  - 10.19090/arhe.2020.34.85-102
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Kostić, Jovana",
year = "2020",
abstract = "In this paper, we follow Gödel's remarks on an envisioned theory of concepts to determine which properties should a logical basis of such a theory have. The discussion is organized around the question of suitability of the classical predicate calculus for this role. Some reasons to think that classical logic is not an appropriate basis for the theory of concepts, will be presented. We consider, based on these reasons, which alternative logical system could fare better as a logical foundation of, in Gödel's opinion, the most important theory in logic yet to be developed. This paper should, in particular, motivate the study of partial predicates in a certain system of three-valued logic, as a promising starting point for the foundation of the theory of concepts.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Novom Sadu - Filozofski fakultet - Odsek za filozofiju, Novi Sad",
journal = "Journal of Philosophy ARHE",
title = "Logic for the theory of concepts2",
pages = "102-85",
number = "34",
volume = "27",
doi = "10.19090/arhe.2020.34.85-102"
}

Kostić, J.. (2020). Logic for the theory of concepts2. in Journal of Philosophy ARHE
Univerzitet u Novom Sadu - Filozofski fakultet - Odsek za filozofiju, Novi Sad., 27(34), 85-102.
https://doi.org/10.19090/arhe.2020.34.85-102

Kostić J. Logic for the theory of concepts2. in Journal of Philosophy ARHE. 2020;27(34):85-102.
doi:10.19090/arhe.2020.34.85-102 .

Kostić, Jovana, "Logic for the theory of concepts2" in Journal of Philosophy ARHE, 27, no. 34 (2020):85-102,
https://doi.org/10.19090/arhe.2020.34.85-102 . .

TY  - THES
AU  - Govedarica, Jelena
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=7867
UR  - http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=30671113
UR  - https://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/handle/123456789/17792
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/113
AB  - Ova studija nudi obuhvatnu interpretaciju Kantovih stavova o uslovima mogućnosti moralnog  napretka i moralizacije čovečanstva, kao ostvarenja krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode. Iako je  vaspitanje pojedinaca i nacija uslov koji najviše doprinosi moralizaciji čovečanstva, njen jedini  nužan uslov mogućnosti je transcendentalno zasnovano javno pravo. Takvo pravo zadovoljava  uslove opšteg i nužnog važenja, jer se zasniva isključivo na slobodi. U tom smislu moralni napredak  čovečanstva zahteva strogo ograničavanje samovolje ljudi putem apriornih juridičkih principa i  učestaliju determinaciju njihove volje samom predstavom moralnog zakona. Osnovna teza studije  jeste da juridička sloboda čovečanstva može u potpunosti biti garantovana ukoliko se uspostavi  svetska federativna republika, dok se etička sloboda čovečanstva osvaja kroz stalnu borbu sa  radikalnim zlom, koja ima više izgleda na uspeh ako ljudi osnuju carstvo vrline, pa je ostvarenje  krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode zamislivo tek pod pretpostavkom konstitucije svetske juridičke i  etičke države. Povrh toga, studija pruža detaljan prikaz najvažnijih ideja Kantove filozofije javnog  prava, kako transcendentalnih, tako i empirijskih principa. Uloga empirijske pravne i političke  teorije je da pokaže na koji je način moguće u što većoj meri realizovati metafizičke principe prava,  dok Kantove antropološke teorije i refleksije o istorijskom razvoju čovečanstva treba da pokažu na  koji način ljudska priroda ide u prilog ostvarivanju najviših principa javnog prava, ponekad čak i  protiv namera ljudi. Ove teorije, zajedno sa njegovom filozofijom vaspitanja, pokazuju koje  smernice ljudi treba da prate na putu ka transcendentalnom javnom pravu, ne bi li čovečanstvo  moglo u moralnom (juridičkom i etičkom) smislu efikasnije i lakše napredovati.
AB  - This dissertation provides a comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s views on the conditions of  possibility of moral progress and moralization, understood as the achievement of the final purpose  of nature. Although education of people and nations is the condition that contributes the most to the  achievement of moralization, its only necessary condition of possibility is transcendentally  grounded public right. This form of law meets the conditions of universality and necessity, because  it is based solely on freedom. In this sense, moral progress of humanity requires strict restrictions on  every person’s freedom of choice in accordance with a priori juridical principles and a more  frequent determination of their will merely by the representation of the moral law. The main thesis  of this dissertation is that juridical freedom of humanity could only be fully guaranteed if the world  federal republic is established, while the ethical freedom of humanity could be attained only  through constant struggle against the radical evil, which is more likely to succeed if people establish  the ethical community; thus, the achievement of the final purpose of nature is conceivable only  under the presumption of the constitution of the legal world state and the ethical world state.  Additionally, this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the most important ideas of Kant's  philosophy of public right, both its transcendental and empirical side. The role of the empirical legal  and political theory is to explain how metaphysical principles of right could be realized to the  greatest possible extent, while Kant's anthropological theories and his reflections on the historical  development of humanity should show the way human nature works in favour of the  implementation of the pure principles of public right, sometimes even against people's  intentions. These theories, together with his philosophy of education, show what guidelines people  should follow on the way towards transcendental public right, so that humanity’s moral (legal and  ethical) progress would be more efficient and less difficult.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet
T1  - Ka transcendentalnom zasnivanju javnog prava
T1  - Towards transcendental grounding of public right
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17792
ER  - 

@phdthesis{
author = "Govedarica, Jelena",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Ova studija nudi obuhvatnu interpretaciju Kantovih stavova o uslovima mogućnosti moralnog  napretka i moralizacije čovečanstva, kao ostvarenja krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode. Iako je  vaspitanje pojedinaca i nacija uslov koji najviše doprinosi moralizaciji čovečanstva, njen jedini  nužan uslov mogućnosti je transcendentalno zasnovano javno pravo. Takvo pravo zadovoljava  uslove opšteg i nužnog važenja, jer se zasniva isključivo na slobodi. U tom smislu moralni napredak  čovečanstva zahteva strogo ograničavanje samovolje ljudi putem apriornih juridičkih principa i  učestaliju determinaciju njihove volje samom predstavom moralnog zakona. Osnovna teza studije  jeste da juridička sloboda čovečanstva može u potpunosti biti garantovana ukoliko se uspostavi  svetska federativna republika, dok se etička sloboda čovečanstva osvaja kroz stalnu borbu sa  radikalnim zlom, koja ima više izgleda na uspeh ako ljudi osnuju carstvo vrline, pa je ostvarenje  krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode zamislivo tek pod pretpostavkom konstitucije svetske juridičke i  etičke države. Povrh toga, studija pruža detaljan prikaz najvažnijih ideja Kantove filozofije javnog  prava, kako transcendentalnih, tako i empirijskih principa. Uloga empirijske pravne i političke  teorije je da pokaže na koji je način moguće u što većoj meri realizovati metafizičke principe prava,  dok Kantove antropološke teorije i refleksije o istorijskom razvoju čovečanstva treba da pokažu na  koji način ljudska priroda ide u prilog ostvarivanju najviših principa javnog prava, ponekad čak i  protiv namera ljudi. Ove teorije, zajedno sa njegovom filozofijom vaspitanja, pokazuju koje  smernice ljudi treba da prate na putu ka transcendentalnom javnom pravu, ne bi li čovečanstvo  moglo u moralnom (juridičkom i etičkom) smislu efikasnije i lakše napredovati., This dissertation provides a comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s views on the conditions of  possibility of moral progress and moralization, understood as the achievement of the final purpose  of nature. Although education of people and nations is the condition that contributes the most to the  achievement of moralization, its only necessary condition of possibility is transcendentally  grounded public right. This form of law meets the conditions of universality and necessity, because  it is based solely on freedom. In this sense, moral progress of humanity requires strict restrictions on  every person’s freedom of choice in accordance with a priori juridical principles and a more  frequent determination of their will merely by the representation of the moral law. The main thesis  of this dissertation is that juridical freedom of humanity could only be fully guaranteed if the world  federal republic is established, while the ethical freedom of humanity could be attained only  through constant struggle against the radical evil, which is more likely to succeed if people establish  the ethical community; thus, the achievement of the final purpose of nature is conceivable only  under the presumption of the constitution of the legal world state and the ethical world state.  Additionally, this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the most important ideas of Kant's  philosophy of public right, both its transcendental and empirical side. The role of the empirical legal  and political theory is to explain how metaphysical principles of right could be realized to the  greatest possible extent, while Kant's anthropological theories and his reflections on the historical  development of humanity should show the way human nature works in favour of the  implementation of the pure principles of public right, sometimes even against people's  intentions. These theories, together with his philosophy of education, show what guidelines people  should follow on the way towards transcendental public right, so that humanity’s moral (legal and  ethical) progress would be more efficient and less difficult.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet",
title = "Ka transcendentalnom zasnivanju javnog prava, Towards transcendental grounding of public right",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17792"
}

Govedarica, J.. (2020). Ka transcendentalnom zasnivanju javnog prava. 
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17792

Govedarica J. Ka transcendentalnom zasnivanju javnog prava. 2020;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17792 .

Govedarica, Jelena, "Ka transcendentalnom zasnivanju javnog prava" (2020),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17792 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Radenović, Ljiljana
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3015
AB  - Prema Aristotelu, jedan od nužnih iako ne i dovoljnih uslova za dobar i srećan život jeste posedovanje vrline. Čovek koji vrline poseduje nikada ne želi nešto što je loše već samo ono što je dobro i na taj način on je oslobođen unutrašnje borbe i neprijatnosti. Takav čovek se postaje dobrim navikama. U Hakslijevoj distopiji ljudi su što genetskom selekcijom što bihevijoralnim uslovljavanjem formirani da žele samo ono što je dobro za državu, tačnije ono što će doprinositi mirnom i prosperitetnom životu u zajednici, a samim tim oni žele upravo ono što je najbolje za njih same. Cilj ovog rada je da ispita u čemu je razlika između Aristotela i Hakslija. U prvom delu će biti reči o različitim tehnikama formiranja karaktera kod Aristotela kao i onih opisanih u Hakslijevoj distopiji. U drugom delu rada biće reči o tome zašto NAM je Hakslijev svet neprivlačan iako u njemu svi žele baš ono što i treba da žele. Dok Haksli u Vrlom novom svetu ilustruje kakav bi svet mogao biti ako bismo pošli od ideje da je za našu sreću dovoljno da želimo ono što možemo da ostvarimo i dobijemo, prema Aristotelu za sreću je potrebno još nešto, a to je da se bavimo najvišim pitanjima prirode sveta i večnim istinama. Da je Aristotelovo stanovište bliže istini ukazuju i savremena istraživanja u psihologiji.
AB  - According to Aristotle, one of the necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for a good and happy life is the possession of virtue. A person who possesses virtues never wants something that is bad, but only what is good, and in that way she is free from internal struggle. Such person is formed through good habits. In Huxley's dystopia, individuals are shaped by genetic selection and behavioral conditioning to want only what is good for the state, its peace iand prosperity, and thus to want what is good for themselves. The goal of this paper is to examine the differences between Aristotle and Huxley. In the first part of the paper I will discuss different techniques of character formation in Aristotle and those described in Huxley's dystopia. In the second part of the paper, I will address the question why Huxley's world does not appeal to us, even though everyone in it wants exactly what they should want. In the Brave new world Huxley portrays the world that is built around the assumption that for a person to be happy it is enough that they want what they can achieve and get. For Aristotle this is not enough. In addition to it we need to study the ultimate nature of the world. That Aristotle's position is more likely to be the case is indicated by contemporary research in psychology.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Aristotel i Haksli - o sreći
T1  - Aristotle and Huxley: On happiness
EP  - 68
IS  - 3
SP  - 59
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2003059R
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Radenović, Ljiljana",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Prema Aristotelu, jedan od nužnih iako ne i dovoljnih uslova za dobar i srećan život jeste posedovanje vrline. Čovek koji vrline poseduje nikada ne želi nešto što je loše već samo ono što je dobro i na taj način on je oslobođen unutrašnje borbe i neprijatnosti. Takav čovek se postaje dobrim navikama. U Hakslijevoj distopiji ljudi su što genetskom selekcijom što bihevijoralnim uslovljavanjem formirani da žele samo ono što je dobro za državu, tačnije ono što će doprinositi mirnom i prosperitetnom životu u zajednici, a samim tim oni žele upravo ono što je najbolje za njih same. Cilj ovog rada je da ispita u čemu je razlika između Aristotela i Hakslija. U prvom delu će biti reči o različitim tehnikama formiranja karaktera kod Aristotela kao i onih opisanih u Hakslijevoj distopiji. U drugom delu rada biće reči o tome zašto NAM je Hakslijev svet neprivlačan iako u njemu svi žele baš ono što i treba da žele. Dok Haksli u Vrlom novom svetu ilustruje kakav bi svet mogao biti ako bismo pošli od ideje da je za našu sreću dovoljno da želimo ono što možemo da ostvarimo i dobijemo, prema Aristotelu za sreću je potrebno još nešto, a to je da se bavimo najvišim pitanjima prirode sveta i večnim istinama. Da je Aristotelovo stanovište bliže istini ukazuju i savremena istraživanja u psihologiji., According to Aristotle, one of the necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for a good and happy life is the possession of virtue. A person who possesses virtues never wants something that is bad, but only what is good, and in that way she is free from internal struggle. Such person is formed through good habits. In Huxley's dystopia, individuals are shaped by genetic selection and behavioral conditioning to want only what is good for the state, its peace iand prosperity, and thus to want what is good for themselves. The goal of this paper is to examine the differences between Aristotle and Huxley. In the first part of the paper I will discuss different techniques of character formation in Aristotle and those described in Huxley's dystopia. In the second part of the paper, I will address the question why Huxley's world does not appeal to us, even though everyone in it wants exactly what they should want. In the Brave new world Huxley portrays the world that is built around the assumption that for a person to be happy it is enough that they want what they can achieve and get. For Aristotle this is not enough. In addition to it we need to study the ultimate nature of the world. That Aristotle's position is more likely to be the case is indicated by contemporary research in psychology.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Aristotel i Haksli - o sreći, Aristotle and Huxley: On happiness",
pages = "68-59",
number = "3",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2003059R"
}

Radenović, L.. (2020). Aristotel i Haksli - o sreći. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 63(3), 59-68.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2003059R

Radenović L. Aristotel i Haksli - o sreći. in Theoria. 2020;63(3):59-68.
doi:10.2298/THEO2003059R .

Radenović, Ljiljana, "Aristotel i Haksli - o sreći" in Theoria, 63, no. 3 (2020):59-68,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2003059R . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milojević, Miljana
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3168
AB  - In this paper, I address one recent objection to Andy Clark and David Chalmers's functionalist argument for the extended mind thesis (EM). This objection is posed by Kengo Miyazono, who claims that they unjustifiably identify the original cognitive subject with the hybrid one in order to reach their conclusion about the mind extension. His attack consists of three steps: (a) distinguishing hybrid from traditional cognitive subjects based on the systems reply originally directed at Searle's Chinese room argument; (b) pointing out that the conclusion of the functionalist argument for EM must be rephrased to state that there are hybrid, and not extended, systems with widely realized mental states; and (c) arguing that functionalist EM cannot justify the assumption about the identity of these two kinds of subjects without circularity. I argue that Miyazono's main argument is ill-founded but that it, nevertheless, points out one important issue, namely, that we need further justification of the identity assumption, without which EM loses much of its flavor. Thus, I am going to challenge Miyazono's argument, provide a reinterpretation of the argumentation in the EM debate, defend the possibility of wide and extended selves, and offer a justification of the identity assumption, which I find crucial not only for vindicating EM but also for differentiating EM from other similar theses, such as the thesis about group minds.
PB  - Springer, Dordrecht
T2  - Synthese
T1  - Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity
EP  - 2170
IS  - 5
SP  - 2143
VL  - 197
DO  - 10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Milojević, Miljana",
year = "2020",
abstract = "In this paper, I address one recent objection to Andy Clark and David Chalmers's functionalist argument for the extended mind thesis (EM). This objection is posed by Kengo Miyazono, who claims that they unjustifiably identify the original cognitive subject with the hybrid one in order to reach their conclusion about the mind extension. His attack consists of three steps: (a) distinguishing hybrid from traditional cognitive subjects based on the systems reply originally directed at Searle's Chinese room argument; (b) pointing out that the conclusion of the functionalist argument for EM must be rephrased to state that there are hybrid, and not extended, systems with widely realized mental states; and (c) arguing that functionalist EM cannot justify the assumption about the identity of these two kinds of subjects without circularity. I argue that Miyazono's main argument is ill-founded but that it, nevertheless, points out one important issue, namely, that we need further justification of the identity assumption, without which EM loses much of its flavor. Thus, I am going to challenge Miyazono's argument, provide a reinterpretation of the argumentation in the EM debate, defend the possibility of wide and extended selves, and offer a justification of the identity assumption, which I find crucial not only for vindicating EM but also for differentiating EM from other similar theses, such as the thesis about group minds.",
publisher = "Springer, Dordrecht",
journal = "Synthese",
title = "Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity",
pages = "2170-2143",
number = "5",
volume = "197",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5"
}

Milojević, M.. (2020). Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity. in Synthese
Springer, Dordrecht., 197(5), 2143-2170.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5

Milojević M. Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity. in Synthese. 2020;197(5):2143-2170.
doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5 .

Milojević, Miljana, "Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity" in Synthese, 197, no. 5 (2020):2143-2170,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milevski, Voin
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3174
AB  - G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say 'Eliminativism is true, but of course I don't believe it's true' sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri's attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri's counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.
PB  - Springer, Dordrecht
T2  - Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition
T1  - Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function
EP  - 541
IS  - 4
SP  - 531
VL  - 35
DO  - 10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Milevski, Voin",
year = "2020",
abstract = "G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say 'Eliminativism is true, but of course I don't believe it's true' sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri's attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri's counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.",
publisher = "Springer, Dordrecht",
journal = "Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition",
title = "Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function",
pages = "541-531",
number = "4",
volume = "35",
doi = "10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1"
}

Milevski, V.. (2020). Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function. in Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition
Springer, Dordrecht., 35(4), 531-541.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1

Milevski V. Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function. in Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition. 2020;35(4):531-541.
doi:10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1 .

Milevski, Voin, "Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function" in Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition, 35, no. 4 (2020):531-541,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jovanović, Monika
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3006
AB  - Filozofskim javnim mnjenjem upravlja mnoštvo faktora i ponekad se dešava da neka ideja dobije opšte priznanje, a da istovremeno prođe čak nekoliko decenija pre nego što joj se posveti sistematska pažnja. U savremenoj estetici je malo tekstova koji se po originalnosti i uticaju mogu meriti sa radom "Kategorije umetnosti" Kendala Voltona; zato i ne čudi što se savremeni estetičari često nadovezuju na Voltonovu tezu. Pa ipak, posle gotovo pola veka od objavljivanja, još uvek nemamo iscrpnu i obuhvatnu interpretaciju njegovog teksta. Ni sam Volton, štaviše, nigde ne nudi detaljnu razradu ideja koje u tom radu formuliše, od kojih su mnoge date tek u skici. Osim toga, Volton svoju tezu ne primenjuje na vrednosne estetičke sudove, iako bi NAM TA ideja danas, na zalasku debate o kanonima, više nego ikad mogla pomoći da razumemo prirodu estetičkog vrednovanja. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da još jednom skrene pažnju na značaj Voltonove teze i preispita njen prijem u savremenoj estetici.
AB  - The public opinion in philosophy is guided by a multitude of factors and sometimes an idea gets general recognition but is systematically studied only after a few decades have passed. There aren't many papers in contemporary aesthetics that can match the originality and influence of Kendall Walton's 'Categories of Art'. It is unsurprising, then, that contemporary aestheticians often expand upon its main theses. Nevertheless, even after almost half a century from its first publication, an exhaustive and comprehensive interpretation of Walton's paper is still lacking. Moreover, even Walton himself doesn't provide a detailed elucidation of his ideas, many of which are merely outlined in his seminal paper. Furthermore, he doesn't apply his view to evaluative aesthetic judgments, even though such an attempt could today, when the debate about aesthetic canons is on the wane, might help us understand the nature of aesthetic evaluation. The goal of this paper is to once again shed some light on the significance of Walton's approach and on its reception in contemporary aesthetics.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Na zalasku debate o kanonima - kategorije, vrednovanje i priroda estetičke vrednosti
T1  - At the end of the debate about canons: Categories, evaluation and the nature of aesthetic value
EP  - 158
IS  - 1
SP  - 143
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2001143J
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Jovanović, Monika",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Filozofskim javnim mnjenjem upravlja mnoštvo faktora i ponekad se dešava da neka ideja dobije opšte priznanje, a da istovremeno prođe čak nekoliko decenija pre nego što joj se posveti sistematska pažnja. U savremenoj estetici je malo tekstova koji se po originalnosti i uticaju mogu meriti sa radom "Kategorije umetnosti" Kendala Voltona; zato i ne čudi što se savremeni estetičari često nadovezuju na Voltonovu tezu. Pa ipak, posle gotovo pola veka od objavljivanja, još uvek nemamo iscrpnu i obuhvatnu interpretaciju njegovog teksta. Ni sam Volton, štaviše, nigde ne nudi detaljnu razradu ideja koje u tom radu formuliše, od kojih su mnoge date tek u skici. Osim toga, Volton svoju tezu ne primenjuje na vrednosne estetičke sudove, iako bi NAM TA ideja danas, na zalasku debate o kanonima, više nego ikad mogla pomoći da razumemo prirodu estetičkog vrednovanja. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da još jednom skrene pažnju na značaj Voltonove teze i preispita njen prijem u savremenoj estetici., The public opinion in philosophy is guided by a multitude of factors and sometimes an idea gets general recognition but is systematically studied only after a few decades have passed. There aren't many papers in contemporary aesthetics that can match the originality and influence of Kendall Walton's 'Categories of Art'. It is unsurprising, then, that contemporary aestheticians often expand upon its main theses. Nevertheless, even after almost half a century from its first publication, an exhaustive and comprehensive interpretation of Walton's paper is still lacking. Moreover, even Walton himself doesn't provide a detailed elucidation of his ideas, many of which are merely outlined in his seminal paper. Furthermore, he doesn't apply his view to evaluative aesthetic judgments, even though such an attempt could today, when the debate about aesthetic canons is on the wane, might help us understand the nature of aesthetic evaluation. The goal of this paper is to once again shed some light on the significance of Walton's approach and on its reception in contemporary aesthetics.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Na zalasku debate o kanonima - kategorije, vrednovanje i priroda estetičke vrednosti, At the end of the debate about canons: Categories, evaluation and the nature of aesthetic value",
pages = "158-143",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2001143J"
}

Jovanović, M.. (2020). Na zalasku debate o kanonima - kategorije, vrednovanje i priroda estetičke vrednosti. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 63(1), 143-158.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001143J

Jovanović M. Na zalasku debate o kanonima - kategorije, vrednovanje i priroda estetičke vrednosti. in Theoria. 2020;63(1):143-158.
doi:10.2298/THEO2001143J .

Jovanović, Monika, "Na zalasku debate o kanonima - kategorije, vrednovanje i priroda estetičke vrednosti" in Theoria, 63, no. 1 (2020):143-158,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001143J . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nedeljković, Adam
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5356
AB  - Cilj ovog rada je pokušaj analize i pomirenja nekih na prvi pogled suprotstavljenih teorija pouzdanosti u okviru formalnih teorija koherencije. Formalni
koherentisti nastojali su da pokažu da između koherencije skupa informacija i pouzdanosti izvora informacija postoji određena epistemološki interesantna veza. Među
ovim autorima postoje podele i neslaganja kako po pitanju prirode koherencije, tako
i po pitanju prirode pouzdanosti. Sa jedne strane imamo probabilističke koherentiste
koji zastupaju statističko shvatanje pouzdanosti. Sa druge strane imamo zastupnike
eksplanatorne koherencije koji imaju dispozicionalističke stavove o prirodi pouzdanosti. Zadatak koji postavljamo u ovom radu je dvostruk: prikazati i objasniti neka
shvatanja pouzdanosti, bez naročitog ulaženja u dubine koherentističkih teorija u
kojima su ta shvatanja nastala i pokazati da ta viđenja pouzdanosti nisu suprotstavljena u meri u kojoj se to može učiniti, već da zajedno mogu činiti nešto što ćemo u
ovom radu zvati „profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija”, „najbazičnija verzija” ili
kraće PPIIbasic
AB  - The aim of this paper is an attempt at analyses and reconciliation of some prima
facie confronted theories of reliability in the context of formal theories of coherence.
Formal coherentists attempted to show that there is an epistemologically interesting
connection between coherence of an information set and reliability of information
sources. Amongst these authors there are divisions and differences concerning the
nature of coherence, as well as the nature of reliability. On the one side, we have before us probabilistic coherentists who support a statistical understanding of reliability.
On the other side we have supporters of explanatory coherence who see reliability as
a dispostition. There are two goals that we shall attempt to achieve in this paper: to
present and explain some ideas of reliability, without going into fine detailes and
depths of theories in which they were formulated and to show that those ideas about
reliability are not that irreconcilable as they might appear, but that they together can
form something that we shall call „reliability profile of an information source”, „the
most basic version”, or shorter: RPISbasic
PB  - Serbian Philosophical Society
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija: Najbazičnija verzija
T1  - Reliability profile of an information source: The most basic version
EP  - 121
IS  - 1
SP  - 107
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.2298/theo2001107n
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Nedeljković, Adam",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Cilj ovog rada je pokušaj analize i pomirenja nekih na prvi pogled suprotstavljenih teorija pouzdanosti u okviru formalnih teorija koherencije. Formalni
koherentisti nastojali su da pokažu da između koherencije skupa informacija i pouzdanosti izvora informacija postoji određena epistemološki interesantna veza. Među
ovim autorima postoje podele i neslaganja kako po pitanju prirode koherencije, tako
i po pitanju prirode pouzdanosti. Sa jedne strane imamo probabilističke koherentiste
koji zastupaju statističko shvatanje pouzdanosti. Sa druge strane imamo zastupnike
eksplanatorne koherencije koji imaju dispozicionalističke stavove o prirodi pouzdanosti. Zadatak koji postavljamo u ovom radu je dvostruk: prikazati i objasniti neka
shvatanja pouzdanosti, bez naročitog ulaženja u dubine koherentističkih teorija u
kojima su ta shvatanja nastala i pokazati da ta viđenja pouzdanosti nisu suprotstavljena u meri u kojoj se to može učiniti, već da zajedno mogu činiti nešto što ćemo u
ovom radu zvati „profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija”, „najbazičnija verzija” ili
kraće PPIIbasic, The aim of this paper is an attempt at analyses and reconciliation of some prima
facie confronted theories of reliability in the context of formal theories of coherence.
Formal coherentists attempted to show that there is an epistemologically interesting
connection between coherence of an information set and reliability of information
sources. Amongst these authors there are divisions and differences concerning the
nature of coherence, as well as the nature of reliability. On the one side, we have before us probabilistic coherentists who support a statistical understanding of reliability.
On the other side we have supporters of explanatory coherence who see reliability as
a dispostition. There are two goals that we shall attempt to achieve in this paper: to
present and explain some ideas of reliability, without going into fine detailes and
depths of theories in which they were formulated and to show that those ideas about
reliability are not that irreconcilable as they might appear, but that they together can
form something that we shall call „reliability profile of an information source”, „the
most basic version”, or shorter: RPISbasic",
publisher = "Serbian Philosophical Society",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija: Najbazičnija verzija, Reliability profile of an information source: The most basic version",
pages = "121-107",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.2298/theo2001107n"
}

Nedeljković, A.. (2020). Profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija: Najbazičnija verzija. in Theoria
Serbian Philosophical Society., 63(1), 107-121.
https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2001107n

Nedeljković A. Profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija: Najbazičnija verzija. in Theoria. 2020;63(1):107-121.
doi:10.2298/theo2001107n .

Nedeljković, Adam, "Profil pouzdanosti izvora informacija: Najbazičnija verzija" in Theoria, 63, no. 1 (2020):107-121,
https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2001107n . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Perović, Slobodan
AU  - Sikimić, Vlasta
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3162
AB  - We argue that inductive analysis (based on formal learning theory and the use of suitable machine learning reconstructions) and operational (citation metrics-based) assessment of the scientific process can be justifiably and fruitfully brought together, whereby the citation metrics used in the operational analysis can effectively track the inductive dynamics and measure the research efficiency. We specify the conditions for the use of such inductive streamlining, demonstrate it in the cases of high energy physics experimentation and phylogenetic research, and propose a test of the method's applicability.
PB  - Springer, Dordrecht
T2  - Journal for General Philosophy of Science
T1  - How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance
EP  - 291
IS  - 2
SP  - 267
VL  - 51
DO  - 10.1007/s10838-019-09468-4
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Perović, Slobodan and Sikimić, Vlasta",
year = "2020",
abstract = "We argue that inductive analysis (based on formal learning theory and the use of suitable machine learning reconstructions) and operational (citation metrics-based) assessment of the scientific process can be justifiably and fruitfully brought together, whereby the citation metrics used in the operational analysis can effectively track the inductive dynamics and measure the research efficiency. We specify the conditions for the use of such inductive streamlining, demonstrate it in the cases of high energy physics experimentation and phylogenetic research, and propose a test of the method's applicability.",
publisher = "Springer, Dordrecht",
journal = "Journal for General Philosophy of Science",
title = "How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance",
pages = "291-267",
number = "2",
volume = "51",
doi = "10.1007/s10838-019-09468-4"
}

Perović, S.,& Sikimić, V.. (2020). How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance. in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Springer, Dordrecht., 51(2), 267-291.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09468-4

Perović S, Sikimić V. How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance. in Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 2020;51(2):267-291.
doi:10.1007/s10838-019-09468-4 .

Perović, Slobodan, Sikimić, Vlasta, "How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance" in Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 51, no. 2 (2020):267-291,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09468-4 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mijić, Jelena
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3200
AB  - This paper deals with the discussions concerning the relationship between determinism and free will (i.e. the Problem of Compatibility), and correspondingly, with the implications for moral responsibility. It approaches the problem from the naturalistic perspective, albeit it does not answer the issue of the truth of causal determinism. For the sake of exploring the prospects for moral responsibility, the paper assumes causal determinism is scientifically warranted. Starting from the concept of causal determinism, the paper examines the challenges for the concept of free will as an ability to act otherwise, invoked by the Consequence Argument. The goal is to demonstrate that requirements for the ordinary moral responsibility conception are weaker than freedom as the ability to act otherwise. On these grounds, it is concluded that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible.
PB  - Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb
T2  - Filozofska istraživanja
T1  - Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World
EP  - 328
IS  - 2
SP  - 313
VL  - 40
DO  - 10.21464/fi40207
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Mijić, Jelena",
year = "2020",
abstract = "This paper deals with the discussions concerning the relationship between determinism and free will (i.e. the Problem of Compatibility), and correspondingly, with the implications for moral responsibility. It approaches the problem from the naturalistic perspective, albeit it does not answer the issue of the truth of causal determinism. For the sake of exploring the prospects for moral responsibility, the paper assumes causal determinism is scientifically warranted. Starting from the concept of causal determinism, the paper examines the challenges for the concept of free will as an ability to act otherwise, invoked by the Consequence Argument. The goal is to demonstrate that requirements for the ordinary moral responsibility conception are weaker than freedom as the ability to act otherwise. On these grounds, it is concluded that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible.",
publisher = "Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb",
journal = "Filozofska istraživanja",
title = "Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World",
pages = "328-313",
number = "2",
volume = "40",
doi = "10.21464/fi40207"
}

Mijić, J.. (2020). Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World. in Filozofska istraživanja
Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb., 40(2), 313-328.
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40207

Mijić J. Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World. in Filozofska istraživanja. 2020;40(2):313-328.
doi:10.21464/fi40207 .

Mijić, Jelena, "Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World" in Filozofska istraživanja, 40, no. 2 (2020):313-328,
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40207 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kamerer, Eva
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3045
AB  - U tekstu želim da pokažem kako su u istraživačkim područjima u kojima ne postoji objedinjujuća teorija modeli često presudni za interpretaciju empirijskih podataka i artikulaciju novih problema. To je pre svega slučaj kada naučnici nastoje da objasne kompleksne fenomene. U analizi hijerarhijskog modela karcinogeneze ukazujem na to kako je ovaj model omogućio naučnicima da se kancer razumeju kao istinski darvinovski fenomen.
AB  - In the article, I want to show that in those research areas where there is no unifying theory, the models are very often decisive for the interpretation of empirical data and articulation of new problems. This is primarily the case when scientists want to explain the complex phenomena. In the analysis of the hierarchical model of the carcinogenesis I will show how this model enabled scientists to understand cancer as a genuine Darwinian phenomenon.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Indiferentne ćelije - novi model za stari fenomen
T1  - The indifferent cells: A new model for an old phenomenon
EP  - 155
IS  - 4
SP  - 143
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2004143K
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Kamerer, Eva",
year = "2020",
abstract = "U tekstu želim da pokažem kako su u istraživačkim područjima u kojima ne postoji objedinjujuća teorija modeli često presudni za interpretaciju empirijskih podataka i artikulaciju novih problema. To je pre svega slučaj kada naučnici nastoje da objasne kompleksne fenomene. U analizi hijerarhijskog modela karcinogeneze ukazujem na to kako je ovaj model omogućio naučnicima da se kancer razumeju kao istinski darvinovski fenomen., In the article, I want to show that in those research areas where there is no unifying theory, the models are very often decisive for the interpretation of empirical data and articulation of new problems. This is primarily the case when scientists want to explain the complex phenomena. In the analysis of the hierarchical model of the carcinogenesis I will show how this model enabled scientists to understand cancer as a genuine Darwinian phenomenon.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Indiferentne ćelije - novi model za stari fenomen, The indifferent cells: A new model for an old phenomenon",
pages = "155-143",
number = "4",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2004143K"
}

Kamerer, E.. (2020). Indiferentne ćelije - novi model za stari fenomen. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 63(4), 143-155.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004143K

Kamerer E. Indiferentne ćelije - novi model za stari fenomen. in Theoria. 2020;63(4):143-155.
doi:10.2298/THEO2004143K .

Kamerer, Eva, "Indiferentne ćelije - novi model za stari fenomen" in Theoria, 63, no. 4 (2020):143-155,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2004143K . .

TY  - THES
AU  - Berber, Andrea
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=7518
UR  - http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=51941647
UR  - http://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/handle/123456789/17350
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/99
AB  - Cilj ovog istraživanja je da utvrdi u kakvom su odnosu sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića, odnosno, da li su suprotstavljene ili ne. Na ovo pitanje ćemo pokušati da damo odgovor tako što ćemo uporediti eksplanatorne domene dva istraživačka programa i nastojati da utvrdimo da li su oni istovetni, komplementarni, ili se delimično preklapaju. Detaljno ćemo analizirati pojmovne i eksplanatorne razlike između sintetičke teorije evolucije i evolucione biologije razvića. Zatim ćemo razmatrati kakva je veza selekcije i razvića u objašnjenju evolucionih fenomena. Nastojaćemo da pokažemo da razviće, koje određuje domen dostupne varijacije, može biti eksplanatorno relevanato i za razumevanje osobina na populacionom nivou. Argumentovaćemo da je nemoguće odgovoriti na značajna evoluciona pitanja, vezana za smer i tempo evolucije, ukoliko ne uzmemo u obzir uticaj razvića na evoluciju. Razmatraćemo i predlog koji je iznela Lindzi Kreg da se odnos između sintetičke teorije evolucije i evolucione biologije razvića može posmatrati kao sukob oko relativnog značaja. Branićemo stav da je rešenje koje predlaže Kregova suštinski nepotpuno (opisuje samo kvantitativne, ne i kvalitativne aspekte sukoba), i da je prvo neophodno razumeti promene koje je nastanak evolucione biologije razvića uveo u eksplanatorni domen evolucione teorije, a tek onda razmatrati kako taj domen treba biti podeljen. Na osnovu naše analize, nastojaćemo da pokažemo da je sintetička teorija evolucije pretrpela dve vrste suženja: relativno i realno. Oba tipa pokazuju da je sintetička teorija nedovoljna da samostalno obezbedi potpuno objašnjenje evolucije. Naš zaključak je da evoluciona biologija razvića proširuje eksplanatorni domen evolucione teorije u celini i da donosi nova eksplanatorna sredstva za razumevanje evolucionih
AB  - The aim of this research is to determine the relationship between synthetic theory of evolution and evolutionary developmental biology, whether they are opposed or not. We will try to answer this question by comparing the explanatory domains of the two research programs and try to determine if they are identical, complementary, or partially overlapping. We will analyze in detail the conceptual and explanatory differences between the synthetic theory of evolution and evolutionary developmental biology. Тhen, we will consider the connection between selection and development in the explanation of evolutionary phenomena. We will try to show that the development in determining the domain of the available variation can be explanatory relevant for understanding the properties at the population level. We will argue that it is impossible to answer some important evolutionary questions regarding the direction and the pace of evolution if we do not consider the influence of development on evolution. Proposal put forward by Lindsey Craig that the relationship between the synthetic theory of evolution and evolutionary developmental biology can be seen as the relative significance issue will be concidered, too. We will argue that the solution proposed by Craig is essentially incomplete (describes only quantitative, but not qualitative aspects of the conflict) and that it is firstly necessary to understand the changes that evolutionary development biology has brought into the explanatory domain of evolutionary theory, and only then consider how this domain should be divided. Based on our analysis, we will try to show that the synthetic theory of evolution has experienced two types of narrowing: relative and real. Both types show that the synthetic theory is insufficient to provide the complete explanation of evolution by its own. Our conclusion is that evolutionary developmental biology expands the explanatory domain of evolutionary theory as a whole and brings new explanatory means in understanding the evolutionary change
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet
T1  - Objašnjenje u biologiji: sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića
T1  - Explanation in biology: the synthetic theory of evolution and the evolutionary developmental biology
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17350
ER  - 

@phdthesis{
author = "Berber, Andrea",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Cilj ovog istraživanja je da utvrdi u kakvom su odnosu sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića, odnosno, da li su suprotstavljene ili ne. Na ovo pitanje ćemo pokušati da damo odgovor tako što ćemo uporediti eksplanatorne domene dva istraživačka programa i nastojati da utvrdimo da li su oni istovetni, komplementarni, ili se delimično preklapaju. Detaljno ćemo analizirati pojmovne i eksplanatorne razlike između sintetičke teorije evolucije i evolucione biologije razvića. Zatim ćemo razmatrati kakva je veza selekcije i razvića u objašnjenju evolucionih fenomena. Nastojaćemo da pokažemo da razviće, koje određuje domen dostupne varijacije, može biti eksplanatorno relevanato i za razumevanje osobina na populacionom nivou. Argumentovaćemo da je nemoguće odgovoriti na značajna evoluciona pitanja, vezana za smer i tempo evolucije, ukoliko ne uzmemo u obzir uticaj razvića na evoluciju. Razmatraćemo i predlog koji je iznela Lindzi Kreg da se odnos između sintetičke teorije evolucije i evolucione biologije razvića može posmatrati kao sukob oko relativnog značaja. Branićemo stav da je rešenje koje predlaže Kregova suštinski nepotpuno (opisuje samo kvantitativne, ne i kvalitativne aspekte sukoba), i da je prvo neophodno razumeti promene koje je nastanak evolucione biologije razvića uveo u eksplanatorni domen evolucione teorije, a tek onda razmatrati kako taj domen treba biti podeljen. Na osnovu naše analize, nastojaćemo da pokažemo da je sintetička teorija evolucije pretrpela dve vrste suženja: relativno i realno. Oba tipa pokazuju da je sintetička teorija nedovoljna da samostalno obezbedi potpuno objašnjenje evolucije. Naš zaključak je da evoluciona biologija razvića proširuje eksplanatorni domen evolucione teorije u celini i da donosi nova eksplanatorna sredstva za razumevanje evolucionih, The aim of this research is to determine the relationship between synthetic theory of evolution and evolutionary developmental biology, whether they are opposed or not. We will try to answer this question by comparing the explanatory domains of the two research programs and try to determine if they are identical, complementary, or partially overlapping. We will analyze in detail the conceptual and explanatory differences between the synthetic theory of evolution and evolutionary developmental biology. Тhen, we will consider the connection between selection and development in the explanation of evolutionary phenomena. We will try to show that the development in determining the domain of the available variation can be explanatory relevant for understanding the properties at the population level. We will argue that it is impossible to answer some important evolutionary questions regarding the direction and the pace of evolution if we do not consider the influence of development on evolution. Proposal put forward by Lindsey Craig that the relationship between the synthetic theory of evolution and evolutionary developmental biology can be seen as the relative significance issue will be concidered, too. We will argue that the solution proposed by Craig is essentially incomplete (describes only quantitative, but not qualitative aspects of the conflict) and that it is firstly necessary to understand the changes that evolutionary development biology has brought into the explanatory domain of evolutionary theory, and only then consider how this domain should be divided. Based on our analysis, we will try to show that the synthetic theory of evolution has experienced two types of narrowing: relative and real. Both types show that the synthetic theory is insufficient to provide the complete explanation of evolution by its own. Our conclusion is that evolutionary developmental biology expands the explanatory domain of evolutionary theory as a whole and brings new explanatory means in understanding the evolutionary change",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet",
title = "Objašnjenje u biologiji: sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića, Explanation in biology: the synthetic theory of evolution and the evolutionary developmental biology",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17350"
}

Berber, A.. (2019). Objašnjenje u biologiji: sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića. 
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17350

Berber A. Objašnjenje u biologiji: sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića. 2019;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17350 .

Berber, Andrea, "Objašnjenje u biologiji: sintetička teorija evolucije i evoluciona biologija razvića" (2019),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_17350 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kušić, Marija
AU  - Nurkić, Petar
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2713
AB  - Artificial Morality is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that centres around the idea of creating artificial moral agents, or AMAs, by implementing moral competence in artificial systems. AMAs are ought to be autonomous agents capable of socially correct judgements and ethically functional behaviour. This request for moral machines comes from the changes in everyday practice, where artificial systems are being frequently used in a variety of situations from home help and elderly care purposes to banking and court algorithms. It is therefore important to create reliable and responsible machines based on the same ethical principles that society demands from people. New challenges in creating such agents appear. There are philosophical questions about a machine's potential to be an agent, or moral agent, in the first place. Then comes the problem of social acceptance of such machines, regardless of their theoretic agency status. As a result of efforts to resolve this problem, there are insinuations of needed additional psychological (emotional and cognitive) competence in cold moral machines. What makes this endeavour of developing AMAs even harder is the complexity of the technical, engineering aspect of their creation. Implementation approaches such as top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approach aim to find the best way of developing fully moral agents, but they encounter their own problems throughout this effort.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd
T2  - Belgrade Philosophical Annual
T1  - Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents
EP  - 49
IS  - 32
SP  - 27
DO  - 10.5937/BPA1932027K
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Kušić, Marija and Nurkić, Petar",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Artificial Morality is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that centres around the idea of creating artificial moral agents, or AMAs, by implementing moral competence in artificial systems. AMAs are ought to be autonomous agents capable of socially correct judgements and ethically functional behaviour. This request for moral machines comes from the changes in everyday practice, where artificial systems are being frequently used in a variety of situations from home help and elderly care purposes to banking and court algorithms. It is therefore important to create reliable and responsible machines based on the same ethical principles that society demands from people. New challenges in creating such agents appear. There are philosophical questions about a machine's potential to be an agent, or moral agent, in the first place. Then comes the problem of social acceptance of such machines, regardless of their theoretic agency status. As a result of efforts to resolve this problem, there are insinuations of needed additional psychological (emotional and cognitive) competence in cold moral machines. What makes this endeavour of developing AMAs even harder is the complexity of the technical, engineering aspect of their creation. Implementation approaches such as top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approach aim to find the best way of developing fully moral agents, but they encounter their own problems throughout this effort.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd",
journal = "Belgrade Philosophical Annual",
title = "Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents",
pages = "49-27",
number = "32",
doi = "10.5937/BPA1932027K"
}

Kušić, M.,& Nurkić, P.. (2019). Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd.(32), 27-49.
https://doi.org/10.5937/BPA1932027K

Kušić M, Nurkić P. Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual. 2019;(32):27-49.
doi:10.5937/BPA1932027K .

Kušić, Marija, Nurkić, Petar, "Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents" in Belgrade Philosophical Annual, no. 32 (2019):27-49,
https://doi.org/10.5937/BPA1932027K . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Perović, Slobodan
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2964
AB  - A long-standing debate on the causality of levels in biological explanations has divided philosophers into two camps. The reductionist camp insists on the causal primacy of lower, molecular levels, while the critics point out the inescapable shifting, reciprocity, and circularity of levels across biological explanations. We argue, however, that many explanations in biology do not exclusively draw their explanatory power from detailed insights into inter-level interactions; they predominantly require identifying the adequate levels of biological complexity to be explained. Moreover, the main explanatory strategies grounding both theoretical and experimental approaches to one of the central debates in contemporary biology, i.e., on the origin of life, are primarily and sometimes exclusively driven by issues concerning the levels of biochemical complexity, and these only subsequently frame more substantial and detailed accounts of inter-level biochemical interactions.
PB  - Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin
T2  - Rivista di Estetica
T1  - The complexity-based explanatory strategy, biological levels, and the origin of life
EP  - 67
IS  - 69
SP  - 54
DO  - 10.4000/estetica.3687
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Perović, Slobodan",
year = "2019",
abstract = "A long-standing debate on the causality of levels in biological explanations has divided philosophers into two camps. The reductionist camp insists on the causal primacy of lower, molecular levels, while the critics point out the inescapable shifting, reciprocity, and circularity of levels across biological explanations. We argue, however, that many explanations in biology do not exclusively draw their explanatory power from detailed insights into inter-level interactions; they predominantly require identifying the adequate levels of biological complexity to be explained. Moreover, the main explanatory strategies grounding both theoretical and experimental approaches to one of the central debates in contemporary biology, i.e., on the origin of life, are primarily and sometimes exclusively driven by issues concerning the levels of biochemical complexity, and these only subsequently frame more substantial and detailed accounts of inter-level biochemical interactions.",
publisher = "Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin",
journal = "Rivista di Estetica",
title = "The complexity-based explanatory strategy, biological levels, and the origin of life",
pages = "67-54",
number = "69",
doi = "10.4000/estetica.3687"
}

Perović, S.. (2019). The complexity-based explanatory strategy, biological levels, and the origin of life. in Rivista di Estetica
Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin.(69), 54-67.
https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.3687

Perović S. The complexity-based explanatory strategy, biological levels, and the origin of life. in Rivista di Estetica. 2019;(69):54-67.
doi:10.4000/estetica.3687 .

Perović, Slobodan, "The complexity-based explanatory strategy, biological levels, and the origin of life" in Rivista di Estetica, no. 69 (2019):54-67,
https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.3687 . .