Gradovi Jonije u Mitridatovim ratovima
Cities of Ionia during the Mithridatic wars
Апстракт
Rad je napisan kao pokušaj sagledavanja istorije ratova između Rima i Mitridata iz perspektive lokalnih zajednica rimske provincije Azije. Konkretno, kao studija slučaja uzeti su gradovi Jonije koji su u Prvom ratu između Rima i Mitridata (89-85) iskusili pontsku okupaciju, saučestvovali u masakru Rimljana, pokušali da promene stranu kada se ratna sreća okrenula protiv kralja, što ih nije spaslo od Sulinih kaznenih mera po sklapanju mira. Gradovi Jonije, podjednako veliki centri i manje zajednice, našli su se zahvaćeni konfliktom velikih razmera na čiji ishod nisu mogli da utiču. Izuzev kratkotrajnog početnog entuzijazma prema Mitridatu VI, stanovnici gradova nisu mogli da se identifikuju ni sa jednom od strana u sukobu te su se držali pragmatično, okrećući se onoj strani u sukobu koja je u datom trenutku izgledala kao pobednik. Ni kralj ni Rimljani nisu imali razumevanja za ovu poziciju gradova koju su tumačili kao kolebljivost ili izdaju, te su u krajnjem ishodu gradovi trpeli repres...ivne mere od obe strane.
It is a well established fact that the wars fought between the Roman Republic and the Pontic king Mithridates had great and, for the most part, negative effect on the communities involved. This paper sets its focus on the cities of Ionia, at the time comparatively wealthy and highly urbanized region, consisting of the narrow coastal strip stretching from Phokaia to Miletus and of two large islands - Chios and Samos. Although the cities of Ionia were affected only by the First Mithridatic War, this major calamity had deep and lasting effects on their society and well-being. Early victories of the Pontic king left cities with a choice: to join what seemed to be the victorious side, or to offer resistance in expectation that Romans will eventually send large enough and effective army that would deal with Mithridates. Under these circumstances, while Pontic army marched through the province of Asia almost unopposed and any Roman military answer was both uncertain and far away, most cities ...followed their immediate interest and opened their gates to the king’s troops. Many scholars sought to explain the behavior of the cities by pointing out the unpopularity and corruption of the Roman administration and money-lenders, by stressing the alleged success of Mithridates’ war propaganda, or by claiming that king had wide support of the lower class citizens and slaves. While emphasizing important points, these explanations seem to miss the primary cause which can only be the military reality or the cities’ understanding of it. At least for the immediate future, Mithridates was clearly the victorious and there were grounds to believe that his success will be more permanent. Thus, few cities in Asia (and none in Ionia, although it is a common mistake that Magnesia on Meander did) offered resistance. Other acts of expression of the support for the king’s cause, like the destruction of images and honorary monuments of Romans in Ephesos, should also be seen in this light. There was no rift between the local elite groups and majority of citizens, the decision to open city gates to king’s troops was made by the traditional ruling elite of the cities. The most notorious act of Mithridates Eupator’s reign, the decision to murder everyone of Roman or Italian descent and confiscate their property, was certainly a shock for the majority of the cities’ population, yet they responded unevenly. The kings decree that initiated the so-called 'Asian Vespers' was made public in Ephesos, while the king and his army were present - the consequence was that the massacre of the resident Romans was carried in full, with the utmost brutality and with no respect even for the right of temple-asylum. Many modern works tend to simplify social division in the late Hellenistic Greek polis, thus transferring the blame for the massacre on slaves, law-class citizens and other, socially and politically, marginal groups. Fact that some cities found the way to soothe expected measure or to avoid it altogether, again points to deliberate decisions by the local municipal elites. Mithridates sought to gain and strengthen their support, both before and during the war. However, these measure were not of decisive importance. The twist in Mithridates’ military fortune, during the campaigns of 86, had immediate consequences on the attitude of the cities. In the early spring Sulla finished the protracted siege of Athens, a success followed the same summer by the two crushing defeats inflicted on the Pontic forces in Boeotia. What previously seemed to be an invincible conqueror was by now clearly a losing side, and several cities reacted accordingly. The pro-Roman uprising was actually quickened by the king himself: the city of Chios was garrisoned under the charges (real or fabricated) that the leading citizens were dealing with Sulla, heavily fined and then depopulated with the intention of bringing the Pontic settlers to replace the original inhabitants. The punishment of Chios, although intended as an example to frighten cities into obedience, actually prompted Ephesos (perhaps, next in line for exemplary chastising) into a full scale uprising; others were soon to follow. The King’s response was a mixture of repression and measures which sought to win or restore support for his cause. The latter were contradictory in themselves: king intended to keep cities on his side by granting them freedom and autonomy, while at the same time offering citizenship to all non-citizens and freedom to all slaves. These measures could only have alienated the cities from him. His ability to offer a military response to uprising in Ionia and elsewhere was soon greatly diminished by the appearance of the second Roman army, which crossed over in Asia during the winter of 86/85, thus leaving only local garrison forces to fight with breakaway cities. After the Peace of Dardanus and the surrender of the Fimbria’s forces, Sulla imposed a new order in the province, rewarding or (in the case of great majority of them) severely punishing the cities. The primary criteria in his treatment of the cities were their loyalty or disloyalty in the previous war and few cities had something to show for. The fact that some of them went into war with Mithridates in 86 meant little: from Sulla’s standpoint, far more important was their behavior in 88, during the initial advance of the Pontic forces and, especially, during the so-called 'Asian Vespers'. Those cities of Ionia that found the way to avoid the massacre, such as Chios and Smyrna, were treated leniently. On others Sulla imposed extraordinary fines (taxes for the previous five years amounting to 20.000 talents for the whole province) and obligations (full burden of the billeting of troops for several months), and degraded them in status (none of the punished cities were free or immune afterwards). Ephesos was singled out for especially severe exemplary punishment, although she was the first city in Asia to rise against the king. In spite of this, it was probably exactly at this time that the provincial capital was moved from Pergamon to Ephesos.
Кључне речи:
Smirna / Mitridat VI Eupator / Mala Azija / Jonija / Hij / EfesИзвор:
Zbornik Matice srpske za klasične studije, 2012, 14, 129-150Издавач:
- Matica srpska - Odeljenje za književnost i jezik, Novi Sad
Институција/група
Istorija / HistoryTY - JOUR AU - Vujčić, Nemanja PY - 2012 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1429 AB - Rad je napisan kao pokušaj sagledavanja istorije ratova između Rima i Mitridata iz perspektive lokalnih zajednica rimske provincije Azije. Konkretno, kao studija slučaja uzeti su gradovi Jonije koji su u Prvom ratu između Rima i Mitridata (89-85) iskusili pontsku okupaciju, saučestvovali u masakru Rimljana, pokušali da promene stranu kada se ratna sreća okrenula protiv kralja, što ih nije spaslo od Sulinih kaznenih mera po sklapanju mira. Gradovi Jonije, podjednako veliki centri i manje zajednice, našli su se zahvaćeni konfliktom velikih razmera na čiji ishod nisu mogli da utiču. Izuzev kratkotrajnog početnog entuzijazma prema Mitridatu VI, stanovnici gradova nisu mogli da se identifikuju ni sa jednom od strana u sukobu te su se držali pragmatično, okrećući se onoj strani u sukobu koja je u datom trenutku izgledala kao pobednik. Ni kralj ni Rimljani nisu imali razumevanja za ovu poziciju gradova koju su tumačili kao kolebljivost ili izdaju, te su u krajnjem ishodu gradovi trpeli represivne mere od obe strane. AB - It is a well established fact that the wars fought between the Roman Republic and the Pontic king Mithridates had great and, for the most part, negative effect on the communities involved. This paper sets its focus on the cities of Ionia, at the time comparatively wealthy and highly urbanized region, consisting of the narrow coastal strip stretching from Phokaia to Miletus and of two large islands - Chios and Samos. Although the cities of Ionia were affected only by the First Mithridatic War, this major calamity had deep and lasting effects on their society and well-being. Early victories of the Pontic king left cities with a choice: to join what seemed to be the victorious side, or to offer resistance in expectation that Romans will eventually send large enough and effective army that would deal with Mithridates. Under these circumstances, while Pontic army marched through the province of Asia almost unopposed and any Roman military answer was both uncertain and far away, most cities followed their immediate interest and opened their gates to the king’s troops. Many scholars sought to explain the behavior of the cities by pointing out the unpopularity and corruption of the Roman administration and money-lenders, by stressing the alleged success of Mithridates’ war propaganda, or by claiming that king had wide support of the lower class citizens and slaves. While emphasizing important points, these explanations seem to miss the primary cause which can only be the military reality or the cities’ understanding of it. At least for the immediate future, Mithridates was clearly the victorious and there were grounds to believe that his success will be more permanent. Thus, few cities in Asia (and none in Ionia, although it is a common mistake that Magnesia on Meander did) offered resistance. Other acts of expression of the support for the king’s cause, like the destruction of images and honorary monuments of Romans in Ephesos, should also be seen in this light. There was no rift between the local elite groups and majority of citizens, the decision to open city gates to king’s troops was made by the traditional ruling elite of the cities. The most notorious act of Mithridates Eupator’s reign, the decision to murder everyone of Roman or Italian descent and confiscate their property, was certainly a shock for the majority of the cities’ population, yet they responded unevenly. The kings decree that initiated the so-called 'Asian Vespers' was made public in Ephesos, while the king and his army were present - the consequence was that the massacre of the resident Romans was carried in full, with the utmost brutality and with no respect even for the right of temple-asylum. Many modern works tend to simplify social division in the late Hellenistic Greek polis, thus transferring the blame for the massacre on slaves, law-class citizens and other, socially and politically, marginal groups. Fact that some cities found the way to soothe expected measure or to avoid it altogether, again points to deliberate decisions by the local municipal elites. Mithridates sought to gain and strengthen their support, both before and during the war. However, these measure were not of decisive importance. The twist in Mithridates’ military fortune, during the campaigns of 86, had immediate consequences on the attitude of the cities. In the early spring Sulla finished the protracted siege of Athens, a success followed the same summer by the two crushing defeats inflicted on the Pontic forces in Boeotia. What previously seemed to be an invincible conqueror was by now clearly a losing side, and several cities reacted accordingly. The pro-Roman uprising was actually quickened by the king himself: the city of Chios was garrisoned under the charges (real or fabricated) that the leading citizens were dealing with Sulla, heavily fined and then depopulated with the intention of bringing the Pontic settlers to replace the original inhabitants. The punishment of Chios, although intended as an example to frighten cities into obedience, actually prompted Ephesos (perhaps, next in line for exemplary chastising) into a full scale uprising; others were soon to follow. The King’s response was a mixture of repression and measures which sought to win or restore support for his cause. The latter were contradictory in themselves: king intended to keep cities on his side by granting them freedom and autonomy, while at the same time offering citizenship to all non-citizens and freedom to all slaves. These measures could only have alienated the cities from him. His ability to offer a military response to uprising in Ionia and elsewhere was soon greatly diminished by the appearance of the second Roman army, which crossed over in Asia during the winter of 86/85, thus leaving only local garrison forces to fight with breakaway cities. After the Peace of Dardanus and the surrender of the Fimbria’s forces, Sulla imposed a new order in the province, rewarding or (in the case of great majority of them) severely punishing the cities. The primary criteria in his treatment of the cities were their loyalty or disloyalty in the previous war and few cities had something to show for. The fact that some of them went into war with Mithridates in 86 meant little: from Sulla’s standpoint, far more important was their behavior in 88, during the initial advance of the Pontic forces and, especially, during the so-called 'Asian Vespers'. Those cities of Ionia that found the way to avoid the massacre, such as Chios and Smyrna, were treated leniently. On others Sulla imposed extraordinary fines (taxes for the previous five years amounting to 20.000 talents for the whole province) and obligations (full burden of the billeting of troops for several months), and degraded them in status (none of the punished cities were free or immune afterwards). Ephesos was singled out for especially severe exemplary punishment, although she was the first city in Asia to rise against the king. In spite of this, it was probably exactly at this time that the provincial capital was moved from Pergamon to Ephesos. PB - Matica srpska - Odeljenje za književnost i jezik, Novi Sad T2 - Zbornik Matice srpske za klasične studije T1 - Gradovi Jonije u Mitridatovim ratovima T1 - Cities of Ionia during the Mithridatic wars EP - 150 IS - 14 SP - 129 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1429 ER -
@article{ author = "Vujčić, Nemanja", year = "2012", abstract = "Rad je napisan kao pokušaj sagledavanja istorije ratova između Rima i Mitridata iz perspektive lokalnih zajednica rimske provincije Azije. Konkretno, kao studija slučaja uzeti su gradovi Jonije koji su u Prvom ratu između Rima i Mitridata (89-85) iskusili pontsku okupaciju, saučestvovali u masakru Rimljana, pokušali da promene stranu kada se ratna sreća okrenula protiv kralja, što ih nije spaslo od Sulinih kaznenih mera po sklapanju mira. Gradovi Jonije, podjednako veliki centri i manje zajednice, našli su se zahvaćeni konfliktom velikih razmera na čiji ishod nisu mogli da utiču. Izuzev kratkotrajnog početnog entuzijazma prema Mitridatu VI, stanovnici gradova nisu mogli da se identifikuju ni sa jednom od strana u sukobu te su se držali pragmatično, okrećući se onoj strani u sukobu koja je u datom trenutku izgledala kao pobednik. Ni kralj ni Rimljani nisu imali razumevanja za ovu poziciju gradova koju su tumačili kao kolebljivost ili izdaju, te su u krajnjem ishodu gradovi trpeli represivne mere od obe strane., It is a well established fact that the wars fought between the Roman Republic and the Pontic king Mithridates had great and, for the most part, negative effect on the communities involved. This paper sets its focus on the cities of Ionia, at the time comparatively wealthy and highly urbanized region, consisting of the narrow coastal strip stretching from Phokaia to Miletus and of two large islands - Chios and Samos. Although the cities of Ionia were affected only by the First Mithridatic War, this major calamity had deep and lasting effects on their society and well-being. Early victories of the Pontic king left cities with a choice: to join what seemed to be the victorious side, or to offer resistance in expectation that Romans will eventually send large enough and effective army that would deal with Mithridates. Under these circumstances, while Pontic army marched through the province of Asia almost unopposed and any Roman military answer was both uncertain and far away, most cities followed their immediate interest and opened their gates to the king’s troops. Many scholars sought to explain the behavior of the cities by pointing out the unpopularity and corruption of the Roman administration and money-lenders, by stressing the alleged success of Mithridates’ war propaganda, or by claiming that king had wide support of the lower class citizens and slaves. While emphasizing important points, these explanations seem to miss the primary cause which can only be the military reality or the cities’ understanding of it. At least for the immediate future, Mithridates was clearly the victorious and there were grounds to believe that his success will be more permanent. Thus, few cities in Asia (and none in Ionia, although it is a common mistake that Magnesia on Meander did) offered resistance. Other acts of expression of the support for the king’s cause, like the destruction of images and honorary monuments of Romans in Ephesos, should also be seen in this light. There was no rift between the local elite groups and majority of citizens, the decision to open city gates to king’s troops was made by the traditional ruling elite of the cities. The most notorious act of Mithridates Eupator’s reign, the decision to murder everyone of Roman or Italian descent and confiscate their property, was certainly a shock for the majority of the cities’ population, yet they responded unevenly. The kings decree that initiated the so-called 'Asian Vespers' was made public in Ephesos, while the king and his army were present - the consequence was that the massacre of the resident Romans was carried in full, with the utmost brutality and with no respect even for the right of temple-asylum. Many modern works tend to simplify social division in the late Hellenistic Greek polis, thus transferring the blame for the massacre on slaves, law-class citizens and other, socially and politically, marginal groups. Fact that some cities found the way to soothe expected measure or to avoid it altogether, again points to deliberate decisions by the local municipal elites. Mithridates sought to gain and strengthen their support, both before and during the war. However, these measure were not of decisive importance. The twist in Mithridates’ military fortune, during the campaigns of 86, had immediate consequences on the attitude of the cities. In the early spring Sulla finished the protracted siege of Athens, a success followed the same summer by the two crushing defeats inflicted on the Pontic forces in Boeotia. What previously seemed to be an invincible conqueror was by now clearly a losing side, and several cities reacted accordingly. The pro-Roman uprising was actually quickened by the king himself: the city of Chios was garrisoned under the charges (real or fabricated) that the leading citizens were dealing with Sulla, heavily fined and then depopulated with the intention of bringing the Pontic settlers to replace the original inhabitants. The punishment of Chios, although intended as an example to frighten cities into obedience, actually prompted Ephesos (perhaps, next in line for exemplary chastising) into a full scale uprising; others were soon to follow. The King’s response was a mixture of repression and measures which sought to win or restore support for his cause. The latter were contradictory in themselves: king intended to keep cities on his side by granting them freedom and autonomy, while at the same time offering citizenship to all non-citizens and freedom to all slaves. These measures could only have alienated the cities from him. His ability to offer a military response to uprising in Ionia and elsewhere was soon greatly diminished by the appearance of the second Roman army, which crossed over in Asia during the winter of 86/85, thus leaving only local garrison forces to fight with breakaway cities. After the Peace of Dardanus and the surrender of the Fimbria’s forces, Sulla imposed a new order in the province, rewarding or (in the case of great majority of them) severely punishing the cities. The primary criteria in his treatment of the cities were their loyalty or disloyalty in the previous war and few cities had something to show for. The fact that some of them went into war with Mithridates in 86 meant little: from Sulla’s standpoint, far more important was their behavior in 88, during the initial advance of the Pontic forces and, especially, during the so-called 'Asian Vespers'. Those cities of Ionia that found the way to avoid the massacre, such as Chios and Smyrna, were treated leniently. On others Sulla imposed extraordinary fines (taxes for the previous five years amounting to 20.000 talents for the whole province) and obligations (full burden of the billeting of troops for several months), and degraded them in status (none of the punished cities were free or immune afterwards). Ephesos was singled out for especially severe exemplary punishment, although she was the first city in Asia to rise against the king. In spite of this, it was probably exactly at this time that the provincial capital was moved from Pergamon to Ephesos.", publisher = "Matica srpska - Odeljenje za književnost i jezik, Novi Sad", journal = "Zbornik Matice srpske za klasične studije", title = "Gradovi Jonije u Mitridatovim ratovima, Cities of Ionia during the Mithridatic wars", pages = "150-129", number = "14", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1429" }
Vujčić, N.. (2012). Gradovi Jonije u Mitridatovim ratovima. in Zbornik Matice srpske za klasične studije Matica srpska - Odeljenje za književnost i jezik, Novi Sad.(14), 129-150. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1429
Vujčić N. Gradovi Jonije u Mitridatovim ratovima. in Zbornik Matice srpske za klasične studije. 2012;(14):129-150. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1429 .
Vujčić, Nemanja, "Gradovi Jonije u Mitridatovim ratovima" in Zbornik Matice srpske za klasične studije, no. 14 (2012):129-150, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1429 .