Rusoistički temelji Šmitovog shvatanja (totalne) države

Abstract

U radu se autor bavi konceptom političkog i ustavnim učenjem Karla Šmita. On nastoji da pokaže da je logika Šmitovog argumenta protiv liberalne demokratije i u korist plebiscitarne demokratije sledi sve najvažnije zaključke do kojih je Žan-Žak Ruso došao u svom Društvenom ugovoru, sa samo jednim izuzetkom. Šmit, naime, nije bio voljan da prihvati da je do društvenog ugovora ikada došlo u bilo kom istorijskom društvu i verovao je da se on ne može koristiti čak ni kao metodološko sredstvo pošto nema nikakvog smisla u samim temeljima političke zajednice. Rusoovi stavovi o 'opštoj volji', 'narodu' i neposrednoj demokratiji bili su Šmitu mnogo zanimljiviji za njegove namere uobličenja modela totalne države.

In this paper the author discusses Carl Schmitt's concept of 'the political' (das Politische), and his constitutional teaching (Verfassungslehre). He is trying to explain that the logic of Schmitt's argument against liberal democracy and in favor of populist democracy follows all the important conclusions made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Social Contract, with only one exception. Schmitt was, namely, reluctant to accept that the social contract ever occurred in any historical society and he believed that it could not be used even as a methodological tool, because it has no meaning in the very foundations of political community. Rousseau's statements on 'general will', 'people', and immediate democracy Schmitt found more attractive for his purposes of designing the model of total state.