Pironizam i Hjumov problem indukcije

Abstract

Sextus' rejection of induction poses a serious problem for Charlotte Stough's classical interpretation of Pyrrhonism. Her explanation of Pyrrhonist action is not available to the classical interpretation, because it implies that a Pyrrhonean has beliefs about his future impressions. In this article, the main premises of Hume's rejection of induction are reconstructed from Sextus' account of commemorative and indicative signs. The Pyrrhonean is not entitled to hold rational beliefs about his future impressions due to his implicit commitment to the Humean criticism of inductive inferences and the details of Sextus' own criticism of the rationality of induction. Some recent attempts of improving and developing the classical interpretation are not of much help here, because they contain the vicious assumption that the possibility of Pyrrhonist actions is accounted for by recourse to his beliefs about his impressions. Whatever interpretation we are able to give to these beliefs, Sextus' rejection of induction and its Humean implications prove that the classical interpretation of Pyrrhonism is not able to provide a coherent picture of the Pyrrhonean life and actions.