Vitgenštajnova ideja porodičnih sličnosti i Vajcov decizionizam u estetici

Abstract

Even though Ludwig Wittgenstein, as far as we know, did not (explicitly) maintain some particular position on the nature of art and the possiblity of defining works of art, he had a great influence in analytic aesthetics. However, it would be wrong to say that his idea was always understood uniformly, in aesthetics as well as in general philosophy. On the contrary, those very philosophers who considered themeselves the followers of Wittgenstein, most notably Morris Weitz, understood it less conventionally than one could expect considering their attitude towards Wittgenstein's later philosophy It is natural to understand Wittgenstein's opposition to the traditional platonistic assumption that the concepts are always applied on the basis of a property or set of properties common to particular cases which fall under these concepts as a refutation of the idea that there must be a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions in order to apply concepts or use concept-words. However, Weitz understands Wittgenstein's alternative model of justification of applying concepts such as concept of game, concept of number, concept of language game, etc. on a more or less determinate set of mutually different cases much more radically. Namely, he thinks that there are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for application of those aesthetic concepts, most notably the concept of artwork, which in his opinion have family resemblance structure. Thus, for Weitz, whether we apply such concepts or not is in fact the matter of our decision.