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Nikola Samardžić

University in Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy

Čika Ljubina 18-20, Belgrade

nsamardzic@f.bg.ac.rs

Marija Kocić

University in Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy

Čika Ljubina 18-20, Belgrade

marija.kocic@f.bg.ac.rs

BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN EMPIRE DURING THE WAR OF THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE (1718–1720)*

The study focuses on relations between Britain and Ottoman Empire after the Utrecht and Rastatt treaties 1713-1714, as the outcome of the War of the Spanish Succession provided Britain with a more significant presence in the Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire was significantly weakened after 1718 Passarowitz peace agreement. British politics in the Ottoman Empire had to take into account increasingly complex relations with Russia, Austria, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain paid particular attention to the Austrian takeover of Naples and Sicily, and new Spanish ambitions in Italy. It turned out that the peace treaties of 1713, 1714 and 1718 did not provide lasting peace and definitive divisions of territories. The War of the Quadruple Alliance 1718–1720 began by Spanish attempts to recover territorial losses, and both Britain and Ottoman empire were interested in the events in Sicily, considered as one of the Mediterranean strategic points. The complex European relations that had been reflected during the war made mutually interdependent a vast space connecting the eastern Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Baltic and the Black Sea. The study is based on unpublished British papers.

Key words: Great Britain, Ottoman Empire, Spain, Russia, Poland, War of the Quadruple Alliance

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INTRODUCTION

Istanbul is remote, and British interests in the seventeenth century have been reduced to a basic trade. News from Istanbul traveled too long, and rarely referred to the immediate political and economic interests of London. Government decisions could not be directly implemented, in due course. London considered the Ottoman Empire as an autocratic state, however distant enough so any political cooperation was possible. England gradually penetrated the Levant and the Middle East, since the first Ottoman capitulations agreed in 1579. The Ottomans considered the need for trade with western and northern Europe as the ‘Muslim commercial retreat’, so the general commerce relied on Christians and Jews. Notwithstanding the wars of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Venice managed to maintain strong activities in the eastern Mediterranean. In their economic relations with the West the Ottomans were trying to suppress the Venetian influence and compensate the reluctance of Muslim traders to reside in the Christian world.¹

The arrangements with the English Levant Company, from 1592, were regulated on the basis of those achieved with the French and the Dutch. Ottoman merchants seldom acted within corporations. Capitulations, the grants made by Sultans to Christian nations, were also both formally and practically unilateral because the Ottomans had no interest in sending official representatives to the foreign states, like England, that lacked the Ottoman communities.

The Levant Company was in the course of decline at the beginnings of the eighteenth century, but still active and powerful. Moreover, other English merchants were resenting its monopolies. The Company reached its peak after the Cretan War (1645–1669) that exhausted Venice and brought territorial losses. The capitulations agreed in 1675 provided English traders with certain advantages over other European merchants. English commerce was based on export of English woolen cloth, exchanged for raw silk, on cotton, mohair yarn and goat hair, spices, drugs, coffee and some silk and cotton textiles. The silk trade confronted the Levant Company with the East India Company, otherwise favored by the Parliament. Simultaneously fierce competition appeared from the French encouraged by Colbert’s protectionism, and the political favor and influence at the Porte, culminating during the Great Turkish War 1683–1699, when France was acting again in the capacity of an Ottoman ally.²

Towards the end of the seventeenth century English businesses also suffered from the occasional French attacks on English ships, as well as the Dutch.

1 Laidlaw, 2010, 23.

2 Also see: Kocić, 2014 c, 40 and further.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Levant Company management's strongholds were reduced to Istanbul, Izmir and Aleppo.³

After 1699, the general relations in southeastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea region have changed significantly. Hanoverians were more interested in European affairs, and introduced closer political and commercial alliances with Russia. Britain entered the western Mediterranean while facing Austrian pressures in Italy. Austria established a new frontier with the Ottoman Empire and was more devoted in navigating the Danube and continuing the penetration into Southeastern Europe. Britain remained restrained in taking part in occasional hostilities of Russia or Austria against the Ottoman Empire, and needed to keep a sensitive balance while facing the fact that both Russia and the Ottoman Empire controlled overland routes to Persia and India.

More than direct involvement in major events, the relations with the Ottoman Empire took place through the affairs of the British diplomatic mission. The British ambassadors to the Porte were in charge of maintaining tolerable and constructive relations in order to preserve the Levant British trade, to ensure the enforcement of the capitulations, and facilitate the commerce. Their political responsibility was to oppose French attempts to keep a dominant role at the Porte, as France, in relations with the Ottoman Empire, remained a single consistent partner for almost two centuries. The French attitude to the Porte, especially after the Franco–Ottoman alliance in the previous war (1683–1699), was that Britain and the Netherlands are the Ottoman enemies, allied to Austria and Venice.⁴

UNSOLVED DYNASTIC CONFLICTS AND A NEW WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Ottoman policy was becoming more important from the British perspective as political relations in the Mediterranean substantially altered during the first two decades of the eighteenth century. In the western Mediterranean, Britain seized Gibraltar in 1704 and Menorca in 1708, and took a partial control over Sicily. In the eastern Mediterranean, new circumstances were primarily marked by the Venetian decadence and the emergence of Austria. Austria was returning Italy into the focus of international relations. Britain showed a visible interest regarding the Austrian conquest of the Kingdom of Naples in 1707, during the Spanish succession war (1701–1714). Britain and Netherlands sup-

3 Laidlaw, 2010, 24.

4 Samardžić, 2011, 12-13.

ported candidacy of Charles of Habsburg, the future Charles VI (1711–1740). The decline of Venice opened new opportunities for Britain in the Levant and the Middle East. Britain no longer considered Venice as a competitor in trade.

Ending the Spanish Succession War, the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 announced the rise of Britain in European relations. Austria obtained Spanish Netherlands, Kingdom of Naples, Sardinia, and a part of the Duchy of Milan, compensating the loss of Spanish Habsburg inheritance, while Savoy obtained Sicily and parts of the Duchy of Milan. The peace agreement in Rastatt 1714 confirmed Austrian possessions in Flanders, Milan, Sardinia, Kingdom of Naples and administration of Tuscany. British interests in the Mediterranean were accomplished thanks to the temporary state of disorder in Italy, and retreat of Spain and Turkey to the level of second-rate powers.

English diplomacy, together with the Dutch, was previously active in peace mediation between Turkey and the Holy League. After the Glorious Revolution 1688–1689 William III and the Hanoverian Dynasty brought more interest in continental politics. The Spanish Succession War, and the following peace agreements implementation, only temporarily restricted Britain in diplomatic initiatives with the Ottoman Porte. England and the Netherlands peculiarly sought to reduce the influence of France in continental relations and the Mediterranean, established through the alliance with Turkey. The return of the Whigs to power shortly after the election of George I (1714–1727) also influenced the role of Britain as a guarantor of the provisions of the Utrecht Treaty, and especially the rapprochement to France, from the beginning of 1717, threatened the interests of Austria.⁵

From the end of the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire was seriously shaken by frequent changes on the throne and at the top of the government. Mehmed IV (1648–1687) was deposed in 1687 and Mustafa II (1695–1703) in 1703. Only the sultan Ahmed III (1703–1730), who also came to power after the riots, managed to stabilize the state affairs, prior to moving into new wars.⁶

Ottoman Empire was further weakened in conflicts with Russia and Poland. The Second Morean War 1714–1718 opened a new crisis in Southeastern Europe, especially when Austria became involved in 1716.⁷ Spanish pressures on Italy in 1717 forced Austria, highly interested in maintaining Italian possessions, to accelerate peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire.⁸

The growing interests of Britain with the Ottoman government also paved the ways to distinct careers, as the British diplomats were leaving signif-

5 Kosić, 2014a, 170–173.

6 Коцић, 2013, 20–40.

7 Kosić, 2014b, 131–147.

8 Samardžić, 2011, 15.

icant traces with their affairs and, particularly, in their official and private papers. Valuable testimonies were left by Edward Wortley Montagu (ambassador 1716–1718), and his wife Mary.

The British idea of mediation in the 1718 peace talks was based on the previous experience of 1698–1699 negotiating in Karlowitz (when Porte had to give up the traditional stance on unilateral diplomacy).⁹ Britain even succeeded in taking on a more significant role in the forthcoming negotiations. From the end of 1717 British ambassadors Robert Sutton (ambassador 1701–1716/18) and Abraham Stanyan (ambassador 1717–1730) participated in the first peace communications between the Ottoman Empire and Austria.¹⁰ Montague remained in Turkey, active despite the official recall. He was replaced by Stanyan. Sutton, who in the meantime gained insufficiently clear competencies, being a “moderator”, also took a significant role in the preparation of the peace conference. Robert Sutton participated in the Passarowitz negotiations in the harmonization of the protocol and also the specific requirements from the Austrian and Turkish representatives, and insisted on giving more favorable conditions to Venice. The Passarowitz Treaty was concluded on 21 July 1718 between the Habsburg Monarchy and Venice with the Ottoman Empire on the other side. After successful mediation Sutton returned to London.¹¹

Appointed in October 1717, the ambassador Abraham Stanyan led the British affairs in the Ottoman Empire from 1718 until 1730.¹² The mediating roles of Britain and the Netherlands remained noticeable even after the conclusion of 1718 peace.¹³

9 Kocić – Samardžić, 2015, 15-30.

10 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 151r, Vienna, 15 January 1718, Robert Sutton to the Secretary of State; TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 141r, Vienna, 17. December 1717, Robert Sutton to the Secretary of State.

11 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 264v, Passarowitz, 23 July 1718, Robert Sutton to the State's Secretary; TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 276r, Passarowitz, 22 August 1718, Robert Sutton to the Secretary of State; TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 302r, Vienna, 15 October 1718, Robert Sutton to the Secretary of State.

12 “My last [Letter]to You was of the 20th July with a Postscript of the 22^d from the Grand Vizir's Camp at Sophia, soon after which he told me there was no further Occasion of my Presence there, so that he would have me go to Constantinople, and if any Matter should arise which required my Interposition, he would give me Notice of it. Accordingly I left his Camp in few days after, and have been here some time without having any Opportunity 'till now of acquainting You with my Arrival here”; TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 308r-309r, Constantinople, 10/21 September 1718, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

13 “I have received from Cavag[lie]re Ruzzini, the Venetian Plenipotentiary at the late Congress, wherein the desired Us to represent some Matters to the Vizir, which We have accordingly done, and take that Occasion of sending Our Answer to him by Express to Belgrade, from whence it will be forwarded to M[yste]r de S[an]t Saphorin by the Post. That You may know what Cavag[lie]re Ruzzini desires of Us, I send You inclosed a Copy of Our Answer to him”; TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 306r-307r, Constantinople, 19/30 November 1718, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

A WAR THAT PROMOTED BRITAIN IN GENERAL
EUROPEAN POLICIES

Further and widespread disturbances in international relations occurred shortly after the conclusion of the 1718 peace agreement. Britain declared war on Spain as the War of the Quadruple Alliance 1718–1720 began by Spanish attempts to recover territorial losses, agreed by the 1713 Peace of Utrecht. Before the peace of 1718 France promised the Ottoman Empire to join Spain against Austria.¹⁴

The Utrecht Settlement was focused on France, however Britain faced new challenges from Russia and Spain on Baltic and Mediterranean. Russia and Spain even supported the Jacobites, a political movement in Great Britain and Ireland aimed to restore the House of Stuart to the thrones of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the catholic restoration in Britain. On Mediterranean, Britain was endangered by the revival of French power and Spanish attempts to return to Italy at Austrian expense. Furthermore, France and Austria were discontent by the loss of Spanish heritage, but Britain had to count on France and Austria in order to oppose the restoration of Spanish rule in Italy.¹⁵

Italy was offering the suitable inheritances for the children of Elizabeth Farnese, the second wife of Philip V of Spain. In 1717 the Spanish troops seized Habsburg Sardinia. Britain needed a broad European support on Mediterranean. British mediation in 1718 peace talks counted on the benefits of Austrian successes in the war against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶ *“All this involved a widening of British diplomatic horizons. Of course, the connection between the northern and western balances had already been grasped by Marlborough; and the need to relieve the Emperor of the Turkish threat had been a consideration in London since the Nine Years War. Still, Britain had hitherto never really had a holistic eastern policy, designed to see issues in the round rather than in isolation. This was a function not so much of ignorance as of institutional blinkers, resulting from the division of foreign affairs into a Northern and a Southern department. This was bad enough in the case of relations with France, where British statesmen were well aware of the ways in which Mediterranean and northern affairs could interconnect. But it was critical in the case of Austria, Russia and Turkey, which were peripheral to both departments.”*¹⁷

While facing the Spanish pressure on Italy, both Britain and Austria were momentarily powerless. Britain was engaged in the Baltic, and a broad military

14 Samardžić, 2011, 23-24.

15 Simms 2009, 137-138.

16 Simms 2009, 137.

17 Simms 2009, 137.

conflict in the Mediterranean could compromise commercial traffic towards the Levant. Britain was finally forced to move against Spain after the Spanish invasion of Sicily, in July 1718. The famous writer Daniel Defoe warned that the Spanish conquest of Sicily will threaten the British position in the Mediterranean: "*Sicily, in such a hand, would be like a chain drawn across the mouth of the Levant Sea.*" "*Great Britain ... cannot acquiesce in letting Spain possess Sicily without giving up her trade to Turkey and the Gulph of Venice . . . to Gallipoli for oil, to Messina and Naples for silk; and in a word her whole commerce of the Mediterranean.*" "*How long shall we be able to carry on our navigation and commerce with our people in Jamaica, Barbados etc., if the naval strenght of Spain shall be suffered to grow to such an immoderate and monstrous pitch?*"¹⁸

The war between Britain and Spain was formally declared in December 1718, and France declared the war on Spain in January 1719. After successful beginning of French invasion of northern Spain, British diversions in Galicia, and the withdrawal from the British fleet in the western Mediterranean, Spain backed a Jacobite invasion of Scotland in April 1719. The rebellion, however, failed and, isolated from all effective foreign support, Jacobites were finally defeated.

Spain was forced to sign a peace with the Quadruple Alliance at the beginning of 1720. Stopping Spain in Italy meant more power for Britain in the Baltic. British attack on the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro prevented a new Spanish attempt to spread the power in the Mediterranean. By doing so, Britain also protected the Ottoman Empire from the sea. Britain also preferred preemptive actions on the Baltic.

During the Quadruple Alliance war Britain began to confront Russian threats that in the Baltic and the Black sea. Previously England, then Britain, even assisted the development of Russian maritime power, supporting European ambitions of Peter the Great. In the capacity of the Whig pamphleteer Daniel Defoe warned in 1705, how the Russian example "*may serve to remind us, how we once taught the French to build ships, till they are grown able to teach us how to use them*". While British interests in Turkey and Levant were driven by trade, Britain was facing a strategic challenge on the Baltic. "*As the Swedish empire in the Baltic disintegrated and the Russians advanced into Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Mecklenburg, unease turned to alarm*". Britain still had to take care of its English merchants in Russia and Sweden endangered by the war and uncertainty.¹⁹

18 Simms 2009, 139.

19 Simms 2009, 142.

The increasing attention to Russia was also related to the Ottoman Empire. The Porte has demanded Russia to withdraw troops from Poland.²⁰ After the death of Charles XII (1697–1718) on 30 November 1718, Russian emperor Peter I (1682/1689–1725) was seeking peace with Sweden. It was clear that the peace will enable new Russian pressures on Poland and the Black Sea. Still, Peter I was trying to calm the Ottoman Porte sending a diplomatic mission supposed to explain the Russian presence in Poland (in 1717, Peter I contributed to the agreement, which limited monarchical power, between Augustus II (as a King of Poland 1709–1733) and the *Sejm*, and Poland became a subject to overwhelming Russian influence). Ambassador Stanyan was very interested in the content of the Russian-Turkish negotiations, kept strictly confidential. However, ambassador managed to learn that the Porte was concerned with a possible alliance between Austrian emperor Charles VI of and the Polish king Augustus II (“*la nouvelle Alliance de Sang*”). With this alliance, as it was assumed, Augustus II, former Elector of Saxony and elected King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, intended to provide his family with the inheritance of the Polish throne. The realization of that Alliance would be a potential threat to both Ottoman Empire and Russia. The Porte was alarmed by Austrian successes in Hungary and Italy, and even informed about the concerns of Protestant electors in Germany about the growing Habsburg power.²¹ That is why Peter I expected the Porte to understand his intended intervention in Poland. Stanyan concluded that Russian intentions were directed also against Austria.²²

Britain used its diplomatic position with the Porte to influence the resistance to the Russian pressure on the Baltic, presenting the views of the barbaric behavior of Russian troops in Sweden. Stanyan even warned Russian ambassador Alexey Ivanovich Dashkov that peace will be possible only when Russian troops leave Sweden.²³

Turkey was significantly weakened after 1718 and the Grand Vizier Nevşehirli Damat Ibrahim Pasha (1718–1730) was not in the mood for new wars, although there were rumors of imminent hostilities with Venice. Turkey could only produce a certain instability supporting the Hungarian rebels

20 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 312r-314v, Constantinople, 16/27. March 1719, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

21 Augustus II converted to Roman Catholicism in order to be eligible for election to the throne of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in 1697. As Saxony had been a homeland of German Protestantism the conversion shook the Protestant Europe.

22 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 316r-320v; Constantinople, 22. July 1719. Copy of the letter which is Abraham Stanyan in the summer 1719 send to the Louis-Pesmes de Saint-Saphorin, envoy of the Great Britain in Vienna.

23 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 332, Constantinople, 22. December 1719/2. January 1720, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State. Also see: Коцић 2016, 87-102.

against Austria. However Ferenc Rákóci lacked the assistance of France engaged in the war against Spain, and in coalition with Austria.²⁴ The certainty of a more lasting peace was confirmed by the arrival of new Venetian and Austrian diplomatic missions.²⁵

The opportunity to strike a balance in the Baltic has emerged after Charles XII of Sweden was killed in Norway, in December 1718, and was succeeded by his moderate sister Ulrica Eleonora (1718–1720). The Austro–Hanoverian treaty of January 1719, concluded by George in his capacity as the Elector only, not as King of England, resulted in the withdrawal of Russia from Poland, as the British navy intervened in south Baltic and isolated Mecklenburg as a Prussian and, indirectly, Russian backbone in Germany. In a longer term, however, Prussia was seen as an obstacle to the Russian penetration in the Baltic. Britain furthermore futilely insisted that the Porte mediate in negotiations between Russia and Sweden,²⁶ and even to establish a defensive alliance with Sweden.²⁷

The Porte certainly was not pleased by the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance, concluded on 17 February 1720. The Hague Treaty provided that Spain join the Alliance, and contributed to the rapprochement between Spain and Austria.²⁸ But the Ottoman Empire was neither ready for new conflicts. When sultan made public rejoicings for 20 days on Account of the circumcision of two of his sons, the Porte ranked diplomats according to the “*instant friendship*” and jointly deployed the French ambassador with the Russian envoy, Dutch and British ambassadors, and the Austrian secretary with the Venice representative.²⁹ Clearly powerless for any new military confrontation, the Ottoman Empire neither was inclined to relent under British pressure and

24 Ferenc Rákóczi, the leader of the Hungarian uprising against the Habsburgs in 1703–1711, after the death of Louis XIV in 1715 accepted the invitation and moved to the Ottoman Empire in 1717. After the 1718 peace his attempts to rise a separate Christian army against the Habsburgs was never under serious consideration by the Ottoman authorities. Stanyan compared the Hungarian rebels with the Jacobites, the 1719 Spanish-backed attempt to bring the exiled James Francis Edward Stuart to the British throne.

25 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 326r–327v, Constantinople, 20 September/1 October 1719, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

26 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 334r, Constantinople, 18/29 January 1721, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

27 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 342r–346r, Constantinople, 2/13 March 1720, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

28 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 347r, Constantinople, 4/15 April 1720, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

29 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 371r–371v, Constantinople, 26 September /6 October 1720, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

confront Russia.³⁰ Abraham Stanyan sent the agreement concluded on 16 November 1720 between Turkey and Russia, translated in Italian. The contract regulated Russian right to hold an ambassador with the Porte, Peter I's right to keep his army in Poland during the following two months. Document also banned Cossacks from invading Crimea, and regulated the rights and obligations of traders, as well as religious issues.³¹

After Poland was stabilized, Britain has concentrated on Austria from the perspective of Austrian influences in Germany and the Mediterranean, and the general relations of Catholicism and Protestantism. The experiences of the Thirty Years War reminded of the need to strike a new balance in order to preserve the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia with reliance on France and Sweden, as the hostilities between Sweden and Poland were ended in 1720 with British mediation. However, by the end of 1720 Britain could not succeed to isolate Russia from European affairs.

The Treaty of The Hague, signed on 17 February 1720, confirmed the Utrecht peace provisions from 1713, and Philip V repeated his renunciation of the French throne and the claims to former French possessions in Italy. Emperor Charles VI renounced again his claims on the Spanish throne. The four year old Philip's third son Charles of Spain (future Carlos III) was recognized as heir to the Duchies of Parma and Tuscany. Savoy and Austria exchanged Sicily for Sardinia.

CONCLUSION

During the Quadruple Alliance war Britain used its economic and diplomatic strongholds in the Ottoman Empire in order to clearly consider the complexities of European relations, as the alliances and hostilities entered in dynamics of changes while any European power could not rely on previous historical or institutional experience. For the first time in history, clear and lasting political ties have been established between the European East and West, and also the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Britain restored alliances with Austria and Netherlands, while still restraining both Austrian continental pretensions, and the ones within the general relations of Catholicism and Protestantism. Britain was becoming more involved in Germany, and also used France to curb Spanish attempts in the Mediterranean. Despite its involvement in the

30 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 373r-375v, Constantinople, 26 September/7 October 1720, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

31 TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 377r-378r, Constantinople, 20 December 1720; TNA, SP, 97/24, f. 379r-381r, Constantinople, 16 November 1720, Abraham Stanyan to the Secretary of State.

Quadruple Alliance, France disrupted British pressures on Turkey to confront Russia. With the Porte, France stood firmly but somewhat reclusive protecting the interests of Catholics on the Levant and the tradition of closeness to Turkey.

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Никола Самарџић – Марија Коџић

ВЕЛИКА БРИТАНИЈА И ОСМАНСКО ЦАРСТВО ТОКОМ РАТА ЧЕТВОРОСТРУКОГ САВЕЗА (1718–1720)

Рат Четвороструког савеза претио је да ће пореметити тек успостављену равнотежу снага у европским односима након Рата за шпанско наслеђе. Британија је користила свој повољан положај на Порти како би утицала на односе на источном Медитерану, и из османске перспективе пратила промене на Балтику, у централној Европи, у Подунављу и Црном мору, пре свега забринута изласком Русије на Балтик и њеним односима са Шведском и Пољском. Порти је Британија постала нови ослонац док се суочавала са кризом својих утицаја на Медитерану, и британску дипломатску мисију уважавала, обично спремна на компромис. Током Рата четвороструког савеза Британија је користила економске и дипломатске утицаје у Османском царству како би јасније увиђала сложеност европских односа чије су трансформације постајале све убрзаније, тако да политичко и историјско искуство нису могли увек бити поуздан ослонац. Први пут у европској истрији успостављене су јасне и трајне политичке везе између Запада и Истока, и између Балтика и Медитерана. Британија је обновила алијансе са Аустријом и Низоземском, обуздавајући аустријске континенталне претензије, и оне које су се односиле на односе римокатоличанства и протестантизма. Британија је постајала и све ангажованија у Немачкој, и користила Француску против шпанских претензија на Медитерану.

Кључне речи: *Велика Британија, Османско царство, Шпанија, Русија, Пољска, Рат четвороструког савеза.*