

## 7. CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN THE EX-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: THE ROLE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CIVIC RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT\*

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### ABSTRACT

Autonomy is treated as a major element in a number of value models and often as a very important feature of the democratic political culture. The aim of this paper is to analyse the valuing of autonomy in a number of ex-communist and non-communist European countries, as well as the changes in that regard in the period between 1999 and 2009 and their main determinants. The data from the European Values Study and the World Values Study were used and aggregate, country-level analysis was performed. A total of 38 European countries were included, which comprised 47.999 respondents for 1999 and 58.155 respondents for 2009. Autonomy valuing was operationalized via the preference for the qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home, opposing support for independence/determination and religious faith/obedience. The *Freedom House* scores and *Human Development Index* values were used as measures of civic and political rights and socio-economic development of the countries, respectively. The results indicate that half of the ex-communist and the majority of the non-communist European countries show a significant increase in the autonomy preference over the ten-year period. In the non-communist

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\* This research was supported in part by grant 47010 from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

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*Changes in the valuing of autonomy in the ex-communist societies*

countries, the autonomy shift is significantly enhanced by the rising level of socio-economic development. Enhanced guarantees of civil and political rights and freedoms are, however, the major factors in promoting autonomy in the ex-communist societies. The obtained findings are discussed in terms of the institutional model of political culture, as well as in the context of the main assumptions of the self-determination theory.

KEYWORDS: autonomy, values, ex-communist societies, European Values Survey

## **INTRODUCTION**

Autonomy figures as a very important concept in cross-cultural and political culture studies. It is usually treated as one of the main dimensions of cross-cultural variations. Similarly, numerous value syndromes that are described as an essence of the democratic political culture include the concepts that are either rooted in or very similar to autonomy. Bearing in mind that the (political) culture of East European societies is usually described in, broadly speaking, collectivistic terms, as incompatible with functional democracy, the matter of changes in the preferences of autonomy becomes a rather important one. This paper is aimed at analysing the changes in autonomy preference over a ten-year period in a number of European countries, with special focus on the ex-communist countries, which had experienced dramatic societal changes in the past several decades. The question of the relationship between the socio-political transformation and the predominant values thus becomes very prominent, both theoretically and empirically. In addressing these issues we proceed as follows. Firstly, a brief overview of the conceptual status of autonomy in the dominant value models is provided. The role of autonomy in promoting democracy is then debated, as well as the different models of political culture and value change. In the following section, the present study is described. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the obtained results.

## **THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DIFFERENT VALUE MODELS**

There are several different approaches proposed in the literature for analysing the cross-cultural differences in values. These vary in the methodological design, the unit of analysis, as well as in the main dimensions of culture and their theoretical underpinnings. However, many, if not all, share a view that individualism is one of the main

dimensions of cross-cultural variation. It is without doubt also one of the most empirically researched dimensions (Triandis, 2004).

The individualism versus collectivism dimension plays a prominent role in the work of Hofstede (2001) and Triandis (2004). In both cases, individualism is conceptualized similarly, as a matter of focus on the rights above duties, personal accomplishments, autonomy and self-fulfilment (Hofstede, 2001); it is a matter of the definition of the self as independent or interdependent with some in-group (Triandis, 2004). Similarly, one of the main value dimensions in Schwartz's (2004; 2007) value model is the autonomy versus embeddedness, which taps the nature of the relation or the boundaries between the person and the group. In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, free to cultivate and express their own preferences, ideals, feelings etc. as opposed to people as "entities", embedded in collectivity. Inglehart posits two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation, one of them being survival/self-expression values (Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) which emphasize giving priority to the quality of life, well-being, freedom of choice and participation in decision-making in social and political matters. Although significantly different in terms of their operationalization and theoretical underpinnings, individualism, self-expression values and autonomy conceptually overlap, most notably in contrasting the autonomous and the interdependent view of people (e.g. Inglehart, 2004; Pavlović, 2009; Schwartz, 2004). Similarly, two main dimensions of value diversity were identified in exploring and mapping the values of European citizens: normative-religious and autonomy-social-liberalism (Hagenaars, Halman & Moors, 2003). Most recently, under the so-called *human empowerment model*, Welzel (2013) has described the emancipative values as a major psychological and motivational force that guides people towards the acceptance of the universal human rights and freedoms, and democracy as their institutional outcome. These values include the emphasis on the freedom

of choice, equality, voice of the people and, most importantly, on autonomy (Welzel, 2013).

### **AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL CULTURE**

Apart from being a major conceptual tool in analysing the cross-cultural variations and explaining cultural differences around the world, the individualism-collectivism dimension has well-documented political “payoffs”. The notion of individualism is close to and rooted in liberal ideology, whose main features include individual self-determination, personal rights and freedoms and limited state control. All of these form the cornerstone of modern democracy, while individualism itself represents an antidote to group conformity and submission to authority (Kemmelmeier, Burnstein, Krumov, Genkova, Kanagawa, Hirshberg, Wiczorkowska & Noels, 2003). Empirically, individualism is, on the individual level, positively related to pro-civic and democratic features, such as social capital (Allik & Realo, 2004) and negatively with its opposites, for example, right-wing authoritarianism (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003). On the aggregate, country level, abundant research has shown that various value dimensions that are intertwined with individualism are correlated with some of the most important and basic measures of countries’ democratic performance (e.g. *Freedom House* scores). The more democratic a country, the higher its position is on the autonomy-embeddedness measure (Schwartz, 2004). Also, its citizens are more inclined to accept, for instance, self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) or emancipative values (Welzel, 2013). In short, individualism is viewed as supportive of long-term democratic regimes and equality in social relations (Tirandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988; Hofstede, 1980). On the other side, the main “flaw” of collectivism is mainly described in the political domain, it’s

compatibility with the countries under authoritarian and non-democratic regimes (Triandis et al., 1988).<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, some related empirical findings are of special relevance for this paper. Since more democratic countries are usually higher on various measures of individualism/autonomy and those countries are, as a rule, Western societies, the East/West division in these terms is often registered and discussed. The East European countries are, in comparison to Western European ones, lower on self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009), autonomy (Hagenaars, Halman & Moors, 2003; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) and emancipative values (Welzel, 2013). If such value syndromes are conducive to democracy, then the often heard argument that the political culture of “new” democracies in Eastern Europe lacks some of the main features of the democratic political culture is justified (e.g. Klingemann, Fuchs, & Zielonka, 2006). Since, supposedly, values change only in the long term, it will take (a long) time for the newly established democracies to develop a genuinely democratic political culture and become fully functional.

This brings us to the important question of the value/political culture change. Two relatively opposing views are discussed in the literature. The political culture or culturalist paradigm proposes that, since values are relatively stable characteristics, acquired in the early adolescence, they can be changed only in the long term and under the influence of general, structural changes in a society, such as the socio-economic modernization, and via generational replacement (Almond & Verba, 1983; Eckstein, 1988; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Since the majority of the ex-communist countries’ citizens were socialized under the non-democratic, authoritarian regimes, the democratization of political

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<sup>1</sup> Some authors argue that individualism and collectivism are not the opposites of one dimension, but rather two distinct and separate measures. However, this line of discussion goes beyond the scope of the present paper (see, for example, Oyserman, Coon & Kimmelmeier, 2002).

culture is not likely in the near future. The flow from values/culture to institutions/structure is unidirectional, and hence, to create an effective democracy, we must “create” democrats first.

Still, a variety of other models, such as the lifetime learning or rational choice (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Pollock, 2003; Whitfield & Evans, 1999), give much more weight to individual rationality and recent experiences. Prevailing values are not the consequence of early instilled beliefs but constantly “updated” strategies, dependent on the political and economic performances of the newly established democratic regimes. This implies that the acceptance of democratic values comes as a consequence of experiencing democracy and its evaluations. Introducing democracy in a society would supposedly breed “democrats” and the process could be accomplished in a relatively short term.

#### **THE PRESENT STUDY**

This paper addresses the afore-mentioned issues in relation to the evaluation of autonomy in the ex-communist societies. Furthermore, we examine the changes that happened in the ten-year period, from 1999 to 2009, and investigate the main determinants of these changes. If values are predominantly influenced by structural changes (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013) then the eventual changes in the autonomy preference should be primarily related to the changes in the level of socio-economic development of a country. Such a view is relatively well supported by empirical data (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schwartz, 2004; Welzel, 2013). On the other hand, previous research has shown that, for instance, the trade-offs between predominant values and political structure could be quite the reverse. The increase in emancipative values (Spaiser, Ranganathan, Mann & Sumpter, 2014) or autonomy (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000) is, at least partly, the consequence of human rights based democratization. Growing acceptance of numerous

pro-democratic orientations such as political tolerance (Duch & Gibson, 1992), trust in social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997), support for marketization and democracy (Pavlović, 2014; 2016; Whitefield & Evans, 1999) or post-materialist values (Pavlović, 2015) can be quite well explained in the rational choice terms, i.e. the effects of economic and political performance evaluations. This being true would imply that increasing institutional guarantees of rights and freedoms should be conducive for the preference of those values compatible with these institutional outcomes, such as autonomy. Testing these assumptions is of particular relevance in the ex-communist societies. These countries underwent turbulent socio-economic-political changes in the last twenty years, which can be related to changes in valuing autonomy. On the other hand, it would shed some light on the on-going debate regarding the possibility of the democratization of political culture and East European countries' prospect in these terms.

## **METHOD**

### *Participants*

Data used in the analysis come from the third (1999) and fourth (2009) wave of the European Values Study (EVS, 2015) and the fourth wave (1996-1999) of the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association, 2015). The data for the following 38 European countries are used in the analysis: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, FYR Macedonia and The United Kingdom. The sample for the first observed period comprised of 47.999



respondents;<sup>2</sup> 58.155 respondents in total were included in the second time period. The primary interest is in the sources and the pattern of the change in the autonomy preference in the ex-communist Europe. Still, since the West/East division is well documented (Hagenaars, Halman & Moors, 2003; Pavlović, 2006; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Todosijevic, 2008; 2011) and the models of value change tend to be formulated in a rather universalistic and uniform way (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013), the rest of the European countries are included in the analysis as well. In that way, it will be possible to tell whether there is anything specific or different in the value change in Eastern Europe.

#### *Data and measures*

**Valuing of autonomy.** Preference for autonomy was measured by the autonomy index developed in the World Values Survey dataset and (with modifications) repeatedly used elsewhere (e.g. Welzel, 2013; Pavlović, 2010). This measure represents giving priority to autonomy over authority and is based on the preference for the qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home. Out of ten offered qualities, respondents were asked to choose five that they thought children should be encouraged to learn at home (yes/no response format). The autonomy index contrasts the preference for independence and determination/perseverance as important child qualities, on the one hand, and religious faith and obedience on the other. The scores for independence/determination variables were summed up and then the sum of scores on religious faith/obedience variables was subtracted from it. The resulting measure ranges from -2 to +2, higher scores implying the more intense valuing of autonomy.

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<sup>2</sup> Since the third wave of the EVS included a smaller number of countries than the fourth, the data for the first observed period in 1999 for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and FYR Macedonia come from the fourth wave of the WVS.

HDI measure. As a measure of the level of the countries' socio-economic development the well-known Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the UNDP is used. HDI represents a composite measure combining life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators; the higher the lifespan, education level and GDP per capita, the higher the HDI country values. The HDI values for each of the analysed countries in the two observed periods were obtained from the existing UNDP data.<sup>3</sup> Higher values imply the higher level of socioeconomic development.

Freedom House measures. The Freedom House measures of the current state of civil and political rights on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) were used as an indicator of the countries' level of political development and democracy. The measures for each analysed country are from the official Freedom House reports;<sup>4</sup> civil and political rights scores were averaged and computed for the two observed periods. Higher values imply a lower level of civil and political rights and freedoms.

Communist past. One dichotomous measure, differentiating between the countries that had and did not have a communist past, was created and used in the analysis.

## **RESULTS**

We proceed in analysing the data as follows. Firstly, the changes in valuing of the autonomy over the ten-year period in two groups of countries, the ex-communist (mostly East European) and the non-communist (mostly West European) countries are analysed. We then perform a closer inspection of the observed changes in autonomy preferences at the level of individual countries. Changes in the autonomy


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<sup>3</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>

<sup>4</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/table-scores>

preference are subsequently correlated with the changes in the countries' level of socio-economic development and the changes in civil and political rights in the sample as a whole, as well as separately in two subsamples of countries.

The mean values on autonomy measure for the two groups of countries in 1999 and 2009 are presented in Figure 1. Several important pieces of information are visible. First of all, there are no significant differences in the preference for autonomy between two groups of countries either in 1999,  $t(36) = -.70, p = .48$ , or in 2009,  $t(36) = 1.04, p = .30$ . In other words, autonomy is valued equally.




**FIGURE 1.** VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN TWO GROUPS OF COUNTRIES IN 1999 AND 2009

Still, the opposite trends in the valuing of autonomy in two groups of countries are visible over the ten-year period. There is a significant increase in autonomy preference in the non-communist group of countries,  $t(17) = -2.10, p < .05$ , from 1999 ( $M = .31, SD = .46, SE = .10$ ) to 2009 ( $M = .42, SD = .32, SE = .07$ ). In the group of ex-communist countries, valuing of autonomy is lower in 2009 ( $M = .31, SD = .30, SE = .06$ ) than in 1999 ( $M = .39, SD = .30, SE = .06$ ), but the change is not

significant,  $t(19) = 1.48, p = .15$ . It looks like the differences in autonomy preference either along the West-East axis or at the two time points are either absent or very small. In other words, taking the two groups of countries as a whole, the valuing of autonomy is relatively stable and at the similar level.


However, if we take a look at the patterns of the changes in the autonomy preference at the level of individual countries, there are large between-country differences in both groups of countries. The data are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

An increase in the valuing of autonomy between 1999 and 2009 (Figure 2) can be observed in about half of the ex-communist countries. The most pronounced changes are visible in Poland, Romania, and Moldova. Still, these three countries are the ones where autonomy is least valued. A decrease in autonomy preference has been registered in ten countries, most prominently in the case of Georgia, Greece, and Croatia. Autonomy is, in both time periods, most highly valued in Slovenia.



**FIGURE 2.** CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN THE EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009

On the other hand, the non-communist European countries show a quite different pattern of change (Figure 3). Majority of countries (14 out of 18) show an increase in the autonomy preference, most notably in the case of Turkey, Portugal, and Malta. Still, similar to their East European counterparts, despite the greatest changes, Turkey and Malta are the non-communist countries where autonomy is least valued. There is a decrease in the valuing of autonomy in a minority of countries, most pronounced in the case of Austria. Scandinavian countries are at the forefront of autonomous preference, which has been found almost regularly in previous studies with regard to other autonomy based or similar value syndromes (Arts & Halman, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Pavlović, 2006).



**FIGURE 3.** CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009

If we turn to the analysis of the possible correlates of the changes in autonomy preference, there are some additional differences between the East and West. In the sample of all analysed countries, there is no significant correlation between the changes in *Freedom House* or *HDI* scores and changes in the preference for autonomy (Table 1).

Still, this pattern of associations between the main variables is quite different in two subsamples of countries. In the case of the non-communist societies, a shift in the direction of higher valuing of autonomy is related to the rising level of socio-economic development (HDI index). The changes in autonomy valuing are not systematically related to the changes in civil and political rights and freedoms.

**TABLE 1.** CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY AND CHANGES IN FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES AND HDI VALUES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009

	All	Non-communist countries	Ex-communist countries
Freedom House scores change 1999-2009	-.29	.39	-.49*
HDI scores change 1999-2009	-.18	.50*	-.28

\* $p < .05$

In the subsample of the ex-communist countries, the pro-autonomy shift is, quite contrary, significantly related only to the changes in the *Freedom House* scores. An increased level of the preference for autonomy is manifest in those countries that had experienced a more intense improvement in the protection of civil and political rights and freedoms over the ten-year period.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the HDI scores change in the observed period is not significantly related to the changes in the autonomy valuing.

<sup>5</sup> The relationship between the changes in the Freedom House scores and the changes in autonomy valuing remain significant even after controlling for the changes in the HDI scores in the ex-communist countries ( $r = -.61, p < .01$ )

## DISCUSSION

The primary aim of this paper was to analyse the changes in valuing autonomy, an important aspect of an individualistic value outlook and one of the cornerstones of the democratic political culture, in East European, ex-communist societies. A related aim was to examine the importance of two macro variables that supposedly should play a very important role in value change – the level of socioeconomic development and the changes in the institutional guarantees of human rights and freedoms. It has been shown that political modernization is conducive to autonomy preference in the ex-communist context while the change in the level of the countries' socio-economic development is not related to it. This finding has some very important implications and several interpretations could be offered.

Before we proceed with the interpretation, let us first make a comment on the *HDI* and *Freedom House* data used in the analysis. In the non-communist group of countries, the changes in valuing autonomy are systematically related to the level of socio-economic development only. Yet, the fact is that in the observed period far more important societal changes have occurred in these terms than in the terms of civil rights and freedoms. For the majority of countries in this group, the changes in the *Freedom House* scores between 1999 and 2009 are absent. This is a sort of the “ceiling” effect; these countries are already “free” and there has been no improvement that the *Freedom House* scores could register. The reasoning for the *HDI* scores is likewise – a more intense improvement is more likely in the case of “poor” countries. In other words, the changes in the level of socio-economic development *and* institutional guarantees of human rights are visible only among the ex-communist societies. This makes the study of changes in autonomy preferences in East European countries even more relevant.

It seems that the findings support the assumptions of the institutional or rational choice model of value and political culture change. There is no dispute that values are relatively stable personal dispositions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1997; Pavlović, 2009). Still, being relatively stable does not mean being unchangeable at an individual or collective level. Values are in some sense adaptations to current life circumstances (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). They are sensitive to the prevailing socio-political context, dynamic, rationally based and reciprocally related to institutions, upgraded or downplayed depending on their utility (Mishler & Pollock, 2003; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Since societies develop and change rather slowly, so do the values. However, dramatic social changes could possibly cause a more prominent value shift. The regime change that the ex-communist countries experienced could count as such a dramatic social change.

The results indeed demonstrate that in the ex-communist societies the rising civic entitlements, i.e. democratization, affect citizens' value orientations. Broadly speaking, the support for one of the most important democracy-compatible values, i.e. autonomy, is influenced by the quality of the institutional guarantees of democracy. It has already been debated elsewhere that the communist regime, with its political oppression, surveillance, and indoctrination, undermined the value of autonomy among its citizens (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). The people, in a way, adapted to the communist regime by downgrading those values that stood in conflict with the environmental "reinforcements" (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). By the same token, creating opportunities to exercise freedoms and rights with the introduction of the democratic institutions could have enabled the acceptance of and desire for autonomy. Making people more prone to cherish democratic norms and values is thus achievable through more positive outcomes of the democracy itself. It seems that the institutions may enhance or inhibit the perceived utility of the relevant values (Pavlović, 2016).



The rationale behind the culturalist model of political culture change is that socio-economic development makes people more intellectually, cognitively and socially independent (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013). This is, additionally, rooted in the Maslowian conception of the hierarchy of needs; gaining more control over resources, broadly speaking, makes people more likely to satisfy and take for granted the lower order needs (such as economic security) and thereby able to pursue higher order ones (e.g. freedom of choice) (Inglehart, 1990).

Still, quite contrary to the Maslowian reasoning in understanding human values, some other theories of human motivation have quite different, though equally applicable postulates. The self-determination theory (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2011) seems to be especially relevant since its main focus is on autonomy as a basic psychological need, and the social (familial, institutional, political etc.) context supportive of autonomous self-regulation. People are driven by the fundamental needs of autonomy (having volition and control over actions), competence and relatedness. The self-determination theory suggests that people are more active, thriving, and fully functioning in the contexts where they can experience competence, relatedness and autonomy; for example, in a democratic political system far more than in a non-democratic one (Downie, Koestner & Chua, 2007). In Maslow's theory or the models derived from it, pursuing emancipative values is conditional and dependent on the satisfaction of some other more basic needs. Quite the contrary, the self-determination theory states that the pursuit of autonomy is dependent on the promotion and support of nothing but autonomy, regardless of, for example, material well-being. In other words, in order to make people value intrinsic goals, we must satisfy their need for autonomy by creating an autonomy supportive context. Studies have shown that the benefits of self-determination are not limited to wealthier countries or individuals who are more likely to have the necessary financial resources (e.g. Downie et al., 2007). Having the means (resources) and the opportunity

(self-determination) to pursue one's own goals is essential. Democracy might not immediately bring the former, but almost certainly brings the latter.

In other words, instead of being a consequence of the lower order needs fulfilment, the preference for autonomy could be more an expression of the *perceived* utility of freedoms. These arguments gain a special relevance in the case of the ex-communist countries, where state oppression and subjection to an authoritarian and non-democratic rule could have made the incompatibility between individual self-determination and prevailing institutional arrangements more prominent (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003). Growing opportunities could enable a growing satisfaction of the need for autonomy, which consequently can lead to higher valuing of emancipative goals. The self-determination theory assumes that under typical, "good enough" conditions people actively attempt to internalize and integrate socially endorsed values, identities and regulations, which, for example, suddenly become democratic ones. These norms, rules, and values will be more fully integrated to the extent that they are transmitted in an autonomy supportive way and that they are not antithetical to basic need fulfilment. The introduction of democracy and making it more institutionally guaranteed provides just that.

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**PROMENE U VREDNOVANJU AUTONOMIJE U BIVŠIM KOMUNISTIČKIM  
DRUŠTVIMA: ULOGA SOCIO-EKONOMSKOG RAZVOJA I RAZVOJA  
GRAĐANSKIH PRAVA**

APSTRAKT

Autonomija ima ključno mesto u većem broju modela vrednosti i smatra se veoma važnom karakteristikom demokratske političke kulture. Cilj ovog rada je analiza vrednovanja autonomije u većem broju bivših komunističkih i nekomunističkih evropskih društava, promene koje se u tom smislu registruju u periodu od 1999. do 2009. godine, kao i glavne determinante tih promena. Korišćeni su podaci koji su prikupljeni unutar Evropske studije vrednosti i Svetske studije vrednosti i analizirani na agregatnom nivou. U analizu je uključeno ukupno 38 evropskih država, što obuhvata 47.999 ispitanika u 1999. godini i 58.155 ispitanika u 2009. godini. Vrednovanje autonomije operacionalizovano je putem preferencije osobina koje bi deca trebalo da usvoje u porodici, suprotstavljajući podršku nezavisnosti/odlučnosti i religioznosti/poslušnosti. *Freedom House* i *Human Development Index* mere korišćene su kao pokazatelji nivoa građanskih i političkih prava, odnosno, socio-ekonomskog razvoja države. Rezultati ukazuju da u polovini bivših komunističkih i većini nekomunističkih evropskih društava postoji pomak ka izraženijoj preferenciji autonomije u desetogodišnjem periodu. U slučaju nekomunističkih društava, pomak ka većem vrednovanju autonomije podstaknut je socio-ekonomskim razvojem. S druge strane, jačanje garancija građanskih i političkih prava i sloboda glavni je faktor promocije autonomije u grupi bivših komunističkih društava. U



zaključnom delu, dobijeni rezultati diskutovani su u kontekstu institucionalnog modela političke kulture i glavnih pretpostavki teorije samodeterminacije.

KLJUČNE REČI: autonomija, vrednosti, bivša komunistička društva, Evropska studija vrednosti