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Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of psychiatry

dc.creatorGovedarica, Milanko
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-12T11:32:11Z
dc.date.available2021-10-12T11:32:11Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn0351-2274
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1424
dc.description.abstractU radu se pobija antirealističko stanovište u pogledu pitanja o postojanju mentalne bolesti, kroz razmatranje antipsihijatrijskog izazova zvaničnoj psihijatriji. Najpre se izlažu antirealističke ideje Sasa, kao najradikalnijeg antipsihijatrijskog autora, Kupera i Lenga, kao nešto umerenijih mislilaca. Zatim se iznose kritike na njihov račun, pre svega od strane kanadskog filozofa psihijatrije L. Rezneka. Zastupa se teza da neki oblici shizofrenog iskustva mogu imati nepatološki i emancipatorski karakter, ali da iz toga ne sledi da ne postoji i shizofrenija kao mentalna bolest. Pobijanje antipsihijatrijskog shvatanja da je ludilo prazan politički konstrukt, praćeno je određenjem mentalne bolesti ne samo kao biomedicinske, nego i kao semiotičke realnosti. Na kraju se pravi razlika između objektnivoa i meta-nivoa problema antirealizma u psihijatriji, i zaključuje se da je antirealizam prihvatljiv samo na prvom nivou, kao karakterizacija nedostatka testiranja realnosti kod psihijatrijskih pacijenata.sr
dc.description.abstractThis paper invalidates the anti-realist point of view on the existence of mental illness by reviewing the anti-psychiatry challenge to official psychiatry. We present the anti-realist ideas of Thomas Szasz as the most radical anti-psychiatric author followed by the more moderate thoughts of Cooper and Laing. We then present the criticism of all these authors, most notably by the Canadian philosopher of psychiatry L. Reznek. We argue that some forms of schizophrenic experience can be non-pathological and emancipatory, but that this does not negate the existence of schizophrenia as a mental illness. After the invalidation of the anti-psychiatric point of view that insanity is just a political construct, mental illness is defined as not only a biomedical, but also a semiotic reality. Finally, we differentiate the object-level and the meta-level of the problem of anti-realism in psychiatry and conclude that anti-realism is only acceptable on the former level, as a characterization of the lack of reality testing by psychiatric patients.en
dc.publisherSrpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceTheoria
dc.subjectshizofrenijasr
dc.subjectsemiotički neskladsr
dc.subjectracionalna strategijasr
dc.subjectpatološka realnostsr
dc.subjectbiohemijski processr
dc.subjectantipsihijatrijasr
dc.subjectsemiotic dissonanceen
dc.subjectschizophreniaen
dc.subjectrational strategyen
dc.subjectpathological realityen
dc.subjectbiochemical processen
dc.subjectanti-psychiatryen
dc.titleRealizam i antirealizam u filozofiji psihijatrijesr
dc.titleRealism and anti-realism in the philosophy of psychiatryen
dc.typecontributionToPeriodical
dc.rights.licenseARR
dc.citation.epage20
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.other55(2): 13-20
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage13
dc.citation.volume55
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/373/1421.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubhttps://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1424
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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