

CHANGES IN THE RECRUITMENT PATTERNS OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ELITES IN SERBIA¹

Promene regrutacijskih obrazaca ekonomske i političke elite u Srbiji

APSTRAKT U tekstu se analizira promena regrutacijskih obrazaca ekonomske i političke elite u Srbiji na osnovu podataka prikupljenih u našim anketnim istraživanjima u 1989, 1993. i 2004. godini. Naša hipoteza je da su se obrasci regrutacije elita promenili nakon promene političkog režima u 2000. godini, ali u drugačijem pravcu nego tokom 1990-ih. Iz dugoročne perspektive, očekujemo dalji porast značaja visokog obrazovanja za regrutaciju elita i izjednačavanje njegovog značaja za regrutaciju političke i ekonomske elite. S druge strane, očekujemo opadanje značaja pripadnosti vladajućim političkim partijama kod ekonomske elite, zajedno sa rastućim značajem društvenog umrežavanja u periodu produžene slabosti institucionalnog okruženja. Da bismo proverili našu opštu hipotezu opisaćemo među- i unutar-generacijske obrasce pokretljivosti. Značaj obrazovanja, pripadnosti političkim strankama i umrežavanja kao kanala pokretljivosti analiziramo putem modela logističke regresije. Takođe, poredimo promene u regrutacijskim obrascima elite sa promenama u obrascima pokretljivosti društvenih klasa u Srbiji, u periodu 1989-2004.

KLJUČNE REČI Srbija, politička elita, ekonomska elita, regrutacijski obrasci

ABSTRACT In this paper the changing patterns of economic and political elite recruitment in Serbia are studied on the basis of three sets of data, collected in our surveys done in 1989, 1993 and 2004. Our hypothesis was that elite recruitment patterns changed after the political regime change in 2000, but in a different direction compared to the period of the 1990s. From a long-term perspective, we expect continuing increases in the relevance of higher education for elite recruitment, and equalization of the relevance of higher education for both the political and economic elites. On the other hand, we expect decreasing relevance for political affiliation among the economic elite, accompanied by an increasing importance of social networking during the period of a prolonged weak institutional environment. In order to test our general hypothesis we describe inter- and intra-generational patterns of recruitment. The relevance of education, party membership and networking as mobility channels is analyzed by model of logistic regression. We also compare changes in patterns of elites' recruitment with changing mobility patterns of social classes in Serbia, 1989-2004.

KEY WORDS Serbia, political elite, economic elite, recruitment patterns

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Introduction

By the elites we understand social groups who possess concentrated control over accumulated resources that are necessary for reproducing of the basic conditions upon which a given (or potential) social mode of production rests, and who play an active role in reproducing these conditions (cf. Lazić, in Higley, ed. 2000). Such a control in socialism was in the hands of nomenklatura (or class of collective owners), the ruling group that was strictly hierarchically organized. Two other characteristics of the group also determined the patterns of its reproduction. First, an individual could keep a position inside nomenklatura (and enjoy all privileges that went with the position) as long as he/she actively performed a definite command role in the society. Second, individuals who occupied hierarchically higher positions inside nomenklatura (and who, by definition, were members of collective bodies – “committees”) had the exclusive right to appoint members at lower positions. These two characteristics secured nomenklatura to be an open social group: individuals as a rule were entering it from lower social positions, moved up step by step, could not hold positions by the end of their lives, and could not transfer their positions inter-generationally (see on these and other characteristics of the class of collective owners in Lazić, 1987).

In former (socialist) Yugoslavia the first generation of nomenklatura members came to power after the Second World War and was recruited mainly from lower social strata (these were peasants and workers, who participated in partisan guerilla movement and acquired leading military or/and political positions after becoming members of the Communist Party). During the first two decades of socialist system, nomenklatura in Yugoslavia (and Serbia) kept itself wide open, so that it recruited individuals from all social strata proportionally. Egalitarian socialist legitimization was also one of the principal reasons for such openness. However, increasing hierarchical differentiation, together with increasing social complexity, started in time to narrow the recruitment basis of the ruling group: chances for inter- and intra-generational advancement of individuals with peasant origin, firstly, and with manual workers origin, secondly, started to drop, while the importance of middle class origin started to get importance. In a survey made during the mid 1980s, the systemic obstacles were discovered for people of lower social origin (peasants and workers) to get to nomenklatura positions, while these positions were wide open to professionals (inter- and intra-generationally). At the same time, descendants of nomenklatura members were falling to professional positions (mostly) and to routine non-manual jobs (but very seldom to manual jobs). It should be kept in mind, however, that decreasing chances of lower strata did not mean complete closure of the upper group: legitimization needs still made possible for individuals of manual workers' origin to climb to higher positions. Also, recruitment patterns of political and economic parts of nomenklatura started to differentiate: university education

was becoming the necessary precondition for individuals to become managers in socialist enterprises, while the communist party membership came to the second place; the political party criterion, on the other hand, kept the priority for politicians (see results of survey of class of collective owners in Croatia/Yugoslavia, in Lazić, 1987).

The process of (partial!) closure of nomenklatura continued until the end of the 1980s, and empirical results of the closure will be presented soon. What should now be briefly be discussed is the specific process of post-socialist transformation in Serbia, which led to important changes in the patterns of elites' recruitment. Namely, post-socialist transformation here took a path that significantly differed from "successful cases" of transition during the 1990s (for example, in Slovenia, Hungary or Poland). Former nomenklatura members in Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, succeeded in blocking transformation long enough to convert their previous monopolistic social position into private capital. The consequence of this process of conversion was an extremely high rate of entrance of their members into the new economic elite of the country during the early 1990s (cf. Lazić, in Lazić ed. 1995). At the same time, continued political domination of the same group prevented massive entrance of new members into the political elite in Serbia, even after the democratic political system was formally introduced in 1990.

The process of blocked post-socialist economic transformation in Serbia (in the form of extremely delayed privatization of state property) was, however, complemented by the legalization of market economy (on the concept of blocked transformation, see Lazić, in Lazić ed. 2000). It gradually made space for increased accumulation of private capital "from below", by a new social stratum, recruited mainly from the groups of professionals and small entrepreneurs. (by the end..) Privatization "from above" (via capital conversion by former nomenklatura members) and "from below" (via gradual capital accumulation by individuals coming from middle class positions) created conditions by the end of the 1990s in which the continued political domination by regime of Slobodan Milosevic started to contradict interests of the new economic elite. Withdrawal of this elite's support of the regime, increasing dissatisfaction among the population in Serbia that was massively pauperized, the consolidation of opposition parties, and Western help, finally led to the regime change in 2000. In this way conditions were created for significant change in the recruitment patterns of political elite (while modifications of recruitment patterns of economic elite might be expected to be much more gradual).

Let us now summarize our position in the form of several hypotheses, which will be tested by the data we collected. Blocked post-socialist transformation in Serbia had the following consequences concerning patterns of elites' recruitment. In the period that preceded the introduction of political pluralism and market economy,

the economic and political elites were relatively open groups into which members of all social strata were recruited. In time, however, relative chances for elite recruitment of professionals and lower managers started to increase, while the chances of manual workers and especially peasants were decreasing. Intra-generational mobility was much more affected by the closure than inter-generational mobility. During the period of 1989-2004, recruitment patterns of the elites started more profoundly to change, but following different trajectories for political and economic elites. Since former nomenklatura members continued to keep political power until 2000, social origin of political elite (as well as of the managerial part of economic elite, who kept positions inside state firms) did not change by this time since socialist period. However, recruitment patterns of entrepreneurial portion of economic elite did change, since – intra-generationally – former nomenklatura members were recruited to this group in high numbers.

Following the change of political regime in 2000, we expect to find new shifts in elites' recruitment patterns in Serbia. Apparently this change profoundly altered the composition of political elite, bringing into it individuals with different social origin (inter- and intra-generationally). On the other hand, concerning economic elite, the process of conversion of political positions of former nomenklatura members into economic capital was already completed. At the same time, privatization of state property has started to accelerate, and rules of market economy have strengthened. Therefore, our hypothesis is that change of elites' recruitment patterns took different direction after 2000, if compared to the period of 1990s. This time, we expect to find much more change in recruitment of political elite, accompanied with certain closure in upward mobility, since social origin (intra- and inter-generational) of the elite has become much higher in comparison with socialist period (or with period of blocked transformation). On the other hand, we expect to find milder changes in recruitment of economic elite, due to slow pace of structural change, accompanied with more openness as well, since increased number of small entrepreneurs and professionals has got a chance to enter economic elite positions. We also expect to find continuing increase in the relevance of higher education for elites' recruitment, and equalization of the relevance of higher education for both political and economic elites. Furthermore, we expect decreasing relevance of political affiliation among economic elite, accompanied by increasing importance of social networking during the period of prolonged weak institutional environment.

The changing patterns of elites recruitment in Serbia will be studied on the basis of three sets of data, collected in our surveys done in 1989, 1993 and 2004. In 1989 survey, 219 members of political elite and 231 members of economic elite were interviewed. The patterns of recruitment observed in this survey will be compared with data on 69 members of political elite and 256 members of economic elite, collected in our 1993 survey. Finally, these surveys will be compared with data

collected in our 2004 survey of 205 members of economic elite and 206 members of political elite. In order to test our general hypotheses we will describe inter- and intra-generational patterns of recruitment. The relevance of education, party membership and networking as mobility channels will be analyzed through the model of logistic regression in which the log of the probability of belonging to political vs. economic elites will be the dependent variable and ruling party (coalition) membership, level of education, social network density, year of survey and some of interactions will be the covariates. We will also compare changes in patterns of elites' recruitment with changing mobility patterns of social classes in Serbia, in the period of 1989-2004. Data on class mobility will be taken from two surveys: the Change in the class structure and mobility in Serbia, done on 3660 respondents in 1989; and the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP), done on 2997 respondents in December 2003/January 2004.

Intra-Generational Mobility of Elites in Serbia

As we mentioned in the introductory part of the paper, recruitment patterns of elites in early (Yugoslav/Serbian) socialism depended on several factors: revolutionary change of the previous system, which brought to the top positions almost completely "new people", as a rule from lower social strata; belated modernization in Serbia, the consequence of which was a very small number of highly educated people in the country after the revolution, and orientation of the ruling class (nomenklatura) toward rapid expansion of educational system (especially of university education); egalitarian communist ideology, which demanded people from manual working class to be directly recruited into the ruling class; collectivist character of the dominant class relations, which made possibility of inter-generational "inheritance" of ruling class positions to represent an exception. As socialist system "maturated", and as middle class expanded (especially professional and lower managerial strata), process of "closure" of elite recruitment was getting momentum. The closure meant that elites' recruitment basis was progressively reduced to middle strata (professionals and lower managers). Nevertheless, limited chances for members of lower strata (mostly office and manual workers) to enter directly top social positions were kept on.

The end of socialism in Serbia was also marked by a paradoxical historical development: former ruling group kept dominant political and economic positions even after political pluralism was introduced in the country. Such course of events led to continuity in the elite recruitment process more than into a new discontinuity, during the first period of blocked transformation. The heritage of this period, during which many former nomenklatura members converted their position power into economic capital, could be registered even today, if we look into intra-generational

and inter-generational mobility of the elites. Now let us start our empirical analysis with survey data on intra-generational mobility.

Table 1. Intra-generational inflow to elite positions, 1989, 1993, 2004, in %

Year	Respondent's present position	Respondent's position at first job				
		Higher class*	Middle class	Transitory stratum	Manual workers	Peasants
1989	Economic elite	3	80	12	5	/
	Political elite	9	63	18	10	/
	Overall	6	72	15	7	/
1993	Economic elite	5	71	14	10	/
	Political elite	6	84	9	1	/
	Overall	5	74	13	8	/
2004	Economic elite	10	79	8	3	/
	Political elite	12	80	6	2	/
	Overall	11	79	7	3	/

*Classes: Manual workers: un-skilled, semi-skilled, skilled; Transitory stratum: office workers and technicians with secondary school, self-employed with secondary education (or less); Middle: professionals, lower managers, self-employed with tertiary education, small entrepreneurs; Higher: managers, medium and big entrepreneurs, politicians

We start our data analysis with change in recruitment patterns of the economic elite. It may be seen from the Table 1 that there were no basic changes in economic elite recruitment during the period of blocked transformation (1989-1993), since former nomenklatura cadres mostly kept their positions. We have to have in mind here that privatization process at that time had just started in Serbia, so that members of the economic elite were still primarily managers in public enterprises. The real difference in recruitment patterns, however, was visible even at that time among new and relatively small sub-stratum of elite entrepreneurs (78 cases in our sample), where we found extreme predominance of former nomenklatura people, or members of their families. Namely, some two thirds of these entrepreneurs were coming directly or indirectly (via family or network of friends) to their positions using different instruments of capital conversion (privileged status in an enterprise during its privatization, or position inside state apparatuses which made possible involvement in illegal trade during the international sanctions, etc.).²

Rising differences in recruitment patterns of the economic elite as a whole are visible in our 2004 data. It may be seen that individuals whose positions at the beginning of their carriers were below the middle class level, could only exceptionally count on achieving elite status in Serbian economy (their chances are much smaller now, in comparison with socialist period). Middle class position – either professional, or lower managerial, or small-entrepreneurial – has become a

² See more detailed survey data on results of this process of capital conversion in Lazić ed. 1995.

prerequisite for entering the elite circle. Also, number of people who directly entered economic elite at the very beginning of their carriers has been significantly increased. Here we probably witness the rise of principle of family inheritance of class position (via private property), a clear sign of the new system of reproduction of social relations.

Another difference in patterns of economic elite recruitment in the two periods (socialist/blocked transformation, and present) may be seen in the case of positions that preceded present elite status. Namely, in late socialism these were almost exclusively professional or lower managerial positions³. Members of economic elite today, however, most often declare their previous position to be also the elite one! In order to understand better these findings, let us look into another set of data, on positions the elite members occupied in 1990, at the end of socialist order.

Table 2. Positions occupied in 1990 by members of present economic elite, in %

Positions*			
Manual workers	Transitory stratum	Middle Class	Higher Class
0.5	2.9	30.2	66.3

*See table 1

Looking at table 2, we may see much more clearly the personal “continuity” in the composition of the economic elite in Serbia, as a consequence of blocked transformation. Since only a handful of entrepreneurs could claim at the time to belong to economic elite (privatization had just started), it is clear that socialist managers were either keeping their positions for fifteen years, in enterprises which only changed their property labels, from self-managerial to state, or – together with politicians – were acquiring large private property during the process of prolonged market transformation of Serbian economy.⁴

If we look now into all of our data on economic elite’s intra-generational mobility, we may conclude that large majority of members of the elite started their carriers at professional positions during socialism, and moved to managerial or political positions before the systemic change. They were successful in keeping managerial positions even after 1990, or they were even more successful in

³ In socialism it was not very usual for a politician to move to managerial position, e.g., since this would in most cases represent downward mobility, which itself was an exception. See data and interpretation in Lazić, 1987.

⁴ Success in capital conversion has had consequences for age structure of the economic elite in Serbia. Namely, almost three quarters (72.7%) of elite members in our 2004 sample are over 50 years of age, while the rest are between 31 and 50 years of age. Only 31.2% of economic elite members belonged to the oldest category in 1993! This “ageing” of the economic elite is another sign of systemic change: there are no age (retirement) limits for private owners to run their firms.

converting their position power into large private capital. Only a third of present members of the economic elite came to positions after the transformation started in Serbia, and almost all of them moved upward from middle class positions: from professional or lower managerial positions to higher managerial positions inside public enterprises, or from professional or small entrepreneurial positions into medium or big entrepreneurial positions. For members of lower social strata, intra-generation entrance into the economic elite in Serbia has been almost completely closed after 1990.

Moving now to our data on political elite, we may notice that it has also become increasingly closed for members of lower social strata. In late socialism, more than a quarter of politicians started their carriers as manual or routine office workers and was able to climb up the social hierarchy, while this chance was progressively dropping during the 1990s. Instead, middle class, mostly professional positions have started to represent much more important recruitment basis for politicians. The “professionalization” of political elite has started to be particularly visible in public after the change of regime in 2000, since intellectuals (university professors, writers, scientists) were playing the dominant role among leaders of former opposition parties. Furthermore, the introduction of multiparty system obviously attracted many newcomers to political life, so that up to 2004 slight increase of people who started their carriers at political positions might also be noticed (lower elite positions inside new party apparatuses, or in parliaments – federal, republican or regional – were often given to young people).

Naturally, it may be expected that change in recruitment patterns of the elites represents only a part of general change in mobility process in Serbian class structure. In order to confirm such a hypothesis, intra-generational inflow mobility rates for classes as defined in analysis of elites are presented in the following table, comparatively for the last period of socialism (1989) and nowadays (2004).

First of all, it can be noticed that all values but one at the major diagonal increased from 1989 to 2004, which meant that an already low career mobility in Serbia decreased even further. This is most evident with transitory stratum, where inflow from the same position increased from 57% to 72%, mostly due to weakening of career shift from manual to non-manual work. Demand for administrative work that had been increasing during the process of rapid industrialization and growth of state apparatuses in the first couple of decades of socialism stabilized later on, and “rewards” (wages and attractiveness) of skilled non-manual positions have declined. With changes in society and economy mentioned above, university education has become prerequisite for good structural positioning (Cvejić, 2006). However, it became much harder to attain it during the career in the 1990s, especially because of dramatic drop in living standards in these years. Such clear educational demarcation of elite-middle class mobility pattern, produced by structural and economic change,

has been followed by yet another push at the lower part of social hierarchy, one that was marked by the only decreasing rate at the major diagonal of the table 3. Higher inflow of manual workers to small farmer positions can be noticed, which means that structural closure at the top of the scale and bankruptcy of many state-owned enterprises has been joined by forced crystallization of labor market position at the bottom. Namely, many of those who were holding two positions during socialism (in socialist enterprise and at family farm) unwillingly chose farming as survival strategy “at hand”. This has been followed also by a decrease in inflow of peasants to manual worker positions.

Table 3⁵. Intra-generational inflow mobility rates, 1989-2004, in %

Year	Respondent's present position	Respondent's position at first job				
		Higher class	Middle class	Transitory stratum	Manual workers	Peasants
1989	Economic elite	3	73	19	6	
	Political elite	9	63	18	10	
	Middle class		61	23	15	1
	Transitory stratum		2	57	39	2
	Manual workers		1	1	93	5
	Peasants			1	8	91
	Overall		1	20	15	42
2004	Economic elite	8	72	15	4	
	Political elite	12	80	6	2	
	Middle class		64	24	12	
	Transitory stratum		2	72	23	3
	Manual workers			4	94	1
	Peasants			1	15	84
	Overall		2	24	23	35

The tendencies of career formation mentioned above point to the fact that elite recruitment in Serbia today has been unfolding under ambivalent circumstances. On the one hand, we can recognize the increasing “professionalization” of the elites, by their more frequent career start in the middle class, but on the other hand, we can see that intra-generational education expansion is happening too slowly, which narrows recruitment reservoir of the elites, and probably contributes to elite closure. In general this is related to the state of economy where needs for higher education and larger size of middle class are stagnating.

⁵ Note that the rates for economic and political elites in Table 3 slightly differ from Table 1. This is due to enlargement of the two (mostly of the economic elite) in the national sample, by adding several cases that originally do not hold an elite position. In our analysis of national sample the dominance principle was applied, which meant that married respondent got higher of the two class positions in the marriage. This approach increases mobility rates in general. This way 2/3 of elite members in the national sample came to this position through marriage, and not by their actual job.

Inter-Generational Mobility of Elites

Let us move now to our data on inter-generational mobility and check if the change of elite recruitment patterns, registered so far, could be found in this field too.

Table 4. Inter-generational inflow to elite positions, 1989, 1993, 2004, in %

Year	Respondent's present position	Father's position				
		Higher class	Middle class	Transitory stratum	Manual workers	Peasants
1989	Economic elite	3	25	14	28	30
	Political elite	2	21	14	32	31
	Overall	3	23	14	30	30
1993	Economic elite	6	17	17	25	35
	Political elite	12	23	15	8	42
	Overall	6	19	17	21	37
2004	Economic elite	24	37	8	19	12
	Political elite	28	37	13	15	7
	Overall	26	37	10	17	10

It is obvious, again, that many similarities between inter-generational recruitment patterns of the economic elite in socialist time, and during blocked post-socialist transformation, may be noticed, while significant change has occurred after the transformation was un-blocked. Relatively open character of socialist recruitment patterns is visible in proportions of lower-class fathers among the economic elite members, which roughly corresponds to distribution of strata in general population of Serbia (long after the World War II Serbia was predominantly agricultural country). In 1993 the only change deserving comment is the increase in percentage of fathers who belonged to higher class.⁶ The change is consistent with our previous conclusion about the role of family class position in capital conversion: fathers who were nomenklatura members made possible for their offspring⁷ to acquire entrepreneurial status and in this way “inherit” a higher class position. This is how we may explain actions of nomenklatura members during the system changes in the 1990s. Namely, to achieve their long-term interests, they made the following

⁶ Increase in percentage of peasant fathers is probably result of sampling procedure, which included many firms in provincial cities in Serbia. For possible additional explanation see also below, fn. 7. Increased number of fathers who belonged to transitory stratum (and corresponding decrease of middle class fathers) comes mostly from the problem of definition: we had to include into transitory stratum all “self-employed” persons (since we had not enough data on fathers; they make more than 5% of the total), while many of them certainly belonged to middle class.

⁷ These were mostly sons! – since only 10% of economic elite members in 1993 were women; the percentage of women among economic elite “jumped” to 17.4 in 2004.

three steps in the process of system transformation: first, they did not oppose initial systemic change in 1989/90, so that market economy and private property were finally legitimized and inter-generational transfer of upper social positions was made possible; secondly, they blocked the deepening of the change in period 1991/97, in order to convert their position power into private wealth; and thirdly, they helped the transformation to unblock after 1997, and especially after 2000, to use their new property without external limits, in the system of market economy.

Unblocking the transformation has produced significant consequences for inter-generational mobility of the economic elite. We may notice a strong tendency towards closure of the upper social strata in 2004. Number of people with peasant origin who could move upwards has been very much reduced (this drop has been much faster than the decline in proportion of peasants in Serbian society, which at present comes to about 15%). Furthermore, drop of manual workers' offspring among the elite members is also noticeable. On the other hand, increase in number of economic elite members coming from middle class families has been very rapid. And especially important has been the dramatic increase of higher class' offspring who succeeded in "inheriting" top class positions in Serbian society! Only now it is possible to understand fully the real consequences of blocked transformation for the process named "elite reconstruction" (cf. Lazić, in Higley & Lengyel, eds. 2000). Namely, former nomenklatura members succeeded not only to secure their own dominant positions in society (by capital conversion), they also made possible for their sons (and not very often for their daughters) to directly inherit elite positions, something that only exceptionally could have happened in socialism. This family transfer of positions, obviously, has had two forms (which have been more and more manifested as consecutive phases): conversion of position power into private capital, and legal inheritance of private capital (our inter-generational data lump these two cases together).

If we move now to recruitment patterns of political elite, we may see that this part of elite, as well, has been transformed from a relatively open to a relatively closed (in a selective way) group. While in 1989 distribution of fathers roughly corresponds to proportion of classes in Serbian population (middle class in time was increasing, as mentioned before), in 1993 strong increase of higher class offspring inside the elite may be noticed. Instead of being an obstacle, fathers' political or managerial position became the resource that made possible for someone to get to a political position. The change had to do both with transformation of legitimization⁸

⁸ The legitimization change probably may help to explain otherwise strange increase in number of peasant fathers and drop of manual worker fathers among politicians in 1993. Namely, because of the tendency to eliminate socialist ideology that glorified workers, and of parallel rise of nationalism with its stress on „organic“ (peasant) roots of nation, it might be that politicians „reinterpreted“ correspondingly their social origin (the rapid industrialization in Serbia after 1945

and of type of organization of political system: political pluralism does not (like nomenklatura hierarchy does) prohibit, by itself, political careers more than business careers of individuals who are offspring of people at power. In fact, during the early years of (blocked) transformation in Serbia, when old rules were dismantled and new rules did not even start to form, accumulated resources (economic, political, social etc.) represented almost the only tool for social promotion, unrestricted by any subtle mechanism (like public opinion, internalized ethic norms, etc.).

Table 5. Inter-generational inflow mobility, 1989-2004, in %

Year	Respondent's present position	Father's position				
		Higher class	Middle class	Transitory stratum	Manual workers	Peasants
1989	Economic elite	3	24	16	28	28
	Political elite	2	21	14	32	31
	Middle class	3	27	16	26	28
	Transitory stratum	2	12	13	42	31
	Manual workers		6	5	43	46
	Peasants		2	1	7	90
	Overall		1	12	8	30
2004	Economic elite	20	30	11	25	14
	Political elite	28	37	13	15	7
	Middle class	9	24	19	31	17
	Transitory stratum	4	10	24	41	21
	Manual workers	1	2	7	57	33
	Peasants			4	15	81
	Overall		7	13	13	40

Our next set of data, collected in 2004, after the second (and relatively free!) parliamentary elections since the removal of S. Milosevic's regime were successfully completed, demonstrated the continuation of the closure of political elite. Almost two thirds of present members of the elite declared that their fathers belong(ed) to middle or upper social class! What seems a little strange here is high percentage of upper-class fathers (managers, entrepreneurs, politicians). Since such tendency – of massive recruitment of political elite from former (or present) elite circles – has not been registered in public life (and since it cannot happen unnoticed), we may offer again (like in fn. 7) socio-psychological explanation as the most acceptable one: our respondents probably tended to over-estimate positions of their fathers (“promoting” middle class people – like lower managers, small entrepreneurs, professionals in state administration etc. – into upper class members: higher managers, big entrepreneurs, politicians). If this is the case, once again we may register the significant change in legitimization pattern that has been developing

led many people in previous generation – fathers – to change their positions, moving from peasants into manual workers).

in contrast to former socialist ideology: instead of glorifying working class origin, it is becoming helpful for political career to stress someone's higher social background.⁹

Let us continue our discussion now with brief comparison of inter-generational recruitment of the elites with inflow mobility of other classes. Here as well, the dominance approach in definition of class position of the national sample respondents was applied (see above, fn. 4).

The increase of self-reproduction of the elites between 1989 and 2004 is the major trend in an overall process of inter-generational social closure. Furthermore, another process registered in our findings that has deep structural effects, is the strengthening of elite-middle class recruitment pattern. The pattern that was dominant in analysis of intra-generational mobility was also apparent inter-generationally. Half of economic elite and almost 2/3 of political elite was recruited through this axis that encountered some 20% of population. A more even distribution of social origin for members of middle class defuses the tension inside the social structure only mildly. Here the influence of elite-middle class reproduction axis is increased only slightly and the major change is drop of percentage of peasant fathers (not significantly above its drop in overall population, though). However, it should be stressed that recruitment into middle class from lower positions is not equivalent to increase of these groups in population, i.e. relative mobility rates point to high self-reproduction of middle class, too. In comparison with analysis of intra-generational mobility, transitory stratum was "spared" from drop of manual workers fill-in but this inflow did not increase either, although it could have been expected due to increase in workers rate in population. On the other hand, transitory stratum origin in middle class did not increase, while the stratum grew, having risen, as a consequence, self-reproduction rate in clerks and technicians strata.

Changes in Mobility Paths of the Elites

So far several factors were mentioned that influenced changes in recruitment of economic and political elites in Serbia from 1989 to 2004, like changes in social role and organizational structure of the elites, changes in legitimation principles, expansion of education, inter-connectedness among elite members, etc. Most of evidence was given for changes in major mobilization basis and that was class origin, and some comparison in this respect was made between elites and other

⁹ Dramatic decrease of elite members with peasant origin this time may logically be connected with drop of peasants in total population of the country, while the percentage of manual-worker fathers has been „normalized“ this time. Of course, with small number of cases in elite surveys, surprises that could not be clearly explained always exist.

social classes. At this point we would like to go to another direction and somehow make synthetic analysis of the paths of elite formation. We will not compare elites and other classes in this respect, but rather compare the two elite groups, economic and political elite, in order to see how different factors influenced their formation. For this purpose, a model of logistic regression will be used in which categories of dependent variable will be political vs. economic elite position, and covariates will represent some of the elites' mobility factors mentioned earlier. Importance of political legitimation will be recognized through membership in ruling political party(ies): Communist League in 1989; Socialist Party of Serbia in 1993; and Democratic Party of Serbia, G17+, Serbian Renewal Movement, New Serbia or Socialist Party of Serbia in 2004. This membership will be presented by indicator variable. Education will be presented by 4-level ordinal variable (primary to university education). Unfortunately, we do not have appropriate data for comparative analysis of elites' social networks, but we will try to catch some of it by introducing class position of respondent's best friend, presented through indicator variable (1 – elite, 0 – other). Father's class position will be operationalized by dummy, too, higher and middle classes marked by 1, other by 0. Finally, to make the analysis dynamic, we will actually build the same model in three successive points of time, when our surveys were done. The model (M1) has the following form:

$$\log \Pi_i / \Pi_j = Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 \quad (1)$$

where:

Y – dependent dichotomous variable, economic elite being referent category

β_0 – constant

X_1 – education, ordinal, 4 levels (primary to higher)

X_2 – ruling political party membership, dummy, not being a member as referent category

X_3 – best friend's class position, dummy, other but elite positions as referent category

X_4 – father's class position, dummy, lower than middle class as referent category

β_1 – parameter for education,

β_2 – parameter for ruling political party membership,

β_3 – parameter for best friend's class position,

β_4 – parameter for father's class position

The results for three models are presented in the table 6.

A single sample bias in 1993 survey produces two unexpected effects in the former table, namely the increase of relevance of education for political elite as compared to economic elite and increase of relevance of higher/middle class origin of the same group. This bias came from the fact that sub-sample of political elite in 1993 was constituted mostly of top level politicians affiliated with business and

economy. Comparison of this group with the managers of private enterprises who did not have university education, and who represented 9% of 1993 economic elite sub-sample, produced contrast expressed by $exp(B)$ of 7.009 in 1993. This bias put aside, we could conclude that, after the period of difference in higher education rate among political and economic elite during socialism ($exp(B)$.503), which was explained earlier in the paper, educational balance was actually reached earlier than 2004, when it was noticed in our survey. The same bias put aside, we could also conclude that there was no significant difference in class origin between economic and political elite during period of 1989-2004.

Table 6. Results for model M1 in 3 surveys

COVARIATES	YEAR OF SURVEY					
	1989		1993		2004	
	Signif.	$exp(B)$	Signif.	$exp(B)$	Signif.	$exp(B)$
Education	.001	.503	.000	7.009	.989	.997
Ruling party membership	.000	9.039	.000	4.702	.000	8.015
Best friend's class position	.421	.801	.009	.528	.018	.582
Father's class position	.543	.854	.001	2.336	.377	1.229
Constant	.413	2.020	.000	.000	.761	.760

Higher relevance of political affiliation for political elite represents another constant throughout the researched period, besides equality in importance of higher/middle class origin for membership in the two elites. On the other hand, economic elite was in favour of elite friendships: after the break of socialism, statistically significant advantage over political elite in this regard has been maintained over time. It seems that now when the two elite groups have same profile regarding education and social origin, the major difference in their reproduction is in control over different resources, systemic vs. economic, and in permanence of their position, which inevitably turns them one to another. How much this cooperation will be beneficial to wider community will depend on further institutional arrangements through which relation between elites will be channeled.

* * *

Putting all our previous findings together, it might be concluded that, for an individual in Serbia, his/her middle class or higher class origin, and/or an elite position (in socialist or post-socialist system), have a significantly increased probability to come to an elite position during the process of post-socialist transformation. The probability has been high here, even if compared with other

countries during the first phase of their transformation (Cvejić, 2005).¹⁰ This has been a relatively lasting consequence of blocked transformation in Serbia, which has been continuing to make Serbian transformation a specific case.

We should stress that the closure of economic and political elites in Serbia (by “lifting” their inter- and intra-generational origin to middle and higher classes) corresponds to increasing differences in economic positions of these two parts of stratification hierarchy in Serbia. Namely, according to our data on economic positions of classes, collected in the same survey in 2004, differentiation between higher class (in particular) and the middle class, on one side, and other social classes, on the other side, has been significantly increased since 1997 (see Lazić and Cvejić, 2004).

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10 If we roughly compare the advancements in privatization and introduction of market economy, and first successful change of government at relatively free parliamentary elections, Serbia in 2004 was where Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and other Central European countries were in mid 1990s. According to a survey on “elite circulation and elite reproduction in transformation countries” that took place in 1993 in 6 countries, in Hungary and Poland, among members of economic elite there were 34.9% and 50.7% of former nomenklatura members respectively, while the corresponding percentages for political elite were: 30.4 and 23.7. See research results in Szeleny & Szeleny, 1995, tables 5 and 9 (pp. 628, 629). It should be kept in mind, however, that serious limitation of authors’ conclusions comes from the fact that they analyzed data on intra-generational mobility only.