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Two impossibility results in public choice theory

dc.creatorJovanović, Radmila
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-12T11:30:44Z
dc.date.available2021-10-12T11:30:44Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn0351-2274
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1402
dc.description.abstractU ovom tekstu bavićemo se nekim problemima teorije društvenog odlučivanja. Počećemo izlaganjem Erovljeve teoreme nemogućnosti oko koje se cela problematika konstituisala: problem nemogućnosti postojanja funkcije društvenog blagostanja. Pomenućemo jednu opciju za rešenje pradoksa koju je predložio Dankan Blek, naime, postojanje jednovršne strukture preferencija. Zatim ćemo izložiti drugi teorem nemogućnosti koji se odnosi na problem agregacije sudova po pitanju logički povezanih iskaza. Izložićemo ideju da je to širi problem u koji se problem agregacije preferencija može uklopiti. Izložićemo soluciju paralelnu ideji jednovršnosti kod agregiranja preferencija, naime zahtev za jednodimenzionalnim poretkom individua u odnosu na njihov sud o svakoj propoziciji. Kao ključno pitanje tada se nameće način na koji je moguće postići ovakvu strukturu, kao i sredstva za ispitivanje takvog poretka. Mi ćemo predložiti skicu za istraživanje u kome bi takvu ulogu mogla da igra teorija revizije verovanja - teorija koja deluje blisko povezana sa pomenutim domenom istraživanja, ali koja do sada nije bila eksplicitno povezivana sa ovim konkretnim problemom.sr
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we deal with some problems of public choice theory. We start with exposition of Arrow's impossibility result which was the starting point in constitution of a whole problematic: the impossibility of existence of a social welfare function. We will mention one solution to the paradox, proposed by Duncan Black, namely, the existence of single-peaked structure of preferences. Then we will pass to another impossibility result that of impossibility of aggregation of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions. We will introduce the idea that this problem represents a larger frame in which the problem of aggregating preferences can be embedded. We will expose one solution to that paradox as well - the existence of unidimensional alignment in the structure of individuals. The main question then is by what means do we achieve this kind of a structure? We will propose a skecth for a future study in which a belief revision theory play important role in finding a solution to these problems.en
dc.publisherSrpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceTheoria
dc.subjectteorija revizije verovanjasr
dc.subjectteorija društvenog odlučivanjasr
dc.subjectteorema nemogućnosti agregiranja sudova po pitanju logički povezanih iskazasr
dc.subjectErovljeva teoremasr
dc.subjectover multiple interconnected propositionsen
dc.subjectbelief revision theoryen
dc.titleDva rezultata nemogućnosti u teoriji društvenog odlučivanjasr
dc.titleTwo impossibility results in public choice theoryen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseARR
dc.citation.epage71
dc.citation.issue3
dc.citation.other55(3): 55-71
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage55
dc.citation.volume55
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/355/1399.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubhttps://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1402
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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