Show simple item record

Naturalistic reductionism in contemporary metaethics

dc.creatorCekić, Nenad
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-12T11:14:20Z
dc.date.available2021-10-12T11:14:20Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn0353-3891
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1142
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with so-called metaethical reductionism. Generally, metaetical reductionism treats moral properties as natural properties. But contemporary reductionism does not assume that any moral property is in fact natural property. Contemporary metaethical reductionism is metodological approach. The main thesis of contemporary metaethical reductionism is: moral properties in theoretical contexts should be treated as natural properties. The main problem which conteporary reductionism poses is idea of semantic revisionism.en
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceBelgrade Philosophical Annual
dc.titleNaturalistički redukcionizam u savremenoj metaeticisr
dc.titleNaturalistic reductionism in contemporary metaethicsen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseARR
dc.citation.epage125
dc.citation.issue24
dc.citation.other(24): 107-125
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage107
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/134/1139.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubhttps://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1142
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record