

**Andrija Šoć**

*LOCKE'S ANTICIPATION OF IDEALISM<sup>1</sup>*

*APSTRAKT: The primary purpose of this paper is to establish that some aspects of Locke's philosophy can be read as an anticipation of Kant's idealism. The paper consists of three main parts. In the first part, I examine the continuity of the conception of substance that exists between otherwise very different philosophical systems of Aristotle and Descartes. Identifying the difference between the questions of 'what' substance is and that to which the concept refers, I examine in some detail Locke's conception of substance, as well as his distinction between nominal and real essence, the latter being unknowable just like the substance. This unknowable character leads Locke to claim that we can cognize only one side of the existing world – the nominal one. In that sense, there is a striking parallel between the aforementioned distinction and the one Kant draws between appearance and the thing-in-itself. I also introduce philosophy of Richard Burthogge and his corresponding distinction I attempt to show how Locke indeed was anticipating Kant's idealism, even if he wasn't an idealist himself. Aside from anticipating the content of some of Kant's basic tenets, I also attempt to show how Locke is also anticipating the Kant's way of arguing for one of the essential components of his idealism – the thing-in-itself, where I draw the parallel between that concept and the concept of real essence.*

*KLJUČNE REČI: Substance, Nominal Essence, Real Essence, Burthogge, Appearance, Thing-in-itself.*

**Introduction**

When we broadly talk about idealism, we are not always talking about some coherent set of viewpoints which every philosopher shares. Just like realism, empiricism, or any other label we use to classify philosophical positions, idealism is formulated in different, not always mutually compatible ways. Instead of going into the extended conceptual and historical analysis of various directions idealism took since, arguably, its beginnings in Plato, I will focus on what we today know as Kant's transcendental idealism. We can, I think, locate the primary feature for this

1 Ovaj rad je izložen na međunarodnoj naučnoj konferenciji „Kant and the British Idealism“ održanoj 29-30. avgusta 2012. godine u Halu.

sort of idealism, at the very beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>2</sup>, where (B XVI) Kant states that it was assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects, and that instead we should assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. In other words, in so far as some particular position states that objects are in some respect and to some degree dependent upon our cognition, and that we can thus make conceptual distinctions between the way things are for us, and the way they are in themselves, we can roughly call it idealist.

British idealism has recently come into focus due to increased interest from several philosophers and several very important studies that deal with Caird, Greene, Bradley and other XIX and early XX century thinkers. I believe that there are precedents for idealism in British philosophy, Berkeley's position notwithstanding. In this paper, I will focus on what seems to me as one of the more neglected aspects of Locke's philosophy – the meaning of the expression 'we know not what' he uses when referring to substance. My claim will be that its meaning, in conjunction with some other aspects of his philosophy allows us to plausibly defend the thesis that he had anticipated idealism. I will start by saying something about traditional understanding of substance. Then I will show the relevance of Locke's conception of it for his anticipation of idealism. Finally, I will draw a comparison between such an account and Kant's idealism. What I hope to establish is that both Locke's anticipation of idealism and Kant's idealism rest upon the way each philosopher understands the role of substance in and its relation to our cognition.

## I Historical background of the conception of substance

That the term 'substance' throughout most of the history of philosophy referred to some primary ontological entity is clear. However, the meaning of the concept was not always the same. To illustrate this, we shall briefly discuss arguably the most important conceptions of substance up until the period we are interested in – Aristotle's and Descartes'. Aristotle explicitly defines substance for the first time in *Categories*:

A *substance* – that which is called a substance most strictly, and most of all – is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called *secondary* substances, as also the genera of these species.<sup>3</sup>

2 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

3 Aristotle, *Categories*, 2a12-2a17.

On the other hand, in *Metaphysics*, this particularist character of substance shifts towards understanding of substance as something more general in character. Aristotle gives one of the most characteristic descriptions of substance when he, calling substance a *substratum* (hypokeimenon), says that what is in the basis of things (or is their ground), can truly be considered a substance. Substratum is, for him, that to which other things are predicated, while it itself is not predicated to anything else. Even though substance in the first instance – *Categories* – refers to particular things (this human, this horse, etc.), while in the second instance it refers to something general (species)<sup>4</sup>, both conceptions share one crucial similarity. Namely, in either case substance exists independently of the existence of other things, whereas other things' existence depends on the substance.

In one respect, Descartes' understanding of substance seems vastly different than Aristotle's. In *Second Replies*, Descartes defines substance in the following manner:

This term applies to everything in which whatever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject, or to everything by means of which whatever we perceive exists. By 'what we perceive' is meant any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea (CSM 2 114).<sup>5</sup>

It is, I think, fairly clear that Descartes does not find it important that substance must not be predicable to anything else. In addition, the main feature of substance is that it must be a subject to which properties can be ascribed. In that sense, God is defined as a 'substance which we understand as completely perfect and which we don't consider as implying any sort of defect or limitation of that perfection'. Descartes, however, does not consider God the only, or indeed the paradigmatic substance. As we are well aware, Cartesian dualism, one of the most significant features of Descartes' philosophy, means that there are two substances, thinking and extended. Neither of the two is 'infinite' nor 'perfect'. There are several ways to talk about substance and, so to say, one fundamental distinction – between infinite and finite substance. The former is applicable to 'God', the latter to 'thought' and 'extension'. We can see this clearly in *Principles*:

By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of God's concurrence. Hence the term 'substance' does not apply univocally, as they say in the Schools, to God and to other

4 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, esp. book V.

5 Rene Descartes, *Objections and Replies* in: Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds.) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 2, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

things; that is, there is no distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to God and his creatures.<sup>6</sup> (CSM 1 210)

What is clear now is that both Descartes and Aristotle consider substance as something which is independent. One major distinction is the way they understand that independence. As Melamed notes, Aristotle primarily believes that independence pertains to predication. On the other hand, for Descartes, independence is also causal.<sup>7</sup> In that sense, ‘thought’ and ‘extension’, do exhibit the predicative independence (other things can be described as thinking or extended), but not causal (unlike God, ‘thought’ and ‘extension’ are not *causa sui*). Regardless of the differences between Aristotle and Descartes, or distinctions within their respective philosophies, it is clear that ‘what’ substance is has not changed even in such otherwise distinct philosophical systems as the two mentioned are. On the other hand, what has changed is ‘that which is’ understood as substance – shifting from individuals to species, from generalized properties to the Absolute.

However, starting from Locke, even ‘what’ of the substance changes, though not that it has to exist. And in that specific change, as we will see, Locke’s anticipation of idealism is reflected. In this brief introduction I have tried to outline extant continuity of understanding substance that persisted even within drastically different philosophical outlooks. Now I turn to elucidating Locke’s understanding of substance and the first hints of the discontinuity which will, in several phases, eventually amount to shift from realism to idealism.

## II Locke’s conception of substance

Locke’s empiricist stance is clear from the first claims he puts forward in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. One of the most famous claims is certainly the one that there is nothing in reason which wasn’t previously present in senses, and that reason is, in essence, *tabula rasa*.<sup>8</sup> Locke further claims that all of our ideas have their origin in the external world. As is the case with Descartes, he argues for the representational theory of perception, according to which ideas are

6 Rene Descartes, *Principles of First Philosophy*, in: Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds.) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 2, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

7 See Yitzak Melamed, “The Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes and Modes”. It is worth noting that, when one considers Aristotle’s theory of four causes (archai), it is not inconceivable that he too might have been aware of the causal meaning of independence of substance.

8 John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Dent: London, 1961, Book I.

'everything that mind intuits in itself, or which is an immediate object of intuition, thought or reason'.<sup>9</sup> In light of these claims, then, what becomes fairly unexpected is Locke's subsequent treatment of substance. He will explicitly define it in the second book of his *Essay*, but one of the most important contexts in which it is mentioned concerns Locke's negating the possibility of innate ideas. He thus writes:

I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance; which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all; and therefore signify nothing by the word substance but only an uncertain supposition of *we know not what*, i.e. of something whereof we have no [particular distinct positive] idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know.<sup>10</sup>

In light of our previous discussion, we can immediately recognize that Locke adopts traditional understanding of substance as something which is inherent to objects and supports their qualities (properties). However, the quoted passage does not present the entirety of Locke's conception of substance. In the second book of his *Essay*, he writes that ideas of substances are 'combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief.'<sup>11</sup> Soon after stating this, he adds that ideas of substances can be twofold – individual (a man or a sheep), and common (ideas of the collection of individual things, for instance a herd of sheep). As we can see, Locke does argue, after all, that we can say some fairly specific things about substances, and make detailed distinctions within ideas we have of them. Thus, the proposed continuity in understanding of substance that exists between such different philosophers as Aristotle and Descartes still persists in Locke.

However, this fairly straightforward picture drastically changes when we attempt to search for an answer 'what' it is that for Locke corresponds to the idea of substance. Here we find a very strong criticism of that idea. In accordance with what he stated in the passage above, Locke believes that we will never be able to have a clear idea of substance, the word 'substance' thus being without any clear meaning'. Moreover, he compares the concept with the famous Indian tale about

9 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 8,8.

10 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, III, 1, 19.

11 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 12, 6.

the elephant supporting the Earth and a turtle supporting the elephant. According to him, when we ask what is that hidden something which ‘supports’ sensible (manifest) qualities of an object, our question is just as meaningful as the question of the ancients what is that invisible something which supports our sensible world.<sup>12</sup> This position should not be of surprise. Bennett, for example, notices that Locke was a fierce critic of using any empty term, or any term at all which is not applicable to anything in our actual or at least possible experience.<sup>13</sup> Ayers goes even further than that claiming that it is practically impossible that Locke, a supporter of Boyle’s views, would use term ‘substratum’ in an Aristotelian way, e.g. to signify anything distinct from the qualities of an object.<sup>14</sup>

However, if we take an even closer look at what Locke has to say about substance, we can see that these remarks may not be entirely accurate:

The essence of each sort of substance is our abstract idea to which the name is annexed. The measure and boundary of each sort or species, whereby it is constituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is what we call its essence [...] I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal essence, to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances, upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which, therefore, as has been said, may be called the real essence.<sup>15</sup>

This passage, I believe, clearly shows that Locke’s intuition was very similar to Aristotle’s, in so far as both describe essence as something general in nature.<sup>16</sup> Both philosophers believe there is something general all human beings have in common, and that this is what makes them what they are. However, does it make them what they really are, or what they appear to be? The answer to this question is where Aristotle and virtually all philosophers after him diverge from Locke. By introducing the concept of nominal essences, Locke, as Woolhouse notices<sup>17</sup>, suggests that there is a difference between the way we perceive things, and that which they,

12 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 13, 19.

13 Jonathan Bennett, *Learning From Six Philosophers*, Vol. 2, p. 111

14 Michael Ayers, „The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke’s Philosophy“, in *Locke on Human Understanding*, ed. Peter Nidditch, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1975 p. 78-79.

15 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, III, 6, 2.

16 Perhaps the source of confusion is Locke’s two senses of the term ‘substance’ – the derivative (substances as corpuscles, or as individual things), and the original (substance in a traditional sense). In the previous passage, he clearly takes the second, derivative usage, whereas the discussed criticism turns to its original use. My claim is that it is this original use that persists in Locke and that substance in that sense is what Locke calls ‘real essence’, as we will see clearly in what follows.

17 Roger Woolhouse, *Locke*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p.99.

according to some underlying unknown structure, really are. For Locke, abstract ideas, by virtue of which things are members of certain species, are nominal essences. Contrary to that, he understands real essences as a real content of each object on which all the qualities are based and are kept together, a particular texture, or composition of things which is inherent to every object, and not connected to anything outside of it:

But essence, even in this sense, relates to a sort, and supposes a species. For, being that real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals: e.g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of such a peculiar color and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities and their union depend [...] Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition of a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable.<sup>18</sup>

But, as Locke has noted earlier, “if you demand what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not”.<sup>19</sup> Thus described, real essences are unknowable and can never be of use in classifying things nor in naming them – that role is played by nominal essences. Remembering now that in the first passage we quoted, Locke refers to substance, or substratum as ‘we know not what’, a fuller picture of his positions begins to form. It is now fairly obvious that that which corresponds to the traditional definition of substance are in fact for Locke real essences. We can also recognize that Locke himself was not always sure about how to approach the concept of substance. Even though he fiercely criticized every traditional understanding of the concept, he still wanted to somehow elucidate it. Considering all he had said, perhaps the most striking conclusion he makes is that even though we have no clear idea of substance, we still cannot say that it doesn't exist.<sup>20</sup>

Wherein might lie the root of such a claim? We can draw a parallel between Locke and Descartes. Namely, analyzing individual objects and their qualities throughout his *Essays* in a manner very similar to Descartes' analysis of a piece of wax in *Meditations*<sup>21</sup>, Locke was unable to attain any positive idea of that which supports sensible qualities. Whereas Descartes was able to talk about *solus mentis inspectio*, Locke's empiricist claims prevent him from committing to anything of the sort. However, he still wasn't prepared to deny the existence of something which is unknowable to us, primarily because he could not imagine how could all

18 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV, 6, 6.

19 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 31, 6.

20 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 32-33. P.314

21 Rene Descartes, *Meditations*, II

sensible qualities of a thing truly belong to it, or be kept together, without anything to support them. Substance thus became ‘that something which is unknown’, a real essence of a thing; a necessary, albeit essentially unknown component of every object.

### III Anticipation of Idealism

Having presented in some specifics Locke’s view of substance, we can move to explain how these views amount to the anticipation of (Kantian brand of) idealism. One way to do it is to make a connection between Locke and his much less famous contemporary Richard Burthogge. In two of his perhaps most famous works, which are recently being brought to light again<sup>22</sup>, *Organum Vetus and Novum* and *Essay Upon Reason*, Burthogge puts forward the following claim:

To us men, things are nothing but as they stand in our Analogies; that is, are nothing to us but as they are known by us; and they are not known to us but as they are in the Sense, Imagination or Mind; in a word, as they are *in our Faculties*; and they are in our *Faculties* not in their *Realities* as they be without them, no nor so much as by *Picture* proper Representation, but only by certain *Appearances* and Phaenomena. [...] Cogitable beings have no foundation, no ground in Realities, that is in things without *Cogitative Faculties*.<sup>23</sup>

As we can see, just like Kant, Burthogge here makes distinction between the way things look, (appear to us), and the way they really are. Let us recall now that Locke also develops corresponding distinction, the one between nominal and real essences. However, the mere fact of it does not still constitute justification for our basic claim, that Locke anticipated idealism. At the very beginning I mentioned two distinctive features of Kant’s position – the distinction between phenomena and noumena, and the demand for things to (at least partly) conform to cognition. That objects of our knowledge are somehow mind-dependent is what truly demarcates idealism from realism (regardless of how that dependency is further elucidated). In her introduction to Burthogge’s works, Margaret Landes notes something similar: ‘But that mind itself, independent of sense-experience, actively contributes to the make-up of its own object is a doctrine which, according to the usual view, was promulgated for the first time by Kant’<sup>24</sup>. Having previously explicated some of

22 I thank Tom Stoneham for bringing Richard Burthogge and his writings to my attention.

23 Richard Burthogge, *Organum Vetus and Novum*, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923, §8-10.

24 Margaret Landes, *The Philosophy of Richard Burthogge*, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing



Burthogge's claims we also covered here, she goes on to notice how 'Kant's own 'Copernican revolution' had an instigator at least a century older than Kant'<sup>25</sup>.

That mind-dependency is in some rudimentary form present in Burthogge is, perhaps of little doubt, though the precise meaning of his ideas need not be discussed here in detail. Nevertheless, Landes' dismissal of Locke's idealistic tendencies is not something we must accept as given. Namely, what is, I think, clear from our discussion of Locke's conception of substance, and real essences, is that he does not limit himself to simply noting the distinction between nominal and real natures of things. A crucial, but often neglected aspect of his position follows from a further claim that real essences are *unknowable* and that substance is *something unknown*. If we want to argue that things are somehow mind-dependent on our cognitive powers, we also need to argue that there is something which limits our complete knowledge of these things (objects, entities). Otherwise, how would we be able to make a philosophically interesting, non-trivial distinction (that is, the distinction that would not rely on optical illusions) between what merely appears to us, and what is real?

From this, I believe, follows that Locke's claim of substance's unknowable character leads him to claim that all classifications and names of things we give them does not stem from what they really are, but from how they are nominally, or in appearance. In that sense, we can clearly recognize the activity of the mind in making sense of the world around it and of the objects that exist in that world. Simply put, we are not in a position to truly comprehend something outside of us, and then classify it, both conceptually and linguistically. Thus, all we can do is determine common features of objects as they appear to us. To some extent, Burthogge also expresses this view when he writes:

Understanding conceives not anything but under the notion of an entity, and this either a Substance, or an Accident; under that of a whole, or of a part, or of a Cause, or of an Effect, or the like; and yet these and the like are only Entities of Reason conceived within mind that have no more of any real true existence without it, than Colors have without the eye or sounds without the ear.<sup>26</sup>

Company, 1923, 'Introduction', p. xvii. One important thing to not is that we can cast doubt on Landes' claim that mind has active role independently of sense-experience. Throughout the first part of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, including its very first sentence, Kant acknowledges constitutive, indispensable role of experience in our cognition.

25 *The Philosophy of Richard Burthogge*, p. xvii. Similar attitude is also present in: Michael Ayers: *Richard Burthogge and the Origins of Modern Conceptualism*, in T. Sorrel and Rogers, G. (eds.), *Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy*, Oxford: OUP, 2005.

26 Richard Burthogge, *Essay Upon Reason*, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923, III, 1, p. 57-58.

In a sense, the way Burthogge understands concepts (or notions) of, say, cause and effect, part or the whole, almost completely corresponds to the way Kant understands similar concepts – namely, as categories of the mind. It is not surprising that Locke and Burthogge were in contact and corresponded often. There is even some uncertainty as to what degree they influenced each other's work. On the other hand, it should be clear now that Locke was expounding some of the views that will after Kant be recognized as idealistic. Someone might now object that merely saying that concepts are categories of the mind does not by itself constitute the view that corresponds to Kantian idealism. Such an objection would be accurate. We have seen, however, that Locke says more than that. And what he says really is close to Kant's claims – that these categories describe only one side, only one aspect of existing objects, that they present our limit of cognizing such objects and that, perhaps crucially, our mind plays an active role in this sort of cognition, thereby supplanting the unknowable aspect of objects in the external world with what appears to him as their manifest nature. Thus, I believe it is safe to say that there is a context in which we can speak of anticipation of some basic tenets of Kantian idealism within the tradition of British modern philosophy.

#### **IV Kant's – Substance and the Thing-in-Itself**

Now, in order to make our case sufficiently clear, when talking about anticipating something, we must also talk about what is anticipated, at least in some detail. Hence, in the last part of the paper I will turn to Kant's conception of substance. The following discussion should play two roles. We have started our elucidation by considering the way substance was understood in the period up to Locke. The demarcation line we then provided was supposed to show us how shifts in understanding the concept of substance bring about a move from clear-cut realism to idealism, or at least anticipation of it. In that sense, the first role the discussion of Kant's understanding of substance has to play is to show the complete turn from ancient and early modern conceptions signaling thereby the arrival of a full-fledged idealism.<sup>27</sup> The second role to be played consists in showing how what was referred to substance in earlier philosophies was in Kant supplanted by 'thing-in-itself', which will also show us another crucial parallel with Locke.

The fundamental staple of Kant's philosophy is arguably his transcendental idealism. At the very beginning of his *Critique of Pure Reason* (B XVI), to repeat it again, Kant states that it was assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects, and that instead we should assume that the objects must conform to our

27 Post-Kantian idealists would certainly be reluctant to call Kant's idealism full-fledged. We will say more about this in conclusion.

cognition. Even though he is at that point yet to fully define meaning of 'transcendental' in his philosophy, it is clear that the focal point of his idealism is showing how exactly objects conform to our cognition. To that end Kant, as we know full well, makes a distinction between appearances and thing-in-itself. What appears to us is that which we can know. The complex system of our epistemic faculties gives rise to things appearing the way they do and ultimately determines the way we perceive and comprehend the world around us. Now, what in Locke's philosophy was 'substance', in Kant diverged into two aspects of his philosophy. The term itself, as we can see in First analogy as well as in chapter on *schemata*, refers to the way we understand appearances. In that sense substance is a category which can be schematized (i.e. we have a schema of substance) – schemas and categories both referring to what merely appears to us as an object of knowledge. It is precisely in that sense that we fully realize departure from earlier philosophy Kant is here making. What was a primary ontological entity, a fundamental aspect of every object, or the entirety of the world around us, in Kant becomes a mere way our mental faculties understand some aspects of the world. In that sense, we have a complete discontinuity, as both 'what' substance is and 'that' to which it refers are now given entirely different meanings.

But, returning to the parallel with Locke, substance is here tied to appearances, that is, to something nominal. In every object also persists an unknowable aspect Kant refers to as 'thing-in-itself'. The existence of the 'thing-in-itself' cannot be perceived, nor directly proven. The only reason we can give for its existence is that otherwise we would be unable to uphold the objectivity of the external world. We would be unable to imagine what it would be like if there were not an 'independent' aspect to things we cognize. The ultimate anticipation of idealism we find in Locke, thus, is not only the distinction between nominal and real, the claim of unknowable character of true nature of things, or the resulting activity of mind, but also the way of arguing for the existence of something unknowable which is still necessary. For both Locke and Kant, then, there simply must be something present 'in' things that ultimately make them susceptible to our minds' activity. Without it, what would support their sensible aspect and what would guarantee that their persistence is independent of our particular viewpoints?<sup>28</sup>

The final point shows us not only the extent of Locke's anticipation of Kant's idealism, but also limits of that idealism itself, as well as shaky grounds on which both ultimately base some of their crucial conclusions. It is not surprising then, that we can also find parallels in years after each of them published their works. Criticisms that Berkeley and Hume had of Locke's philosophy and the criticisms that Fichte, Schelling or Hegel had of Kant's correspond in the way those philoso-

28 This concern, I think, is with respect to Kant also clearly visible in his refutation of Berkeley's idealism. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 274-279.

phers rejected notions of substance and thing-in-itself, respectively, observing in a similar way that it is not consistent to posit existence of something and at the same time claim that we (can) know nothing about it. Thus, in both Berkeley and Hume, we have a reduction of the extent to which Locke's notion of substance has a reference. Berkeley denies existence of any material substance, and Hume goes even further, denying the existence of any kind of substance whatsoever<sup>29</sup>. Both philosophers acknowledged that substance was indeed unknowable, but concluding that it is unknowable because there isn't anything to which the notion of substance would refer. Similarly, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all followed Kant in his attempts to formulate an idealist philosophical system, but all concluded that the notion of the 'thing-in-itself' as unknowable presents a dangerous remnant of earlier, realist (or dogmatic) systems. Thus, each in his own way – Fichte by claiming 'thing-in-itself' doesn't exist<sup>30</sup>, Schelling and Hegel by claiming that it does, but is not unknowable, quite the opposite<sup>31</sup> – these philosophers understood it as their responsibility to 'purge' idealism of this 'defect'.<sup>32</sup>

In conclusion, I think we can safely say that, even though Locke cannot be yet considered an idealist, since much of his ideas are veiled in strict empiricist terminology, he fully realizes, even though he very rarely considers it explicitly, that some crucial aspects of reality are mind-dependent and that the unknowable ultimate nature of that reality imposes limits on our understanding of it, thus opening space for activity of the mind and the dependency of those knowable aspects of reality on that mind and its cognitive faculties. This, as I tried to claim during the entire paper, is the way he anticipates Kant's idealism.

Andrija Šoć

Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu

29 See George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 22-23; David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Book I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007,

30 See J.G.Fichte, *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

31 See, F.W.J. Schelling, *A System of Transcendental Idealism*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978, esp. 'Introduction', ch.5 and ch.6; In Hegel, this claim can be found in various forms and in many of his works. See, for instance, G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, Introduction.

32 One excellent analysis of the way these three philosophers tried to amend what they thought was wrong in Kant can be found in: Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. I, 'Aims of a New Epoch'.

### Literatura

- Aristotle *Metaphysics*, London: Penguin Classic, 1998.
- Aristotle *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Ayers, Michael "The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke's Philosophy", in: *Locke on Human Understanding*, ed. Peter Nidditch, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Bennett, Jonathan *Learning From Six Philosophers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Berkeley, George *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Burthogge, Richard *Essay Upon Reason*, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923
- Burthogge, Richard *Organum Vetus and Novum*, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923.
- Descartes, Rene *Objections and Replies*, in: Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds.) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 2, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Descartes, Rene *The Principles of Philosophy* in: Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds.) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 1, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Fichte, J.G. *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Hegel, G.W.F. *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
- Hume, David *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Kant, Immanuel *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Landes, Margaret (ed.), *The Philosophy of Richard Burthogge*, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923.
- Locke, John *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Dent: London, 1961.
- Melamed, Yitzak "The Building Blocks of Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes and Modes", online copy.
- Schelling, F.W.J. *A System of Transcendental Idealism*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978.
- Taylor, Charles *Hegel*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Woolhouse, Roger *Locke*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Andrija Šoć

### **Lokova anticipacija idealizma**

(Apstrakt)

U ovom radu pokušaću da pokažem kako se neki aspekti Lokove filozofije mogu razumeti kao anticipacija Kantovog idealizma. U prvom delu rada, ispitujem kontinuitet u shvatanju supstancije koji postoji između tako raznolikih filozofskih sistema kao što su Aristotelov i Dekartov. Identifikujući razliku između pitanja „šta“ je supstancija i pitanja na šta referiše pojam supstancije, u drugom delu rada razmatram Lokovo shvatanje supstancije, kao i njegovu distinkciju između nominalne i realne suštine, pri čemu je druga po njegovom mišljenju, kao i supstancija, nesaznatljiva. U tom smislu, postoji jasna paralela između te Lokove distinkcije i Kantovog razlikovanja pojave i stvari-po-sebi. Takođe, u razmatranje uvodim i filozofiju Ričarda Barthoga, koji pravi sličnu distinkciju. U poslednjem delu rada razmatram Kantovo shvatanje supstancije i diskontinuitet koji to shvatanje predstavlja u odnosu na prethodno razmatrana stanovišta. Zaključak rada je da čak i ako sam Lok nije bio idealista, jasno se može reći da ga je anticipirao. Štaviše, tvrdiću da pored tog, postoji još jedan smisao govora o anticipaciji Kantovog idealizma. Naime, on se može pronaći u načinu na koji Lok brani postuliranje pojmova supstancije i realne suštine i utoliko i iz tog ugla može napraviti paralela između Lokovog pojma realne suštine i Kantovog pojma stvari-po-sebi.

KLJUČNE REČI: supstancija, nominalna suština, realna suština, Burthog, pojava, stvar-po-sebi