Refleksivni ekvilibrijum i problem opravdanja u etici
Reflective equilibrium and the problem of justification in ethics
dc.creator | Živanović, Igor | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-12T11:27:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-12T11:27:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-3891 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1346 | |
dc.description.abstract | The aim of this paper is to explain and critically examine the concept of reflective equilibrium as coherence method of justification in ethics and its use in everyday moral deliberation. The first part of the paper puts reflective equilibrium in the historical context and briefly explains its role in the justification of induction. In the second part author refers to the distinction between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium, and discusses the 'sense of justice' in the context of Rawls' philosophy. Author's interpretation of a 'sense of justice' is more naturalistic than Rawls'. Taking into account allegations of intuitionism, subjectivism and unreliability of reflective equilibrium, author analyzes the proposal that the knowledge of experts, rather than moral intuitions, should be taken as a starting points for reflection about the good, right or just. This proposal is rejected due to the specificity of moral judgment. The most attention has been paid to deliberative aspects of the method. When it comes to that issue, the author argues that deliberative aspect of wide reflective equilibrium is unachievable, or at least hardly achievable due to the biological, cognitive and temporal limitations of the subject in relation to the multiplicity of theoretical statements that have to be taken in consideration. Accordingly, reflective equilibrium is insignificant for practical decision making. Last but not least, the author refers to the social interpretation of reflective equilibrium as a coherence method of justification and points to the difficulties of achieving broad consensus on universal moral foundations of social life. On the other hand, it is recognized that reflective equilibrium has limited theoretical significance. | en |
dc.publisher | Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.source | Belgrade Philosophical Annual | |
dc.title | Refleksivni ekvilibrijum i problem opravdanja u etici | sr |
dc.title | Reflective equilibrium and the problem of justification in ethics | en |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | ARR | |
dc.citation.epage | 101 | |
dc.citation.issue | 25 | |
dc.citation.other | (25): 75-101 | |
dc.citation.rank | M24 | |
dc.citation.spage | 75 | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/306/1343.pdf | |
dc.identifier.rcub | https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1346 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |