Protivčinjeničke verovatnoće

Abstract

Postoji pojam verovatnoće koji se koristi u determinističkim sistemima, poput bacanja novčića, ali ostaje puno pitanja kako tačno shvatiti taj pojam. Cilj ovog istraživanja je pružanje argumenata da taj pojam treba razumeti kao protivčinjeničku verovatnoću. Da bismo opravdali ovakav zaključak, napravićemo nekoliko glavnih koraka u istraživanju. Prvo, analiziraćemo poznate istorijske i moderne interpretacije objektivnog pojma verovatnoće. Ova analiza će služiti da istaknemo mane i vrline bitnih radova u filozofiji verovatnoće, i da pokažemo da učenjem od prethodnika možemo da dođemo do određenog zaključka oko toga kakva interpretacija verovatnoće treba da bude. Tvrdiću da nam ti zaključci favorizuju protivčinjeničku interpretaciju verovatnoće, čije je osnove izneo Džon Bigelou. Predložiću modifikaciju njegove teorije. Drugo, analiziraćemo najjače argumente za inkompatibilizam objektivne verovatnoće i determinizma. Zaključićemo da je deo diskusije povodom (in)kompatibilizma u filozofiji verovatnoće plod terminološke zbrke. Uz preciznije određenje probabilističkih pojmova, pokazaćemo da ima razloga da prihvatimo kompatibilističku poziciju. Najzad, analiziraćemo tri primera determinističkih sistema koji obiluju probabilističkim pojmovima: klasičnu statističku mehaniku, evolutivnu biologiju, i igre šansi, i pokazati da postoje razlozi da se probabilistički pojmovi u slučaju klasične statističke mehanike i igre šansi shvate kao protivčinjeničke verovatnoće, a da u slučaju evolutivne biologije možemo poboljšati argumente Eliota Sobera ukoliko prihvatimo protivčinjeničku interpretaciju

Certain notion of probability has been widely used in deterministic systems. However, lots of open question remain about the exact meaning of the notion. The aim of this research is to argue that the notion should be interpreted as counterfactual probability. To justify such a conclusion, we will make several steps in the research. First, we will analyze major historical and modern interpretations of the objective probability. This should serve to highlight both the flaws and virtues of famous ideas in the field of philosophy of probability, and to show that by learning from the predecessors we can come to some conclusions about what should be a good candidate for an interpretation of probability, i.e. what are criteria for acceptable interpretation of probability. I will argue that these conclusions favor the counterfactual interpretation of probability, originally proposed by John Bigelow. I will propose modification of his theory, for some philosophical reasons. Second, we will analyze the strongest arguments for incompatibilism of objective probabilities and determinism. We will conclude that at least part of the long discussion regarding (in)compatibilsm in the philosophy of probability is the result of a conceptual confusion. Using more precise probabilistic concepts, we will show that there are reasons to accept compatibilsm. Finally, we will analyze three examples of deterministic systems intertwined with probabilistic concepts: classical statistical mechanics, evolutionary biology, and games of chance. We will show that there are reasons to interpret probability in the cases of classical statistical mechanics and games of chance as counterfactual probability, and in the case of evolutionary biology, we can refine Eliot Sober's arguments if we interpret probability as counterfactual probability