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Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona

Peter Railton's moral realism

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2011
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Milevski, Voin
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Abstract
Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruž...a jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja.

Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.
Keywords:
vrednosni standard / reformišuća definicija / reduktivna osnova / redukcionizam / objektivni interes / naturalizam / moralni realizam / reforming definition / reductive basis / reductionism / objective interest / naturalism / moral realism / evaluative standards
Source:
Theoria, 2011, 54, 2, 79-103
Publisher:
  • Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd

ISSN: 0351-2274

[ Google Scholar ]
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194
URI
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1194
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
Institution/Community
Filozofija / Philosophy
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milevski, Voin
PY  - 2011
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1194
AB  - Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruža jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja.
AB  - Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona
T1  - Peter Railton's moral realism
EP  - 103
IS  - 2
SP  - 79
VL  - 54
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Milevski, Voin",
year = "2011",
abstract = "Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruža jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja., Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona, Peter Railton's moral realism",
pages = "103-79",
number = "2",
volume = "54",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194"
}
Milevski, V.. (2011). Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 54(2), 79-103.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194
Milevski V. Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona. in Theoria. 2011;54(2):79-103.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194 .
Milevski, Voin, "Moralni realizam Pitera Rejltona" in Theoria, 54, no. 2 (2011):79-103,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1194 .

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