

PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONALIST VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN SERBIA*

Opstajanje tradicionalističkih vrednosnih orijentacija u Srbiji

APSTRAKT Sistematski neuspesi u pokušajima da se društvo Srbije modernizuje tokom poslednja dva veka vodili su opstajanju tradicionalističkih vrednosnih orijentacija. Dugotrajni period otomanske vladavine doprineo je da patrijarhalni, plemensko-ratnički kulturni obrazac opstane i postane baza za buduće oblikovanje nacionalnog i celokupnog kulturnog identiteta. Ekstremno siromaštvo, autarkični karakter poljoprivredne proizvodnje, slabi prodori kapitalizma i tržišne ekonomije, neizdiferencirana socijalna struktura sa većinskim seoskim stanovništvom, patrijarhalna organizacija kako privatnog tako i javnog života, te autoritarni karakter vlasti, doprineli su usporenom razvoju pre-modernog društva Srbije i opstajanju tradicionalizma. Iako je socijalistički sistem imao u mnogim aspektima modernizujuće učinke, homolognost između socijalističke i pre-moderne kolektivističke, autoritarne i patrijarhalne orijentacije doprinela je lakom prodoru nacionalizma i posledičnom razaranju države u građanskim ratovima. U periodu odložene postsocijalističke transformacije, koji se karakteriše građanskim ratovima, ekonomskim kolapsom, ekstremnim osiromašenjem i međunarodnom izolacijom, dolazi do produbljivanja orijentacije ka premodernim obrascima identifikacije.

U ovom tekstu analiziraću opstajanje kolektivism, autoritarnosti i patrijarhalne orijentacije u periodu deblokirane post-socijalističke transformacije, oslanjajući se na empirijske podatke dobijene putem istraživačkog projekta "Stratifikacijske i vrednosne promene u periodu društvene transformacije" (SEESSP), sprovedenog u periodu od decembra 2003. do januara 2004. godine. Dobijene rezultate upoređiću sa podacima dobijenim 1989. godine putem istraživačkog projekta Društvena struktura i kvaliteta života.

KLJUČNE REČI *tradicionalizam, kolektivism, autoritarnost, patrijarhalnost*

ABSTRACT *Systematic failures in attempts to modernize Serbian society during the past two centuries have led to the survival of traditionalist value orientations. The long period of Ottoman rule allowed patriarchal, warrior-tribal cultural patterns to persist and shape the basis for national and overall cultural identity. Extreme poverty, autarkical agricultural*

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production, the slow penetration of capitalism and a market economy, an undifferentiated social structure with majority of rural population, patriarchal organization of both the private and public sphere and the authoritarian character of authority, were characteristics of Serbian pre-modern society, which inhibited its development and contributed to the persistence of traditionalism. Although the socialist period was modernizing in many respects, homology between socialist and pre-modern collectivist, egalitarian and authoritarian orientation, made it easy for nationalism to penetrate and consequently led to decomposition of the state in civil wars. Delayed post-socialist transformation, characterized by civil war, economic collapse, extreme impoverishment, and international isolation, has only strengthened the orientation towards pre-modern patterns of identification.

This paper examines the persistence of collectivism, authoritarianism and patriarchal orientation in the period of unhindered post-socialist transformation, based on the data obtained in the "South-East European Social Survey Project" (SEESSP), conducted from December 2003 to January 2004. These results are compared with those obtained in the research project "Changes in the Class Structure and Mobility in Serbia", conducted in 1989.

KEY WORDS *traditionalism, collectivism, authoritarianism, patriarchal orientation*

I Introduction

The economic and social crisis of Yugoslav socialist society, which became manifest during the 1980s, brought about a crisis in values, ideological orientations, and the legitimacy of the system itself. The ideology of socialist self-management lost its integrative function, and due to the eruption of conflict between republic elites, which soon acquired a nationalist connotation (although its latent causes were far from being nationally based splits),¹ the ideology of "brotherhood and unity" became anachronistic. The decreased influence of the socialist self-management ideology made it possible other, marginal or displaced ideologies to penetrate. In acute economic, political and overall social crisis and increased insecurity, the majority of the Serbian population turned to traditional patterns of identification (national instead of class, confessional rather than atheist identification). In addition, political socialization in the socialist period brought about an authoritarian orientation,² with a strong inclination to collective rather than individual identification, which made it easy for nationalist ideology to penetrate. The collapse of socialism imposed the need for social transformation, which was almost automatically understood as set of changes resulting in political democracy and market based economics. However, civil war and the growing impact of nationalism

¹ More on the causes of conflicts between Yugoslav republic elites see in: Bunce, 1999.

² High level of authoritarianism of Serbian population was already present in 1970es, as it was shown in the research of high school youth in the year 1973 (Rot, Havelka, 1973).

led to international isolation, and consequently to total system breakdown. In such a situation, transformation processes were blocked and delayed, resulting in a long period of vegetation in Serbian society, somewhere between the old, socialist, and the new, liberal-democratic systems. Collective action directed to radical systemic changes was not undertaken in the 1990s; it had no sources of support, neither normative nor in the sphere of value patterns. Hence, this paper examines the persistence of traditionalist value orientations in Serbian society during the period of post socialist transformation, as significant obstacle for modernization.

II Contextual and historical framework of analysis

Tradition refers to oral transfer of ideas, values, norms and interpretative schemes from one generation to another, with the aim of preserving the cultural identity of specific social collectivities (nations, groups). Eric Hobsbawm defined it as a set of social practices of routine or symbolic nature, the main aim of which is the adoption of certain norms and values. This process often implicates a continuity with an imaginary or a real past (Hobsbawm, 1983). Although being routine, tradition is not an empty habit, since different layers of meaning are connected to respect for different aspects of the past. The main characteristic of tradition is its resistance to changes, but nevertheless, if new social conditions impose the need for changes, they have to be confirmed on the basis of examples from the past, so that social continuity (again, either imaginary or real) is not interrupted.

Traditionalism, on the other hand, often refers to a set of value orientations, which are connected to the respect for customs deeply rooted in the past of a nation or group, which are considered to have an endogenous origin. Furthermore it implies the instrumental utilisation of tradition and resistance to change and new ideas (in this historical context, these ideas are individualism, rationalism, democracy, industrialization, secularization).

Traditionalism refers to a notion, the content of which may differ depending on the historical context. When defining traditionalist value orientations, we have to differentiate between the general notion and its historically variable content. As a result, traditionalism here will be defined as the state of structural unresponsiveness to change within the system and in its environment. Since it is broadly defined, this notion may refer to very different types of societies and value patterns. Therefore, we shall now proceed to the description of some historical characteristics of Serbian society which may be taken as the basis for the specification of concrete traditionalist value orientations.

Serbian society entered the modernizing processes much later than developed European societies. Being part of Ottoman Empire until the early 19th century, it had

a very traditional organization based on an autarkical economy, at a time when developed European societies had already started to function as capitalist market economies. Its identity was shaped in opposition to the Turkish conquerors, in which traditional, warrior-tribal, patriarchal culture played the crucial role (Lazić, 2003: 195). However, the long period of coexistence of Orthodox and Islamic cultural patterns, habits, values and beliefs, led to their intertwining, giving Serbian culture a double foundation. Strong reliance on traditional cultural patterns in the process of shaping the national identity disabled cultural emancipation in terms of secularization and rationalization. The oriental, despotic character of Ottoman authority led both to its unconditional acceptance, on one hand, and mistrust towards it, on the other.

The period of struggle for national independence, which lasted almost three quarters of a century, brought little significant changes in terms of social modernization. Although some attempts at political modernization were made in the 19th century (parliamentary control over the monarch's authority, constitutional polity), Serbian society entered the 20th century poor, underdeveloped and agrarian, with a mainly rural population and an undeveloped bourgeoisie. The poorly differentiated social structure (and therefore the non-existence of modernizing actors) and the slow penetration of the market economy, limited Serbian society in its efforts to catch up with its Western role models during the first half of the 20th century. Economic and cultural modernization was not a priority for Serbian political elites, and this led to misbalance, where some modern political institutions were established, while subsystems of the economy and culture preserved their traditional characteristics. In the absence of modernizing elites and with urban social strata still in the process of coalescence, Serbian society remained structurally undifferentiated. Furthermore, the ideal of social egalitarianism was so overemphasized, that it inhibited every possibility for social development.

The undeveloped division of labor, the traditional economy, and, consequently, the undifferentiated social structure, resulted in the persistence of traditional institutions. The institution of the extended family ("zadružna porodica"), with its joint ownership over the means production and the patriarchal authority of an elected elder (*pater familias*), remained a widespread form of family organization until the mid-20th century. The patriarchal organization of private life was buttressed by the normative system,³ and formed the pattern for organization of the public sphere (with head of state acting towards his liegemen as a *pater familias* towards his children). The principle of hierarchy established in the private sphere

³ Citizen's Code from 1844 determined that individual persons are not entitled to possess any property, since families were the only legally determined physical entities. However, during the 19th century normative system allowed decomposition of extended family, and consequently made individual persons legal physical entities. Source: Čalić, 2004: 36.

(older versus younger, men versus women, strong versus weak) was transferred into the public, the ruler's authority exhibiting an authoritarian character. The absence of consolidated democratic institutions⁴ and control of the ruler's unrestricted authority endorsed the authoritarian orientation of population.

The formation of the joint Yugoslav state led to resolution of the national issue (the majority of the Serbian ethnic community was collected into one state), but new problems arose when internal conflicts between political elites over the redistribution of power took on nationalist overtones. Political issues were once again the center of public attention, while economic and societal development suffered: industrialization and the development of a transport infrastructure were slow, agricultural autarkical production was still dominant, the market economy was undeveloped, the inclusion of the population in education was low (especially in underdeveloped parts of the country), and public authority was organized according to the patrimonial pattern. The majority of population continued to live on the land, with the extended family as one of the dominant organizational units of societal life.

The socialist period was modernizing in many respects: problems of industrial growth, development of the tertiary sector, urbanization and education became the center of attention of a new political elite. For most this meant a growth in living standards and improved social position (in the first decades of socialist period, vertical mobility was extremely high, especially for the rural population).⁵ The communist regime was determined to discontinue the pre-modern economic, societal and cultural heritage: national particularities, identity based on religion, an agriculturally based economy, etc. The establishment of the system of obligatory education raised the level of literacy of the population. The basic values introduced by the Communist Party were social and national equality (based on an ideology of "brotherhood and unity"), industrialization, and urbanization. However, the egalitarian and anti-nationalist orientation of the Party became the basis for the establishment of political, economic and cultural monopoly, wherein a privileged minority managed, by collectivization, to conjoin political and economic power in the form of centralized, bureaucratic control. As a substitute for the democratization of political and overall societal life and a response to systemic crisis, processes of decentralization (both in economic and political subsystems)⁶ did not have the intended effects: systemic crisis was not overcome, and territorial decentralization led to the formation of several smaller replicas of the once unique federal state. Democratization did not happen, and authoritarian structures remained. In a situation where republic elites were faced with decreased legitimacy, the ideology of nationalism found its fruitful ground.

⁴ More on development of Serbian democratic institutions see in the text of Perović, 1994.

⁵ More on that issue see in Lazić, 1987.

⁶ More on these process see in Lazić, 1987 and Sekelj, 1990.

The socialist modernization managed to combine the necessity for economic growth, hostility towards Western values ("substantial" socialist versus formal Western democracy, socialist egalitarianism versus capitalist non-egalitarianism, socialist collectivism versus bourgeois individualism) and romantic idealized concepts of community based on "production" labor. Furthermore, the rural mentality of suspiciousness and mistrust towards others was reinforced by the socialist ideology of external enemies. The normative system enabled a collectivist value orientation to persist, but, while pre-modern forms of collectivism rested on family and local community as collective owners, in the socialist period the principle of collective ownership was built into the very core of the system, imposing the whole class as collective owner. Although there were changes in the dominant system of relations, the principle of collective ownership achieved a systemic character and firm normative foundation. In addition, it was supported by the ideology of socialist self-management, according to which the workers were proclaimed owners of the means of production.

Although modernizing in many respects, this period did not bring about a substantial shift in the sphere of value orientations towards modernity. The outbreak of particularistic nationalisms during the 1970s and 1980s, and the decomposition of the state in civil war, testifies to the fact that Yugoslav socialist society had retained some pre-modern characteristics.

The first period of post-socialist transformation,⁷ characterized by civil war, economic collapse, extreme impoverishment, and international isolation, only deepened this orientation towards pre-modern patterns of identification. Instead of the socialist ideology of "brotherhood and unity", nationalism became the legitimacy stronghold of the regime. Furthermore, since nationalism itself is based on traditional patterns, already present during the past centuries (collectivism, authoritarianism, suspiciousness and mistrust towards others, patriarchal orientation), it was no wonder that it penetrated so easily and established itself as the dominant value orientation of the majority of Serbian population. The redistributive role of the state in economics and the delay of transition to a regulated market favored widespread collectivist orientation. The period of post-socialist transformation brought about changes in the dominant system of relations, but these changes had their own specific characteristics, since some elements of the old normative system persisted during the first period of transformation. Although the principle of collective ownership did not retain such a firm normative basis, it persisted as the dominant form of ownership of the means of production (the only difference was that collective ownership was allocated to the state itself). On the other hand, private ownership regained its normative stronghold, through a

⁷ More on classification of periods of post-socialist transformation in Serbian society see in: Lazić, Cvejić, 2004: 39-70.

proclaimed, but not consequently carried out process of privatization. Although collective forms of ownership were intended to have only a transitory character, they persisted as a more-less durable solution, which had its inevitable reflections on value orientations: inconsistency in the normative sphere generates disharmony in the sphere of value orientations. This situation was further complicated by the changes which occurred after the fall of Milošević's regime: changes in the normative system towards clear determination to implement complete privatization of state-ownership over production means were inconsistent with the long-term and heavy reliance on collectivity in the sphere of value orientations. While in the first period of post-socialist transformation, collectivism partially rested on a given system of social relations and normative system, in the second period it became reflection of the past.

International isolation gave legitimacy to further penetration of mistrust and suspicion, while the authoritarian character of the regime underlined the orientation towards obedience of subordinates. In the first period of the post socialist transformation, the systemic production of authoritarianism did not loose strength, since an authoritarian system of power remained a painful reality of Serbian society. When, finally, Milošević's regime collapsed, the obstacles towards modernization of Serbian society appeared legion, and traditionalist value orientations were major barriers. Unresolved national issues, extreme impoverishment and international isolation delayed modernization processes and backed up the inclination towards traditional value patterns.

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This paper will analyze the extent of traditionalist value orientations in 1989 and the changes that had occurred in that respect fifteen years later, in 2004. The analysis is based on empirical data collected within two research projects: *Changes in the Class Structure and Mobility in Serbia*, based on a sample of 4 352 respondents in 1989, and the *South-East European Social Survey Project*, based on a sample of 3 639 respondents in 2004. The possibilities for consistent comparability placed restrictions on this analysis. Namely, when analyzing some of traditionalist value orientations, we were able to form scales (composite indices) and thus establish more reliable results, while for other value orientations this was not possible, and we were forced to use single empirical statements. Bearing these restrictions in mind, this analysis will focus on three value orientations considered traditionalist that proved to be correlated: collectivism, patriarchal orientation and authoritarianism.⁸

⁸ Correlation analysis showed that correlation between collectivism and authoritarianism is 0.340, collectivism and patriarchal orientation 0.279, and authoritarianism and patriarchal orientation 0.429.

III Results of the analysis

Analysis of the *collectivist* orientation of the Serbian population rested on the empirical statement that: "The interests of the collective must always precede those of individuals."⁹ Low results on Likert's scale indicated individualism, while high results indicated collectivism. The results for 1989 reveal that Serbian population was strongly oriented to collectivity, with an average result of 3.92 (the theoretic mean for this statement is 3.0). The modal value for the overall population was strong agreement with the statement (51.9%), while only 11.7% declared strong disagreement. Results for 2004 indicate that changes in value orientations are relatively slow, in spite of the changes which occurred in the domain of normative arrangements. The average result for the whole population was 3.65, with a modal value of partial agreement with the statement. Interestingly enough, some changes had occurred within the categories of overall agreement/disagreement, since on both sides of the "scale" there had been a shift towards the mid categories, indicating decreased intensity of both collectivist and individual orientation.

Table 1: Collectivism for the overall population, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

The interests of the collective must precede those of individuals	1989	Total	2004	Total
Strong agreement	51.9%	69.1%	18.5%	66.3%
Partial agreement	17.2%		47.8%	
No opinion	13.4%	13.4%	17.2%	17.2%
Partial disagreement	5.7%	17.4%	13.2%	15.5%
Strong disagreement	11.7%		3.3%	
Mean scores	3.92		3.65	

The results of a Chi-square test indicate that scores on the "scale" of collectivism differ on the basis of gender, age,¹⁰ place of residence,¹¹ level of

⁹ Analysis of collectivism was restricted to only one statement since empirical data lacked with other comparable statements.

¹⁰ Variable age consisted of four interval categories: 1) from 18 to 29 years old, 2) from 30 to 44 years old, 3) from 45 to 59 years old, and 4) 60 years old and more.

¹¹ Variable place of residence consisted of three categories: 1) village, 2) small town, 3) large town.

education,¹² social stratum,¹³ and authoritarian and patriarchal orientation,¹⁴ for both 1989 and 2004. However, coefficients representing measures of association reveal that these differences vary from relatively weak, moderate to strong association, depending on variables in the model and time period. While the age of respondents, their level of education and social stratum were relatively weakly to moderately associated with collectivism in 1989, these relations were subjected to change fifteen years later (see Table 2). Interestingly enough, in 1989 collectivism was most strongly associated with patriarchal orientation, while in 2004 its relation was strongest with authoritarianism. These findings indicate that the traditionalist orientations examined originate from the same cultural background, which was largely shaped under conditions of autarkical economy, undeveloped division of labor and undifferentiated social structure, and backed up with corresponding social institutions and normative solutions.

While in 1989, the categories which inclined most to collectivist orientations were managers (4.09), the retired (4.11), strongly authoritarian (4.21) and patriarchal oriented respondents (4.21); in 2004 those categories were residents of villages (3.77), the retired (3.95), peasants (3.84), the uneducated (3.91), and again authoritarian (4.08) and patriarchal oriented respondents (4.07). Another interesting finding was that the highly educated (52.2%) and respondents with secondary school degree (54.8%) strongly inclined to collectivist orientation in 1989, while at the same time those were two categories which were highly represented among those rejecting collectivism in the same year (15.2% among the highly educated and 12.5% among secondary school degree respondents strongly disagreeing with the statement).

We can conclude that high scores on the “scale” for both 1989 and 2004 indicate that the Serbian population remained predominantly oriented to collectivity rather than the individual and personal achievements. However, while in the socialist period collectivist orientation may be attributed to the specific characteristics of the system itself, its institutions and normative solutions (collective ownership of the means of production), in the period of post-socialist transformation the nature of collectivism had changed. Its sources were not longer socialist ideology or institutions, but nationalist ideology and unresolved ethnic questions, which made the ethnic community (instead of class or organization) the referent group in the

¹² Variable education consisted of four categories: 1) no school, unfinished elementary school 2) elementary school, 3) secondary school, and 4) university.

¹³ Variable social stratum included following categories: 1) peasants, 2) manual workers, 3) clerks, 4) professionals, 5) managers (for the year 2004 this category included also entrepreneurs), 6) unemployed, and 7) retired persons.

¹⁴ Authoritarian and patriarchal orientations were measured by composite indices formed for the purpose of this analysis. More on the methodology of forming these indices see in the text below.

process of an individual's identification. Therefore, we can distinguish two kinds of collectivism, one socialist, and other ethnic, both having the same cultural pattern as its background. Homology between those two types of collectivism can explain why Serbian population remained highly oriented on collectivity, in a situation when the normative system and institutions not longer supported such orientation.

Table 2: Collectivism and gender, age, place of residence, level of education, social stratum, authoritarian and patriarchal orientation, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

	Measures of association (and correlation)	Coefficients for 1989	Coefficients for 2004
Gender	Gamma	-0.111	-0.093
	Phi	0.076	0.073
Place of residence	Gamma	Not sign.	-0.142
	Phi	0.165	0.159
Level of education	Gamma	Not sign.	-0.192
	Phi	0.193	0.223
Social stratum	Phi	0.185	0.247
Age	Gamma	0.253	0.253
	Phi	0.087	0.231
Authoritarianism	Gamma (Pearson's R)	0.287 (0.245)	0.401 (0.330)
Patriarchal orientation	Gamma (Pearson's R)	0.328 (0.280)	0.318 (0.251)

Analysis of *authoritarian* orientation rested on a composite index (scale of authoritarianism), made of the following empirical statements:

“Without leaders every nation is like a man without a head;”

“The most important thing for children to learn is to obey their parents;”

“There are two kinds of people - weak and strong.”

Factor analysis¹⁵ confirmed that only one factor can be extracted for both years (1989 and 2004), in the first case explaining 57.21%, while in the second case explaining only 48.389% of Variance of results on the scale. Reliability analysis showed an acceptable value of Cronbach's Alpha for 1989 (0.623), but a rather unsatisfactory value for 2004 (0.518).¹⁶ However, in order to conduct methodological consequent analysis, we decided to use both scales. The theoretic

¹⁵ Extraction method used: Principle components; Rotation: Varimax. The value of latent root for 1989 was 1.716 and 1.452 for 2004.

¹⁶ The value of Cronbach's Alpha is decreasing to 0.444 when data are weighted (age x education).

arithmetic mean for both scales was 3.0,¹⁷ where the smallest values denoted non-authoritarian and the highest values authoritarian orientation. The empirical arithmetic mean on the scale for 1989 was 3.94, which is significantly higher than the theoretic mean. The modal value for the same year was strong authoritarianism (46.5%). Fifteen years later, the Serbian population remained significantly authoritarian in orientation, with a slightly decreased average score on the scale of 3.77 and a modal value of moderate authoritarianism (38.2%). Interestingly enough, the percentage of strong authoritarians decreased, while at the same time the percentage of non-authoritarians also receded.

Table 3: Results on the scale of authoritarianism for the overall population, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

<i>Scale of authoritarianism</i>	1989	Total	2004	Total
Strong authoritarianism	46.5%	68.6%	25.0%	63.2%
Moderate authoritarianism	22.1%		38.2%	
Undecided	16.5%	16.5%	27.3%	27.3%
Moderate non-authoritarianism	8.6%	14.9%	7.3%	9.5%
Strong non-authoritarianism	6.3%		2.2%	
Mean scores	3.94		3.77	

A Chi-Square test showed that results on the scale of authoritarianism differ on the basis of age, place of residence, education, social stratum and the patriarchal orientation of respondents, but again these differences range from small, moderate to strong.¹⁸ More subtle analysis revealed that authoritarianism was the most closely associated to level of education, social stratum and patriarchal orientation in 1989, while in 2004, apart from those variables, place of residence and age of respondents also showed a relatively strong linkage with authoritarianism (see Table 4). The relatively strong correlation between patriarchal and authoritarian orientation (Pearson's R: 0.364) indicates that these two value orientations belong to the same traditionalist core. As the most authoritarian for 1989 the following categories can be graded: respondents with no education (4.38), strongly patriarchal oriented (4.28), respondents with lowest educational level (4.31), agricultural workers (4.29), residents of villages (4.21), manual workers (4.13), and the retired (4.11). The categories of strongly non-patriarchal oriented (2.85), highly educated (3.41), professionals (3.48) and managers (3.27) inclined the least towards authoritarianism,

¹⁷ Originally, the scale was ranging from 3 to 15, with theoretic mean of 9.0, but it was recoded into five categories in order to get form of Likert's scale, with 3.0 as theoretic average score.

¹⁸ Variable gender was not statistically significant factor influencing on differences on the scale of authoritarianism, since significance of Chi-Square test was 0.433 for year 1989.

although the average score of all these categories, except non-patriarchal, exceeded the theoretic arithmetic mean. In the year 2004 the most authoritarian were the following categories: strongly patriarchal oriented (4.38) respondents with no education (4.25), older than 60 years (4.16), agricultural workers (4.12), retired persons (4.03), respondents who had completed primary school (4.06), and residents of villages (4.01). Interestingly enough, among the categories of uneducated and lower educated respondents, agricultural workers and strongly patriarchal oriented, the percentage of both strong and moderate non authoritarians together does not exceed 2.0%.

Table 4: Association between authoritarianism and place of residence, level of education, social stratum, age and patriarchal orientation, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

	Measures of association (and correlation)	Coefficients for 1989	Coefficients for 2004
Place of residence	Phi	0.198	0.306
	Gamma	-0.204	-0.338
Level of education	Phi	0.280	0.432
	Gamma	-0.317	-0.484
Social stratum	Phi	0.276	0.326
Age	Phi	0.125	0.290
	Gamma	0.089	0.321
Patriarchal orientation	Gamma (Pearson's R)	0.410 (0.364)	0.488 (0.429)

Regression analysis¹⁹ indicated that the only significant predictor of authoritarian orientation in 1989 was years of formal schooling (Beta: -0.255, Sig.: 0.000),²⁰ meaning that with each additional year of education, results on the scale fell by 0.255 Standard deviations. Villages, as place of residence, compared to large towns, meant an increase in the score on the scale of 0.061 Standard deviations. This

¹⁹ Variables in final regression model for 1989 were explaining 7.8% of variations on the scale of authoritarianism (R-Square: 0.078), while variables entered the final regression model for 2004 were explaining 16.1% of variations on the scale (R-Square: 0.161).

²⁰ In original regression model, variables entered were indicator (dummy) variables for residents of village and small town (referent category were residents of large town), agricultural workers, manual workers, non manual workers, professionals, managers, unemployed (referent category were retired) and females (with males as referent category), as well as variables of years of formal schooling and age. Test of significance revealed that all of these variables, except years of formal schooling and place of residence, can not be counted as significant predictors of authoritarianism for 1989. Analyzing data for 2004, the same variables entered regression model, and only indicator variables representing agricultural, manual workers and unemployed were not statistically significant predictors of authoritarianism.

result suggests that place of residence had some, but not a very significant influence on authoritarian orientation. On the other hand, results for 2004 reveal that authoritarianism could be predicted by the following variables: age, education, place of residence and gender (see Table 5). However, compared to 1989, education has lost some of its influence on authoritarianism (Beta: -0.151), while age (Beta: 0.219) and village as place of residence (Beta: 0.228) became the strongest predictors of this value orientation. Although influence of gender was not proved to be strong, an interesting finding was that being female, compared to being male, meant a drop in the results on the scale for 0.065 Standard deviations. The increased influence of place of residence and age on authoritarianism may be attributed to the fact that urban areas and younger generations were more subjected to the modernizing effects of the global market economy and culture during the 15 years examined.

Table 5: Regression models representing predictors of authoritarianism, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

	1989		2004	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Age	/	/	0.219	0.000
Years of full time formal education	-0.255	0.000	-0.151	0.000
Females	/	/	-0.065	0.000
Residents of villages	0.061	0.003	0.228	0.000
Residents of small towns	0.056	0.002	0.151	0.000

Dependent variable: Scale of authoritarian orientation

Analysis of *patriarchal* orientation relied on a composite index (scale of patriarchal orientation), made of following empirical statements:

“If in marriage one person is employed, it should be the man;”

“Most of the housework is naturally a woman’s job;”

“Women and men should be equal in marriage, but it is best if men have the final say;”

“Men should do public and women private work.”

Factor analysis²¹ showed that only one factor underlined these statements for both 1989 and 2004. The value of latent root for 1989 was 2.340 and 2.187 for 2004; in the first case, the latent root explained 58.510% and in the second case 54.670% of Variance. Reliability analysis proved both scales to be coherent: the value of

²¹ Extraction method used: Principle components; Rotation: Varimax.

Cronbach's Alpha for 1989 was 0.761 and 0.696 for 2004.²² Originally, both scales had theoretical arithmetic means of 12.0, but since they were recoded in five categories (where higher scores denoted patriarchal and lower scores non-patriarchal orientation), theoretic average scores were 3.0. The empirical arithmetic mean for the year 1989 was 4.06, indicating a strong inclination of the Serbian population towards acceptance of patriarchal values. The modal value for the same year was strong patriarchal orientation (52.7%). Fifteen years later, the Serbian population proved to be patriarchal oriented to a lesser extent, but still strongly inclining to traditional views on gender based division of labor (with an average score of 3.54 and a modal value of moderate patriarchal orientation). Having in mind the starting position of 73.9% of more-less patriarchal oriented respondents in 1989, a drop of 13.4%, a decade and a half later could indicate that some changes, although slow, are happening in the sphere value orientations. Democratization of the country and the influence of the market economy could well constitute part of the explanation for this phenomenon. On the other hand, being temporarily displaced from the focus of public debate, the national question and its influence on producing and backing up traditional views has dropped off. The interests of the endangered nation are starting to loose their primacy over the interests of individuals, while in the center of public attention are pressing economic issues.

Table 6: Results on the scale of patriarchal orientation for overall sample, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

<i>Scale of patriarchal orientation</i>	1989	Total	2004	Total
Strong patriarchal orientation	52.7%	73.9%	19.9%	60.5%
Moderate patriarchal orientation	21.2%		40.6%	
Undecided	11.9%	11.9%	18.7%	18.7%
Moderate non-patriarchal orientation	8.0%	14.2%	15.7%	20.8%
Strong non-patriarchal orientation	6.2%		5.1%	
Mean scores	4.06		3.54	

The results of a Chi-Square test indicate that scores on the scale of patriarchal orientation differ according to the respondents gender, place of residence, level of education, age and social stratum (in each of those cases the significance of the Chi-Square test was 0.000 for both years). The strength of association of these variables and scale of patriarchal orientation (measured either by Phi or Gamma) varied from relatively weak, through moderate to strong. In 1989, scores on the scale

²² For year 2004, value of Cronbach's Alpha increases to 0.726 if item "Man should do public and woman private work" is left out from the scale, but since we wanted to have methodologically correct comparison, exception had to be made and this empirical statement was included in analysis.

were strongly associated to gender, level of education, and to some extent to place of residence and social stratum. Interestingly enough, the strength of association of patriarchal orientation and gender fell significantly in 2004 (see Table 7), while at the same time, its relation to place of residence, level of education and age grew stronger. The decline of gender based patriarchal orientation may indicate that women were subjected to a lesser extent than men to modernizing processes over the years, since the percentage of women who are non patriarchal oriented remained almost the same (25.0% in 1989; 24.6% in 2004), while at the same time, the percentage of men increased from 8.4% to 16.7%. The same conclusion can be drawn out if we look at the average scores on the scale: for males the fall in the average scores was 0.62, and only 0.21 for females.

The category which inclined the most to patriarchal orientation in 1989 were respondents with no education (4.74), followed by agricultural workers (4.53), respondents with a primary school certificate (4.48), residents of villages (4.43), older than 60 years (4.34), males (4.29), manual workers (4.18) and retired persons (4.10). At the same time, professionals (3.53), females (3.64), the highly educated (3.65) and residents of large towns (3.72) were the least likely to accept a traditional, gender based division of labor. A decade and a half later as strongholds of traditionalism we can single out the categories of the uneducated (4.11), agricultural workers (4.11), the low educated (3.95), the elderly (3.95), residents of villages (3.88) and retired persons (3.80). On the other hand, apart from traditionally "liberal" highly educated (2.71) and professionals (2.68), some new categories have arisen as carriers of non-patriarchal values: those younger than 30 (3.15) and residents of large towns (3.14). It seems that these categories were exposed to a higher extent to the modernizing effects of a market economy and processes of democratization than those living in rural areas, without an educational background and no perspectives in the transformation processes.

Table 7: Association between patriarchal orientation and gender, place of residence, level of education, social stratum and age, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

	Measures of association	Coefficients for 1989	Coefficients for 2004
Gender	Gamma	-0.375	-0.147
	Phi	0.255	0.116
Place of residence	Gamma	-0.296	-0.342
	Phi	0.238	0.293
Level of education	Gamma	-0.360	-0.488
	Phi	0.281	0.416
Social stratum	Phi	0.268	0.285
Age	Gamma	0.164	0.297
	Phi	0.157	0.279

Regression analysis was conducted to detect statistically significant predictors of patriarchal orientation. In the original regression models, for both years, the following independent variables entered the model: years of full time formal education, age and indicator variables for females (referent category were males), residents of small towns and villages (referent category were residents of large towns), agricultural, manual, non-manual workers, professionals, managers and the unemployed (the referent category were the retired). In both models, indicator variables representing social strata categories had to be excluded, since they proved not to be statistically significant predictors. In addition to this, for the year 1989, the variable age was also excluded, since it proved insignificant. The variables that entered the final regression model for 1989 explained 14.2% of Variance on the scale (R-square: 0.142), while the variables that entered the model for the year 2004 explained 15.9% of Variance (R-Square: 0.159). The results of this analysis indicate that the most important predictors of the scores on the scale in 1989 were years of formal education (Beta: -0.247) and gender (Beta for dummy variable "females" was -0.241). Fifteen years later the impact of education again decreased, this time on patriarchal orientation (Beta: -0.110), while the place of residence and age of respondents became the strongest predictors of the examined value orientation. Residents of villages and older generations turned out to be the major strongholds of traditionalist value orientations. Interestingly enough, gender has lost a lot of its strength as a predictor of patriarchal orientation (Beta: -0.094). The results of regression analysis for both authoritarian and patriarchal orientation suggest that in 1989 the level of education was the most important predictor of traditionalism, while in 2004 age and place of residence proved to be the most significant factors determining pre-modern patterns of identification.

Table 8: Regression models representing predictors of patriarchal orientation, comparatively for 1989 and 2004

	1989		2004	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Age	/	/	0.219	0.000
Years of full time formal education	-0.247	0.000	-0.110	0.000
Females	-0.241	0.000	-0.094	0.000
Residents of villages	0.076	0.000	0.259	0.000
Residents of small towns	0.054	0.002	0.122	0.000

* Dependent variable: Scale of patriarchal orientation

IV Conclusions

Looking at the dimension of collectivism, it appears that after fifteen years of uneven transition, the Serbian population still cherishes its pre-modern and socialist inclination towards collectivism. Categories which had the lowest scores and which are recognized as modernizing actors (highly educated, professionals), exceeded the arithmetic mean of the scale. Managers, as reputed strongholds of economic transition, are still highly collectivist oriented (although to a lesser extent than fifteen years earlier), and the same goes for younger generations which are supposed to be the most receptive towards Western cultural influences and modernist values. However, the long period of isolation and exposure to retrograde, nationalist ideology, on one hand, and uncertainty arising from transformational processes, on the other, has caused a continuing reliance among these categories on different forms of traditional collectivity rather than on their individual achievements.

Almost the same conclusion can be drawn if we look at the dimension of authoritarianism: all categories, except highly educated and professionals were authoritarian oriented four years after the beginning of democratization processes. Today's strong inclination of some categories of Serbian population towards radical and conservative political parties and groups, oriented to get-tough policies and radical solutions, underlines the continuing presence of authoritarian submissiveness and aggression. It seems that the uneducated population, residents of villages, agricultural workers and retired persons were not at all exposed to the modernizing influences of political democratization and the market economy (especially because these categories are recognized as "losers" in transformation processes), which makes them strong opponents of further modernization.

Finally, looking at the dimension of patriarchal orientation, all categories have recorded more or less significant reductions on the scale, but only because their starting point was extreme patriarchal orientation. The most persistent traditionalists proved to be the uneducated, rural, and agricultural population, while they are opposed by the highly educated and professionals, who are also consistent in moderate non-traditionalist orientation. The patriarchal organization of private life still prevails among those whose overall emancipation is still in question, since they are left out of modernizing global currents. Considering their marginal position in society, and inability to identify themselves with social changes, it is no wonder that they still cherish the patterns of traditional culture.

Analysis of traditionalist value orientations showed a strong inclination of the Serbian population towards collectivism, authoritarianism and patriarchal views on the gender based division of labor, both in the periods of late socialism and post-socialist transformation. The shift towards acceptance of values stemming from modernity appeared to be very slow, which makes the already hard and painful

process of transformation more troublesome and uncertain. The cultural heritage, historic factors and the present character of social relations often acted in different directions, creating misbalance between spheres of normative order and value patterns.

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