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# THE FUNCTIONS OF THE RHETORICAL QUESTION QUID? IN CICERO'S PHILIPPICS 1-II<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** The first aim of this paper is to investigate whether the question *Quid*? used in Cicero's *Philippics* and his other writings could be approached as a rhetorical question, since it is usually not recognized as such. The second aim is to offer an analysis of the functions of the rhetorical question *Quid*? in Cicero's *Philippics* I-II, based on pragmatic criteria.

Key words: rhetorical questions, pragmatics, Quid?, Cicero's Philippics

#### 0. Introduction

The salient points of the nature and functions of the rhetorical question in general, and the question *Quid*? in particular, have been outlined by scholars through the course of centuries, from antiquity until the present time. Some of their arguments have been challenged in a number of studies so that an ongoing debate still exists on the issue.<sup>2</sup> In this paper I am attempting to give a fresh perspective on the use of the question *Quid*? in Cicero's *Philippics* I-II.

In section 1 I will briefly outline the treatment of the rhetorical question in Roman rhetorical theory which serves as a starting point for further discussion. Section 2 discusses how the rhetorical question has been approached from a pragmatic perspective and compares it with the treatment in Roman rhetorical theory. Section 3 discusses interpretations of the question *Quid?* both in antiquity and in modern scholarship. In section 4 I propose an analysis of the use of the question *Quid?* in Cicero's *Philippics* I-II, followed by a conclusion in section 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The research carried out for writing this paper originated from the project 'Modernization of the Western Balkans' funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (project no. 177009). I am indebted to Georgios Chatzelis and Vessela Valiavitcharska for their helpful comments on content and style of an earlier version of this paper. Georgios and Vessela are, of course, not to blame for the result. I am equally grateful to Christopher Pelling for reading this paper, even though I did not have time to implement his suggestions for its improvements. I would also like to thank Delaram Bextermöller for the improvements of the German summary (Zusammenfassung).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> According to my knowledge, the latest contribution to the debate is the paper of Michal Ctibor presented at the 19 International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics (Munich, April 2017). For a short information on his argumentation see Ctibor (2017) entitled 'Introductory *quid*: Reconsideration of Utterances Traditionally Edited as "Quid?". Although I do not agree with most of Ctibor's arguments and conclusions, I see it as a useful step forward in the further exploration of the problem.

#### 1. Rhetorical questions in Roman rhetorical theory

The purpose of this section is to look into the ways that rhetorical questions were treated in the Roman rhetorical tradition,<sup>3</sup> since it could give us a good starting point for better understanding of the use of the question *Quid?* in Cicero's *Philippics*. The fact that the ancient treatment of rhetorical questions is often oversimplified or misrepresented in Latin grammars might be one of the reasons for the insufficient attention paid to this topic in Latin linguistics in the last decades. For instance, Pinkster (2015: 344) says that 'the distinction between real questions (*percontatio*) and rhetorical questions (*interrogatio*) was already made in Antiquity and the effects of the latter well understood',<sup>4</sup> and it seems that the distinction was simple and easy to perceive. To support this view, Pinkster quotes a passage from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* which is also cited below (1). In this section, I will attempt to demonstrate that the picture is not as clear as it is assumed.<sup>5</sup>

In the fourth book of the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which is arguably the oldest extant rhetorical handbook in Latin, most commonly dated to the mid-80s of the first century B.C., a feature called *interrogatio* appears within a list of figures of diction. The author offers an example, as follows:

(1) *Interrogatio* non omnis gravis est neque concinna, sed haec, quae, cum enumerata sunt ea, quae obsunt causae adversariorum, <u>confirmat superiorem orationem</u>, hoc pacto: 'Cum igitur haec omnia faceres, diceres, administrares, utrum animos sociorum ab re p. removebas et abalienabas, an non? et utrum aliquem exornare<i>oportuit, qui istaec prohiberet ac fieri non sineret, an non?' (*Rhet.Her.*4.22)

'Not all *Interrogation* is impressive or elegant, but that Interrogation is, which, when the points against the adversaries' cause have been summed up, reinforces the argument that has just been delivered, as follows: 'So when you were doing and saying and managing all this, were you, or were you not, alienating and estranging from the republic the sentiments of our allies? And was it, or was it not, needful to employsomeone to thwart these designs of yours and prevent their fulfillment?''6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Despite the fact that in this paper I excluded evidence from Greek sources, I argue for paying attention to what Pseudo Longinus (*On the Sublime* 18.1-2) says on the persuasive effects of rhetorical questions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In Pinkster (1990: 287) the issue is approached in exactly the same lines, with the same quotation from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. According to Pinkster (1990) and Pinkster (2015), the subject is fully discussed in Calboli (1981), which was not available to me at the time of writing this paper. The only reason I have chosen to address the treatment of the rhetorical question in general and the question *Quid?* in particular in Pinkster (2015) is the fact that I see it as the most valuable and widely used Latin grammar at present, and I have done it with much hesitation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This is not to say that Pinskter (2015) does not appropriately address the rhetorical question as such. For instance, chapter 6.23 starts with the following words: 'When a speaker/writer formulates a question the answer to which is self-evident for himself and to which he does not really expect an answer, that question functions as an assertion (it is a so-called rhetorical question)... Often the surrounding context is decisive for understanding a question as rhetorical, but sometimes the question contains elements that direct us towards that interpretation' (p. 343). All this is in line with the discussion in section 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The translations of the passages from the Rhetorica ad Herennium are taken from Caplan (1977).

On the one hand, the *interrogatio* signifies rhetorical questions in the above passage, and this is in accordance with the assumption presented in Pinkster (2015). On the other hand, the *percontatio* is absent here. It only appears in the second book of the handbook, devoted to the judicial causes and procedures to be followed in the various types of legal issues, and it really signifies real questions. It is important to note that this passage contains a comment on the function of the rhetorical question: *interrogatio...confirmat superiorem orationem* ('interrogation... reinforces the argument that has just been delivered') which will be discussed in greater detail in later sections.

The next figure related to the rhetorical question described in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is a feature called *ratiocinatio*.

(2) Ratiocinatio est, per quam ipsi a nobis rationem poscimus, quare quicque dicamus, et crebro nosmet a nobis petimus unius cuiusque propositionis explanationem. Ea est huiusmodi: 'Maiores nostri si quam unius peccati mulierem damnabant, simplici iudicio multorum maleficiorum convictam putabant...Quid? veneficii damnatam quid\_putabant? Inpudicam quoque necessario. Quare? Quia nulla facilius ad id maleficium causa, quam turpis amor et intemperans libido commovere potuit; tum cuius mulieris animus esset corruptus, eius corpus castum esse non putaverunt. Quid? in viris\_idemne hoc observabant? Minime... Haec exornatio ad sermonem vehementer a<d> commodata est et animum auditoris retinet attentum cum venustate sermonis tum rationum expectatione. (Rhet. Her. 4.23-4)

'Through the figure, *Reasoning by Question and Answer*, we ask ourselves the reason for every statement we make, and seek the meaning of each successive affirmation, as follows: 'When our ancestors condemned a woman for one crime, they considered that by this single judgment she was convicted of many transgressions... <u>Well now</u>, what did they think of a woman found guilty of poisoning? That she was necessarily also unchaste. Why? Because no motive could more easily have led to this crime than base love and unbridled lust. Furthermore, if a woman's soul had been corrupted, they did not consider her body chaste. <u>Now then</u>, did they observe this same principle with\_respect to men? Not at all'... <u>This figure is exceedingly well adapted to a conversational style, and both by its stylistic grace and the anticipation of the reasons, holds the hearer's attention.'</u>

By taking these passages into account we can draw three important conclusions. The first is that the Roman rhetoricians were well aware of the effect of the rhetorical question as early as the first decades of the first century B.C. The second is that the anonymous author of this handbook made a connection between the rhetorical question and colloquial style.<sup>8</sup> The third is the fact that the examples chosen to illustrate this device contain the question *Quid?* implies that the Romans

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Rhet. Her. 2.13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For the full treatment of colloquial style in Latin language see Dickey and Chahoud (2010).

perceived it as a feature related to the rhetorical question, or maybe a rhetorical question as such.

Contrary to the rather extensive treatment of the rhetorical question in the *Rhetotrica ad Herennium*, Cicero's dialogue *De Oratore*, dated to the mid-50s of the first century B.C., gives merely a reference to the figures *rogatio*, *percontatio* and *expositio*, without a single example:<sup>9</sup>

(3) et *rogatio* atque huic finitima quasi *percontatio expositio*que sententiae suae. (Cic. *De Orat*. 3.203)

'then you *examine*, and, what is very near to examination, you *expostulate* and *answer* upon your own principles'.<sup>10</sup>

It is clear that the terminology is not exactly the same as in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Instead of the *interrogatio*, the *De Oratore* features the *rogatio* and it adds two other figures – the *percontatio* and the *expositio*. We have finally come across the term *percontatio* in connection with rhetorical questions. It is hard to make a definite conclusion about the specific meanings of these terms, since there is no example to shed more light on the matter. However, the aforementioned view which argues that the *percontatio* signifies real questions seems neither to hold nor to be conclusive. On the contrary, linguistic context leads us to the opposite conclusion. It is most likely that the *rogatio* signifies real questions, whereas the *percontatio* and *expositio* are related to rhetorical questions.

While the reason for including the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De Oratore* in our analysis seems clear, the same may not apply to the text of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* written in the last decades of the first century A.D. I hope that this issue will be clarified in the following section, devoted to pragmatic analyses of the rhetorical question.

Quintilian offers a long list of various subtypes of the rhetorical question, assigned by him to the figures of thought. The treatment of this topic starts as follows:

(4) Quid enim tam commune quam *interrogare* vel *percontari*? Nam <u>utroque utimur indifferenter</u>, quamquam alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratia videtur adhiberi. At <u>ea res</u>, <u>utrocumque dicitur modo</u>, etiam <u>multiplex habet schema</u>. (Quint. *Inst*. 9.2.6)

'What is more common than to *ask* and *enquire*? For <u>both terms are used indifferently</u>, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But <u>whichever term we use</u>, <u>the thing</u> which they present admits a variety of figures.'<sup>11</sup>

This passage shows that both the verb *interrogare* and the verb *percontari* signify posing questions, the former with a view to acquiring information (real questions), and the latter to supporting argumentation (rhetorical questions). Therefore, it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The same holds for all other figures in that section of the dialogue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The translation is taken from Guthrie (1808).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The translations of the passages from the *Institutio Oratoria* are taken from Butler (1969).

appears that the meaning of these verbs is in accordance with the meaning of their nominal derivates *rogatio* and *percontatio*, used in Cicero's treatise *De Oratore*. This is not surprising, given that Cicero had a tremendous influence on Quintilian's work. In addition, it is important to underline Quintilian's awareness of the complex nature of the rhetorical question and of its rather confusing terminology.

To sum up, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* offers evidence that at times the *interrogatio* signified rhetorical questions and the *percontatio* real ones, but our sources do not confirm the assumption that it remained unchanged in the course of the history of the Roman rhetorical theory. On the contrary, the passages quoted above lead us to the conclusion that the picture was not as clear as it is sometimes assumed. It seems that in Cicero's *De Oratore* the term *percontatio* should be interpreted as signifying rhetorical questions, and Quintilian's verb *percontari* clearly means posing rhetorical questions. Thus, we can conclude that the terminological confusion started as early as Cicero's time and continued well into the next centuries, but Cicero does not seem to be responsible for the terminological confusion. <sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, from Quintilian's testimony it is clear that older terms were mixed or used together with Cicero's terms and at the end Quintilian could easily say for the verbs *interrogare* and *percontari* that 'both terms are used indifferently' (*utroque utimur indifferenter*) and 'whichever term we use' (*utrocumque dicitur modo*).

Let us once again turn to Quintilian. He continues his treatment of the subject, as follows:

(5) Simplex est sic rogare: 'sed uos qui tandem? quibus aut uenistis ab oris?': figuratum autem quotiens non sciscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi: 'quid enim tuus ille, Tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat?' et 'quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?' et 'patere tua consilia non sentis?' et totus denique hic locus. Quanto enim magis ardet quam si diceretur 'diu abuteris patientia nostra', et 'patent tua consilia'. (Quint. Inst. 9.2.6-8)

'A simple question may be illustrated by the line: 'But who are ye and from what shores are come?' On the other hand, a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasize our point, as in the following examples: 'What was the sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?' and 'How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?' and 'Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?' with the whole passage that follows. How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said, 'You have abused our patience a long time,' and 'Your plots are all laid bare."

At this point I will only confine myself to commenting on two things quoted above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> On the contrary, he might have wanted to improve Latin terminology related to rhetorical questions, as he did in many other cases. For example, see a short outline of his struggles with philosophical terms related to emotions in Graver (2002: xxxvii-xxxix).

To begin with, Quintilian says that there is a clear distinction between real questions and rhetorical questions, which has already been stated in the passage quoted in our example (4). Furthermore, he gives a practical explanation of this view showing that sentences framed as rhetorical questions could be also framed as simple statements, albeit with a great loss in their force, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

### 2. Pragmatic approaches to rhetorical questions

In the second part of twentieth century rhetorical questions have, quite rightly, received significant attention of researchers in the field of pragmatics. <sup>13</sup> The incorporation of pragmatic information in linguistic analysis has already found general acceptance among Latin linguists. <sup>14</sup> Thus, in this section I will briefly outline a few pragmatic approaches to rhetorical questions. Furthermore, I will try to compare these findings with the treatment of the same subject in Roman rhetorical theory.

Schmidt-Radefeldt (1977) is one of the first important studies on rhetorical questions carried out on pragmatic grounds. Schmidt-Radefeldt starts his paper on rhetorical questions with the observation that the term *rhetorical question* denotes 'a somewhat hybrid type of utterance' (p. 375), and one of the main issues in his paper is to determine whether rhetorical questions are to be regarded as *indirect speech acts*. Schmidt-Radefeldt concludes that despite the fact that the concept of indirect speech act has to be defined more rigorously it may apply to rhetorical questions (p. 390-391). In the background of this notion is the fact that real questions are used to elicit unknown information, whereas rhetorical ones do not do so. Moreover, it has been generally accepted that rhetorical questions are in fact statements in interrogative form. This means that the act of asking questions has the illocutionary force of the act of making statements in a certain context. Thus, it can be concluded that performing and understanding indirect speech acts involves a kind of metonymic reasoning. The theory of speech act metonymy is put forward

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> I will use the definition given in Crystal (1997: 301): 'Pragmatics is the study of language from the point of view of users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction and the effects their use of language has on other participants in the act of communication.'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Pinkster (1990) is one of the first fuller attempts to introduce pragmatics into Latin linguistics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> There are two kinds of communication. The first kind is related with the direct speech act 'which constitutes a matching of structure (e.g. a declarative) and a communicative function (assertion)' and the second with the indirect speech acts, in which 'structure and speech function are not matched,' as argued in LoCastro (2003: 119). In addition, I will quote the definition of indirect speech acts given in Davison (1975: 157): 'Indirect speech acts are the speech acts suggested by their surface structure forms in addition to being some other speech act.' Finally, it is useful to quote Searle (1975: 60): 'In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by the way of relying on their mutually share background of information.'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> It is widely recognized in pragmatic studies. For example, see the discussion of this problem in Schmidt-Radefeldt (1977: 378-379).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> A frequently quoted definition on this concept is that of Quirk et al. (1985: 825): 'a rhetorical question is interrogative in structure but displays a strong assertive force and generally does not expect an answer.'

by Thornburg and Panther (1997). It is important to note that this phenomenon has also been fully recognized by Latin linguists. <sup>18</sup>

Frank (1990: 726) draws attention to the fact that rhetorical questions are used to enable the speaker to make stronger statements than those made through simple assertions. She concludes that the primary function of rhetorical questions is to persuade (p. 737). Ilie (1994) argues that rhetorical questions have a multifunctional character and maintains that 'the main discursive function is to induce, reinforce, or alter assumptions, beliefs, or ideas, of the addressee's mind' (p. 128). In her later work Ilie (1999: 979-980) shows that rhetorical questions are 'mostly used to shape arguments and influence public opinion, partly by defending and/or attacking particular viewpoints, and partly by striving to reach shared agreement.'

Kraus (2009: 130) again draws attention on the persuasive force of rhetorical questions and their capacity to exert moral and psychological pressure on the audience. According to him, rhetorical questions are very useful for making *argumentum* ad hominem.

Finally, it is important to note that experimental research in the field of cognitive psychology has provided evidence for the claim that the persuasive force of arguments is strengthened by their formulation as rhetorical questions. As an illustration, I will just mention the findings of Howard (1990) and Blankenship and Craig (2006).

Now let us turn back to the Roman rhetorical theory. Commenting on the complex nature of the rhetorical question, Quintilian said: ea res...multiplex habet schema ('the thing...admits a variety of figures'), as quoted in the previous section in our example (4). This is clearly in line with Schmidt-Radefeldt (1977) and Ilie (1994). In addition, Quintilian demonstrated that he was well aware of the difference between posing real questions and rhetorical ones and he mentions it twice in the same context. According to him, alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratia videtur adhiberi ('the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something') and figuratum ... quotiens non sciscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi ('a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasize our point'), as quoted in our examples (4) and (5). This is in line with Frank (1990) and Kraus (2009) who insist on the persuasive potential of the rhetorical question. Finally, we have seen that Quintilian knew that a speaker was actually making the statements by asking rhetorical questions, and gave examples as an illustration of this phenomenon. He quoted the first sentence from Cicero' First Oration Against Catiline: quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? ('How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?'), and gave an insightful comment Quanto enim magis ardet quam si diceretur 'diu abuteris patientia nostra' ('How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said, 'You have abused our patience a long time"), as quoted in our example (5). We can see that Quintilian's discussion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See, for example, Risselada (1993: 39). According to Kroon (1995: 75), 'the relations are 'rhetorical' in that they involve the function of an act vis-à-vis another act, viewed from the perspective of the communicative goals of the language users.'

on the subject anticipates the theory of speech act metonymy of Thornburg and Panter (1997).

As we have seen, the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, a century and a half before Quintilian, made a comment on the function of the rhetorical question: *interrogatio...confirmat superiorem orationem* ('interrogation ... reinforces the argument that has just been delivered'), as quoted in our example (1). Furthermore, the same author was also well aware of the effect of the rhetorical question on the hearer's mind: *haec exornatio...animum auditoris retinet attentum* ('this figure...holds the hearer's attention'), as quoted in our example (2). Thus, Frank (1990) and Ilie (1994) might be seen as distant echoes of these ancient assumptions.

To sum up, it seems that the treatment of the rhetorical question in Roman rhetorical theory anticipated some important aspects of twentieth century pragmatics. <sup>19</sup> Should we look at Roman rhetoricians as if they were pragmaticians without realizing it? If this is the case, should we agree with David West's statement that 'a fair amount of modern work with a theoretical basis has not helped us in any way to understand texts'? <sup>20</sup> In my opinion, the answer is negative. The modern theory has not been there in the past waiting for us, but rather appears for the first time in modern times, having its predecessors in much earlier periods. <sup>21</sup>

#### 3. Intonation, interpretation, and punctuation of the question Quid?

Although there are linguistic indicators for rhetoricity in utterances, which differ from one language to another, it has to be stated that whether an interrogative sentence is being used rhetorically or not sometimes may be made clear only against the nonlinguistic background of the utterance.<sup>22</sup> Schmidt-Radefeldt (1977: 381) lists the following as the main linguistic indicators for rhetoricity of a sentence: intonation pattern, special particles (adverbials), non-deontic modal verbs and verbal mood (conjunctive or conditional). It is self-evident that in the case of the question *Quid?* there is only one possible indicator for rhetoricity – its intonation. The important characteristic of research in the field of Latin linguistics is the lack of native speakers, preventing us from checking the results of investigations in a direct way. How could we compensate for this loss and consequently for the lack of information about intonation? The transmission of the texts without punctuation present an additional problem. Having in mind all these issues, it becomes clear that in Latin (and other Classical languages) the context is much more crucial for determining the information structure of a sentence than in modern languages.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> A parallel can be drawn with St. Augustine's assumed anticipation of many aspects of twentieth century poststructuralism. For a full account of this topic see Young (2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> West's words are quoted according to Fowler (1997: 13).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> I am paraphrasing the words of Fowler (1997: 27). Although he argues about the theory of intertextuality, the same argument can be applied to other modern theories as well.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> For example, Llewelyn (1964: 78) argues that ultimately pragmatic conditions decide whether an utterance in the interrogative form is to be regarded as rhetorical or not.

Thus, pragmatic perspective seems to be even more useful for Latin than for modern languages.<sup>23</sup>

As a starting point I will quote from Pinkster (2015): 'Sentence questions are often preceded by a question Quid? 'what?' often in combination with an adverb or a particle... Questions with quid in combination with the interactional particle enim, which appeals to common understanding, or with igitur 'what then' and ergo 'what in that case', expect a positive answer...' (p. 317). As a part of the discussion about the use of the question particle nonne, Pinskter mentions in passim that 'a question with quid often precedes' sentences with the nonne (p. 326). In another context, talking about elliptical interrogative sentences in general, Pinkster points out: 'Elliptical interrogative sentences with quid are quite common in comedy and in Cicero's letters. The function of the other constituent in the *quid* question can easily be inferred from immediately following context' (p. 346). It is obvious that Pinkster assumes that the question Quid? is rarely a free-standing unit, and its nature and meaning are determined by other words in a sentence.24 Under the same assumption, commenting on chapter 20 from the First Philippic Ramsey (2003: 125) argues, as follows: 'quid? 'what (is the point)?', introducing a rhetorical question that presents not simply a new point but rather an objection to what has just been stated. These rhetorical questions tend to contain non (cf. Phil. 5.7) or nonne (cf. Phil. 2.20).' With an analysis of the use of the question *Quid?* in Cicero's *Philippics* I-II in section 4 I hope to show that these assumptions are not always established on the firm ground.

There is an ongoing tendency of reinterpreting the punctuation of the interrogative *Quid*? in many Latin texts of different genres.<sup>25</sup> Scholars prefer to leave the previously established punctuation with the question mark placed after *Quid*? and to reunite the *Quid*? with other parts of the (following) sentence. Although I agree that in some passages 'it would be unsatisfactory mechanically to put a question mark after *quid*',<sup>26</sup> it seems to me that it should not go in the opposite direction - to delete a question mark after *quid*, even without giving a satisfactory explanation. In my opinion, sometimes suggestions for the alternation of the punctuation are going too far, without a valid and relevant argumentation. The latest example of this practice is Ctibor's contribution (2017) where we can read that 'a majority of utterances traditionally edited as "Quid?" in the Ciceronian corpus should not be edited the way it is.'<sup>27</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Beside Risselada (1993) and Kroon (1995) mentioned above, there are many other important contributions to pragmatics written by Latin linguists. For example, see Risselada (1998) and Rosén (2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Even when it is punctuated as a separate unit, it is sometimes left without a translation. The following example from Pinskter (2015: 327) serves as an illustration: Quid? Aestus maritimi vel Hispanienses vel Brittannici eorumque certis temporibus vel accessus vel recessus sine deo fieri nonne possunt? ('Cannot the tides on the coasts of Spain or Britain ebb and flow at fixed intervals of time without a god's intervention?' Cic. N.D. 3.24).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> For example, see Stockert (1978) for early Latin comedy, and Ricottilli (1978) for Petronius.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> I quote from Adams (2016: 150).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> He continues, as the following: 'There are two major constructions edited as "Quid?". The first one is *quid* for expression of surprise ("What?!", cf. Risselada 1993: 210); this construction is edited

From my point of view, the only possible way to escape the danger of reinterpreting the text according to arbitrary parameters is to be well aware of the fact that *Quid*? is often used as a single-word interrogative, with its own functions.<sup>28</sup> Finally, if we agree that there are many instances of the *Quid*? as a free-standing unit, we should investigate its nature and meaning. In the following section I will attempt to demonstrate that in Cicero's *Philippics* I-II as in many other cases the *Quid*? should be interpreted as the rhetorical question.

#### 4. Analysis of the use of the rhetorical question Quid? in Cicero's Philippics I-II<sup>29</sup>

Despite the fact that in this paper I will not discuss at length a possible inspiration and motivation for Cicero's use of the question Quid?, here I will just confine myself to pointing towards two different, but not mutually exclusive explanations. On the one hand, Cicero could easily grasp from early Roman oratory and find an inspiration for the use of the question Quid? in Cato the Censor's orations. For example, in his oration Pro Rhodiensibus we read the following:30 'Quid nunc? ecqua tamen lex est tam acerba, quae dicat: si quis illud facere voluerit, mille minus dimidium familiae multa esto...' (fr. 131).31 On the other hand, Cicero could also grasp from the Greek oratory, especially from Demosthenes. In Cicero's rhetorical treatises composed in the mid 40s, the Brutus, Orator and De optimo genere oratorum Demosthenes is presented as the chief Greek model. In addition, Cicero maybe wanted to underline the similarity of his political role in Rome to that of Demosthenes in the fourth century Athens. As it has been already recognized, 'it is not Demosthenes' Philippics but rather his speech De corona ('On the crown') that bears the closest resemblance to Cicero's Second Philippic.'32 Interestingly, however, Ramsey (2003: 115) in his comment on the use of the question Quid? in chapter 14 of the

appropriately. The other one is introductory *quid* which introduces a new topic (*What about...?*). Words following after this introductory *quid* syntactically depend on it, so the question mark should follow them. Whereas in other authors introductory *quid* is recognized and edited correctly [I omit the content in brackets, since there are just numbers of the given examples!] in editions of Cicero it is frequently mistaken for "Quid?!" ("What?!") for expression of surprise [I omit the content in brackets, since there are just numbers of the given examples!]'. On the one hand, Ctibor is right in his assumption that in Cicero's writings *Quid*? could rarely be interpreted as expression of surprise, whereas this interpretation is valid for Latin comedy. On the other hand, it does not necessarily mean that the only alternative would be, as he proposes, to interpret it as introductory *quid*. We can assume that by employing *Quid*? Cicero might want to express an objection or anger and/or to provoke different kinds of feelings in his audience, as I hope to demonstrate in the following section.

- <sup>28</sup> This kind of a balanced approach is presented in Adams (2016: 150).
- <sup>29</sup> In what follows heavy use will be made of Ramsey (2003), i.e. Ramsey's commentary which accompanies his edition of the *Philippics* I-II. It should not be implied that I agree with every point discussed in the Commentary (pp. 81-337).
- <sup>30</sup> Here I will just cite a view already expressed by Astin (1978: 143) that rhetorical questions are quite common in the oratory of Cato the Censor.
- <sup>31</sup> The passage from Cato's oration *Pro Rhodiensibus* is quoted according to the edition of Gianascian (1964).
  - <sup>32</sup> Ramsey (2003: 17) is quoting Denniston's view.

First Philippic, which is quoted in our example (6), implicitly mentions a possibility that Cicero's use of the question *Quid?* was influenced by the Greek, more precisely, Plato's phrase τί δέ;<sup>33</sup>. In my opinion, it is more likely that Cicero found his inspiration in the above mentioned oration of Demosthenes. In the *De corona* Demosthenes employed a phrase similar to that mentioned by Ramsey (τί οὖν;) twice,<sup>34</sup> which might have some influence on Cicero's use of the question *Quid?*.

Rather than discussing all ten instances of the use of the question *Quid?* in Cicero's *Philippics* I-II, I focus on the types of the linguistic context in which it appears, as illustrated in Table 1.<sup>35</sup> First, I discuss the use of the rhetorical question *Quid?* before questions with *-ne* and *nonne*. Examples are (6) - (8). Secondly, I investigate its use before other types of sentences. Examples are (9) - (11).<sup>36</sup> Finally, I address the question whether there is any functional difference between those two categories.

|              | the question Quid? before    | the question Quid? before |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
|              | questions with -ne and nonne | other types of sentences  |
| Philippic I  | 1.14 = example (6)           | 1.18 = example (9)        |
|              | 1.19 = example (7)           | 1.20 = example (10)       |
|              | 1.38                         | 1.36                      |
| Philippic II | 2.20 = example (8)           | 2.26 = example (11)       |
|              | 2.99                         | 2.104                     |

Table 1

At first glance, it seems strange that the rhetorical question *Quid?* is more often employed in the much shorter oration, the *First Philippic*. But the picture becomes more clear if we bear in mind two things – the first is that the *Second Philippic* was almost certainly not delivered as an actual speech,<sup>37</sup> and the second is that the *Quid?* should be viewed as a feature connected to colloquial style, since it is found in 'interactive contexts'.<sup>38</sup> In my opinion, the colloquiality of the *Quid?* is a strong argument for interpreting it as the rhetorical question. The connection between rhetorical questions and colloquial style was already made in antiquity, as we have seen in section 1, in our example (2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See footnote 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> The phrase is used in chapter 147 and chapter 220. I have used Goodwin's (1979) edition of Demosthenes' oration *On the Crown*. Significantly enough, in Vince and Vince's (1971) translation of this oration we find two different English equivalents to the phrase. In chapter 147 it is translated by the words 'Very well', whereas in chapter 220 it is translated by the exclamation 'What!'. All this is in accordance with the English equivalents to the question *Quid?*, as it is demonstrated in our examples (6) – (12).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The following passages are not included in the present discussion: Cic. *Phil.* 1.36; 1.38; 2.99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> These examples show that the rhetorical question *Quid?*, beside the usage before interrogatives with *nonne* and *-ne*, could also be employed before other types of sentences, unlike the assumptions quoted in section 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> For example, see Ramsey (2003: 158).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> The phrasing is borrowed from Adams (2016: 149). For fuller discussion see Hofmann and Ricottilli (1985: 191-192) and Hofmann and Szantyr (1965: 424-425).

Although Cicero keeps up the appearance of the delivered oration by different devices, the decreased number of utterances of the question *Quid?* provides an additional argument in favor of the thesis that the *Second Philippic* was never actually delivered. Thus, I argue that the extensive use of the question *Quid?* in some of Cicero's orations or parts of them should be viewed as an indicator of their colloquiality.<sup>39</sup>

#### 4. 1. The Quid? before questions with -ne and nonne

The first example which will be discussed here is taken from the beginning of the *propositio* of the *First Philippic*,<sup>40</sup> delivered at a meeting of the Senate that took place in the Temple of Concord in the Roman Forum on 2 September 44 B.C. In this part of the speech Cicero laments his absence from Rome on 1 August, when L. Piso was the only ex-consul to speak out against Antony. It seems that Cicero alone took an independent line on 2 September.<sup>41</sup>

As we can see, the passage cited below starts with the personal pronoun *ego* put first for emphasis. In addition, the first sentence of the passage contains a feature of the prose rhythm (*si bellum, si morbus, si fames*). Finally, before introducing the question *Quid?* Cicero appeals to immortal gods to pardon the Roman people and the Senate. All these things made a suitable setting for the rhetorical question *Quid?* and the question with *-ne* which follows.

(6) ego uero eam sententiam dixissem ut me aduersus populum Romanum, si qui accidisset grauior rei publicae casus, si bellum, si morbus, si fames, facile possem defendere; quae partim iam sunt, partim timeo ne impendeant. sed hoc ignoscant di immortales uelim et populo Romano, qui id non probat, et huic ordini, qui decreuit inuitus. **Quid?** de reliquis rei publicae malis <u>licetne</u> dicere? (Cic. *Phil*. 1.13-14)<sup>42</sup>

'I would have given such a vote as would enable me easily to justify myself to the Roman people if any more serious calamity had happened to the State, war, pestilence, famine – calamities which already exist in part, and in part are, I fear, impending. But for this I pray the Gods may grant their pardon, both to the people

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> In my opinion, this conclusion could be supported with additional evidence, but it has to be investigated more rigorously.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> According to Ramsey (2003: 83-84), the *First Philippic* can be outlined as follows: *narratio* (ch. 1-10), *digressio* (ch. 11-13), *propositio* (ch. 14-15), *probatio* (ch. 16-26), *refutatio* (ch. 27-38a), *peroratio* (ch. 38b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> In Fam. 12.25.3 he asserts: liber unus fuit. Addressing the use of the question Quid? in Phil.1.13-14 Ramsey (2003: 115) says: 'When quid? precedes a rhetorical question and marks a transition to a new point (cf. in Greek  $\tau$ ί δέ; - esp. common in Plato), the interrogative word in the following question is invariably postponed and so too usually is the enclitic –ne, as here [I omit the content in brackets]. This permits the words preceding the interrogative to be taken apo koinou (i.e. in common) with quid and with the predicate that forms the question: 'What about the other ills of our state? Is one permitted to speak about them?'.' On the one hand, Ramsey's interpretation and translation are not in line with his edition of Latin text. On the other hand, the translation given in Ker (1969) follows the Latin text more strictly. Since I do not agree that the words preceding the interrogative should be taken together with quid, I have cited the translation from Ker (1969).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> The passages from the *Philippics* are quoted according to the edition of Ramsey (2003). The only exception is our example (11).

which disapproves and to this our body that decreed it unwillingly. **But to resume.** Am I permitted to speak of the remaining ills of the State?'43

The second example of the use of the question *Quid*? is from the *probatio* of the *First Philippic* which deals with the *acta* of Caesar. Cicero's major premise is that the *acta* should be upheld. According to Cicero's interpretation, Antony's proposal to create a third class of jurors might overturn Caesar's judiciary law.

Cicero took special care in the composition of this passage, producing the long set of rhetorical questions, with the question *Quid?* in the middle and the question with *nonne* which follows. The passage ends with the plural form *evertitis*, which makes a contrast with *defenditis*.<sup>44</sup>

(7) Quae lex melior, utilior, optima etiam re publica saepius flagitata quam ne praetoriae prouinciae plus quam annum neue plus quam biennium consulares obtinerentur? hac lege sublata uidenturne uobis posse Caesaris acta seruari? quid? lege quae promulgata est de tertia decuria nonne omnes iudiciariae leges Caesaris dissoluuntur? Et uos acta Caesaris defenditis qui leges eius euertitis? (Cic. Phil. 1.19) 'What better law was there, what more useful, what more often demanded in the best period of the republic, than that the praetorian provinces should not be held longer than a year, nor consular longer than two years? If this law be done away with, do you imagine that Caesar's acts can be preserved? Again: are not all Caesar's judicature laws rescinded by the bill touching the third jury-panel which has been advertised? And do you defend the acts of Caesar, you that upset his laws?'

The last example in this sub-section is from the *refutatio* of the *Second Philippic*.<sup>45</sup> As has already been stated, this oration was almost certainly not delivered as an actual speech, but put into circulation not long after Antony left Rome for Cisalpine Gaul.<sup>46</sup> In contrast with the *First Philippic*, which sought to persuade Antony to adopt a given set of recommendations, the *Second Philippic* is an invective. Cicero's main goal in this speech is to present a highly negative picture of Mark Antony.

The sentence *Cedant arma togae*, which precedes the rhetorical question *Quid?*, forms the first half of a dactylic hexameter taken from Cicero's poem on his consulship. Cicero cited the same words on a few different occasions.<sup>47</sup> Although Cicero is arguing that these words mean simply 'let war give way to peace', the second half of this line (*concedat laurea laudi*) shows that Cicero was claiming superiority of the glory he had won as a consul (*laus*) in comparison with the glory of a triumphing general (*laurea*). In this example the question *Quid?* is uttered with indignation and comes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> The translations of the passages from the *Philippics* are taken from Ker (1969).

 $<sup>^{44}</sup>$  According to Ramsey (2003: 124), this might suggest that Antony and Dolabella were joint sponsors of the *lex iudicaria*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> According to Ramsey (2003: 160), the *Second Philippic* can be outlined as follows: *exordium* (ch. 1-2), *refutatio* (ch. 3-43), *confirmatio* (ch. 44-114), peroratio (ch. 115-119).

 $<sup>^{46}</sup>$  I.e. on the night of 28/29 November. For a fuller account of this question see, for example, Ramsey (2003: 158).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Cic. Pis. 73; Off. 1.77. For a fuller discussion see, for example, Димитријевић (2010: 273-276).

very close to exclamations.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, it is evident that the statement implied in the question *Quid*? is equivalent to the contradictory to its propositional content.<sup>49</sup>

(8) At etiam quodam loco facetus esse uoluisti. quam id te, di boni, non decebat! in quo est tua culpa non nulla; aliquid enim salis a mima uxore trahere potuisti. 'cedant arma togae.' quid? tum nonne cesserunt? at postea tuis armis cessit toga. (Cic. *Phil*. 2.20)

'But you were even pleased on one occasion to be facetious. Heavens! How clumsy you were! And here some blame attaches to you, for you might have derived some wit from your actress wife. 'Let arms yield to the gown.' **Well!** Did they not yield then? But afterwards the gown yielded to your arms.'

To conclude, the primary function of the rhetorical question *Quid*? in examples (6)-(8) is to persuade, whether by exerting moral and psychological pressure on the audience as in example (6), or by shaping arguments according to Cicero's aims as in example (7) and (8).

### 4. 2. The Quid? before other types of sentences

The first example which will be discussed here is taken from the *probatio* of the *First Philippic*. In the passage quoted below Cicero mentions three legislators – C. Sempronius Gracchus, the dictator L. Cornelius Sulla, and Cn. Pompey. All of them enacted laws affecting the jury courts and provincial administration.<sup>50</sup>

In the passage cited below the question *Quid?* jointly with other rhetorical questions invites the senator to infer and thereby to share the answer intended by Cicero. In the same time it conveys the impression of a strong commitment of Cicero to his statement. Thus, we can say that one major function of the rhetorical question *Quid?* is eliciting agreement from the addressee.

(9) ecquid est quod tam proprie dici possit actum eius qui togatus in re publica cum potestate imperioque uersatus sit quam lex? quaere acta Gracchi: leges Semproniae proferentur; quaere Sullae: Corneliae. **quid?** Pompei tertius consulatus in quibus actis constitit? nempe in legibus. (Cic. *Phil*. 1.18)

'Is there anything that can be called so peculiarly the act of the man who, although a civilian in the State, was invested with power both military and civil, as a law? Enquire of the acts of Gracchus: the Sempronian laws will be brought forward; enquire of the acts of Sulla: the Cornelian. **Again:** the third consulship of Pompeius of what acts was that made up? Of course of his laws.'

The second example in this sub-section is also from the *probatio* of the *First Philippic* and its context is very similar to our examples (7) and (9). Cicero argues

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Pesetsky and Torrego (2001) put forward the thesis that wh-interrogative clauses and wh-exclamative clauses are syntactically the same.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> This is what Ilie (1994: 45, 51-52) calls the 'polarity' between question and implied statement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> For a fuller discussion see, for example, Ramsey (2003: 122).

against Antony's proposal to create a third class of jurors (*decuria*). He puts the stress on the (in)eligibility of centurions.<sup>51</sup>

In the passage quoted below the question *Quid?* is a part of the set of rhetorical questions. Its persuasive force is assured by the introduction of an imaginary dialogue between the speaker and his addressee.

(10) at quae est ista tertia decuria? 'centurionum' inquit. quid? isti ordini iudicatus lege Iulia, etiam ante Pompeia, Aurelia non patebat? 'census praefiniebatur,' inquit. non centurioni quidem solum sed equiti etiam Romano; itaque uiri fortissimi atque honestissimi qui ordines duxerunt res et iudicant et iudicauerunt. (Cic. *Phil.* 1.20)

'But what is that third panel? 'Of centurions,' he says. What? Were not judicial functions open to that class by the Julian law, also before that by the Pompeian, by the Aurelian? 'A property qualification was prescribed,' he says. But not for a centurion alone, also for a Roman knight; accordingly men of the greatest valour and integrity who have been in command still act as judges and have hitherto acted.'

The last example is from the *refutatio* of the *Second Philippic*, as it was the case with our example (8). In this part of the speech Cicero argues that he had played no role in the plot to assassinate Caesar. One of his arguments presented in the passage quoted below is the fact that the conspirators had no need of Cicero to advise them, since they were 'of such ancestry' (*his maioribus*) which obliged them to defend freedom.

Contrary to all other examples from Cicero's *Philippics* (6) – (10), in the passage quoted below the *Quid*? comes before the exclamation, not the interrogative sentence. Furthermore, only in this case I have not followed Ramsey's (2003) edition of Cicero's *Philippics* I-II. Namely, in this passage Ramsey (2003: 201) puts 'quid C. Cassius?', and he gives the following explanation: 'This repunctuation by SB (5), in place of the vulgate *quid*? *C. Cassius...*, makes the question about Cassius more pointed', which is not convincing enough for me.

(11) etenim si auctores ad liberandam patriam desiderarentur illis actoribus, Brutos ego impellerem, quorum uterque L. Bruti imaginem cotidie uideret, alter etiam Ahalae? hi igitur his maioribus ab alienis potius consilium peterent quam a suis et foris potius quam domo? **quid?** C. Cassius in ea familia natus quae non modo dominatum sed ne potentiam quidem cuiusquam ferre potuit me auctorem, credo, desiderauit! (Cic. *Phil*. 2.26)

For if advisers were wanted for the liberation of the country when those men were the actors, should I incite the Brutuses, of whom the one saw every day the bust of Lucius Brutus, the other that of Ahala also? Should these men then, with such a lineage as this, seek counsel from strangers rather than from their own kin, and abroad rather than at home? **Again:** Gaius Cassius, a man born of a family that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Ramsey (2003: 123) rightly concludes: 'The precise composition of Antony's new *decuria* is difficult to determine from Cicero's caricature of it'.

could not endure, I do not say sovereignty, but even the superior power of any man, wanted me, I suppose, as an adviser.'

To conclude, the most important reason for Cicero's using the rhetorical question *Quid*? in examples (9) - (11) lies in the fact that its persuasive force exerted strong psychological and moral pressure to his audience to make them accept his conclusions without any further request for argumentative backing.

#### 5. Conclusion

After an outline of the treatment of the rhetorical question in the Roman rhetorical theory, the paper continued to examine functions of this device within the framework of pragmatics. The paper demonstrated how Cicero employed the rhetorical question *Quid?* in his *Philippics* to achieve various ends: to emphasize his personal views and statements, to express and provoke strong emotions, as well as to persuade and manipulate the audience, whether or not the following sentence contains *nonne* and *-ne*. Furthermore, this rhetorical device served to present some of Cicero's statements as common sense. Thus, the audience was morally and psychologically urged to accept his line of reasoning. Finally, the paper demonstrated that the rhetorical question *Quid?* was employed to attack the *persona* of Marcus Antonius and that it had a highly persuasive effect.

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## DIE FUNKTIONEN DER RHETORISCHEN FRAGE "QUID?" IN CICEROS PHILIPPISCHEN REDEN I-II

(Zusammenfassung)

Das erste Ziel dieser Arbeit war es, herauszufinden, ob die Frage "Quid?" als rhetorische Frage interpretiert werden könnte. Unsere Analyse hat gezeigt, dass diese Interpretation durchaus möglich ist. Zentrales Ziel der Arbeit war die Identifizierung der wichtigsten Funktionen der rhetorischen Frage in Ciceros *Philippicae*. Die Forschung hat gezeigt, dass die Frage "Quid?" eines der wichtigen rhetorischen Mittel in Ciceros Philippischen Reden darstellt.