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Dve verzije eksternalističkog tumačenja epistemičkog opravdanja

Two externalist accounts of epistemic justification

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2011
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Lazović, Živan
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
U ovom članku analiziraju se glavne postavke dve najuticajnije verzije eksternalističkog shvatanja epistemičkog opravdanja, teorija pouzdanosti indikacije (TPI) i teorija pouzdanosti procesa (TPP). Prema TPI, opravdanost verovanja zavisi od toga da li je ono relativno pouzdan indikator javljanja stanja stvari koje ga čini istinitim. Osnovna teza TPP je da opravdanost verovanja zavisi od pouzdanosti kognitivnog procesa putem kojeg je ono formirano. Poređenje ove dve teorije i isticanje njihovih dobrih i loših strana izvršeno je u svetlu opštijih eksternalističkih zahteva da opravdanje: (1) ne mora biti introspektivno dostupno subjektu; (2) ima veze sa istinitošću verovanja u tom smislu što nas češće vodi istini nego pogrešci; i (3) zavisi od uzročne istorije verovanja.
This article deals with two prominent versions of externalist account of epistemic justification, the reliable indication theory and the reliable process theory. According to the reliable indication theory, a belief is justified if it provides a reliable indication of the occurrence of the state of affairs which makes it true. The reliable process theory holds that a belief is justified if it has been formed by a reliable cognitive process. The main contentions of this two accounts are analyzed and compared in the light of three more general and fundamental externalist ideas: (1) justification need not be cognitive available to the person whose belief is in question; (2) justification should be connected to the truth of the belief in such a way that it makes the case that one's epistemically justified belief is likely to be true; and (3) justification of one's belief depends on the causal history of the belief.
Keywords:
uzročna istorija verovanja / pouzdanost procesa / pouzdanost indikacije / epistemičko opravdanje / reliable process / reliable indication / epistemic justification / belief's causal history
Source:
Theoria, 2011, 54, 1, 5-23
Publisher:
  • Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd

ISSN: 0351-2274

[ Google Scholar ]
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1186
URI
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1186
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
Institution/Community
Filozofija / Philosophy
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Lazović, Živan
PY  - 2011
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1186
AB  - U ovom članku analiziraju se glavne postavke dve najuticajnije verzije eksternalističkog shvatanja epistemičkog opravdanja, teorija pouzdanosti indikacije (TPI) i teorija pouzdanosti procesa (TPP). Prema TPI, opravdanost verovanja zavisi od toga da li je ono relativno pouzdan indikator javljanja stanja stvari koje ga čini istinitim. Osnovna teza TPP je da opravdanost verovanja zavisi od pouzdanosti kognitivnog procesa putem kojeg je ono formirano. Poređenje ove dve teorije i isticanje njihovih dobrih i loših strana izvršeno je u svetlu opštijih eksternalističkih zahteva da opravdanje: (1) ne mora biti introspektivno dostupno subjektu; (2) ima veze sa istinitošću verovanja u tom smislu što nas češće vodi istini nego pogrešci; i (3) zavisi od uzročne istorije verovanja.
AB  - This article deals with two prominent versions of externalist account of epistemic justification, the reliable indication theory and the reliable process theory. According to the reliable indication theory, a belief is justified if it provides a reliable indication of the occurrence of the state of affairs which makes it true. The reliable process theory holds that a belief is justified if it has been formed by a reliable cognitive process. The main contentions of this two accounts are analyzed and compared in the light of three more general and fundamental externalist ideas: (1) justification need not be cognitive available to the person whose belief is in question; (2) justification should be connected to the truth of the belief in such a way that it makes the case that one's epistemically justified belief is likely to be true; and (3) justification of one's belief depends on the causal history of the belief.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Dve verzije eksternalističkog tumačenja epistemičkog opravdanja
T1  - Two externalist accounts of epistemic justification
EP  - 23
IS  - 1
SP  - 5
VL  - 54
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1186
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Lazović, Živan",
year = "2011",
abstract = "U ovom članku analiziraju se glavne postavke dve najuticajnije verzije eksternalističkog shvatanja epistemičkog opravdanja, teorija pouzdanosti indikacije (TPI) i teorija pouzdanosti procesa (TPP). Prema TPI, opravdanost verovanja zavisi od toga da li je ono relativno pouzdan indikator javljanja stanja stvari koje ga čini istinitim. Osnovna teza TPP je da opravdanost verovanja zavisi od pouzdanosti kognitivnog procesa putem kojeg je ono formirano. Poređenje ove dve teorije i isticanje njihovih dobrih i loših strana izvršeno je u svetlu opštijih eksternalističkih zahteva da opravdanje: (1) ne mora biti introspektivno dostupno subjektu; (2) ima veze sa istinitošću verovanja u tom smislu što nas češće vodi istini nego pogrešci; i (3) zavisi od uzročne istorije verovanja., This article deals with two prominent versions of externalist account of epistemic justification, the reliable indication theory and the reliable process theory. According to the reliable indication theory, a belief is justified if it provides a reliable indication of the occurrence of the state of affairs which makes it true. The reliable process theory holds that a belief is justified if it has been formed by a reliable cognitive process. The main contentions of this two accounts are analyzed and compared in the light of three more general and fundamental externalist ideas: (1) justification need not be cognitive available to the person whose belief is in question; (2) justification should be connected to the truth of the belief in such a way that it makes the case that one's epistemically justified belief is likely to be true; and (3) justification of one's belief depends on the causal history of the belief.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Dve verzije eksternalističkog tumačenja epistemičkog opravdanja, Two externalist accounts of epistemic justification",
pages = "23-5",
number = "1",
volume = "54",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1186"
}
Lazović, Ž.. (2011). Dve verzije eksternalističkog tumačenja epistemičkog opravdanja. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 54(1), 5-23.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1186
Lazović Ž. Dve verzije eksternalističkog tumačenja epistemičkog opravdanja. in Theoria. 2011;54(1):5-23.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1186 .
Lazović, Živan, "Dve verzije eksternalističkog tumačenja epistemičkog opravdanja" in Theoria, 54, no. 1 (2011):5-23,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1186 .

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