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Seeking Depth in Science

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2012
Authors
Perović, Slobodan
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
Michael Strevens develops kairetic account of causal explanations as a brand of explanatory reductionism. He argues that explanations in higher-level sciences are complete (stand-alone) only because they can be potentially deepened-that is, added kernels of causal processes all the way down to the level of micro-physical relations. Thus, they are, in essence, the result of abstraction from deeper causal explanatory levels. I argue that Strevens's discussion of the notion of depth in science is limited to a very narrow domain, the boundaries of which are determined by a simplistic amalgam of science textbook and everyday cases analyzed by means of rational metaphysics. In contrast to his view, history of scientific practice shows that scientific explanations are typically bounded within a level and do not draw their viability from their potential for lower-level explanatory deepening. Moreover, a result of such deepening of higher-level explanations produces changes and refinements much... more complex than Strevens's account assumes.

Keywords:
special sciences / depth of explanation / causation / causal explanation
Source:
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2012, 42, 4, 561-572
Publisher:
  • Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks

DOI: 10.1177/0048393110386707

ISSN: 0048-3931

WoS: 000310333000005

Scopus: 2-s2.0-84868127443
[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1453
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
Institution/Community
Filozofija / Philosophy
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Perović, Slobodan
PY  - 2012
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1453
AB  - Michael Strevens develops kairetic account of causal explanations as a brand of explanatory reductionism. He argues that explanations in higher-level sciences are complete (stand-alone) only because they can be potentially deepened-that is, added kernels of causal processes all the way down to the level of micro-physical relations. Thus, they are, in essence, the result of abstraction from deeper causal explanatory levels. I argue that Strevens's discussion of the notion of depth in science is limited to a very narrow domain, the boundaries of which are determined by a simplistic amalgam of science textbook and everyday cases analyzed by means of rational metaphysics. In contrast to his view, history of scientific practice shows that scientific explanations are typically bounded within a level and do not draw their viability from their potential for lower-level explanatory deepening. Moreover, a result of such deepening of higher-level explanations produces changes and refinements much more complex than Strevens's account assumes.
PB  - Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks
T2  - Philosophy of the Social Sciences
T1  - Seeking Depth in Science
EP  - 572
IS  - 4
SP  - 561
VL  - 42
DO  - 10.1177/0048393110386707
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Perović, Slobodan",
year = "2012",
abstract = "Michael Strevens develops kairetic account of causal explanations as a brand of explanatory reductionism. He argues that explanations in higher-level sciences are complete (stand-alone) only because they can be potentially deepened-that is, added kernels of causal processes all the way down to the level of micro-physical relations. Thus, they are, in essence, the result of abstraction from deeper causal explanatory levels. I argue that Strevens's discussion of the notion of depth in science is limited to a very narrow domain, the boundaries of which are determined by a simplistic amalgam of science textbook and everyday cases analyzed by means of rational metaphysics. In contrast to his view, history of scientific practice shows that scientific explanations are typically bounded within a level and do not draw their viability from their potential for lower-level explanatory deepening. Moreover, a result of such deepening of higher-level explanations produces changes and refinements much more complex than Strevens's account assumes.",
publisher = "Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks",
journal = "Philosophy of the Social Sciences",
title = "Seeking Depth in Science",
pages = "572-561",
number = "4",
volume = "42",
doi = "10.1177/0048393110386707"
}
Perović, S.. (2012). Seeking Depth in Science. in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks., 42(4), 561-572.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393110386707
Perović S. Seeking Depth in Science. in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 2012;42(4):561-572.
doi:10.1177/0048393110386707 .
Perović, Slobodan, "Seeking Depth in Science" in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 42, no. 4 (2012):561-572,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393110386707 . .

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